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In recent years, the topic of migrants’ access to social protection has increasingly 
become an issue of concern amongst scholars, policy makers and citizens alike 
(Ruhs and Palme 2018). Yet, this interplay between migration and welfare has 
gained much more salience in some world regions than in others, being intensively 
discussed especially in the European Union (EU). The rising interest on how 
European welfare states adapt to international mobility is due to a combination of 
factors that points towards the peculiarity of this region. On the one hand, it can be 
seen as a direct effect of the accelerated migration inflows that EU countries have 
witnessed during the last decades, coupled with worrying levels of vulnerability 
faced by migrant populations, especially in times of economic crisis (Vintila and 
Lafleur 2020 in volume 1 of this series). On the other hand, the rising societal oppo-
sition towards migrants’ access to welfare in Europe and the increasing politicisa-
tion of this topic in some EU destination countries (Lafleur and Stanek 2017; Ruhs 
and Palme 2018; Schmidt et al. 2018) have further contributed to the academic and 
political attention to the openness or closure of European social protection systems 
to mobile individuals.
Consequently, an extensive body of literature has examined how EU countries 
treat international migrants in terms of their access to welfare. Some pieces of work 
have focused exclusively on welfare-related dynamics among intra-EU migrants. In 
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doing so, they aimed to examine the articulation between free movement and social 
policy in a context in which the EU’s supranational legislation on non- discrimination 
and social security coordination has progressively facilitated mobile Europeans’ 
access to welfare in their EU home and host countries (Martinsen 2005; Blauberger 
and Schmidt 2014; Kramer et  al. 2018; Schmidt et  al. 2018, among others). 
Additionally, recent studies have also paid attention to third-country nationals resid-
ing in the EU, a group that faces not only higher risk of poverty and social exclu-
sion, but also more institutional barriers for accessing welfare benefits in EU 
destination countries (European Migration Network 2014; Lafleur and Vintila 2020a).
Despite these rich theoretical and empirical contributions regarding the interplay 
between mobility and welfare, the existing literature on this topic still faces major 
limitations. First, by mainly examining how the host country’s welfare configuration 
treats international migrants, past studies have often neglected the fact that mobile 
individuals can also benefit from certain levels of social protection from their origin 
countries. The diaspora literature shows that home countries often develop a wide 
repertoire of policy initiatives to keep links with their nationals abroad (Agunias and 
Newland 2012; Collyer 2013; Ragazzi 2014; Delano 2018; Gamlen 2019). In some 
cases, this also covers specific policies and programs aiming to ensure the social 
protection of non-resident nationals, especially those facing strong economic hard-
ship (Lafleur and Vintila 2020b). Second, in the attempt to measure migrants’ access 
to welfare, past studies have mainly adopted a Eurocentric perspective by closely 
examining the real and anticipated consequences of human mobility on European 
social protection systems. However, the historical development and recent achieve-
ments of European welfare states make them a unique case study; and many socio-
economic and welfare-related dynamics witnessed across European democracies 
may not be easily generalizable worldwide. In fact, the way in which non-European 
welfare states respond to international mobility still stands out as a grey area in 
migration and social policy literature, as very few studies have focused on the nexus 
between migration and welfare beyond the EU context. Even when extending the 
scope of the analysis beyond the EU, most studies have rather explored informal 
strategies and practices of transnational social protection of non- EU migrants in 
European countries and their families left in the homeland, rather than systemati-
cally analysing how they access welfare benefits from origin countries (see Boccagni 
2011; Sainsbury 2012; Merla and Baldassar 2011; Lafleur and Vivas Romero 2018).
This volume seeks to address this research gap by taking the perspective of non-
 EU countries on migrant social protection. In doing so, we address the following 
research questions: What type of social protection policies do non-EU sending 
countries adopt for their nationals abroad, including those residing in EU Member 
States? Do non-EU countries grant a differentiated access to social benefits for their 
emigrant populations when compared to foreign or national citizens residing in their 
territory? In other words, do non-EU states treat immigrants and emigrants differ-
ently when it comes to social protection? By providing an in-depth analysis of these 
questions, this volume thus complements the other two books included in this series 
(Lafleur and Vintila 2020a, b) that closely examine the interplay between migration 
and social protection in Europe and beyond.
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Our analysis focuses on a sample of 12 sending countries for migrants residing in 
the EU (Argentina, China, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Morocco, Senegal, Serbia, 
Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Tunisia, and Turkey), plus the United Kingdom 
(UK) after the Brexit referendum. This sample of 12 non-EU countries is particularly 
relevant for our purposes for several reasons. To begin with, these countries are dis-
tributed across different world regions (first step of our case selection process) and 
they count with a population of more than three million individuals (second step, 
aiming to exclude from the analysis very small states which may put forward rather 
distinctive social policy and migration patterns). These countries also have signifi-
cant shares of nationals abroad (their diaspora worldwide accounts for more than 1% 
of their total population- third step) and a substantial segment of their diaspora (more 
than 40%) resides in the EU (fourth step). Their diaspora has a significant presence 
across several EU Member States, by being in the top five foreign nationalities in at 
least two EU countries (fifth step). Finally, these 12 countries are stable states (with 
a score of 10 or less in the 2016 State Fragility Index and Matrix- sixth step),1 while 
also counting with sufficient variation in the historical development of their welfare 
regimes (seventh selection criterion). The United Kingdom that was, until recently, 
an EU Member State, was added to this volume as it represents a quite peculiar case. 
Just like other countries analysed in this book, the UK counts with a significant dias-
pora abroad, although a smaller share of its non- resident population (around 25%) 
lives in EU countries. Nevertheless, UK citizens are in the top five foreign nationali-
ties residing in more than a half of current EU Member States (Lafleur and Vintila 
2020c); and interesting changes in access to social protection of the UK diaspora in 
the EU and of EU citizens in the UK are likely to occur in the future.
Two chapters are dedicated in this volume to each one of these 13 countries. For 
each country, the first chapter focuses on access to social benefits across five core 
policy areas (health care, unemployment, old-age pensions, family benefits, guaran-
teed minimum resources) by highlighting the type of social protection policies 
offered to national residents, non-national residents, and non-resident nationals. For 
each policy area, we look at a rather broad array of social benefits including: bene-
fits in kind and cash in case of sickness, invalidity benefits, unemployment insur-
ance and assistance benefits, contributory and non-contributory old-age pensions, 
maternity, paternity, parental and child benefits, and social assistance programs (see 
Vintila and Lafleur 2020 for a more detailed description of these benefits). The sec-
ond chapter for each case study discusses the role of three key actors (consulates, 
diaspora institutions, and home country ministries/agencies responsible for specific 
social policy areas) through which non-EU countries interact with their nationals 
abroad across the five policy areas previously mentioned (see further details in 
Lafleur and Vintila 2020c).
1 This index was developed by the Integrated Network for Social Conflict and Research (INSCR) 
and it covers all independent countries in the world with a population of more than 500,000 in 
2016. For each country, the fragility score takes into account aspects related to effectiveness and 
legitimacy across four performance dimensions: security, political, economic and social. See: 
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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For each country, the data for both chapters are based on two surveys with 
national experts (one survey for the first chapter on access to social protection and 
another survey for the second chapter on diaspora policies and institutions). The 
surveys were conducted in the framework of the ERC-funded project “Migration 
and Transnational Social Protection in (Post) Crisis Europe” (MiTSoPro);2 and they 
included standardised questions to ensure the comparability of our findings across 
countries counting with different welfare and migration features. For each survey 
(see details in the introductory chapters of volumes 1 and 2 in this series), national 
experts were asked to provide objective information regarding the eligibility condi-
tions for accessing social benefits (first survey) and diaspora policies and initiatives 
for nationals abroad (second survey).
1.2  Social Policy Developments in Non-EU Contexts
Broadly speaking, the development of welfare and social policies in non-European 
contexts has historically followed a quite different path when compared to the EU 
(for an overview of EU countries, see Lafleur and Vintila 2020a). This has attracted 
an increasing scholarly interest on how non-European welfare regimes have the 
potential to challenge or redefine different typologies of ideal social policy models 
that have emerged after the seminal work of Esping-Andersen (1990) on the Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (see Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Österman et al. 2019, 
among others). However, the variation across non-EU social protection 
schemes— sometimes closely linked to very distinctive historical, economic, politi-
cal or societal traits than the ones observed in the EU- makes their categorization 
into existing “ideal” social policy models rather difficult (see Rudra 2007 or 
Mkandawire 2016 for more detailed discussions on how existing typologies over-
look varieties of welfare capitalism in developing countries). This is particularly the 
case considering that “one size fits all” typologies strongly clash not only with the 
diversity of welfare institutions and provisions between different regions around the 
globe, but also with increasing cross-country differences even within the geographi-
cal boundaries of the same world region.
Currently, there are still major differences across non-EU countries between 
those counting with rather generous welfare regimes (mostly present in wealthier 
high-income states) and the welfare state of developing countries that often remains 
hybrid, heavily fragmented and relatively fragile. The latter is observable especially 
across countries in more volatile economic contexts with significant macro- economic 
imbalances in which specific benefits rather generalised across EU welfare states 
either do not exist or have been replaced by different (often less institutionalised) 
2 http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/. Accessed 16 March 2020. The survey was conducted 
between April 2018–January 2019 and several rounds of consistency check were centrally con-
ducted by the MiTSoPro team. Given the period in which the survey was conducted, the country 
chapters included in this volume focus mainly on the policies in place at the beginning of 2019.
D. Vintila and J.-M. Lafleur
5
social protection initiatives. In many of these countries (including several of the 
countries analysed in this volume), the development of welfare institutions and pro-
visions has often encountered similar socio-economic challenges, including rising 
levels of poverty and increasing income and class-related disparities. As we will 
explain in this book, policy makers have sometimes attempted to address these chal-
lenges via processes of policy diffusion or, more broadly, policy convergence, with 
some countries implementing welfare schemes previously institutionalised in other 
contexts, by adapting them to the specificities of domestic receiving environments.
By way of example, Barrientos (2009) argues that until the 1980s, the develop-
ment of welfare institutions in Latin America was largely influenced by the conser-
vative welfare regime of several European countries, particularly when it comes to 
the support offered to families in protecting male breadwinners via occupationally 
stratified insurance schemes. However, unlike their European counterparts, Latin 
American welfare regimes restricted the level of protection and insurance only for 
workers engaged in formal employment. Given this distinguishable peculiarity, until 
the 1980s, the Latin American welfare state was considered as rather hybrid or con-
servative-informal (see also Carmona Barrenechea et al. this volume). Nevertheless, 
as Barrientos (2009) points out, recent reforms shifted this paradigm towards a “lib-
eral-informal” social policy model operating in a context of increasing unemploy-
ment rates, poverty and income inequalities in the region. Additionally, in response 
to poverty reduction targets, new social assistance programs have recently emerged, 
thus introducing new forms of protection disconnected from the labour market. Yet, 
these similar social policy influences or developments did not automatically lead to 
a harmonization of welfare regimes across Latin American states, as significant 
cross-country variations still exist (Riesco 2009). Franzoni (2008) mapped out 18 
Latin American countries into three main clusters of welfare regimes, showing that 
the two Latin American states analysed in this volume respond to quite different 
social policy features. On the one side, Argentina shows higher decommodification, 
stronger formalisation of labour and income levels, higher public expenditure and a 
system targeting the poor, with many of these features being also present in other 
Latin American cases, such as Chile. On the other hand, Ecuador (together with 
Colombia, Peru or Guatemala, among others) has been characterised for a long time 
by low decommodification of the labour force, limited levels of occupied salaried 
workers, limited Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, low social policy expen-
diture and a largely informal labour market in which families play a significant role 
for risk management. As also discussed in this volume, Ecuador reshaped its domes-
tic social policy since 2007, with the consolidation of labour protection and a series 
of executive decrees aiming to secure immediate investments for education and 
health care, thus shifting towards a more universal model.
Certain welfare-related similarities and European-driven influences can also be 
found across other countries in the Global South. In many of them, the development 
of welfare arrangements has been shaped after social protection schemes already 
operating across European countries, often as a direct consequence of colonial inter-
ference or more indirect colonial legacies, in general. India received strong colonial 
influences in the development of its welfare regime, with many of its current social 
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security arrangements and labour regulations being influenced by the country’s 
colonial past. Although the country has experienced strong economic growth and 
managed to reduce the ratio of people living in extreme poverty,3 social inequality 
and uneven access to social protection persist. As highlighted in this volume, the 
Indian welfare system remains highly fragmented, with formal workers receiving 
more generous social security arrangements following the colonial legacy; and a 
large share of the labour force working in the informal sector without access to 
social security schemes.
On the other hand, countries from the Middle East and North Africa, such as 
Morocco or Tunisia, have witnessed for a long time populist state welfare provi-
sions in which the state provided for its citizens in return for their loyalty to the 
regime (Harrigan and El-Said 2014). The first modern type of social security 
schemes emerged in Tunisia when the country was under the French protectorate, 
but significant reforms have been implemented after the independence (Gelb and 
Marouani this volume). These reforms led to substantial progress in terms of 
strengthening state’s role in social provisioning with high social spending, a devel-
opment of social security institutions, and the adoption of new social protection 
schemes for the unemployed and the poor (Cheikh 2013; Harrigan and El-Said 
2014). Yet, economic growth and high employment rates continue to be concen-
trated in specific areas only (Amara and Ayadi 2013); and informal econ-
omy—  together with limited social coverage mainly affecting low-income and 
vulnerable individuals— remains a top priority to be addressed via structural policy 
reforms (Cheikh 2013). As explained in this book, Morocco also maintains some 
welfare arrangements and institutions strongly influenced by its past as French pro-
tectorate. One of the main challenges faced by the Moroccan welfare state is the 
inadequacy of its social assistance program for the most vulnerable, despite recent 
reforms incentivized by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, aim-
ing to reduce the poverty rate (Harrigan and El-Said 2014). The situation is even 
more complicated in Senegal. This country has been characterised as a “cash crop 
economy” (Mkandawire 2016) in which social protection is often informal and 
community-based, with limited public spending on welfare. As shown in this vol-
ume, the Senegalese welfare system is actually a legacy from France, with its first 
pillars being established long before the 1960 independence.
Certain social policy developments strongly influenced by the EU or with signifi-
cant similarities with other European welfare states can also be observed in Turkey, 
Switzerland, and the UK. The Europeanisation process has strongly affected the 
development of social policy arrangements in Turkey. As highlighted in this book, 
the country has witnessed significant welfare reforms, especially since the 
mid- 2000s. In light of these changes (including the attempts to implement a single 
pension system, the adoption of a universal health insurance, the unification of 
social security institutions or the restructuring of social assistance programs), 
Aybars and Tsarouhas (2010) evaluate the Turkish social policy model as a rather 
3 See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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hybrid one. They argue that Turkey combines important elements of the Middle 
Eastern welfare regime (with religion playing a significant role and social policies 
following more the idea of nation-building, rather than the one of social citizenship 
rights) and the South European one (with low social expenditure, strong reliance on 
families for welfare provision, and fragmented welfare delivery). On the other hand, 
the well-developed Swiss and UK welfare regimes share significant social policy 
traits with EU Member States. The Anglo-Saxon welfare regime in the UK is usu-
ally defined by weak universalism, free health care services, and social benefits for 
individuals in need in which means-testing plays a significant role. Many of these 
social policy features can also be observed in Ireland and, to a lesser extent, in Malta 
(Vintila and Lafleur 2020). In turn, Switzerland, unlike other European countries, 
implemented social insurance programs relatively late (Trampusch 2010). Until the 
1970s, the Swiss welfare regime was considered as a liberal one, although subse-
quent reforms shifted the country towards a conservative and continental welfare 
state that still preserves important features of a liberal social policy model 
(Armingeon 2001).
The rest of the countries analysed in this volume also put forward significant 
diversity in the development and main rationale of their welfare systems. 
Russia— which has witnessed strong economic performance and recent social pol-
icy reforms aiming to introduce residual, neo-liberal welfare arrangements- has 
been categorised by Cerami (2009) as an oil-led welfare state in which high oil and 
gas prices have significantly shaped the contemporary social protection system. 
Most of the welfare-related reforms implemented since 1989 targeted the privatisa-
tion of provisions, management decentralisation, strengthening the social insurance 
principle and the implementation of a residual unemployment protection scheme 
coupled with basic safety nets (Cook 2000; Cerami 2009). China has also experi-
enced impressive economic growth since the market-oriented reforms initiated in 
the 1980s, up to the point that today, it represents the second largest world economy. 
This economic performance is reflected in indicators such as the increase of the 
GDP or workers’ wages. Yet, significant challenges including regional and class 
disparities or strong inequalities in accessing basic education or health care (espe-
cially in rural areas) remain to be addressed (London 2014; He this volume).
Finally, Serbia and Lebanon also respond to rather distinct social policy models. 
Social policy development in Serbia has been strongly influenced by the legacy of 
the communist welfare regime. The post-communist Serbian welfare system has 
been characterized by reduced social spending during the transition, high share of 
private sources in health care, low social assistance coverage and high number of 
pension beneficiaries, with facilitated early retirement aiming to solve increasing 
unemployment rates (Stambolieva 2013). As shown in the country chapters in this 
volume, most attempts to reform the Serbian welfare system took place especially 
since the 2000s, although some of them were rather unsuccessful. As for Lebanon, 
the development of its welfare regime highlights the importance of non-state actors 
(religious charities, sectarian parties) in a context of fragile state-related welfare 
institutions, fragmented social protection schemes, minimal public provisions and 
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increasing socio-economic challenges of human impoverishment (Jawad 2002; 
Cammett and Issar 2010; Tabar et al. this volume).
This diversity in social policy developments across the 13 countries included in 
our sample is also reflected in their varying levels of social protection expenditure 
(Table 1.1) and effective coverage (Table 1.2). As shown in Table 1.1, total social 
protection expenditure as share of the GDP still varies widely across these coun-
tries, with some of them (India, Lebanon, Senegal) allocating 5% or less on social 
protection. This is in clear contrast with countries such as Serbia, Switzerland, the 
UK or the Russian Federation in which social protection expenditure accounts for 
more than 15% of the GDP. By type of schemes, the expenditure ratio is generally 
higher for older persons. For instance, Argentina, Russia, Serbia or Turkey spend 
8% or more of their GDP for the protection of the elderly, whereas the resources 
dedicated to this group in Senegal, Ecuador, Lebanon, China or Morocco are much 
lower. Public expenditure for children or individuals in active age (including expen-
diture for unemployment, labour market programs, sickness-related benefits or 
social assistance) is usually more reduced than for old-age; and generally higher in 
Serbia, Argentina, Switzerland, the UK, and Russia. Across these 13 countries, pub-
lic expenditure is extremely limited especially for sickness and maternity (0.3% of 
the GDP or less in India, Senegal, Turkey, Ecuador) and general social assistance 
(0.3% or less in Morocco, Senegal, Ecuador, China, Turkey).
In any case, a higher allocation of public resources for specific groups does not 
necessarily mean that these groups are well secured against vulnerability or social 
risks, as social protection expenditure may still be insufficient to cover a large num-
ber of persons in need. Table 1.2 compares the social protection effective coverage 
across the selected countries. India and Ecuador report a very limited effective cov-
erage, especially when compared to Switzerland, the UK or Russia. By specific 
groups, effective coverage tends to be higher for older persons (except for Senegal, 
Lebanon, India, Turkey, Morocco or Tunisia) and children (except for China or 
Senegal, from the countries for which the data is available), when compared to 
unemployed or other vulnerable groups.
As discussed in several chapters in this book, this rather limited social protection 
coverage, especially for individuals in working age, is often linked to high levels of 
informal employment. This structural problem of informality has serious implica-
tions on (national and foreign) workers’ formal access to welfare. Informal employ-
ment reaches very high rates especially in Senegal, India, and Morocco, where 
informality is 80% or more of employment (Fig. 1.1). Thus, very limited segments 
of the population of these countries can actually benefit from social protection poli-
cies linked to formal employment status. Ecuador, Tunisia, China, and Argentina 
also return very high shares (more than 40%) of informal employment, thus also 
excluding significant proportions of the population from employment-based wel-
fare entitlements. Informal employment is much more limited in Serbia, Switzerland, 
and the UK.  Turkey returns the highest difference by gender, with the share of 
female workers in informal employment being much higher when compared to their 
male counterparts.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1.1 Share of informal employment in total employment (%), by gender. (Source: Own elabo-
ration based on ILO (2018). Women and men in informal economy. A statistical picture (third 
edition), https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_626831/lang%2D%2Den/index.
htm. Accessed 16 March 2020. The data for Lebanon is not available)
Apart from their welfare and labour market characteristics, the countries anal-
ysed in this book also vary widely in the Human Development Index ranking (HDI, 
Table 1.3) and poverty levels (Fig. 1.2). Switzerland, the UK, Argentina, and Russia 
score quite high in the Human Development Index. Unsurprisingly, Switzerland 
returns a very high gross income per capita and higher life expectancy and years of 
schooling than any other country analysed here. Turkey, Serbia, Lebanon, Ecuador, 
China, and Tunisia also rank high in this index (top 100), although their gross 
national income is substantially smaller when compared to Switzerland, the Russian 
Federation, the UK or Argentina. Finally, Morocco and India report only a medium 
human development score, whereas Senegal occupies the last position in this rank 
among the 13 selected countries.
Important variations are also observable when looking at the evolution of the 
poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (as percentage of the population) 
across these countries (Fig. 1.2). In general, the share of those living below poverty 
lines has significantly decreased over time across all countries analysed, but espe-
cially so in India, Tunisia, Russia or China, due to reforms adopted during the past 
years. Yet, the poverty headcount ratio still reaches worrying levels especially in 
Senegal and Lebanon (46% and 27% respectively in 2012), but also in Argentina, 
Serbia, Ecuador or India (more than 20% in each case). On the other hand, both 











Ecuador Russian Federation Lebanon
India China
Fig. 1.2 Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population), 2000–2018. (Source: 
Own elaboration based on the data from the Global Poverty Working Group of the World Bank 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC, accessed 16 March 2020). The figures for 
Switzerland and the UK are not available. The data for Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, and India are 
available only for specific non-consecutive years, but the dots are connected for consecutive years 
only for illustration purposes)



















Switzerland 0.944 83.5 13.4 57,625 2 Very high
UK 0.922 81.7 12.9 39,116 14 Very high
Argentina 0.825 76.7 9.9 18,461 47 Very high
Russian 
Federation
0.816 71.2 12.0 24,233 49 Very high
Turkey 0.791 76.0 8.0 24,804 65 High
Serbia 0.787 75.3 11.1 13,019 66 High
Lebanon 0.757 79.8 8.7 13,378 82 High
Ecuador 0.752 76.6 8.7 10,347 84 High
China 0.752 76.4 7.8 15,270 86 High
Tunisia 0.735 75.9 7.2 10,275 96 High
Morocco 0.667 76.1 5.5 7340 122 Medium
India 0.640 68.8 6.4 6353 129 Medium
Senegal 0.505 67.5 3.0 2384 165 Low
Source: Own elaboration based on the Human Index Development of the United Nations 
Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. Accessed 16 March 2020
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Morocco and China have reduced their poverty headcount ratio at less than 5% 
according to the latest data available in each case.4
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that certain types of benefits rather gener-
alised across EU countries (Vintila and Lafleur 2020) have not yet been imple-
mented in some non-EU states (see also Fig. 1.7 in Sect. 1.4 of this chapter). An 
evident example is in the area of guaranteed minimum resources. Most countries 
examined here (Argentina, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia or 
Russia) have not adopted yet general (non-categorical) social assistance schemes 
for the most vulnerable, although some of them do offer categorical social assis-
tance programs for specific groups such as children or the elderly. Similar examples 
can be found in the area of unemployment or family benefits. As discussed by Dioh 
(this volume), Senegal (which also returns the highest share of informal employ-
ment) has not adopted yet any formal mechanism to deal with the risk of job loss. 
Lebanon also lacks a formal unemployment insurance or assistance scheme, the 
only provision available being an end-of-service benefit for those affiliated to the 
social security system. In the area of family benefits, although all these countries 
offer maternity benefits for female employees, some of them have not implemented 
yet specific paternity benefits schemes, whereas parental benefits exist as such only 
in few cases such as Serbia or Russia. Moreover, not all these countries offer child 
benefits (see the chapters on China, India or Turkey); and in some of them, these 
benefits are not granted to all families with children (as it is often the case in the 
EU), but only to the most vulnerable ones. As an illustration, the Human Development 
Bonus in Ecuador is granted only to heads of families with children under the age 
of 18 who live in conditions of extreme poverty.
Secondly, as mentioned before, some of these countries have recently adopted 
important social policy reforms with certain benefits being introduced only in the 
last years. Argentina adopted its unemployment insurance scheme in 1991, the 
Universal Child Allowance in 2008 and it renationalised the pension system in 
2008. A social assistance scheme aiming to provide a safety net for the poor was 
introduced in China only in 1999 for the urban areas and in 2004 for the rural parts 
of the country. Similarly, India introduced its unemployment scheme in 2005, 
Ecuador did so in 2016, whereas Turkey experienced an important social security 
reform in 2006.
Thirdly, and even more importantly, despite recent attempts to introduce new 
social policy reforms, many of these countries still face major challenges to ensure 
individuals’ access to social protection, regardless of their nationality. As explained 
in the chapters, some states still put forward very stratified social protection regimes 
that protect only those formally affiliated to the social security system via employ-
ment or voluntary contributions. While employment is a crucial element for 
4 The data on the evolution of the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines is not available 
for the UK and Switzerland. However, Eurostat data shows that in 2018, 17.4% of individuals 
residing in Switzerland and 23.1% of those residing in the UK were considered at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion (compared to 21.6% for EU27). See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-
browser/view/sdg_01_10/default/table?lang=en. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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accessing welfare in many countries (including EU Member States, as shown by 
Vintila and Lafleur 2020), this condition becomes highly problematic in certain 
non-EU contexts in which the informal economy has a considerable weight. As 
discussed, many of the countries analysed here return  very high proportions of 
informal workers. Since inclusion in social protection schemes derives from formal 
employment, this directly excludes high proportions of the population- nationals 
and foreigners alike- from accessing welfare. Consequently, even when specific 
welfare schemes exist- such as the ones for unemployment or old-age pensions-, 
informal workers are a priori excluded given their lack of contributions; and the 
pool of potential beneficiaries of these programs implicitly becomes quite limited. 
As in more than a half of the countries analysed here up to 40% of the labour force 
is engaged in informal employment, this leads to a significant exclusion of both 
national and foreign residents from accessing formal programs to protect them 
against specific risks. Additionally, even when employment or prior contribution 
requirements are met, the benefit levels are sometimes too limited to ensure an 
effective protection. As discussed by He (this volume), the amount received for 
unemployment benefits in China is so low that it does not guarantee an adequate 
protection of those who lose their jobs. Similarly, the chapter of Popova (this vol-
ume) on the Russian case shows that, despite the fact that government transfers 
cover a rather large segment of the population, most cash benefits do not actually 
reach the subsistence level, the adequacy of the coverage offered by these programs 
thus remaining quite limited.
Overall, this differentiated institutionalization and development of the welfare 
regimes of the 13 countries analysed here could significantly shape their responsive-
ness to the inclusion of immigrant or diaspora populations in their national social 
protection systems. Countries counting with limited resources and fragile welfare 
arrangements face considerable difficulties to ensure a sufficient and efficient cov-
erage of the socio-economic needs of their resident nationals. Given these high pres-
sures that already exist on their domestic welfare systems, the social protection of 
migrants may not be a top national priority, especially when compared to the much 
larger group of national residents in need. On the other hand, having a more gener-
ous and well-developed welfare regime is not necessarily expected to act as a guar-
antee that a country would be more inclined to ensure migrants’ social protection. 
More developed welfare states may actually adopt a rather protectionist approach in 
trying to limit the number of beneficiaries potentially entitled to claim generous 
social benefits.
D. Vintila and J.-M. Lafleur
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1.3  Non-EU Welfare States 
and the Immigration-Emigration Nexus
As noted by Adamson and Tsourapas (2019), migration studies have often looked at 
the development of migration policies in the Global South by using analytical 
frameworks designed to understand migration regimes in the Global North. 
Consequently, migration policies of advanced economies such as EU Member 
States tend to be depicted primarily as guided by their role of immigrant receiving 
areas, while states in the Global South are mostly perceived as countries whose 
migration policies exclusively ought to deal with departure and transit. In volume 2 
of this series (Lafleur and Vintila 2020b), we questioned this representation by 
showing how EU Member States also engage with citizens abroad in the area of 
welfare and beyond. Similarly, this volume discusses the case of non-EU countries 
that—  while they represent important sending states of migrants coming to the 
EU—  are also frequently receiving immigrants. In other words, the articulation 
between the engagement of non-EU sending states with their diaspora and the way 
in which they protect foreigners residing in their territory remains largely 
understudied.
Unlike this volume, past attempts at examining this nexus between emigration 
and immigration policies have usually focused on single case studies that highlight 
contradictions in the way sending states treat citizens abroad and foreign residents. 
In Europe for instance, Zincone (2006) noted that Italy’s nationality law combined 
very generous features for emigrants’ descendants with strict criteria for immi-
grants’ descendants born in Italy. Similarly, other scholars also underlined in cases 
such as Mexico (Delano 2018) or Morocco (Cherti and Collyer 2015) that dis-
courses on immigration and policies for foreigners residing in those states do not 
necessarily match with the protective stance towards citizens abroad.
In this volume, we aim to push the analysis of the immigration-emigration nexus 
further by examining the inclusiveness of non-EU states’ welfare policies towards 
two categories of individuals in situation of international mobility: nationals resid-
ing abroad and foreigners residing in these countries. Before comparatively discuss-
ing our main findings for the 13 case studies, it is however important to distinguish 
them along demographic, political, and economic characteristics that are likely to 
create tensions— and possibly, contradictions- in the way these states treat emigrant 
and immigrant populations.
1.3.1  Demographic Pressures
The 13 countries included in our sample vary substantially in their historical migra-
tion trajectories, which could potentially constrain the way in which they define the 
access of minority populations to domestic welfare systems. As mentioned, all of 
them are relevant origin states for third-country nationals residing in the EU. Some 
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also host sizeable immigrant communities due to continuous inflows for a prolonged 
period. Figure 1.3 illustrates this diversity by capturing the demographic weight of 
immigrants and emigrants in each selected country. Although all countries return 
rather large foreign and diaspora populations in absolute terms, the relative shares 
that these groups represent from the total population still vary widely, as some states 
have much larger populations in general.
Two clusters emerge for each group (immigrants and emigrants). In the case of 
the diaspora, the first cluster groups countries (Argentina, China, India, Russia, 
Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey) in which nationals abroad constitute a rather limited 
segment of the total population (5% or less). Hence, the non-resident populations of 
these countries have a more  reduced demographic visibility, although in some 
cases— e.g. India-, the diaspora is very sizeable in absolute numbers. The countries 
included in the second cluster (Ecuador, Switzerland, Serbia, the UK, Morocco, and 
Lebanon) return much higher shares of nationals abroad, up to 9% of the total popu-
lation in Lebanon. As for immigrants, in half of the countries analysed (China, 
Ecuador, India, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey), their share is still quite limited- 





























% foreigners over total population
Fig. 1.3 Selected non-EU countries, by share of foreigners and diaspora over total population. 
(Source: Own elaboration. The data on stocks of foreign residents are from the UN dataset on 
International Migrant Stock, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
estimates2/estimates17.asp (accessed 16 March 2020). The data on diaspora stocks are from the 
DIOC-E 2010/2011 dataset (https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/ dioc.htm, accessed 16 March 2020), 
covering emigrant population across 91 destinations (34 OECD countries and 57 non-OECD 
states). The percentages are calculated based on the total population data from the UN dataset on 
World Population Prospects, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=population&d=PopDiv&f=variableI
D%3a12, accessed 16 March 2020. For both immigrants and emigrants, the reference year for the 
data is 2010)
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comprising the rest of the countries analysed, reaching up to 12% in the UK, 16.6% 
in Lebanon, and 26.6% in Switzerland, respectively.
Immigrants and emigrants thus count with varying levels of demographic visi-
bility across these countries and their demands for inclusion in the welfare system 
of these states may also vary significantly. When these minority groups are rela-
tively small in demographic terms, ensuring their access to welfare may have little 
costs for these countries as, a priori, few individuals would potentially qualify as 
eligible claimants. At the opposite pole, when these groups are particularly size-
able, granting them access to welfare rights could be a costly decision, although 
more meaningful in terms of impact (for a similar argument, see Vintila and Lafleur 
2020). In addition, states such as Lebanon, Switzerland, the UK or Serbia, which 
count with large numbers of immigrants and emigrants alike, may  also have to 








% nationals in high income countries over total diaspora population
% nationals in the EU over total diaspora population
% immigrants from high income countries over total immigrant population
% EU immigrants from the total immigrant population
Fig. 1.4 Migrants coming from or going to high income countries and EU Member States from 
the total immigrant and emigrant population of the 13 non-EU countries. (Source: Own elabora-
tion. The share of nationals residing in EU countries is calculated based on the DIOC-E 2010/2011 
dataset (https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm, accessed 16 March 2020) covering emigrant 
populations across 91 destinations (34 OECD countries and 57 non-OECD states). The shares of 
nationals residing in high income countries and the shares of immigrants originating from the EU 
and from high income countries are calculated based on the UN dataset on Migrant stocks by ori-
gin and destination (https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/esti-
mates2/estimates17.asp, accessed 16 March 2020). For all groups, the reference year for the data 
is 2010)
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1.3.2  Considerations Regarding the Composition 
of Migrant Stocks
Apart from size, the composition of migration  stocks may  also constrain states’ 
predisposition to ensure the access of mobile individuals to welfare. For instance, 
countries whose migrants come from or go to more economically developed 
states  (especially high-income countries with more generous welfare regimes) 
may have fewer incentives to address the social protection needs of these minority 
groups. Figure 1.4 shows that more than a half of the emigrant populations of almost 
all states analysed here resides in high-income countries, up to more than 90% for 
Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Switzerland, Ecuador, Lebanon, the UK, and China. 
Consequently, policy makers in the homeland may be less reactive to these diaspora 
communities if they assume that their welfare needs may be better addressed by the 
(sometimes more developed) social protection regimes of their host countries, pro-
vided they have legal residence in the latter.
Furthermore, more than a half of the diaspora population of Tunisia, Turkey, 
Morocco, Senegal, Serbia, and Switzerland resides in EU countries, up to more than 
90% for Tunisia. The share of non-resident nationals living in the EU is more mod-
erate- but still significant- for Ecuador, Russia, and Argentina (more than four out of 
10 emigrants from these countries reside in EU Member States); but substantially 
smaller for the UK, India or China. The case of Argentina, in particular, also allows 
us to underline another important element regarding the potential effect of the com-
position of migrant stocks on states’ responsiveness to migrants’ welfare. As shown 
by Gallo et  al. (2006) with recent Argentine immigration to Southern Europe, a 
varying share of these migrants coming to the EU are dual nationals who already 
possess the nationality of an EU Member State prior to arriving in Europe or have 
facilitated access to such nationality upon arrival. As also discussed by Margheritis 
(this volume), such situation may trigger sending states to be less active in protect-
ing their citizens abroad because of the assumption that the latter will be treated as 
nationals in the EU countries of settlement. More generally of course, the legal 
status (or undocumented status) of individuals in situation of international mobil-
ity— whether they are immigrants or emigrants— equally shapes the perception of 
state authorities about the necessity to intervene in favour of these populations.
Turning the scope to immigrants, only in Morocco, Switzerland, and China, 50% 
or more of foreign residents originate from high-income countries,5 this share being 
substantially smaller (less than 10%) for Senegal, Serbia, Russia, Lebanon, and 
India. In fact, in the latter two countries, only 1% of all immigrants come from 
high- income origin countries. The data also shows that, apart from Turkey and 
Switzerland in which half of all immigrants originate from EU Member States, in 
5 Besides the inflows of documented migrants, some of these countries have also received impor-
tant irregular flows, as it is the case with migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco (see, for 
instance, the CARIM Migration Profile for Morocco, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han-
dle/1814/22441/MP_Morocco_EN.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 16 March 2020).
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all others, the majority of foreigners have a non-EU background (up to 99% for 
Lebanon, India or China).
This variation in migration flows to and from Europe compared to other regions 






















































































































































Fig. 1.5 Main origin countries of immigrants residing in the 13 non-EU countries (left side) and 
main destination countries of their nationals abroad (right side). Share over total immigrant and 
emigrant population of each non-EU country analysed. (Source: Own elaboration. The data on top 
destinations for the diaspora is from OECD (2015) “Connecting with emigrants: a global profile of 
diasporas 2015” and it refers to emigrants (defined as foreign-born individuals by country of birth 
and their children born in destination countries) aged 15+ across 84 selected destinations (33 
OECD countries and 51 non-OECD states)- reference year 2010/2011. The data on top origin 
countries of foreigners is from the UN dataset Trends in international migrant stock (reference year 
2010), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates 
17.asp, accessed 16 March 2020)
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in these selected non-EU states, as well as the specific destination countries of their 
nationals abroad (Fig. 1.5). Unsurprisingly, among non-European destinations, the 
United States of America (USA), Australia or Canada stand out as the most impor-
tant host countries for the emigrant populations of the 13 countries analysed here. 
Significant outflows are also oriented towards EU destinations, mainly Italy, Spain, 
France, Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands. For Morocco and Serbia in particu-
lar, the main five destination countries of their diaspora are European countries. 
Figure 1.5 also confirms the tendency already highlighted for European diaspora 
populations (Lafleur and Vintila 2020c) of a high concentration of emigrants in 
particular destination countries only. For instance, the first two host countries of 
Argentinean, Ecuadorian, Indian, Moroccan, Senegalese, Tunisian or  Turkish 
nationals already sum up more than a half of the total diaspora of these countries, 
with more than 50% of all non-resident Tunisian or Turkish citizens being concen-
trated in one country in particular. In some cases, a common language and/or past 
colonial ties (the case of Indians in the UK, Argentines and Ecuadorians in Spain, 
UK citizens in Australia and the USA, or Moroccans in France) facilitate this selec-
tion of specific destination countries. Regardless of the reasons for diaspora’s geo-
graphical concentration in particular destinations, having a high share of nationals 
abroad residing in a specific state may also incentivize origin countries to become 
more attentive to the needs of that particular group.
The situation is more diverse when looking at the main origin countries of immi-
grants residing in these 13 countries. In China, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Russia, 
and Senegal, the main immigrant groups originate from non-EU countries; and in 
Ecuador, India, and Lebanon, more than a half of all foreigners come from a single 
country. In Argentina, Morocco, Serbia, and Turkey, the first two migrant communi-
ties account for more than 50% of all immigrants, the demographic concentration of 
foreigners being more evenly distributed across different groups in the other coun-
tries analysed. Often, the most sizeable immigrant communities originate from 
neighbouring states (see the cases of India, Senegal, Serbia or Russia). In other 
cases, the presence of specific communities is due to strong migratory ties with 
origin countries (Italians in Argentina, Germans in Turkey, Indians and Pakistanis in 
the UK, or French nationals in Morocco).
1.3.3  Economic and Political Tensions
The size and composition of migrant stocks may influence states’ behaviour regard-
ing the social protection of minority groups, but so is the economic or political 
leverage that these communities might have on national governments. The example 
of diaspora populations helps us illustrate this point. As mentioned, based on the 
size of the diaspora, we can identify two clusters of countries. First, there are those 
counting with a relatively small diaspora in which nationals abroad account for 5% 
or less of the population (Argentina, China, India, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, and 
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Turkey). The second cluster includes countries with more sizeable diaspora groups 
(Ecuador, Switzerland, Serbia, the UK, Morocco, Lebanon).
The first group of countries may not be particularly pro-active when it comes 
to diaspora’s inclusion into domestic welfare systems not only because of its rela-
tively small size, but also given that nationals abroad make a rather limited finan-
cial contribution to the homeland via remittances. As illustrated in Fig. 1.6, their 
remittances usually represent 0.5% or less of the GDP (higher in India and 
Tunisia). The clear exception from this first group is Senegal: although the 
Senegalese diaspora is relatively small, its impact for the homeland economy is 
particularly high since remittances sent from abroad account for more than 9% of 
the GDP. This, in turn, may raise awareness amongst policy makers in Senegal 
about the importance of the diaspora, thus making them more likely to become 
attentive to the needs of this population. At the opposite pole, policy makers in 
countries included in the second cluster are already faced with a strong demo-
graphic visibility of diaspora groups; and their responsiveness may  be further 
incentivised by the economic leverage of non-residents. This is particularly the 
case for Morocco, Serbia, and Lebanon, countries in which an important share of 
the GDP is due to diaspora’s remittances. This external financial help plays a rel-
evant role in boosting income in the homeland, including that of the most vulner-


























Remittances as % of the GDP
Fig. 1.6 Non-EU countries by share of diaspora (vertical axis) and remittances as share of the 
GDP (horizontal axis). (Source: Own elaboration. The data on remittances are from the World 
Bank dataset on Migrant Remittances Inflows (reference year 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=SN, accessed 16 Match 2020). See detailed 
sources for diaspora data in Fig. 1.3)
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Diaspora’s economic contribution may  thus shape how sending states behave 
towards this group; and this is even more likely to happen when nationals abroad 
also count with voting rights in homeland elections. All countries analysed here, 
except for China and India,6 grant voting rights to their non-resident citizens for 
national legislative and/or presidential elections (with important restrictions in the 
UK). As shown in past studies, emigrant turnout in homeland elections is influenced 
by different factors (party mobilization, voter registration requirements, etc.), but 
usually tends to be lower than that of domestic voters (Lafleur and Sánchez- 
Domínguez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 
2019). Yet, as demonstrated in the Turkish case, parties in sending states may try to 
appeal to voters abroad by developing policies to address specifically their needs 
(Mencutek and Baser 2018).
Similar economic and political constrains could also shape states’ inclusiveness 
towards immigrants. For instance, Switzerland stands out in our sample as the state 
with the highest share of immigrants, reaching up to 27% of the population. Overall, 
foreign-born individuals constitute 32% of all employees in Switzerland, with a 
high share (47%) working as managers, professionals, or technicians and associate 
professionals.7 Their strong economic leverage is further complemented by the fact 
that, in some Swiss cantons, foreigners also have the right to vote in  local and 
regional legislative elections and referendum, as well as in  local mayoral and 
regional presidential elections.8 At the opposite pole, in Turkey, for instance, for-
eigners account for a rather small share of the population. They also face rather 
unfavourable conditions in terms of labour market mobility, while being excluded 
from political participation as they cannot joint political parties, cannot vote nor 
have their own associations or media unless one of the directors is a Turkish citi-
zen.9 Consequently, this configuration of factors may  reduce the likelihood of 
Turkish authorities to become particularly responsive to their needs, including their 
social protection needs.
Drawing on these initial expectations, the next section maps out some of the 
main findings of the country chapters included in this volume regarding the way in 
which non-EU states respond to the inclusion of immigrant and emigrant popula-
tions in their domestic welfare regimes.
6 Despite ongoing discussions regarding the implementation of proxy voting, India allows non-
resident nationals to vote only if they travel back to India during the election day (see the diaspora 
chapter in this volume).
7 Eurostat data on Employees by migration status, educational attainment level, occupation and 
working time, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do. Accessed 16 March 
2020.
8 http://globalcit.eu/conditions-for-electoral-rights/. Accessed 16 March 2020.
9 See MIPEX results for Turkey, http://www.mipex.eu/turkey. Accessed 16 March 2020
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1.4  What Kind of Social Protection for Mobile Individuals 
Moving from/to Non-EU Countries?
1.4.1  Access to Social Protection for Foreigners: Between 
Equal Treatment and (In)Direct Disentitlement
The analysis of the 13 countries included in this book points towards interesting 
patterns of convergence in how they define the link between migration and welfare 
in social policy legislations. Figure 1.7 comparatively maps the type of access that 
non-national residents and non-resident nationals have to specific social benefits, 
when compared to national residents.
The figure confirms the pattern previously discussed according to which both 
immigrants and emigrants are sometimes excluded from certain welfare schemes 
(which are quite generalised across the EU) simply because the countries anal-
ysed here have not implemented yet such programs, not even for their resident 
nationals. Examples of such general grounds of exclusion that affect migrants 
and non- migrants alike can be identified in the area of unemployment benefits 
(especially unemployment assistance), non-contributory old-age pensions, social 
assistance, and family-related benefits (especially parental benefits, but also- less 
frequently- paternity and child benefits). The absence of such social protection 
schemes is particularly visible in Lebanon, which has not implemented yet spe-
cific programs for unemployment benefits, sickness cash benefits, social assis-
tance or several family- related benefits. To a lesser extent, this is also the case for 
China (still failing to provide sickness benefits in cash or paternity, parental, and 
child benefits) and Senegal (which has not integrated yet unemployment schemes 
or general social assistance programs for the most vulnerable).
Apart from these general limitations applicable to all groups, when it comes to 
immigrants in particular, our findings show that the contributory logic generally pre-
vails over nationality in access to welfare. In most countries and for almost all 
benefits—  regardless of their contributory/non-contributory nature –, nationality 
becomes an irrelevant factor once the wage-earning criterion is fulfilled. This con-
firms the trend of employment-driven inclusion of foreign workers in domestic wel-
fare systems already identified for other countries (see Vintila and Lafleur 2020 for 
EU Member States).
Yet, country chapters in this volume also discuss how different migration and 
labour-market conditions may still hinder foreign workers’ access to welfare even 
when national legislations do recognize them as eligible claimants. To begin with, 
the strong labour market informality across many countries analysed here stands 
out as an important obstacle for immigrants’ access to welfare. Secondly, foreign-
ers may  find it more difficult than nationals to comply with the period of prior 
employment that often conditions access to cash benefits, especially if we consider 
how language barriers or labour market discrimination practices could hinder their 
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Fig. 1.7 Access of national residents, non-national residents and non-resident nationals to social 
benefits. (Source: Own elaboration based on the MiTSoPro dataset (policies in place at the begin-
ning of 2019). A value of “2” indicates that the benefit exists in the country and the groups anal-
ysed here are entitled to access it upon fulfilment of the general eligibility conditions. A value of 
“1” indicates that the benefit exists, but only certain categories of individuals (such as only those 
originating from specific countries in the case of foreigners or only those affiliated to special 
schemes reserved for citizens abroad in the case of diaspora) can access it, instead of being open 
to all individuals from each group (i.e. all immigrants and emigrants, in general). A value of “0” 
indicates that individuals do not have access to a specific benefit. When all three groups analysed 
return the value “0” for a specific benefit, it means that the benefit does not exist in that specific 


































































National residents Non-national residents Non-resident nationals
possibility to find stable jobs. Thirdly, since several benefits granted by these non-
EU countries cover formal workers only, migrants may find it hard to obtain this 
status in the first place especially since, unlike non-migrants, foreigners must first 
regularise their immigration status and obtain the right to work. As explained in 
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several chapters, the acquisition of the right to work sometimes requires a rather 
complicated administrative procedure (see chapters on Argentina and Tunisia; or 
the case of Ecuador where foreigners’ right to work in the private sector is condi-
tioned by the obtainment of a certificate from the Labour Ministry stating that their 
employment does not affect the national policy on employment and human 
resources).
Country chapters also illustrate instances of direct exclusion of foreigners 
from specific types of welfare rights. In some countries, non-national residents 
are not entitled to claim certain benefits, whereas in others, they must comply 
with additional eligibility conditions which do not apply for national residents. 
For instance, Bertolini and Clegg (this volume) discuss in this volume how non-
EEA citizens who are subject to immigration control in the UK are excluded by 
the terms of their visas from claiming social benefits that fall under the legal defi-
nition of ‘public funds’, including demogrants, means-tested benefits and tax 
credits. Similarly, foreigners are not entitled to claim social assistance in Serbia 
or China, as cash benefits for individuals in need are offered only to citizens of 
these countries. In the area of family benefits, the birth grants granted by Turkey 
are exclusively reserved for national  citizens, the same applying for the late 
maternity leave in China or the cash parental allowance in Serbia. Unlike their 
national counterparts, foreigners can access the Universal Child Allowance in 
Argentina only after three years of residence. In other countries, access to family 
benefits is allowed only for specific groups of foreigners as it happens in Lebanon, 
where only foreigners originating from countries that maintain a reciprocal treat-
ment for Lebanese nationals can receive maternity and child benefits.
A similar tendency of restrictiveness towards foreigners’ access to social assis-
tance or certain family benefits was also found across EU countries (Vintila and 
Lafleur 2020). Yet, some non-EU states show that this restrictiveness can be further 
extended to other policy areas in which foreigners generally benefit from equal 
treatment in the EU. One example is in the area of unemployment. Although for-
eigners can generally claim unemployment benefits under the same eligibility 
requirements as nationals in most countries analysed here, in Russia, they are still 
excluded as potential beneficiaries of cash benefits in case of job loss, thus being 
entitled only to job search services. Similarly, foreigners residing in India cannot 
claim the recently introduced Unemployment Assistance Scheme, as this program 
is exclusively reserved for Indian citizens; whereas in Turkey, unlike their national 
counterparts, non-nationals must have resided for at least a year to qualify for unem-
ployment benefits.
Certain instances of direct exclusion of non-national residents are also detected 
in the area of old-age pensions. As explained for the Indian case in this volume, 
foreigners cannot access the national pension scheme, whereas the chapter on 
Lebanon discusses how foreigners (except Palestinians with a valid work permit) 
are excluded from accessing the Lebanese end-of-service indemnity. Russia also 
excludes temporary foreign residents as potential beneficiaries of a contributory 
pension, and only those holding the permanent residence status (which can be 
claimed within three years after having obtained the temporary residence permit) 
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qualify for this pension. In some cases, access to non-contributory pensions is also 
restricted. By way of example, foreigners cannot access this pension in India, 
whereas the Turkish social assistance scheme for the elderly is reserved only for 
resident Turkish nationals. Carmona Barrenechea et al. (this volume) also show how 
non-contributory pensions in Argentina are granted to Argentine citizens or natu-
ralised migrants with at least 10 years of prior residence, or to foreigners with a 
minimum of 20 years of residence who continue to live in Argentina once the pen-
sion is granted. In other countries, only specific groups of foreigners are entitled to 
claim non-contributory pensions. For instance, Switzerland restricts the access to 
this pension only to nationals of EU or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
countries who are permanent residents; whereas in Russia, only foreigners who are 
permanent residents and have lived in the country for at least 15 years can claim this 
pension.
Such examples demonstrate that many of these non-EU countries have opted 
for a more protectionist and restrictive stance when defining who is legally enti-
tled to claim welfare, this implicitly leading to more frequent instances of exclu-
sion of foreigners when compared to EU countries. Overall, India and Lebanon 
seem to put forward a more exclusionary approach towards immigrants, as the 
latter are entitled to claim very few of the welfare provisions implemented in 
these countries. The Indian case is particularly noteworthy as apart from mater-
nity benefits, foreigners do not qualify as eligible applicants for any of the other 
social protection schemes offered by the Indian government. At the opposite pole, 
in Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia, foreigners always have legal access to the wel-
fare entitlements analysed here although, as discussed, some of these coun-
tries— especially Senegal- a priori have fewer social protection schemes when 
compared to other countries. Yet, even when foreigners do have access to welfare 
under equal conditions as national residents, in some cases, the take-up of such 
benefits may  have negative consequences. As explained in this volume, the 
Russian Federal Migration Service may recall a previously issued residence per-
mit for foreigners who cannot provide for themselves or their families at a level 
that is higher than the regional poverty line. Similarly, foreigners living in 
Switzerland may lose their residence permits if receiving social aid. As shown in 
this book, as a result of a popular vote in 2014, new provisions now stipulate that 
Swiss residence permits are not issued to foreigners who apply for non-contribu-
tory benefits paid for old-age, survivors or disability via the federal complemen-
tary scheme, while foreign jobseekers (except for EU/EFTA) are excluded from 
claiming social assistance.
Despite of that, some country chapters also provide interesting examples of how 
certain states sometimes privilege specific migrant groups in their national legisla-
tions regulating access to welfare. This preferential treatment of certain nationalities 
operates either indirectly- by facilitating their access to residence permits and, 
implicitly, to work and welfare rights-, or directly— by granting them easier access 
to social benefits compared to other foreign nationalities. In some cases, this facili-
tated access derives from cooperation initiatives at the supranational level; in others, 
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it is the result of special (historical, political or strategical) ties with origin coun-
tries. By way of example, Argentina is part of the MERCOSUR Multilateral 
Agreement on Social Security10 with Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. This agree-
ment covers access to health care, old-age and disability benefits and grants migrant 
domestic workers pension portability rights. MERCOSUR nationals residing in 
Argentina are also granted longer temporary residence permits compared to other 
nationalities, while also benefiting from lower visa fees. Similarly, Switzerland is 
part of the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons and the EFTA Convention aim-
ing to coordinate various national social security systems, offering equal treatment 
of nationals of the other signatory partners with Swiss citizens and covering a wide 
array of social insurance benefits. Until recently an EU Member State, the UK has 
granted access to most welfare rights to foreigners originating from EEA countries 
under the EU law; although many changes in this group’s access to social rights are 
likely to be introduced in the future. Preferential treatment of certain nationalities is 
also observed in Lebanon, where Palestinians are exempted from paying the work 
visa fees and, unlike other foreigners, they can also receive the end-of-service 
indemnity. This case is particularly interesting, especially since Lebanon stands out 
as the non-EU country from our sample that mostly restricts the pool of foreign resi-
dents who can access social protection. As explained in this volume, only foreigners 
originating from countries which provide equal treatment to Lebanese citizens 
based on a reciprocity clause are eligible to enroll in the National Social Security 
Fund that is the main provider of health care, end-of-service indemnity, and family 
benefits. However, this currently applies only for citizens of France, the UK, 
Belgium, and India. Finally, Russia also favours specific nationalities by granting 
them equal access to social security benefits (except for pensions). This applies to 
nationals of Belarus (based on a bilateral agreement) and nationals of countries of 
the Eurasian Economic Union (including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and 
Kyrgyzstan).
1.4.2  The Case of Non-Resident Nationals: Formal Exclusion 
from the Home Country’s Welfare Regime, 
with Some Exceptions
As mentioned, individuals’ employment status is a key element ensuring their 
access to social protection across the 13 countries analysed in this book. Often, this 
also implies residence in these countries, a requirement that directly excludes 
nationals living abroad as potential beneficiaries of welfare provisions from their 
countries of nationality. As discussed in the country chapters, when deciding to 
move abroad permanently, citizens of most of the countries examined here 
10 See: https://www.mercosur.int/. Accessed 16 March 2020.
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generally lose their entitlement for social benefits from the homeland. Residence in 
the country is usually mandatory to receive unemployment benefits, non-contribu-
tory pensions, and (most) family benefits, reason for which non-residents cannot 
access them from abroad. The same form of exclusion also operates in the area of 
social assistance: when specific social assistance programs exist (Fig.  1.7), they 
tend to be strictly linked to the residence principle (for instance, in Serbia) or even 
to local residence in particular areas of the country that grants them (see the exam-
ple of China). Overall, sending states’ restrictiveness towards diaspora’s access to 
welfare seems particularly visible in Lebanon, Senegal and, to a lower extent, also 
in Turkey and China where non-residents can claim very few welfare benefits.
Yet, there are three important exceptions from this general trend of restrictive-
ness towards diaspora populations. First, there are certain policy areas for which 
exportability is more frequently stipulated in national legislations. Figure 1.7 shows 
that all selected countries—  except for Lebanon11—  allow their nationals living 
abroad to continue receiving a contributory pension despite their physical absence. 
However, in some cases, there are certain limitations. For instance, exportability of 
contributory pensions from Serbia is allowed only when included in bilateral agree-
ments with destination countries. In Ecuador— which allows its nationals abroad to 
voluntarily contribute to the Ecuadorean pension scheme-, contributory pensions 
are not technically exportable, but they can still be accessed from abroad as long as 
the beneficiary keeps a bank account in Ecuador where the pension will be paid. 
Similar regulations apply for invalidity benefits, which represent the second most 
important exception to the strong link between welfare and residence in a country. 
States such as Argentina, Morocco, Russia (only for the contributory disability pen-
sion), the UK (with restrictions) or Serbia (only when covered by bilateral agree-
ments) allow for the exportability of invalidity benefits. In any case, this flexibility 
of states in allowing the exportability of old-age pensions or invalidity benefits is 
not peculiar to these countries, being frequently observed also among EU Member 
States (Vintila and Lafleur 2020).
A second relevant exception rests in a series of policy innovations that several 
non-EU states have developed in the attempt to respond to the social protection 
needs of their diaspora. Such policies often consist in facilitating non-residents’ 
access to the homeland social protection regime. Figure  1.7 highlights a clear 
example in this regard in the area of health care. Most non-EU countries analysed 
here authorize their non-resident citizens to maintain some type of health coverage 
in the homeland, mainly by allowing them to continue paying contributions from 
abroad that open access to the healthcare system back in origin countries. Such 
policy innovations can also  refer to the design of ad-hoc schemes for citizens 
abroad, that are different from the general welfare programs accessible to resi-
dents. In the field of health care, India recently introduced a specific insurance 
scheme— the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana- aiming to ensure the protection of 
11 As explained in the country chapters, the Lebanese public pension schemes only covers a very 
limited segment of non-resident nationals, namely civil servants and those working in the military.
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Indian workers abroad in destination countries where they have limited welfare 
rights (e.g. Gulf countries). This scheme covers insured workers for accidental 
death, permanent disability leading to loss of employment while abroad, repatria-
tion, and reimbursement of hospitalisation costs. India also created the Indian 
Community Welfare Fund (ICWF), a means-tested social assistance initiative aim-
ing to respond to exceptional hardship faced by nationals abroad. Other countries 
also put forward similar schemes specifically designed to address diasporas’ social 
risks. For instance, Tunisia created a program that allows its citizens who work in 
destination countries with which Tunisia has not signed a social security agreement 
to voluntarily join the Tunisian insurance system. This provides health coverage to 
both the Tunisian worker living abroad (during temporary stays in Tunisia, for 
instance) and to family members remaining in Tunisia. On a much more limited 
scale, Morocco also set up a specific program called “Marhaba” that grants access 
to health care to citizens residing abroad who return temporarily to Morocco dur-
ing the summer. In the field of pensions, Serbian authorities have responded to the 
needs of Serbian citizens who work abroad and are not compulsory insured in 
destination countries by allowing them to voluntarily join the Serbian pension 
insurance scheme. As for social assistance, Switzerland created a separate scheme 
for non-resident nationals who are in a situation of need and cannot support 
themselves.
Thirdly, beyond general exportability and/or specific social protection schemes 
for the diaspora, country chapters in this volume also show how sending states’ 
responsiveness to nationals abroad is often reflected in the bilateral or multilateral 














Fig. 1.8 Number of bilateral social security agreements signed by non-EU countries. (Source: 
Own elaboration based on the MiTSoPro dataset)
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social security agreements they engage in. Such agreements usually grant certain 
migrant groups with an extra layer of protection when compared to what domestic 
social security legislations provide to all migrants in general (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Koettl 2010). Regarding multilateral forms of cooperation, the examples of 
MERCOSUR (for Argentina) and the EFTA Convention and the Agreement on Free 
Movement of Persons (for Switzerland) clearly illustrate how multilateral social 
security arrangements can improve the access to social protection of nationals of 
signing partners. As for bilateral arrangements, Fig. 1.8 shows that Turkey, Serbia, 
the UK, India, and Switzerland have been particularly pro-active in engaging in 
bilateral social security cooperation, whereas Senegal and Lebanon signed very few 
conventions in this area. However, the country chapters also show that there is still 
substantial variation in the types of benefits that these agreements actually cover; as 
well as in the way these states managed to secure social security agreements with 
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Fig. 1.9 Non-EU sending states’ welfare inclusiveness for immigrant and emigrant populations. 
(Source: Own elaboration based on MiTSoPro data. The horizontal axis captures states’ inclusive-
ness towards immigrants, whereas the vertical axis refers to emigrants. Both axes are calculated 
based on the average values of inclusiveness/restrictiveness of access that they return for each 
policy area (see details in Fig. 1.7))
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1.4.3  Protecting Immigrants and Emigrants: A Trade-Off 
for Welfare States?
Figure 1.9 summarises our comparative findings regarding the inclusiveness of the 
selected non-EU states regarding the access of migrant populations to their domes-
tic welfare systems. In terms of general social protection provision, our findings 
indicate that none of these countries have put forward very inclusive social protec-
tion regimes for both immigrants and emigrants at the same time. Almost all of 
them— except for India- actually seem more inclined to grant access to social ben-
efits for their non-national residents when compared to non-resident nationals. The 
principle of territoriality remains a key element conditioning welfare entitlement in 
these countries; and it generally seems to be a more relevant factor for accessing 
social protection than nationality. Moreover, the fact that most of these countries 
usually  allow their diaspora to access very limited welfare provisions from the 
homeland could also be linked to the fact that, as explained above, a significant 
share of their nationals abroad reside in high-income destination countries which 
often have strong welfare regimes.
Figure 1.9 also allows us to identity two clusters of countries. A first cluster 
includes states that put forward a rather restrictive approach to both immigrants and 
emigrants alike, as they offer few welfare benefits to mobile individuals. This group 
includes Lebanon, India, Turkey, China, and Senegal. With the exception of Lebanon 
(which returns a very sizeable foreign community, with immigrants representing 
16.6% of the population), the rest of the countries in this first cluster host relatively 
few foreigners, with non-national residents accounting for less than 2% of the popu-
lation. In Lebanon and Senegal, this rather restrictive attitude vis-à-vis immigrants’ 
access to welfare— and their implicitly protectionist approach regarding the social 
protection of resident citizens- is perhaps unsurprising considering that these coun-
tries a priori have rather fragile social protection systems and limited resources to 
be allocated to the area of welfare. As mentioned, both countries return quite low 
levels of social protection expenditure. Senegal also stands out by its high share of 
informal employment, worrying poverty levels, and limited gross national income 
per capita; although it still adopts a more inclusive stance towards immigrants’ 
access to benefits when compared to Lebanon. Although India also falls in this first 
cluster- and it shares certain socio-economic features with Senegal or Lebanon, 
such as the high labour market informality and poverty levels-, this country still 
scores slightly higher than other non-EU states in terms of welfare provisions 
offered to its population residing abroad.
The remaining non-EU states included in this volume form a second cluster. 
They share a common denominator in the fact that seem more inclusive towards 
immigrants than emigrants when it comes to granting them access to the domestic 
welfare system. Many of these states allow foreigners (especially foreign workers) 
to claim social benefits, but they remain reluctant to extend such benefits to their 
nationals residing abroad. Within this second group, Argentina, the UK, and 
Switzerland seem the most inclusive countries towards immigrants’ access to social 
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protection. As discussed by Margheritis (this volume), Argentina has been histori-
cally considered as an immigration country, this approach being closely linked to 
Argentina’s state and nation-building processes. On the other hand, both the UK and 
Switzerland stand out in our sample as countries returning high shares of foreigners 
in the total population. As previously mentioned, Serbia and Russia also report quite 
sizeable non-national groups; and, in general, they are relatively inclusive when it 
comes to allowing foreigners to access their social protection system.
Going back to diaspora populations, our findings indicate that most non-EU 
sending states return rather moderate or even limited responsiveness to non- 
residents’ social protection. The majority of them have not even developed specific 
policies by which their consular authorities (or other homeland institutions) are 
required to assist citizens abroad when applying for home or host country welfare 
benefits. Among these, China and Morocco, however, have an explicit policy of 
financially supporting not-for-profit organizations which assist nationals abroad in 
the area of social protection. On the other hand, Switzerland and Tunisia do have 
formal policies that clearly identify— but only in very general terms— a formal 
responsibility for homeland authorities to support citizens abroad in their applica-
tion process for accessing welfare. Such homeland assistance is even stronger for 
Ecuador and Turkey, as both states identify specific missions of social protection 
assistance. As discussed in this volume, Ecuador created the position of representa-
tive of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman that advises and supports citi-
zens abroad to access rights in the home and host countries; whereas Turkey has 
created the position of attaché of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 
consulates, with the aim of assisting citizens abroad to access welfare.
In addition to what they provide to nationals abroad or how they facilitate non- 
residents’ access to welfare, some of these countries have also put forward a quite 
extensive institutional framework to engage with diaspora populations. While this 
framework may not appear, at first sight, as directly related to welfare concerns, the 
existence of such institutions provides us an indication of the visibility of diaspora 
issues in homeland politics. In our introduction to the second volume of this book 
series (Lafleur and Vintila 2020c), we used the concept of descriptive infrastructure 
to describe the set of “home country institutions that explicitly acknowledge the 
diaspora as main reason for their existence, while formally being granted the mis-
sion to act in its interests (including specific social protection interests)”. More pre-
cisely, we identified three types of institutions: consulates (excluding honorary 
consulates), governmental institutions (at the ministry and sub-ministry levels, spe-
cifically acknowledging the diaspora in their name, while also acting in emigration- 
related issues) and interest-representation institutions (members of Parliament 
elected by citizens abroad and official consultative bodies and mechanisms allowing 
the diaspora to voice its concerns).
Looking at the existence of such institutions across the 13 non-EU countries 
analysed here, we observe a quite mixed picture. Table 1.4 shows us that not all 
these countries count with an equal representation abroad. The two countries with a 
long history of post-war emigration to the EU— Morocco and Turkey— return the 
strongest consular presence in their top five destination countries. However, as 
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discussed in this volume, the quality of the assistance offered by Moroccan consul-
ates abroad has often been questioned by its beneficiaries, this triggering Morocco’s 
attention and efforts in trying to improve its consular services. As previously shown 
in Fig. 1.5, the Moroccan diaspora is more evenly distributed across different EU 
countries (for instance, 33% of all Moroccans living abroad reside in France, 25% 
in Spain and 13% in Italy), whereas more than a half of the Turkish diaspora con-
centrates in a single destination country (Germany). Morocco also seems to be more 
responsive in terms of allowing its nationals abroad to access homeland benefits 
(Fig. 1.9), although Turkey has implemented a more developed consular assistance 
in the area of social protection for its non-resident citizens. At the opposite pole, 
India and Lebanon return the lowest number of consulates in top destination coun-
tries, although the weight of their diaspora over the total population varies from 
0.3% in India to 9.1% in Lebanon, respectively. On the other hand, countries such 
as China, Argentina, Senegal or Russia, in which non-resident nationals count with 
a limited demographic share (less than 3% of the population), return more than 15 
consulates in their top five destination countries. In some cases, this number is not 
necessarily reflecting those states’ interest in the needs of their citizens abroad, but 
rather their desire to increase their economic and political influence. As discussed in 
this volume, this seems to be the case for China: its diaspora population has histori-
cally played a fundamental role in the modernisation and development projects 
implemented in China, with a strong state emphasis on encouraging investment and 
return of highly skilled Chinese from overseas.
Table 1.4 also shows that very few of these countries have created ministry-level 
institutions for their nationals abroad. Currently, such institutions exist  only in 
Lebanon, Senegal, and Ecuador, countries that actually provide limited access to 
Table 1.4 Diaspora institutional framework of non-EU selected states
Country















Argentina 19 No Yes No No
China 28 No Yes No Yes
Ecuador 23 Yes Yes Yes Yes
India 12 No Yes No Yes
Lebanon 12 Yes Yes No Yes
Morocco 41 No Yes No Yes
Russian F. 17 No Yes No Yes
Senegal 14 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Serbia 15 No Yes No Yes
Switzerland 17 No Yes No Yes
Tunisia 15 No Yes Yes No
Turkey 33 No Yes No Yes
UK 28 No No No No
Source: Own elaboration based on MiTSoPro data
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homeland welfare benefits for their diaspora. As they ensure visibility at the highest 
governmental level and usually come with budgets for diaspora-related issues, these 
ministries are providing very clear indications of homeland’s interests in this matter. 
However, because of their political nature, such institutions are also the ones that are 
most likely to come and go as governments (or their priorities) change. This volatility 
is illustrated with the examples of India, Morocco, China or Serbia, states which had 
ministries for the diaspora, but no longer do. Sub-ministry level institutions, on the 
contrary, are present in almost all countries examined, which reflects their concern 
for having a stable and dedicated institution at the executive level to deal with dias-
pora issues. Most of these institutions are hierarchically dependent on the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Yet, the fact that sub-ministerial institutions in Tunisia and 
Turkey are depending on the Labour and Social Affairs Ministries can be interpreted 
as a way to dedicate greater focus and expertise to labour migrants and their access 
to welfare. Lastly, the analysis of interest-representation institutions also produces a 
mixed picture, as only three states (Ecuador, Tunisia, and Senegal) allow citizens 
abroad to elect their own members of Parliament. Interestingly, Ecuador and Tunisia 
introduced such diaspora representation mechanism following regimes changes, 
therefore indicating how engagement with citizens abroad is reflective of a broader 
change in the way homeland authorities define their policies. On the contrary, almost 
all countries in our sample— except for Argentina, Tunisia, and the UK— have an 
explicit policy and/or institution that allows non-residents to voice their concern to 
homeland authorities in a non-binding manner (e.g. consultative bodies).
Overall, this comparative overview thus reveals interesting variations in the level 
of institutionalization of diaspora relations across non-EU states. Ecuador and 
Senegal have developed the most extensive institutional network for their diaspora 
but, as discussed in the country chapters, only Ecuador has accompanied these insti-
tutions with actual social protection policies for citizens abroad. Furthermore, the 
Senegalese case is particularly interesting as although the Senegalese diaspora is not 
very sizeable, it nonetheless has a strong economic leverage due to the high share of 
remittances from abroad. This trend confirms, as also suggested in past studies on 
diaspora institutions (Gamlen 2019), that creating such institutions may serve as a 
tool to signal to the diaspora that their homeland cares about them. A purely sym-
bolic approach to diaspora institutions can therefore reflect the authorities’ attempt 
to instrumentalize non-resident populations to pursue a specific economic or politi-
cal agenda. In our sample, such strategic approach is also visible in the case of 
Lebanon, which created a dedicated ministry for its diaspora, does not grant social 
benefits to nationals abroad, but still designed policies to attract remittances and 
diaspora investments back to Lebanon.
1.5  Structure of the Volume
The rest of the book includes 26 country chapters, two per each country analyzed. 
One chapter discusses the conditions of access to welfare for resident nationals, 
non-resident nationals, and non-national residents, whereas the second one focuses 
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on diaspora policies and institutions for nationals abroad. For each country, the first 
chapter starts by providing readers with a contextualization of each case study in 
terms of key characteristics of their national welfare systems and migration trajec-
tories. This introductory section is followed by an in-depth analysis of the main 
eligibility conditions under which individuals can access social benefits across five 
policy areas: unemployment, health care, old-age pensions, family-related benefits, 
and guaranteed minimum resources. For each country, the authors discuss how for-
eigners can access these benefits when compared to their national counterparts, 
while also explaining which welfare entitlements are made available for citizens 
living abroad.
The second chapter for each country is designed to complement the first one by 
focusing on diaspora policies and institutions that these non-EU states have devel-
oped for their nationals abroad. The first part of these chapters starts with a brief 
discussion of the characteristics of the diaspora and its relations with the homeland. 
They then dedicate more attention to key institutions and policies (outside of social 
protection policies) that regulate these relations. In the second part, authors first 
discuss the general framework in which sending states develop social protection 
policies for citizens abroad (consular policies, bilateral social security agreements, 
membership in regional organizations, etc.); and proceed with the identification of 
key policies for this population across several policy areas. The chapters conclude 
by reiterating key factors that explain the development of each country’s diaspora 
policies and institutions.
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Chapter 2
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Argentina
Verónica Carmona Barrenechea, Giuseppe M. Messina, and Mora Straschnoy
2.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in Argentina
This chapter aims to discuss the link between migration and social security and 
protection in Argentina. The introductory section provides a historical overview of 
the national security system and recent transformations of migration policy in 
Argentina. The main section analyzes the link between migration and social protec-
tion by closely examining the current legal framework regarding five main policy 
areas: unemployment, health, pensions, family benefits and guaranteed minimum 
resources. Lastly, the section on conclusions presents a summary of the key findings 
of this study.
2.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
At the end of the 1970s, Argentina’s welfare institutions resembled those of the 
European conservative model with a developed contributory Social Security and 
quasi-universal state provisions in the areas of healthcare and education (Lo Vuolo 
and Barbeito 1994; Isuani 1992).1 However, risk coverage, eligibility and benefit 
1 In this section we are referring to the classic categorization by Esping-Andersen (1990). This 
author distinguishes between a social-democrat model of Welfare state (high decommodification, 
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amounts were highly stratified (see Filgueira 1998); a proper unemployment income 
protection was never fully developed; and a significant quota of people remained 
excluded from the contributory system- especially informal workers (Lo Vuolo and 
Barbeito 1994). The latter was actually a key element that emerged during the 
1990s, a period in which unemployment and informality increased steadily, reach-
ing the highest levels during the political and economic crisis of 2001–2002 
(Lindenboim 2003).2
In those years, Argentina’s welfare regime suffered a significant shift towards a 
liberal-residual model (Barrientos 2009) with the introduction of a capitalization 
pillar for the pension system managed by private pensions funds (Administradoras 
de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones  – AFJP), the deregulation of “Obras 
Sociales” (statutory insurance schemes paid with joint employer-employee Social 
Security contributions) (Danani and Hintze 2011), and the increasing weight of 
“Prepagas” (private medical insurances) in the provision of health and private 
schools in education (Gamallo 2011). Even if the contributory unemployment insur-
ance was implemented in 1991, its coverage was particularly low. For instance, in 
2001 – as the economic crisis was in full swing- only 6% of the unemployed were 
receiving this benefit (Messina 2017). Between 2003 and 2015, these tendencies 
have been partially reversed (Danani and Hintze 2011).
Firstly, the pensions system underwent a renationalization in 2008 forming a 
united pay-as-you-go public system called Integrated Argentinian Pension System 
(Sistema Integrado Previsional Argentino – SIPA). Since 2005, a special access and 
Contribution Repayment Plan (“Moratoria previsional”) allowed millions of people 
to retire within the Social Security scheme, although at a minimum level and regard-
less of previous contributions.3 As of September 2017, around 6.8 million people 
were receiving a pension, out of which 3.6 million had gained access due to the 
moratorium (MTEySS 2017). Secondly, the introduction of a non-contributory pil-
lar to the Social Security Family Allowance system in 2009 – “Asignación Universal 
universalistic social policies), a liberal model (low decommodification, residual social policies), 
and a conservative one (high stratification, contributory social policies). The concept of decom-
modification refers to the disconnection of individual welfare from access to formal labour mar-
kets. Stratification captures the distributive effects of social policy on the class structure of society. 
In the case of the conservative model, social security is founded on horizontal solidarity between 
workers along professional lines in order to cover for social risks such as old age, sickness, unem-
ployment, etc. while preserving occupational hierarchies. This is historically combined with a high 
familiarisation of unpaid care work that rests on the shoulders of the female members of the house-
hold, whose irregular work histories have prevented them from accessing in full form to social 
insurance programs (Martínez Franzoni 2008).
2 Unemployment rate was as high as 18% and informality among salaried workers jumped to the 
44% Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
3 A vast majority of individuals who had access to the pension moratorium were women (73%). At 
the beginning, the term used for describing this repayment plan was “housewives pension” as it 
was the State recognition of reproductive and care work that was mostly in charge of women who 
also had non-formal jobs. During the second moratorium of 2014, 86% of the beneficiaries were 
women. See https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suple mentos/las12/13-10464-2016-03-21.html 
(in Spanish).
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por Hijo para Protección Social”, Universal Child Allowance, UCA (Pautassi et al. 
2013)-, also increased significantly the number of households of informal workers 
with children which were receiving benefits via the Social Security National 
Administration (Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social-ANSES).4 As of 
September 2017, around 4.2 million workers and 1.8 million retired workers were 
receiving a contributory family allowance, while 3.9 million non-formal workers 
were covered under the UCA scheme (MTEySS 2017). Thus, these two non- 
traditional social policy programs  – Contribution Repayment Plan and UCA- 
accounted for the great increase in pension and family allowances coverage during 
the last few years (Danani and Hintze 2014).5
In other social policy areas, the persistent informality in the labour market  – 
which still characterized around 40% of the overall workforce (MTEySS 2013) – 
has been affecting the coverage and financing of Social Security institutions, 
whereas the universal (non-contributory) public provision of goods and services 
have been generally underfunded. That is the case for the health care system in 
which the contributory provisions “Obras Sociales” cover only formal workers, 
whereas the public sector has a residual role of attending people without explicit 
coverage. Consequently, the combination of dual labour markets and the 
conservative- type of Welfare state institutions have resulted in a highly stratified 
and segmented access to social policy programs (Pautassi and Gamallo 2014, 2016).
2.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
Argentina has traditionally been a receiving country for migrants, although the 
composition of the inflows has varied over time, now coming mainly from the coun-
tries of South America. In the pre-World War 1914 era, the migratory flow from 
Europe was particularly intense: the Census of that year registered the maximum 
population of foreign origin over the total (around 30%), most of them Italians and 
Spaniards (Rapoport 2003). In this period, Argentina became the second recipient 
country for European immigrants after the United States (Migraciones, OEA 2019). 
Thanks to birthright citizenship (jus solis), Argentine nationality is acquired by 
migrants’ children born in Argentina. This factor was compounded by the decline in 
European migratory balances from the mid-twentieth century, leading to a decrease 
in the share of foreigners. At the same time, a regional migration system emerged in 
which Argentina constitutes a pole of migratory attraction originating from 
4 Domestic workers started receiving the Universal Child Allowance regime in 2013. In 2016, 
under the new right-leaning presidency, the Family Allowance was extended to low-learner self-
employed workers, this increasing even more its coverage.
5 In 2009, 86% of children and adolescent were covered by this mixed family allowance system, 
while 90% of adults over 65 years received a retirement benefit (Bertranou and Maurizio 2012; 
Messina 2017).
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bordering countries and other countries of South America.6 This process occurred 
while Argentine citizens migrated to more developed countries in Europe or North 
America during the recurrent phases of crisis started in the 80s (ILO & MTEySS 
2011). According to 2017 data,7 about 977 thousand Argentines reside abroad. The 
main countries of destination are Spain (254.230) and the United States (196.095). 
Other countries historically linked to migration to Argentina also host an important 
Argentine population such as Italy (74.470) and Israel (38.372). Argentine migra-
tion is also concentrated in countries in the region such as Chile (73.285), Paraguay 
(58.535), Bolivia (44.436), Brazil (35.618) and Uruguay (27.933), as well as other 
countries in North America such as Canada (21.939) and Mexico (19.214).
In recent years, Argentina has been the destination of intraregional migrations 
(IOM 2017). As shown in Table 2.1, a significant share of foreign residents comes 
from South American countries.
Regarding immigration policy, the 2004 Immigration Reform (Migration Law 
N° 257818) defined migration as a fundamental human right, while also establishing 
the general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination for migrant work-
ers. The reform granted access to public education and healthcare to irregular 
migrants and ensured the protection of their claims against employers for non- 
compliance with employment laws. It was an important normative advance in the 
protection of migrants’ rights that replaced the previous regulation approved by the 
last military dictatorship (Law N° 22439 of 1981). The latter was a very restrictive 
and punitive regulation regarding undocumented migrants, did not promote chan-
nels of legal migration for citizens of neighboring countries and was permeated by 
a negative attitude towards non-European migrants.9 Due to restrictions to the legal 
entry of persons from the Latin American region, the number of irregular foreigners 
increased during this period (Novick 2012), leading to the adoption of two 
6 In the year 2010, just a 4.5% of Argentine population was foreign. Out of approximately 1.8 mil-
lion foreign citizens residing in Argentina, 68.9% have arrived from bordering countries (Source: 
INDEC Census Data).
7 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2017). Trends 
in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/
Rev.2017).
8 Available in Spanish here: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000- 
94999/92016/texact.htm
9 Article 2 of the law dictated the promotion of migration “whose cultural characteristics allow for 
their proper integration into Argentine society”.
Table 2.1 Top 10 Countries of Origin of Migrants Residing in Argentina (2017)




2.164.524 704.503 434.759 221.109 202.643 158.049 137.726 101.726 50.621 32.126 14.936
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2017). Trends in 
International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017)
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immigration amnesties: in 1984, during the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín, regulariz-
ing 136 thousand foreigners; and in 1992, during the first presidency of Carlos 
Menem, regularizing 224 thousand migrants (ILO and MTEySS 2011).
These temporary solutions changed by a more open migration policy after the 
2004 reform. To correct pre-existing situations of irregularity, the National Migratory 
Document Regularization Program (Programa Nacional de Normalizacion 
Documentaria Migratoria – better known as “Big Homeland”/“Patria Grande”) 
was implemented for Mercosur nationals and states associates who were residing in 
Argentina prior to April 2006.10 This program thus allowed for a more favorable 
regime for migration from the Latin American region.
In January 2017, the migration law was reformed in a regressive way by Decree 
70/2017.11 Under the argument of a “security emergency” (including narco- 
criminality and organized crime threats), the new norm implies a regression in terms 
of rights and due process, limiting the access to justice, weakening the right to 
defense in cases, and leading to denial of residence or even expulsions. In February 
2017, human rights organizations filed a lawsuit requesting the decree to be declared 
unconstitutional and their petition was granted in March 2018.12 Regarding immi-
gration and social protection, the issue of migrants’ access to the public health sys-
tem and free public education gained salience in political debates,13 although it has 
not translated into restrictive policies. However, in February 2019, ministers from 
the Executive Branch have announced measures aimed at hardening immigration 
policy.14 The announced modifications imply the presentation of more documenta-
tion by the immigrant applicant of residence, including certification of lack of crim-
inal records of the last 10  years, health certificates and work certificate of their 
countries of origin, and an increase of fees related to the migratory process under 
the concept of “measures of reciprocity”.
10 This program followed the signing of the “Agreement on Residence for Nationals of the States 
Parties of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile” and “Agreement on Residence for Nationals of the States 
Parties of Mercosur” in 2002, ratified by Argentina in 2004.
11 Available in Spanish: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/270000-274999/271245/
norma.htm
12 More information available here: https://www.cels.org.ar/web/en/2018/03/el-dnu-de-migrantes 
-fue-declarado-inconstitucional-por-el-poder-judicial/
13 The Minister of Health of Jujuy Province stated in February 2008 that they want to charge foreigners 
that are treated in public hospitals: https://www.lanacion.com.ar/2111530-el-ministro-de-salud-
jujeno-advirtio-que-quieren-que-bolivia-pague-por-la-atencion-medica. This has raised public debates 
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2.2  Migration and Social Protection in Argentina
Although the 2004 Immigration Reform improved the human rights of migrants 
regardless of the regularity of their residency, the new regime also reaffirmed that 
residence permits are needed for foreigners to engage in formal economic activities. 
There are two types of residence permits granting the same rights, but with a differ-
ent duration: the temporary (1 year) residence permits and the permanent ones. The 
applicable legislation also differentiates between: (1) nationals of Mercosur and 
associate countries15; (2) foreigners from other countries. Citizens of the former 
category benefit from a privileged status granting them longer temporary residence 
permits (2 years instead of 1 year), lower immigration visa fees and access to resi-
dence permits based on citizenship. Non-Mercosur citizens have to provide docu-
mentation to apply for the types of visas available (employment, education and 
marriage/civil union being the most important). Other than that, when a foreigner’s 
regular status has been certified and he/she has been granted a National Identity 
Document (Documento Nacional de Identidad – DNI) in Argentina, that person is 
entitled to the same labour and Social Security rights as national residents, regard-
less of the migration category to which he/she belongs.
Argentina has also signed a number of international Social Security agreements 
granting privileged access to some social benefits for national citizens residing 
abroad or migrant workers coming to Argentina (Table 2.2). Generally speaking, 
these agreements regulate the transfer of workers’ contributions between signatory 
States.16 This mechanism allows workers to ask for an aggregation of contributions 
paid in each country to gain entitlement to contributory public (old age and invalid-
ity) pension benefits in the country of residence. Some agreements also grant access 
to health care and family allowances for pension recipients (Chile or Italy), mater-
nity leave and sickness benefits (Italy and Spain), and health care for temporary 
expatriate workers (MERCOSUR), etc.17
15 This includes Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Guyana and Suriname.
16 Certain categories of workers remain under the Social Security of the country of origin. In most 
cases, this applies for workers sent as expatriate to the other country by their employers for a lim-
ited period of time; sea and air transportation workers; civil and foreign service employees, etc. 
See: https://www.anses.gob.ar/prestaciones/prestaciones-por-convenio-internacional/ (in Spanish).
17 In most cases, bilateral and multilateral agreements have been signed with countries representing 
relevant migration destination or points of origin. For instance, the three countries whose nationals 
represent the largest groups of foreigners residing in Argentina are Paraguay (704.503 nationals of 
Paraguay residing in Argentina), Bolivia (434.759) and Chile (221.109). The three most relevant 
countries of destination for Argentine migrants are Spain (254.230 nationals of Argentina residing 
in Spain), the United States (196.095) and Italy (74.470) (Source: United Nations 2017).
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2.2.1  Unemployment
Unemployment insurance (Seguro de Desempleo) has been implemented in Argentina 
since 1991,18 granting cash benefits –plus family allowance and health care – during 
the unemployment period. This contributory scheme is financed by employers from 
deductions of their employees’ gross payroll. To receive unemployment benefits for 
only 2  months, claimants are required at least 6  months of prior contributions. 
However, a minimum period of 36 months of contributions is needed to become 
eligible for a maximum of 12 months of unemployment benefits. Having a formal 
job and identification documents (DNI) are also important eligibility conditions for 
nationals and foreigners alike. Continuous residency in Argentina is required for 
both categories since recipients have to be available for possible controls by the 
authorities, occupational training and job offers from the employment office.
Nevertheless, many categories of workers are not covered by this general scheme. 
Currently, unemployment insurance covers private-sector employees, construction 
workers, and agricultural workers in case of unfair dismissal, while excluding self- 
employed persons, household workers, public-sector employees or private-school 
teachers. Informal workers are also excluded because of their lack of contributions, 
leading to a rather low coverage of this scheme. At the end of 2016, this program 
had approximately 93,000 recipients (MTEySS 2017), against an unemployed pop-
ulation of approximately 926,000 individuals residing in urban areas (INDEC 
2017). Individuals who are excluded from this scheme can still benefit from active 
labour policies that generally aim to increase the employability of the most vulner-
able unemployed persons by granting them some economic incentive/means-tested 
cash benefits (Bertranou and Casanova 2016).
Having exhausted the unemployment insurance benefits also grants access to a 
non-contributory unemployment assistance program called Training and 
Employment Insurance (Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo). This benefit is granted 
for a maximum period of 24 months. In 2016, this program covered up to 103,000 
individuals (CGN 2017). It combines a non-contributory benefit scheme with active 
labour policies managed by the local Employment Offices where unemployed 
18 Available in Spanish: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/412/texact 
.htm
Table 2.2 Argentina: International social security agreements
I. Multilateral agreements: MERCOSUR (Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay); Iberoamerican 
(Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain and Uruguay).
II. Bilateral agreements with EU countries: Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain.
III. Bilateral agreements with non-EU countries: Chile, Colombia, Peru.
Source: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/trabajo/seguridadsocial/internacionalesvigentes; https://
www.anses.gob.ar/prestaciones/prestaciones-por-convenio-internacional/
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workers must register. Participation in activities such as adult education, vocational 
training and job placement services, among others, increases the amount of the cash 
transfer granted to the beneficiaries. However, beneficiaries risk having the benefit 
suspended – or eventually been excluded from the program – if they fail to partici-
pate in those activities or are not available to work. Residency is a strict requirement 
for accessing this program. The scheme thus excludes Argentines residing abroad. 
However, foreigners with legal residency and national identification documents 
have equal access as resident nationals. Moreover, accessing unemployment bene-
fits does not affect per se the access of foreigners to residence permits, family reuni-
fication or naturalization. It is also important to note that in this area of unemployment 
protection, multilateral/bilateral agreements do not generally allow to transfer paid 
contributions to another country, which means that migrants cannot count those 
contribution periods to become eligible for unemployment insurance in the coun-
tries of residence.
2.2.2  Health Care
The Argentine health care sector is highly fragmented and decentralized. Public 
health services grant universal access to health care, but they are still chronically 
underfunded. Furthermore, health care services are managed at the subnational 
level, this affecting their capacity to cover the poorer areas of the country. The poor-
est sectors of the population, excluded from any kind of health insurance, are the 
main patients of the public sector. According to the 2010 Census data, up to 36% of 
the population was in that situation, reaching 60% in the first income quintile. 
However, 46% of the population have access to “Obras Sociales” covering formal 
private and public workers.19 The most relevant program in this regard- “PAMI” 
(Programa de Asistencia Médica Integral – Program of Integral Medical Assistance) 
attends millions of beneficiaries of old-age public pensions. Additionally, around 
10% of the population had gained access to private health care insurance through 
their “Obra Social”, while 5% are exclusively covered by a private insurance com-
pany (Prepaga). Around 30% of overall health care expenditures are represented by 
out-of-pocket costs sustained especially by low-income households.20
Different rules apply for accessing healthcare via the contributory, non- 
contributory and private health sector. This chapter will focus mainly on the con-
tributory sector. “Obras Sociales” cover all individuals who are formally employed 
and self-employed registered with the Federal Administration of Public Revenue 
(Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos – AFIP). For employees, the benefit 
is funded out of contributions over the salary: 5% by the employer and 3% by the 
19 Currently there are approximately 280 national “Obras Sociales”, most of them under trade 
union control (Cetrángolo et al. 2011).
20 Data in this section is taken from Maceira (2011) and Cetrángolo (2014).
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employee. For self-employed, the benefit is funded via a monthly fixed amount paid 
by the worker through the monotax (monotributo). Foreigners with legal residency 
and national documents have the same rights as national citizens to access this 
scheme. Health insurance under the “Obras Sociales” program has a coverage of 
medicines between 40% and 100%,21 whereas health insurance may charge a copay-
ment whose maximum value is regulated by the government.22 However, both con-
tributory and private health insurances have to guarantee a minimum level of 
medical provision established by the Compulsory Medical Program (Programa 
Médico Obligatorio).
Non-resident nationals are not usually covered by health insurance schemes, 
with the exception of those residing in other MERCOSUR countries, which are 
covered by the MERCOSUR Multilateral Agreement on Social Security. This 
Agreement entered into force in 2005 for the four Member States: Brazil, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, and Argentina. It includes coverage of healthcare for wage workers 
according to the legislation of the country of residence. In order for a worker and 
his/her family members to receive benefits in kind in case of sickness during their 
time abroad, the person is required to submit to the Social Security of the country of 
residence a document of enrollment issued by Argentine Social Security. Also, a 
few bilateral agreements (Chile, Italy and Portugal) grant health care access to 
retired workers receiving a pension benefit in those countries.
On the other hand, the sick leave and benefit are regulated in Argentina by the 
Work Contract Law (Ley de Contrato de Trabajo) applicable to private sector wage 
workers. If an individual has been working for less than 5 years in the same com-
pany, he/she has the right to a 3-month paid leave (extended to 6-month if he/she has 
family dependents). The sick leave period is duplicated for those who have worked 
for more than 5 years in the same company. The monthly amount is equivalent to the 
full monthly wage and it is paid by the employer. After the paid leave period, the 
worker has right to up to one more year of unpaid leave. Foreigners with legal resi-
dency and national identity documents have the same rights as resident citizens, so 
no qualifying period of prior residence is required to be eligible. After 2 years of 
sick leave, the worker must return to work or access a disability pension. In general, 
non-resident nationals are not cover by sick benefits, but those residing in 
MERCOSUR countries are covered by the MERCOSUR Multilateral Agreement 
on Social Security. This Agreement establishes that the Social Security authorities 
in the country of residence will receive worker’s claim including information 
regarding his/her contribution period and the certification of his/her temporary or 
permanent incapacity. Doctors will establish if the incapacity is due to working 
accidents or professional sickness, and if there is the need for rehabilitation; and the 
liaison bodies of the other state will decide if the right to the sick leave applies 
according to the legislation in the country of origin.
21 Resolution N°310/2004: https://www.sssalud.gob.ar/normativas/consulta/000595.pdf
22 Resolution 58/2017: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=270760
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As for invalidity benefits, Argentina’s Social Security System covers workers’ 
loss of income caused by conditions of invalidity, defined as the permanent reduc-
tion of at least 66% of his/her physical or intellectual abilities. This condition will 
be assessed through a process of medical qualification regulated by the State. The 
invalidity benefit is not compatible with an employee’s income and the beneficiary 
must be below the statutory retirement age. There are two categories of beneficia-
ries: regular and qualifying irregular contributors. Regular beneficiaries are required 
to have at least 30 months of contributions in the 36 months prior to the permanent 
invalidity assessment or else meet the requirements for the social insurance old-age 
pension. They are entitled to a benefit equal to 70% of their contribution base (“base 
jubilatoria”). Qualifying irregular contributors must have at least 18 months of con-
tributions in the previous 36  months or meet 50% of the minimum contribution 
requirements for the social insurance old-age pension (30 years) and have 12 months 
of contributions in the previous 60 months. They will receive a benefit equal to 50% 
of their contribution base. Foreigners with legal residency must meet the same eli-
gibility rules as resident nationals. Both groups are allowed to aggregate contribu-
tions paid to another country under a multilateral/bilateral agreement to be eligible 
for the invalidity benefit. Moreover, both categories can receive their benefit abroad 
once the process of financial and medical qualification has been completed and the 
condition of invalidity definitely certified.23 Migrant beneficiaries are also required 
to periodically provide a proof-of-life response to maintain the benefit payments.
In Argentina, there is also a means-tested non-contributory invalidity pension 
requiring at least 76% degree of reduction of capacity. This scheme has strict resi-
dency rules (5 years of residency in Argentina for national citizens and 20 years of 
residency for foreigners) and cannot be exported abroad. The scale of this scheme is 
quite large (1.1 million beneficiaries in September 2017) when compared to just 194 
thousand beneficiaries of the contributory invalidity pension (MTEySS 2017).
2.2.3  Pensions
The pension system in Argentina was renationalized in 2008 under a pay-as-you-go 
public scheme called Integrated Argentinian Pension System (SIPA). Since 2005, a 
special access and contribution repayment plan (“Moratoria previsional”) allowed 
millions of people to retire via the Social Security scheme, although at a minimum 
level, regardless of their previous contributions. The Argentinian system also distin-
guishes between contributory and non-contributory pensions.
Contributory pensions include Old-age pension (Prestación por Vejez) and 
Advanced-age old-age pension (Prestación de vejez en edad avanzada). The 
23 When the worker is residing in a country not covered by a multilateral or bilateral agreement for 
a period of 3 months or more, he/she has to give warning to ANSES so that a local bank that can 
operate international transfers will be assigned to send the worker’s benefit abroad: https://www.
anses.gob.ar/tramites/ausencia-del-pais-y-reingreso/
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qualifying period of contributions is 30 years and the qualifying age is 60 years for 
women and 65  years for men. Self-employed or dependent formal workers who 
meet the age requirement but do not have sufficient years of contributions may do 
so through adherence to a moratorium, which allows them to complete the missing 
years of contribution. Old age contributory benefits are increased four times per 
year according to a mixed price and wage Mobility Index and are paid by the 
Argentine Social Security – ANSES.
Foreigners with legal residency must meet the same eligibility rules as national 
citizens to be granted an old-age contributory pension. To be eligible for this pen-
sion, both groups are allowed to aggregate contributions paid to another country 
under a multilateral/bilateral agreement. Moreover, both categories can receive their 
benefit abroad by giving warning to the ANSES when they leave the country for 
3 months or more. Migrant beneficiary are required to periodically provide a proof- 
of- life response to maintain the benefit payments.
The non-contributory pension- the Universal Pension for Older Persons, (Pensión 
Universal para el Adulto Mayor) is granted by the ANSES to people over 65 years 
old who do not have any retirement or pension benefits. This pension cannot be 
exported and additional qualifying requirements also include: being Argentine or 
naturalised Argentine with at least 10 years of residence in the country or being a 
foreigner with a minimum period of 20 years of prior residence and maintain the 
residence in the country once the pension has been granted. The amount of this 
universal pension is the equivalent of 80% of a minimum old-age pension.
2.2.4  Family and Parental Benefits
The Argentine Family Allowance System was implemented in 1957 and its main 
aim was to alleviate formally employed workers from the expense of family repro-
duction by transferring income through the Social Security System. The right to 
these allowances was conditioned by claimant’s relationship to the labour market 
and his/her financial contributions to the Social Security System. In 1968, the dif-
ferent funds for Family Allowances were unified in the attempt to create an organic 
family allowance regime (Law N° 18,017).24 Several allowances were established 
(for marriage, maternity, birth, spouse, child, large family size, and children in ele-
mentary, middle, and high school age) and the frequency of the allowance depended 
on the type of contingency to be covered.
In 1973, the inclusion process in the Family Allowance System of all formally 
employed workers was consolidated. During the 1990s, a new reformed introduced 
the Unique Social Security System (Sistema Único de Seguridad Social) leading to 
the elimination of allowances in higher income tiers and the establishment of a stair- 
step amount inversely proportional to the income (Hintze and Costa 2011). Changes 
24 See: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/19443/norma.htm
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in the regime involved a shift in paradigm: while Family Allowances covered family 
contingencies, access to the allowances became relativized due to the new law 
granting protection against such circumstances.
As a product of the reform and transformations in the labour market, a growing 
number of families and children were no longer protected by the system. In 2009, 
the Universal Child Allowance (UCA) was created through Necessity and Urgency 
Decree No. 1602/09. The UCA incorporates a “per child allowance” into the social 
security system, for the children of non-formal and domestic workers who earn 
salaries below the Minimum Adjustable Vital Wage (Salario Mínimo Vital y Móvil), 
and the children of unemployed workers and registered temporary workers of the 
agricultural sector. As for the nationality criteria, children and adults must be 
Argentinian, naturalised citizens, or legal residents for no less than 3  years.25 
Migrants who cannot prove legal residency for the required number of years are 
excluded.
As mentioned before, in 2017, around 4.2 million workers and 1.8 million retired 
workers were receiving a contributory family allowance, while 3.9 non-formal 
workers were under the UCA scheme (MTEySS 2017). It is also important to high-
light the case of female workers excluded from the contributory family allowance 
scheme (domestic, informal or unemployed workers). In 2011, a new non- 
contributory component was added to the UCA scheme; the Pregnancy Allowance 
for Social Protection (Decree 446/201126), targeting informal or unemployed female 
workers. Eligible claimants receive a monthly benefit since week 12 of pregnancy, 
provided that they comply with an established set of health controls and treatments 
within the public health sector. During their pregnancy, a 20% of the benefit is kept 
by ANSES and is given to the beneficiaries at the birth of their children. Foreign 
citizens must have the DNI and a legal residency of at least 3 years.
As for maternity benefits, formally employed female workers have the right to 
paid maternity leave for 12 weeks. This requirement leaves an elevated number of 
women without protection, due to the problem of informality. Both Argentinian citi-
zens and foreigners residing legally in Argentina have the right to maternity bene-
fits. The maximum period if paid maternity leave is 3 months (45 days pre-birth and 
45 days post-birth leave). The payment is equivalent to the salary and it is done by 
ANSES.  Women residing abroad are eligible for maternity leave in case an 
International Agreement, such as the MERCOSUR Agreement and the bilateral 
agreements with some EU countries (France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Portugal).
25 An UCA assessment from a human rights of migrants’ perspective can be found in Ceriani and 
Morales 2011. This has been criticized by the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, both of which are United Nations committees. (United Nations, Committee on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, September 2011).
26 Family Allowances. Decree 446/2011 Amend Law No. 24,714  in relation to the Pregnancy 
Allowance for Social Protection. The text of the decree is available in Spanish, See: http://servi-
cios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/180000-184999/181250/norma.htm
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Finally, there are no parental benefits at the national level in Argentina. Fathers 
in a formal wage work have the right to 2 days paid live after their child’s birth. Only 
formal workers are eligible, regardless of their nationality.
2.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
In Argentina there is no general non-categorical cash transfer program for individu-
als or household whose income is below the extreme poverty line. The largest pro-
gram targeting low-income households is the Universal Child Allowance (see 
above), which doesn’t include individuals or households without children. Other 
non-contributory cash transfers are in place for specific categories (old-age, invalid-
ity, etc.).
2.3  Conclusions
The issue of migration is of special relevance for Argentina since the majority of its 
population is descendant from immigrants who settled in the country in the last few 
hundred years. According to the 2010 Census, just 2.28% of Argentines declared to 
belong to an indigenous population. Also, the composition of the Argentine popula-
tion has changed with modifications in the flow of migration. Prior to the First 
World War, Europeans (especially from Spain and Italy) were the protagonists of 
mass migration to Argentina, accounting for 30% of the population at the peak of 
this process. After the Second World War, not only did the relative weight of immi-
gration decrease, but its composition also changed, with a sharp decline of the 
European inflow and an increase of immigrants coming from neighboring countries.
The main findings of the chapter indicate that in each of the policy areas anal-
ysed, there is a high degree of fragmentation in the systems, with an overlap between 
contributory and non-contributory regimes which guarantees broad levels of cover-
age, but unequal levels of benefits. In order to understand what impact this charac-
teristic has on migrants’ access to social benefits, two features of the Argentine case 
must be taken into account. Firstly, the social protection system was constituted 
around contributory social security institutions with coverage of formal salaried 
workers (mainly men). Non-contributory programs were introduced during the last 
decade and they managed to incorporate a large number of people, mainly women, 
previously excluded because of their work trajectories. In the same period, the 
immigration reform defined migration as a fundamental human right and estab-
lished the general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination for migrant 
workers.
Within this broader framework, this chapter shows that in the case of contribu-
tory benefits, access is not directly subject to the migratory status, but to the condi-
tion of labour formality. Formal employees and self-employed workers who 
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contribute to Social Security have the same rights regardless their nationality. 
However, in order to become formal workers, foreigners must have regularized their 
immigration status. The migratory status and the years of residence in Argentina are 
factors that determine access to non-contributory benefits. For example: the 
Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection requires 3 years of residence for 
both parents and children, even in the case of children born in Argentina. Similarly, 
the Universal Pension for Older Persons requires its recipients to be Argentine by 
birth, naturalized Argentine with 10 years of residence in the country, or foreigners 
with a minimum residence of 20 years.
Once the person has gained access to a benefit, there are also differences between 
the contributory and non-contributory schemes with regards to the residence require-
ment. For example, in the case of ordinary contributory pensions, the recipients may 
reside in the country of their choice. However, for the Universal Pension for Older 
Persons, recipients must reside in Argentina.
Another relevant issue regarding social protection refers to the international 
Social Security agreements that Argentina signed. These agreements grant privi-
leged access to some social benefits for national citizens residing abroad or migrant 
workers coming to Argentina. In general, these agreements regulate the transfer of 
workers’ contributions between signatory States. This mechanism allows workers 
to ask for an aggregation of contributions paid in each country to gain entitlement to 
old age and invalidity pension benefits in the chosen country of residence. Some 
agreements also grant access to health care and family allowances for pension recip-
ients (Chile, Italy), or maternity leave and sickness benefits (Italy, Spain). The most 
robust agreement is the MERCOSUR Multilateral Agreement on Social Security 
that guarantees access for migrant workers in the States Parties to the same rights as 
in the States of origin in matters of social security regarding contributory benefits 
and health services. There are also a number of bilateral Agreements in place which 
grant access to old age and invalidity benefits. Some of these agreements also grant 
access to health care and family allowances (usually for pension recipients) and oth-
ers give access to maternity leave and sickness benefits. When a worker migrates to 
countries not covered by any Social Security agreements, he/she loses the right to 
ask for an aggregation of contributions paid in each country to be eligible to con-
tributory benefits in the chosen country of residence. This usually derives in losing 
the rights to receive a Social Security benefit in Argentina, unless the benefit is 
already being granted (for example, in the case of retired workers receiving a pen-
sion benefit and deciding to move abroad). On the other hand, unemployment ben-
efits are not granted to those residing abroad.
In summary, migrants’ access to contributory social security in Argentina is 
determined mainly by their employment status. In contrast, access to non- 
contributory benefits depends not only on the eligibility conditions determined by 
each public policy, but also the years of residence that migrants can demonstrate, 
once he/she has regularized his/her residence with the migration authorities. This 
situation is explained by the relatively open immigration policy that characterizes 
Argentina since the 2004 reform. Yet, the measures adopted by the current govern-
ment (since the end of 2015) and the discourses that follow them betray a political 
V. Carmona Barrenechea et al.
55
change towards a more restrictive migration policy, although this has not been 
reflected yet in changes in access to social protection for migrants with regular 
residence.
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Chapter 3
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 




Argentina has a relatively short experience in addressing emigration as a policy 
issue and engaging with its citizens residing abroad. The topic has started to be 
studied in the last two decades, but specific literature is still scarce. This chapter 
aims at explaining the general institutional framework by which Argentina’s author-
ities interact with nationals abroad, with a specific focus on social protection. It 
shows that Argentina’s policies for citizens abroad have not institutionalised yet as 
a distinct and vibrant sphere of action and most initiatives have waxed and waned 
over time. Such lukewarm approach is characterised by ambivalence, intermittent 
and selective engagement, and relatively little development in terms of responding 
to social protection needs of national abroad.
In particular, this chapter presents a detailed account of the policies, programmes 
and services offered by Argentine authorities across five specific policy areas: 
unemployment, health care, pensions, family-related benefits, and economic hard-
ship. For each of these areas, the existence of initiatives is traced at the national, 
subnational and regional levels, with specific emphasis on the five top country des-
tinations for Argentine emigrants: Spain, USA, Italy, Paraguay and Israel.
The main findings provide evidence to characterise engagement as lukewarm, 
showing that neither the state nor citizens abroad have been pro-active on regular 
basis; thus, when both migrant and state activism converged, engagement intensi-
fied for a while to lose momentum later. In particular, in terms of social protection 
policies, the findings indicate that (a) priority has been given to pensions and social 
security issues; (b) there is currently an attempt to facilitate access to protection and 
benefits through simplified bureaucratic practices and virtual means, and (c) rights 
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of Argentines residing within MERCOSUR countries are enacted by regional agree-
ments, yet regional integration remains at a low level of institutionalisation, regional 
norms are not fully binding, norm implementation is not homogeneous across mem-
ber states, and access to benefits is contingent on the country of residence’s imple-
mentation capacity.
The following section provides some background information on the profile of 
the Argentine diaspora and main characteristics of the home country engagement. 
This includes an overview of the institutional infrastructure by which Argentina’s 
authorities engage with nationals abroad and the main components of such engage-
ment policies. The second section focuses on the specificities of the above- mentioned 
social protection policies. The third section summarises the main findings.
3.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
3.2.1  The Argentine Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
Argentina was historically (and still is) considered a place for immigration. 
Emigration has received increasing academic and political attention in the last few 
decades, and especially since the 1990s, when the numbers rose significantly and 
the characteristics of flows changed. While in the past emigration had been consid-
ered a temporary problem, mostly linked to political instability and persecution, in 
the early 2000s it started to be seen as a relatively constant and heterogeneous trend, 
related to the deteriorating political and economic situation (for a brief historical 
overview, see Jachimowicz 2006).
Antecedents of policy initiatives towards emigration are to be found in the late 
1950s, when governments showed some concern with the exit of scientists and drew 
up some plans to repatriate them. After the return to democracy in 1983, govern-
ments were sensitive towards the hardships endured by former political exiles. In 
the context of reparatory measures, in 1991 Law 24,007 was passed to allow 
Argentines living abroad to vote (Novick and Murias 2005).
In terms of numbers, emigration increased since the mid-1970s and peaked at the 
time of the 2001 crisis and immediately afterwards. The profile of the last wave of 
Argentine emigrants (i.e., young, educated, with relatives or networks in Spain—
which together with Italy became a preferred destination—, employed at the time of 
living, and mostly non-active in migrants’ associations) is closely related to the 




According to the UN Population Division (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs), in 2017 the total number of Argentine emigrants was 977.200.1 This figure, 
which has been relatively stable since 2005, is around 2.27% of the total population 
of Argentina (44.3 million in 2017). These numbers are consistent with the informa-
tion in the last country profile published by the Organisation for International 
Migrations (OIM 2012b). In the last (mid-term legislative) elections of 2017, 
362,820 Argentines residing abroad were entitled to vote.2 For the same year, the 
top five destinations were Spain, the USA, Italy, Chile and Paraguay, in this order, 
with the first three countries attracting around 55% of the total. The gender compo-
sition of emigrants was balanced.3
3.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
Historically, immigration was inextricably linked to Argentina’s state- and nation- 
building processes. The imperative to populate its vast territory translated into an 
open door policy in late nineteenth century, preferably regarding European new 
comers. At the turn of the century, the country indeed received massive immigration 
and the flows continued until the 1960s approximately, helping to consolidate the 
image of being a country of immigration (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 
2014:299–332). As Cook-Martin (2008) ably explains, Italy, Spain and Argentina 
constituted a ‘migration system’ since mid-nineteenth century and became linked as 
sending and receiving countries whose roles reversed when the direction of massive 
migration flows reversed toward the end of the twentieth century. Over time, the 
three countries competed for establishing or maintaining citizenship links with the 
same group of migrants and their descendants. Thus, nationality laws, the creation 
of specialised offices, administrative centralisation and red tape translated those 
efforts and conditioned migrants’ strategies, as well as those of future generations. 
For example, Argentines of Spanish or Italian descend have access today to dual 
citizenship, which in the European context allows them to reside, work, and access 
social benefits in destination/host countries. This may facilitate the re-orientation of 
mobility in times of crisis and discourage mobilization to demand services to the 
home country. As some studies indicate, in comparison to other groups, the last 
massive wave of Argentines emigrants moving to Europe in early twenty-first cen-
tury seem to be keen on using dual citizenship to ‘blend’ within the host society and 
integrate via the labour market rather than engaging in associational life with co- 
nationals; they also tend to rely on relatively high human and social capital, adopt 
1 See https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_origin&t=2017&cm49=32, accessed 25 Febr 
uary 2019.
2 Cf. https://www.clarin.com/politica/360-mil-argentinos-residen-exterior-habilitados-votar_0_
B1JRWtIpZ.ht ml, accessed 26 February 2019.
3 Cf. https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/migracion/emigracion/argentina, accessed 26 
February 2019.
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individualistic strategies, and seek very little support from institutions of the home 
country or migrant-related non-governmental organisations (Margheritis 2017b).
Given this historical background, Argentina’s coming to terms with different 
waves of emigration is a relatively new phenomenon, only partially incorporated 
into political rhetoric and actions. The inclusion of Argentines abroad in political 
discourses and specific policies of the home country becomes evident only in the 
aftermath of the 2001 crisis, when there was a peak in emigration flows. It is in that 
decade that consular services and institutions expanded and informal relations with 
some groups of nationals abroad intensified,4 although intermittently. On both sides 
of the relationship, testimonies indicate that there was not a tradition of engagement 
and low capacity to set stable and inclusive participatory mechanisms of dialogue.5
Notable developments in that decade include the attempt to carry out an online 
census of nationals abroad, the expansion and institutional upgrade of the office of 
Argentines Abroad within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the launching, in 
2004, of the Province 25 Programme within the Secretariat of Provinces at the 
Ministry of Interior, named after the imaginary, extra-territorial province.6 The 
rationale behind the initiative was that the state has to help to recover or maintain 
nationhood links with expatriates, especially with those who left around the time of 
the 2001 crisis and felt extremely disappointed by, and upset with, the country and 
the political elite; that is, those who felt “expelled” by a socio-economic model that 
failed to provide for their needs and aspirations. The 2001 crisis confirmed their 
sense of frustration, reinforced negative expectations about the future, and acceler-
ated their plans to emigrate. Although the reference in the label to an imaginary 
province never translated into any legal or constitutional update of the country’s 
administrative structure, the immediate goals of this program at the moment of 
launching were quite ambitious: to facilitate certain procedures to support citizens 
abroad (e.g., ID and passport renewals, police record certificates, etc.) and to encour-
age political participation and representation of nationals abroad. Over the years, 
the Province 25 Programme went from a phase of intense activity and exchanges 
with migrant associations (particularly those in Spain) between 2007 and 2009 to 
low-profile, assistance-oriented activities since then.
This is better understood in the context of broader migration dynamics. Given 
receding emigration and the domestic repercussions of increasing immigration from 
neighbouring countries,7 in the current decade Argentina re-focused its attention 
towards immigration issues. Institutional expansion happened in relation to all 
immigration issues. In contrast, deprived of the political impulse given by former 
4 For instance, the 2005 regularization process in Spain created an opportunity to develop an incipi-
ent relationship between Argentine consulates and some migrant associations.
5 For a detailed historical overview and analysis of the evolution of the relations between the coun-
try of origin and nationals abroad, see Margheritis 2016.
6 Argentina is politically and administratively divided into 23 provinces plus one autonomous dis-
trict (the capital city). Argentines abroad would represent the fourth largest province in terms of 
population.
7 For details on this point, see OIM 2012a.
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president Néstor Kirchner in the early 2000s, emigration initiatives were put on hold 
and followed an inertial path. The Province 25 Programme relied on very few staff 
members and, turning away from its initial political goals, re-focused in the last 
decade on providing information to citizens residing abroad, mainly online. Until 
2015, it worked in informal and sporadic contact with two small, related institu-
tions: the Department of Argentines Abroad, within the General Directorate of 
Migrations at the Ministry of Interior, and the Directorate of International 
Migrations, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The programme is now absorbed 
within the new online platforms for Argentines abroad;8 its twitter account was cre-
ated in 2010 and not updated since 2015.
The Macri administration (2015–2019) has made extensive use of online portals 
to communicate with citizens at home and abroad in all areas of policy, including 
the creation of a web page dedicated to nationals abroad.9 It is also to be noted that 
the terminology of ‘Argentines abroad’ has switched to ‘Argentines in the world’ 
recently.
In sum, in terms of institutional actors, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Worship outstands in this realm as the main institutional actor. As it is in charge of 
foreign policy and representation in foreign countries and international organiza-
tions, its functions include consular affairs, defined as protection and assistance to 
citizens living abroad, as well as strengthening of links with the country. It main-
tains informal contacts to coordinate with all other offices mentioned above. No 
specific diaspora institution has been created yet.
Similarly, there is no record of variation for the basic consular services across the 
five top destinations for Argentines abroad, although the scope of the consular net-
work varies in each country (six in Spain, seven in the USA, three in Paraguay and 
one in Israel).
3.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
In the framework of the above institutional infrastructure, relations between the 
country of origin and nationals abroad have remained largely non-institutionalised 
and informal. The main attempt to develop engagement policies was the creation of 
the Province 25 Programme which, as it was explained above, lags behind its initial 
goals. Such programme underwent a phase of intense activity and exchanges with 
migrant associations (particularly those in Spain) between 2007 and 2009. Several 
meetings with representatives of emigrants were held and a bill to create the 
“Exterior” (extra-territorial) District and grant emigrants parliamentary 
8 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/interior/secretaria-de-provincias-y-municipios/argentinos-en-
el-exterior, accessed 25 February 2019.
9 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/argentinosenelmundo. Accessed 10 May 2018.
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representation was submitted in 2009.10 This was an attempt to actually constitute a 
new constituency out of the group of citizens residing abroad and extend their politi-
cal rights so they can not only vote in national elections but also elect their own 
representatives to the national legislative body as other territorial districts of the 
country do. However, the project did not receive enough endorsement in Congress. 
The meetings did not lead to the institutionalisation of a specific mechanism of 
dialogue and collaboration like neighbour countries have (e.g., consultation 
councils).11
Political participation of nationals abroad in election processes is possible. The 
right to vote in presidential and national legislative elections was established by 
Law 24, 007 in 1991. In the context of democratization, it was then seen as a ‘repa-
ratory’ measure towards those political exiles who left the country during the dicta-
torship, rather than an engagement policy. It has indeed generated limited 
engagement as voter registration and voting have remained relatively low 
(Margheritis 2017a). Standing as candidates is not an option for nationals abroad. 
Franchise for citizens abroad in regional or subnational elections does not exist.
The Macri administration attempted to facilitate procedures regarding the exer-
cise of political rights abroad. Citizens living abroad used to be expected to register 
before casting a vote. Since 2017, by Decree 403, citizens living in other countries 
whose current domicile abroad is properly recorded in their ID are automatically 
included in the Registry of Voters Residing Abroad and can cast a ballot in the con-
sular office with jurisdiction in their area of residency. Another recent innovation 
(implemented in the October 2017 elections) is the setting of an information stand 
at the main airport to inform nationals abroad of voting rights, requirements, and 
procedures.12 Epistolary voting was implemented for the first time in the 2019 elec-
tions as established by Decree 45/2019.13
In spite of these developments, major political parties do not have a department 
and/or position dedicated to dealing with nationals residing abroad and have not 
engaged in a major parliamentary debate on these matters lately. Yet, PRO (Propuesta 
Republicana/Republican Proposal, the party leading the coalition in power for the 
period 2015–2019) has created a website to gather proposals from Argentines 
abroad and engage them with the proposed changes above.14
In addition to the registration of voters already mentioned, the former Argentine 
Government attempted to develop a comprehensive registry of nationals abroad. To 
10 See full text of the bill at http://boletinargentino.blogspot.com/2009/12/argentina-creacion-del-
distrito.html.Accessed 12 May 2018.
11 On this respect, a bill to create councils of residents abroad and a general council of emigration 
was sent to Congress in 2004 but it has not been approved yet. See http://www.diputados.gob.ar/
proyectos/proyecto.jsp?id=49684. Accessed 15 May 2018.
12 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/elecciones-2017-stand-informativo-en-ezeiza-para-
los-argentinos-en-el-exterior. Accessed 15 May 2018.
13 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/los-argentinos-en-el-exterior-ya-pueden-votar-por-
correo-postal, accessed 9 March 2020.
14 See http://www.pro.com.ar/argentinosenelexterior/. Accessed 10 May 2018.
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that effect, these nationals can request their registration in the so-called Libro de 
Matrícula/Matricular Registry of the consulate, at the nearest consulate to their 
place of residency abroad. Registration is optional and free. They can also request a 
certificate or proof of registration for a fee, and such certificate would be valid for a 
year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends registration as a way of facilitat-
ing administrative procedures and creating a channel of communication so citizens 
abroad can receive relevant information. It is also possible to register online at the 
general website of the Argentine Government.15
The Argentine consular network assists nationals abroad with the traditional con-
sular procedures, such as obtaining or renewing passports, identification documents, 
and other. There is no record of norms regarding honorary and mobile consulates, 
but public officials confirmed that Argentina does not have honorary consulates and 
the practice of setting mobile consulates does indeed exist. Embassies and consul-
ates organise the itinerary and frequency of visits depending on the needs in each 
location.16
Regarding the economic dimension of engagement policies, it is worth mention-
ing that Argentina has signed bilateral treaties for the avoidance of double taxation 
of its citizens abroad with 21 countries and other initiatives were discussed in the 
mid-2000s. Yet, in spite of discussions on mortgages or special bank accounts to 
citizens abroad, no economic policies related to remittances or investments have 
ever been adopted.
Although there is no specific policy to encourage return, the Government pro-
vides online information available on procedures, documents required, and tax 
exemptions for personal goods and other items.17 Argentina also developed a spe-
cific programme towards scientists within the Ministry of Science: RAICES, Red de 
Argentinos Investigadores y Científicos en el Exterior/Network of Argentine 
Researchers and Scientists Abroad. One of the goals of this programme is to encour-
age return of highly skilled emigrants.18 Another policy in the area of return consists 
in subsidies to encourage returnees and knowledge transfer (e.g., scientists who 
intend to return may apply for support in the form of a subsidy, a fellowship, or 
participation in a productive project).19 As of February 2019, the online page of the 
programme informs that 1323 scientists have returned to Argentina.20
In the realm of culture, the National Directorate of International Cooperation, 
within the Ministry of Culture, is the main institution with the mission of promoting 
Argentina’s culture among nationals residing abroad21 but there are no specific 
15 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/argentinosenelmundo/registro. Accessed 9 May 2018.
16 Interview with the author, Argentine consul in Cadiz, Spain, 10 April 2018.
17 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/secretaria-de-provincias/guia-para-argentinos-que-desean-retornar-al- 
pais. Accessed 24 October 2018.
18 See http://www.raices.mincyt.gov.ar/institucional-presentacion.php. Accessed 25 February 2019.
19 See details under ‘repatriation actions’ in the link above.
20 Cf. http://www.raices.mincyt.gob.ar/, accessed 25 February 2019.
21 See https://www.cultura.gob.ar/institucional/organismos/direccion-nacional-de-cooperacion-
internacional/. Accessed 11 May 2018.
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 policies to grant access to educational facilities or to create incentives for the cre-
ation of non-for-profit associations. Notable exceptions include the existence of five 
Argentine schools abroad to provide complementary education on language and 
social sciences (in the USA, Switzerland and France).22 In addition, nationals resid-
ing abroad have the possibility of taking exams at embassies or consulates to com-
plete secondary education.23 Regional norms offer further opportunities: the Protocol 
of Educational Integration (signed in 1994 by MERCOSUR members) allows con-
tinuity in education when on the move by validating diplomas of primary school and 
mid-level/non-technical education.24
In terms of the basic consular protection, the website of the ministry informs 
what consulates can do for nationals living abroad and what consulates cannot do 
for them. It states that, under no circumstances, consulates or embassies are respon-
sible for cash benefits or any financial help,25 although in practice, this constitutes a 
grey area as routine protocols of consulates are not available online but public offi-
cials acknowledge that they have some discretionary power to help and/or re-direct 
some cases to international organizations or host country institutions.26
More generally, consular services include some classic services such as the use 
of the postal address of the consular office for the reception of private correspon-
dence, general assistance and orientation regarding legal, medical and notarial mat-
ters, assistance to people who are injured or have serious health problems (although 
this does not involve economic disbursement by the consul or Argentine authori-
ties), the granting of passports and other IDs, legalisation of documents, and notar-
ial services. More specific services and other forms of assistance by consular offices 
include: informing relatives about accidents or deaths, catastrophes and provide 
advice in such situations; facilitating communication with relatives to inform them 
about a person’s situation and needs; being interested in detained or imprisoned 
nationals and, under certain circumstances, transmit messages to their relatives; 
ensuring the defense of the Argentine citizens in court by seeking information about 
the process, the person’s state of health, and ensuring the maintenance of dignified 
conditions of hygiene and housing, in the case of detainees. Regarding documenta-
tion, consular offices can authorise all acts that can be performed by public notaries 
22 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/educacion/innovacionycalidadeducativa/escuelasargentinase 
nelexterior. Accessed 11 May 2018.
23 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/rendir-examenes-en-el-exterior-para-terminar-el-secundario. 
Accessed 11 May 2018.
24 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/reconocimiento-de-certificados-titulos-y-estudios-de-nivel-
primario-y-secundario. Accessed 11 May 2018.
25 See https://www.mrecic.gov.ar/funciones-consulados-argentinos-en-exterior. Accessed 20 Oct 
ober 2018.
26 This information comes from personal communications with public officials at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Argentina. They often refer to internal norms that guide daily activities of con-
sulates, but these are not available online. Law 20.957 regulates the functions of Argentine Foreign 
Service, including duties and working conditions of its personnel, but it does not specify consul-
ates’ activities. See http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/18795/tex-
act.htm. Accessed 15 October 2018.
A. Margheritis
65
in the country, especially legalisation, award of the nationality option to children of 
native Argentines born abroad, and processing documentation (e.g., record updates, 
duplicate ID, changes of address, etc.).
The consular network does not provide certain services such as paying the costs 
of repatriation of ashes or mortal remains of Argentine citizens who died abroad nor 
providing money for medical expenses, hospitalization, surgery, or medical repa-
triation. Consular offices are also not expected to pay bills (such as hotel bills, legal, 
medical or any other expenses), provide tickets or means to return to Argentina 
except in very special circumstances of proven indigence or extreme vulnerability 
that merit the evaluation of repatriation, under strict compliance with certain 
requirements. It is to be noted, however, that in the early 2000s, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs managed a Fund for the Assistance to co-nationals that served to 
repatriate migrants with no economic resources as well as to support financially 
those facing medical emergencies (Buira 2006).
3.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Argentina
Social protection in Argentina has mirrored the high volatility in politics and eco-
nomics, as well as the cycles of state intervention and withdrawal (or, cycles of 
protection and lack of protection) shaped by various development strategies 
(Barbeito and Goldberg 2007). More recently, the attempt to bring back the state 
and increase the protection to vulnerable social sectors has been part of the post- 
neoliberal, neo-populist discourse in the aftermath of the dramatic 2001 crisis 
(Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007). Maintaining social welfare programmes has been a 
key component of president Macri’s approach since 2015. The need for flexibility in 
social spending was acknowledged in the early 2018 agreement reached with the 
International Monetary Fund, in the context of concerns with domestic order.
Moreover, the nature of the institutional framework and character of engagement 
policies described above indicates that Argentina’s attempt to develop diaspora poli-
cies has not followed a linear, progressive path. It has rather advanced in stops and 
goes in the development of such policies, that is, state outreach efforts have been 
intermittent and of varying intensity. Some initiatives have been relatively success-
ful in terms of achieving initial goals, such as the RAICES Programme. Others have 
somehow faded or reached a plateau. That is the case of the Province 25 Programme 
(Margheritis 2016:109–112). There has been little progress in the area of social 
protection for non-resident citizens, although Argentina offers a number of pro-
grammes to assist resident citizens.27 Providing information has become, instead, 
the main component of the current Government’s approach to emigrants. In prac-
tice, information diffusion seems to be part of general policies rather than a 
27 For a summary as of February 2018, see an official online chart at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/
politicassociales/informacion-sobre-planes-y-programas-sociales/guias-de-programas-sociales. 
Accessed 13 October 2018.
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 protection or assistance mechanism fully integrated into a package of diaspora 
engagement policies. The fact that, when consulted, consulate officials refer to the 
national institution for general information illustrates this point.28
A few other mechanisms of protection are worth mentioning here. For instance, 
nationals living abroad suffering from discrimination can report this to the INADI, 
Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia y el Racismo/National 
Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism.29 This is a free service 
and can be done by phone, email or webpage. There is no information online of 
what action is taken after a complaint made by a citizen residing abroad, if any, or 
what procedures follow suit in the host country. INADI only informs online that 
domestic reports are investigated, advice is offered to victims, a solution is sought 
and a final report is prepared.
Finally, access to social protection is included within regional norms and, there-
fore, can potentially impact the small group of Argentines residing in a neighbour-
ing country under consideration here: Paraguay (which hosts around 58,535 
emigrants, that is, around 5% of the total).30 According to MERCOSUR’s Residency 
Agreement (agreed on 2002, effective since ratification by all member states in 
2009), Argentines have access to free circulation within MERCOSUR member 
states and access to legal residency and related rights, such as right to work, peti-
tion, exit/entry, worship, family reunification, and send remittances. Regarding 
employment and access to health services, they are offered equal treatment vis-à-vis 
nationals of the country of residency and the possibility of consolidating all contri-
butions into a single social security scheme in the country of residency at the 
moment of retirement –being this Argentina or another country.31 The 1998 
Declaración Socio-laboral/Social and Labour Declaration of MERCOSUR estab-
lishes principles and rights, such as equality of rights, treatment and opportunities 
in the area of employment regardless of race, nationality, gender, age, religion, 
political ideology or other social or family condition, as well as equality of rights 
and working conditions for migrant workers vis-a-vis nationals in the host coun-
try.32 In 2015, a similar Declaration ratified these principles and established the right 
to assistance, information, protection and equal rights and working conditions, 
regardless of nationality. In the framework of MERCOSUR, a Multilateral 
Agreement on Social Security was also adopted in 1997 (effective since June 2005), 
thus making possible for workers to accumulate contributions in any member state 
28 Personal communication, Minister, Argentine Embassy in London, 18 April 2018.
29 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/denunciar-discriminacion-para-argentinos-en-el-exterior. Acc 
essed 10 May 2018.
30 Cf. https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/migracion/emigracion/argentina, accessed 1 
March 2019.
31 See http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/6425/5/innova.front/residir_y_trabajar_en_el_mer-
cosur. The Cartilla de Ciudadanía/Citizenship Booklet provides further details. See http://www.
cartillaciudadania.mercosur.int/es. Accessed 16 October 2018.
32 See http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/4506/1/es_declaracion-sociolaboral.pdf. Acces 
sed 15 May 2018.
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and consolidate them as if they had been made in only one country. As a result, 
workers are also entitled to social security benefits in any member state, including 
health coverage in case of illness and insurance policy in case of accidents at work.33 
However, the full and proper implementation of these ‘portable’ rights within the 
bloc is contingent on the nature of regional integration in South America. 
MERCOSUR has a long and mixed record of slow and conflictive movement 
towards its goals, despite the fast advance of its socio-political agenda in the 2000s 
(Margheritis 2013). Because of MERCOSUR’s norms enter into force once each 
member state has ratified them, lack of provisions regarding member compliance 
and dispute settle mechanisms (Pucheta 2014), and power asymmetries between 
member states, the exercise of rights is uneven across groups and geographies.
The assessment of progress on free circulation, protection of migrants’ rights and 
regional citizenship within the MERCOSUR made for the 2013 World Forum on 
Human Rights held in Brazil, confirms the limits of MERCOSUR as a tool for the 
protection of citizens abroad. Although only a small segment of the entire Argentine 
diaspora reside in a neighbouring MERCOSUR member state (Paraguay), conclu-
sions of the Forum indicate that the protection and exercise of rights within 
MERCOSUR in general face serious obstacles in practice and full implementation 
of regional accords is still pending. Reasons for these underwhelming outcomes 
include (a) the lack of adaptation and harmonisation of national legal and institu-
tional frameworks to the new norms, and (b) bureaucratic obstacles such as lack of 
budget, technical and managerial expertise, and information systems (IPPDH 
2013:19).
Overall, although comprehensive information is not available, scattered evidence 
shows that intra-regional migrants face similar challenges in all countries and the 
actual exercise of rights and access to social welfare benefits vary significantly 
across immigrant communities, depending on their relative position in ethnic hier-
archies, resilient forms of stigmatization by the host society, and migrants’ spatial 
segregation. In addition, gender, age, ethnicity, and time of arrival matter. Many 
migrants are not even aware of their rights and properly informed of how to make 
claims; most of them experience lack of protection, insecurity, discrimination, and 
abuses daily (Margheritis 2018).
3.3.1  Unemployment
In the twenty-first century, Argentine Governments implemented a number of mea-
sures to address unemployment, including unemployment allowance, job training, 
job creation, redundancy payments/compensation, and subsidies to employers, 
among others (for details, see Bertranou and Paz 2007). For most of them 
33 See http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/Normas/normas_web/Decisiones/
ES/Dec_019_097_.PDF. Accessed 25 April 2018.
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permanent residence34 in the country and physical presence at in Argentina to sub-
mit an application (as application is personal and needs to be done in the closest 
office to their domicile)35 are listed as a qualifying criteria. These benefits are there-
fore not available to non-resident citizens. In addition, there is no specific or addi-
tional policy in the area of unemployment for citizens abroad beyond the limited 
provisions of the MERCOSUR agreements. Lastly, as shown above, the missions of 
consulates are narrowly defined and they do not help citizens abroad seek jobs or 
obtain work permits in host countries.
3.3.2  Health Care
As noted by Bianculli and Hoffmann (2016), the right to health did not appear in 
Argentina’s constitutional framework until recently; full recognition happened 
simultaneously with structural reforms and decentralisation, which partially dis-
mantled and questioned universal health provision. Argentina does have a universal 
health system that offers free treatment to both national and foreigners. At present, 
a specific health policy for Argentines abroad does not exist but they can access 
public health when visiting the country for free (regardless of place of residency and 
socio-economic condition) unlike foreigners which, since 2018, are subject to medi-
cal fees except if they are legal residents proceeding from MERCOSUR member 
states as they are entitled to the same benefits as nationals.36 For Argentines residing 
in a major destination country such as Paraguay that is also member of MERCOSUR, 
access to health coverage in the country of residency is therefore established in the 
Residency Agreement. Yet Argentines residing in Paraguay and other MERCOSUR 
countries are affected by the fact this organization is essentially inter-governmental, 
and ministries of health differ significantly in competences, organisation, and fund-
ing which means that compromises are difficult to achieve and agreements are not 
always incorporated into domestic legal framework. Overall, because of the focus of 
MERCOSUR has been on disease control and epidemic prevention, the portability 
of health entitlements remains very underdeveloped (Bianculli and Hoffmann 
2016). As a consequence, as noted by the Regional Manual on Migrants’ Human 
Rights, whereas some South American countries have incorporated the right to 
health coverage in their national migration legislation, implementation issues, cost 
or requirement to present valid ID often prevent effective access (OIM/IPPDH 
2017:101).
34 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/politicassociales/informacion-sobre-planes-y-programas-soci-
ales/guias-de-programas-sociales. Accessed 24 October 2018.
35 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/tramitar-la-prestacion-por-desempleo. Accessed 8 October 
2018.
36 See https://www.minutouno.com/notas/3063508-atencion-medica-gratuita-extranjeros-que-
pasa-el-resto-del-mundo. Accessed 5 October 2018.
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Looking at the role of consulates, they provide general information in the area of 
health but do not engage in seeking services for residents abroad and cannot petition 
preferential treatment in hospitals or prisons of host countries for Argentines resid-
ing abroad.
3.3.3  Pensions
The pension system in Argentina has been recurrently in crisis and subject to several 
reforms. Long-term, general characteristics included decreasing coverage (i.e., 
lower and lower pensions and mounting difficulties to access) and increasing fiscal 
deficit. Hence, as a result of a deep crisis affecting the entire state apparatus, it 
underwent several partial reforms. A major attempt to privatise social security 
occurred in 1994, with mixed results.37 The 2001 crisis exposed the lack of social 
protection in this area again. Centralised, public management by the state was 
restored via a major structural reform in 2008. As Danani and Beccaria (2011) show, 
this illustrates the point above about historical cycles in social protection in general, 
or lack of thereof.
Notwithstanding a chronic critical situation, it is worth noting that pensions is a 
notable exception within the lack of fully-fledged diaspora engagement policies. In 
this area, for the past few years nationals residing abroad can rely on some assis-
tance to consolidate contributions made in more than one country and related pro-
cedures. There is consistent information provided online by the main national 
institution in charge of social security and consulates.
The main national institution in charge of pensions is the ANSES (Administración 
Nacional de la Seguridad Social/National Administration of Social Security) and 
provides the same information on procedures to retired nationals abroad as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also informs online of international agreements with 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and MERCOSUR mem-
bers.38 MERCOSUR norms became effective after 1 June 2005 and replaced former 
bilateral agreements with Brazil and Uruguay. ANSES further informs of agree-
ments with other countries, such as Belgium, Colombia, Slovenia, France, 
Luxemburg, and Peru, as well as the Inter-American Multilateral Agreement on 
Social Security, effective since 1 August 2016.39
The main implication of these agreements concerns the portability of pension 
contributions made by Argentines who have worked in several countries and allow 
them to consolidate all contributions in a single pension scheme. For Argentines 
residing in Paraguay and other MERCOSUR countries, the MERCOSUR 
37 See details in CEPAL 2004; for a comparative perspective and persistent weaknesses of the 
Argentine social security system, see De Mesa and Bertranou 1997.
38 See https://www.anses.gob.ar/tramites/trabajadores-en-el-exterior/. Accessed 15 May 2018.
39 See https://www.anses.gob.ar/prestaciones/prestaciones-por-convenio-internacional/. Accessed 
15 May 2018.
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Multilateral Agreement on Social Security allows for the transfer of contributions 
from one member state to another is done via administrative offices of the countries 
in which they worked –most often, the ministries of Social Security or Employment 
(OIM/IPPDH 2017).
In addition, nationals abroad may also request to the home country a revision in 
the amount of their Argentine pension via the Programa de Reparación Histórica/
Historic Reparation Programme (created in June 2016) based on legal sentences of 
the Supreme Court and other courts.40 This programme aims at solving two chronic 
problems: improving pensions (which have seriously deteriorated historically) and 
ending legal suits to the state by pensioners.
To receive an Argentine pension abroad, nationals residing abroad have to submit 
life certificates regularly (twice a year). They have to report to the national social 
security agency by submitting ID and pension payslip. Consulates assist retirees 
with the life certificate by transmitting the certificate via electronic means to the 
national social security agency: the ANSES. This was designed as to give retirees an 
optional means of submitting the certificate and to expedite the procedure.41 Retirees 
can submit the certificate to consulates in person or via regular mail.42 This repre-
sents an innovation implemented in early 2017 as a result of inter-ministerial coop-
eration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ANSES.43
Beyond these provisions, there is no cash or in-kind benefits and specific pro-
grammes to attend the needs of retired nationals residing abroad and consulates 
limit their role to the provision of information.
3.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
Support to families has increased in Argentina since early 2000s under Governments 
of different political orientation. Existing programmes include the so-called a uni-
versal child allowance, universal allowance for social protection during pregnancy, 
and family allowance for children with special needs. Most of them have clear con-
ditions for access to the benefit and/or duties such as proof of children attending 
40 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/consultar-si-estas-incluido-en-la-reparacion-historica-de-jubi-
lados-ypensionados. Accessed 15 May 2018.
41 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/dar-fe-de-vida-supervivencia-para-jubilados-y-pensionados-
argentinos-en-el-exterior. Further information is available in the ANSES website: https://www.
anses.gob.ar/tramites/supervivencia-fe-de-vida/. Accessed 15 May 2018.
42 See http://www.csidn.mrecic.gov.ar/es/content/anses-informacion-para-jubilados-y-pensionados-que- 
residen-en-el-exterior. Accessed 15 May 2018.
43 See https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/eventos-destacados-presi/38505-jubilados-y-
pensionados-que-residen-en-el-exterior-pueden-acreditar-superviviencia-por-medios-electroni-
cos. Accessed 15 May 2018.
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school, pregnancy regular checks, etc.44 Residency in the country is a requisite to 
apply for the universal child allowance.45 Thus, the access to such social protection 
is not available to non-resident citizens. Other type of assistance to families, such as 
access to paternal leave, child benefits, cash or in-kind benefits upon birth of a child 
or during the period of raising children, does not exist for Argentines abroad.
Argentine consulates assist families residing abroad in a limited way by facilitat-
ing certain bureaucratic procedures. For example, nationals of Argentina residing 
abroad cannot obtain a birth certificate for their children born abroad from their 
home country but they can request birth certificates of their children born in 
Argentina. Children of Argentine nationals born abroad can opt to have Argentine 
nationality and the process can be initiated either in Argentina or in the country of 
residency via the closest consular office.46
In the area of education, Argentine families abroad have the right to register for 
online long-distance primary and secondary education for children of Argentine 
nationals but the system is designed primarily for those who are residing abroad 
temporarily. The goal of the Servicio de Educación a Distancia (Distance Learning 
Service) is to allow these children to keep practising the language, cultivate the feel-
ing of belonging to their country of origin, and facilitate their re-incorporation to the 
national educational system upon returning.47
3.3.5  Economic Hardship
The Plan Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria/National Plan of Food Safety contem-
plates access to food for those in situations of extreme vulnerability. Likewise, the 
Plan Nacional de Protección Social/National Plan of Social Protection and Plan 
Nacional de Primera Infancia/National Plan of Early Childhood target households 
and infants in similar conditions. Other programmes address specific basic needs, 
such as access to the public network of natural gas. They are all implemented via 
social assistance in situ.48 Thus, these benefits are not available to non-resident citi-
zens. In short, this type of policies do not reach out to citizens residing abroad. Also, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs that, under no circumstances, consulates or 
embassies are responsible for financial help. It also informs that families are 
44 See details at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/politicassociales/informacion-sobre-planes-y-pro-
gramas-sociales/guias-de-programas-sociales. Accessed 8 October 2018.
45 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/tramitar-la-asignacion-universal-por-hijo-auh. Accessed 8 
October 2018.
46 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/opcion-de-nacionalidad-argentina-para-hijos-de-argentinos-
nacidos-en-el-exterior. Accessed 9 October 2018.
47 See https://www.argentina.gob.ar/educacion/gestioneducativa/sead. Accessed 9 October 2018.
48 See details at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/politicassociales/informacion-sobre-planes-y-pro-
gramas-sociales/guias-de-programas-sociales. Accessed 8 October 2018.
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responsible for repatriation.49 Nevertheless, in practice consulates have the discre-
tion to help in extraordinary circumstances and/or re-direct the case to international 
organizations or host country institutions. This constitutes a grey area of action, 
subject to assessment on a case-by-case basis.
3.4  Conclusions
In early twenty-first century, Argentina made an attempt to tackle what was per-
ceived as the increasingly visible problem of emigration. The number of emigrants 
peaked at the time of the dramatic political and economic crisis in 2001, exacerbat-
ing a historical trend of outflows due to politico-economic problems and state failed 
policies. Thus, emigration was part and parcel of the social debt that democratic 
governments felt compelled to address. However, engagement with the diaspora 
started only two decades later and the sending state’s approach has mainly been 
based on assistance, that is, on facilitating certain solutions rather than expanding 
the scope of protection or building partnerships. After some short instances of activ-
ism on both sides, engagement faded and diaspora issues have not been high on the 
agenda of Argentine governments in the current decade.
The main initial motivation to expand services to emigrants derived from emi-
grants’ profile and, to some extent, the need of an emerging governing coalition to 
build up its identity and support base in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. Also, given 
the concern with national development, this approach has led to an emphasis on 
return of highly qualified citizens living abroad and/or scientific collaboration as a 
way of reversing the emigration trend and compensating for the loss of human capi-
tal. Political enfranchisement—not a new, engagement-oriented measure but a pre- 
existing right—remained confined to extra-territorial voting in presidential and 
national legislative elections. A few other measures aim at cultivating links with the 
country of origin but these are thin in the area of social welfare protection or benefits.
This is not surprising given the historical record of cycles in state intervention/
withdrawal and protection/lack thereof. Moreover, the state itself has constituted a 
hurdle in emigrants’ access to social protection. Bureaucratic practices have been 
reformed several times but still face serious challenges, such as the lack of a com-
prehensive and strategic vision to strengthen policy consistency, uneven distribution 
of technical capacities, scarce coordination across the state apparatus and levels of 
government, and overwhelming role of the executive power on decision making 
(Margheritis 2016: 112–116). In addition, as it was explained in this chapter, dias-
pora policies constitute a relatively new area of state intervention in which expertise 
was scarce and progress is still incipient and intermittent. Engaging with Argentines 




abroad was a relatively new task for traditional consular offices in the twenty-first 
century.
Looking at the demand side, the size of the emigrant community has remained 
relatively stable after the last peak at the turn of the century. Claims and mobiliza-
tion have not been intense, constant and effective enough to resonate domestically 
on regular basis and become a driver of engagement. Some groups of Argentines 
abroad have proved able to advance a few demands at specific moments in time. But 
associational life revolves mainly around cultural and social issues; the level of 
organization varies considerably across associations and destination sites; in gen-
eral, members’ participation is very low. For the majority of emigrants, memories of 
recurrent crises and losses that prompted their departure still translate into distrust 
of state institutions, thus making them reluctant to cultivate links with co-nationals 
and visit or consult with official offices. For many of them, access to a second (gen-
erally, European) nationality facilitates a strategy of ‘invisibility’ (Margheritis 2017b).
As a result, by all accounts, Argentina has implemented some measures to 
address the needs of its nationals abroad, though in a limited fashion. Comparison 
with other Latin American countries show that Argentina has joined this regional 
trend but has not lead it in terms of policy scope and innovation. This is confirmed 
by both quantitative and qualitative accounts (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017; 
Margheritis 2016, respectively).
The Argentine authorities’ approach has also been selective and somehow shaped 
by relations with countries of destination. The RAICES Programme clearly targets 
highly skilled emigrants who are being enticed to either return or maintain profes-
sional involvement in the country of origin. The bilateral relationship with Spain 
was deemed at times as ‘strategic’ due to historical colonial ties and relatively 
strong economic and cultural links. Being the place of residency for some political 
exiles since the 1970s and more recent economic emigrants, former administrations 
made outreach efforts, although at present no additional or specific protection poli-
cies are implemented in that country.
Overall, thus, Argentina has exhibited a lukewarm and intermittent approach to 
diaspora engagement. No specialised office or formal consultative mechanism have 
been created yet. As this study shows, there is little progress on social protection at 
the transnational level, except for the area of pensions. In the last 3 years, the most 
notable developments regarding emigrants are the extensive use of online means of 
communication to diffuse practical information of interest to nationals abroad and 
the change of terminology to address them: rather than placing them ‘in the exte-
rior’ of the national borders, emigrants are today ‘in the world’ –a language nuance 
which might indicate simply geographical dispersion and/or an incipient attempt to 
foster inclusion in the country of origin.
Whereas the MERCOSUR agreements place Argentines residing in another 
country of the bloc in a theoretically more favourable position when it comes to 
access to social protection, the exercise of those rights is contingent on host coun-
tries’ capacity to implement regional norms. Significant change is not expected 
from a bottom-up source as pressure from civil society is limited and regional insti-
tutions remain relatively impermeable to its input (Pucheta 2014; Grugel 2005).
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Overall, we can safely conclude that because Argentina stands out in the South 
American context as a net receiving country. Immigration rather than emigration 
has been a core concern for policy-makers in spite of the emigration peaks of the 
early 2000s.
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Chapter 4
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in China
Alex Jingwei He
4.1  Overview of the National Social Security System 
and Main Migration Features in China
4.1.1  Main Characteristics of China’s Social Security System
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its welfare system 
had been deeply embedded into the country’s planned economy and urban-rural 
divide, until China’s embarkation on market-oriented reforms in 1980s. Full and 
life-long employment, job creation and job assignment—often referred to as the 
“iron rice bowl”––were guaranteed (Guan 2000). Economic activities in urban areas 
predominantly took place around state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that still contrib-
uted close to 80% of gross industrial output and employed more than 75% of the 
urban workforce by 1980 (Leung 2003). Work units (danwei), particularly SOEs, 
were the cornerstones of both welfare financing and delivery, providing workers and 
their family members with a comprehensive social protection package (Saunders 
and Shang 2001). In contrast to the dominance of danwei in this socialist mini- 
welfare state, the role played by the state was limited to caring for the most vulner-
able groups in the urban population, including childless frail elders, the disabled 
homeless, and orphans (Leung 2005). Overall, the Chinese society, especially the 
urban sector, constituted a “welfare society in a low-income country,” under the 
planned economy (Guan 2000).
The economic reform initiated in 1978 exerted a significant impact on social 
security. First, inefficient and overstaffed SOEs started to suffer from heavy eco-
nomic losses, so that financing the mini-welfare state became a heavy burden. 
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Neither the government nor the SOEs had the financial ability to continue their 
generous provision of welfare. Even worse, many SOEs underwent privatization 
and bankruptcy. Second, the iron rice bowl was blamed as a disincentive for improv-
ing productivity and was gradually dismantled. A mass layoff of workers in the 
1990s dramatically changed labour relations and raised enormous demands for 
social protection. Third, alongside economic liberalization, private and informal 
sectors flourished while new professions proliferated, calling for a paradigm shift in 
social security. Although the economic transition was gradual and incremental, it 
swiftly led to the destruction of old social security institutions, especially pension, 
housing, education and health care (Chan et  al. 2008). Only in recent years has 
China seen a prominent expansion of social policies, in response to rising social 
instability and the need for the party-state to exert political legitimacy (Ngok and 
Huang 2014).
Constituting the skeleton of the current urban social security system are five 
social insurance schemes, covering old-age pension, general medical care, mater-
nity benefits, work injury, and unemployment, as well as a provident fund for hous-
ing finances. Well-known to most Chinese people is the term of “wu xian yi jin” 
(five insurances and one fund). Table 4.1 presents the prevalent contribution rates of 
all mandatory social insurance schemes, which are predominantly financed by con-
tributions from employers and employees. Also financed by contributions from 
employers and employees, but without risk-pooling, is the housing provident fund, 
which is earmarked for enrollees’ housing purposes.
The development of China’s rural social security system is much more recent. 
The Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) is a community risk-pooling pro-
gram intended to help farmers cope with catastrophic medical expenditures. 
Enrolment is typically on a household basis. Central and local governments provide 
generous premium subsidies. Now the NCMS is being integrated with the Urban 
Resident Basic Medical Insurance, in China’s efforts to consolidate its fragmented 
social health insurance system. Built on a similar model, the New Rural Basic Social 
Pension Scheme was introduced in recent years to provide basic financial protection 
for the rural elders. This voluntary scheme is jointly funded by individuals, villages, 
and local governments.
Table 4.1 Prevalent contribution rates of mandatory social insurance schemes
Employer (%) Employee (%)
Retirement insurance (old-age pension) 20 8
Unemployment insurance 2 1
Maternity insurance 1 0
Work injury insurance 1 0
Medical insurance 6 2
Housing provident fund 5–12 5–12
Note: The merger of maternity insurance and medical insurance has been undertaken since 2017
Source: He and Wu (2017)
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The Minimum Livelihood Guarantee System (MLG)1 or dibao, is China’s social 
safety net. Jointly financed by the central government and local governments, this 
means-tested non-contributory cash transfer system serves as the major instrument 
of poverty alleviation in the country. The MLG started as an urban scheme in 1999 
and now covers every locality. Rural MGL has been introduced in many localities 
since 2004, albeit much less generous than the urban scheme.
The Chinese social security system bears two salient characteristics: systemic 
fragmentation and wide regional disparity. Some social insurance schemes are oper-
ated at county level, while others are operated at prefectural level. Social risk-pools 
and individual accounts co-exist in some insurance schemes. Depending on residen-
tial status (urban vs. rural hukou; hukou refers to household registration status), 
individuals are enrolled on different insurance schemes, which vary substantially in 
benefits (Wu 2013; Gao and Rickne 2014; He and Wu 2017). Equity issues also 
exist across localities, as fiscally-strong local governments tend to offer higher ben-
efits (Shi 2012).
4.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
Migration, both internal and international, has a long history in China. Hong Liu 
(2005) identified three distinctive phrases of Chinese emigration to overseas. In the 
first phrase (1850s to 1950), millions of Chinese, predominantly laborers from 
South China (Guangdong and Fujian) started emigrating overseas, concentrating 
mainly in Southeast Asia. The second phrase (1950–1980) was much smaller in 
both scale and population, as the newly founded People’s Republic of China adopted 
a highly restrictive immigration policy (Liu 2009). But the destination of emigration 
was much more diverse, including mainly North America, Western Europe, Japan, 
and Australia (Liu 2005). The third and the most recent wave (1980 to present) has 
been characterized by very wide range of personnel, including high-skilled profes-
sionals, students, wealthy immigrant investors, as well as low-skilled workers. 
China has become one of the world’s leading source countries of immigration, pro-
viding about 4% of the total population of migrants (Xiang 2016). It is estimated 
that around 30–35 million ethnic Chinese live outside of Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Macau (Thunø 2001).
Historically, China has been a sending country of migrants, but this situation is 
gradually evolving. With increasing number of international immigrants from a 
variety of countries, China is becoming a destination country for transnational 
migrants rather than a mere source of them. Yet, the migration inflows are still sig-
nificantly lower when compared to the outflows. Even including those from Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, the total stock of immigrants is merely one million, 
1 Translated variously as “Minimum Living Standard Assistance”, “Minimum Living Standard 
Guarantee”, and “Minimum Living Standard Scheme”.
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accounting for 0.07% of the Chinese population (Center for China and Globalization 
2018). Based on the most recent population census (2010), the top then source 
countries of immigration to China are: Republic of Korea, United States, Japan, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, Canada, France, India, Germany and Australia. Main reasons 
of migration include: business (20.1%), employment (19.8%), residential settle-
ment (18.3%), and study (19.7%) (National Bureau of Statistics 2011). Most of 
these legal immigrants reside in economically prosperous parts of China, such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Zhejiang.
In theory, China accepts asylum seekers for political reasons, as the right to seek 
asylum is recognized by the PRC Constitution. There is a large undocumented pop-
ulation of refugees and illegal workers in China, mainly from North Korea, Vietnam, 
and Africa; but due to the secretive nature, no official data is available. At the end of 
2015, China held about 300,000 recognized refugees, with the vast majority coming 
from Vietnam (UNHCR 2015).
Seeking to attract foreign talents, particularly in education, technology, science, 
and management, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations for 
Examination and Approval of Permanent Residence of Aliens in China in 2004. 
The regulation officially introduced the permanent resident permit, commonly 
known as China’s “green cards”, to three eligible categories of foreign nationals: 
skilled immigrants, business immigrants, and family reunion (Liu 2009). The per-
mit serves the identity card of foreign nationals in China which also gives them 
access to the domestic social security system. However, the actual number of green 
card holders until 2016 is merely around 10,000, due to high eligibility barriers and 
stringent screening (Nanfang Zhoumo 2017).
The Entry and Exit Administration of the Ministry of Public Security had been 
the government body managing immigration-related affairs until 2018. In the effort 
to formulate and implement more effective immigration policies, the Chinese 
government upgraded it into the State Immigration Administration in April 2018.
4.2  Migration and Social Protection in China
The development of China’s social security system accelerated during the turn of 
the new millennium, and incremental reforms have been undertaken since then. 
In the belief that a developing country is unable to afford welfare that is “too gener-
ously” provided to citizens, the Chinese government explicitly defines most social 
security schemes as “basic” entitlements, manifesting its modest welfare ideology 
(Chan et al. 2008). Major social insurance programs have achieved fairly wide, if 
not universal, coverage of the population, while the MLG serves as the last-resort 
protection for all.
Despite the rapid immigration of foreigners to China in the past two decades, 
their social protection had not become a major policy concern for the government 
until the recent years. In 2011, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
promulgated “The Provisional Arrangement for the Enrolment of Employed Foreign 
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Nationals in China’s Social Insurance Programs”, which remains the only central 
government administrative ordinance to date governing foreigners’ access to the 
Chinese social security system.
In parallel to the immigration of foreigners to China, a growing number of 
Chinese citizens also emigrate abroad, predominantly for employment, business, 
and study purposes. Most Chinese emigrants residing in developed societies have 
participated in the social security system of the destination country, although they 
may be subject to different levels of entitlement. Because the Chinese social secu-
rity system is largely employment- and hukou-based, most non-resident nationals 
are not covered in China, their home country. One notable exception is the expatri-
ate personnel who may have their social security status (and contribution) kept by 
their employers in China, leaving them access to benefits in spite of their overseas 
residence. In the event of citizenship changes, the individual is no longer eligible to 
claim social security benefits, regardless of his/her prior contribution history in 
China. Local social security authorities may refund the balance on his/her individ-
ual account as appropriate.
4.2.1  Unemployment
Unemployment protection in China is based on mandatory unemployment insur-
ance, jointly contributed by employers and employees. The program covers urban 
work units (except government organizations) and their employees, including the 
self-employed. Migrant workers with a rural residential status but employed in 
urban enterprises are required to be insured. Eligibility criteria include: (1) pre-
mium contribution of at least 12 months, (2) involuntary unemployment, (3) unem-
ployment registration at local social security authorities, and (4) willingness to 
work. Risk-pooling is conducted at the prefectural level. Employer bears the respon-
sibility of producing proof of terminated employment, which is an essential docu-
ment for the individual to register unemployment status at social insurance agency. 
The actual set of required documents varies across localities. For example, some 
local authorities require bank account statement and fingerprint authentication of 
the unemployed applicant.
Recipients of unemployment protection are required to report their job search 
efforts to local social insurance agency on a monthly basis. Failing to meet the 
reporting requirement may lead to the loss of cash benefits for that month. Aside 
from the qualifying eligibility stated above, a continuing eligibility is also imposed, 
requiring the recipient to actively seek, capable of, and available for work. 
Unemployment benefits shall terminate under several conditions, such as (1) re- 
employment, (2) emigration, (3) becoming eligible for old-age pension, and (4) 
refusal to take jobs recommended by the local authorities. China’s unemployment 
insurance system does not have a waiting period before benefits commence, and 
therefore, the cash allowance is provided from the date when unemployment regis-
tration is completed.
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Unemployment benefits in China are not earning-related, but are provided on a 
flat rate set by local governments. The actual rate varies across localities, but is typi-
cally between the level of MLG allowance and the level of minimum wage. In other 
words, the cash benefits are supposed to support daily subsistence only. The length 
of benefits also varies according to the recipient’s years of contribution. An indi-
vidual who has contributed for less than 5 years before unemployment may receive 
benefits for up to 12 months, while an individual with more than 10 years’ continu-
ous contribution may receive benefits for up to 24 months. It is widely criticized that 
the level of unemployment benefits is too low and the income replacement rate (less 
than 20%) is much lower than that of other countries (Jiang et al. 2018). In order to 
discourage recipients’ reliance on the insurance, the benefit payment is typically 
provided on a descending structure with elapse of time. The low level of financial 
protection stands in sharp contrast with the large surplus of the insurance funds, 
leading to doubts about the operational efficiency of the unemployment insurance 
scheme (Vodopivec and Tong 2008).
Given the shallow protection that it provides to Chinese citizens, the unemploy-
ment insurance is even less attractive to foreign nationals residing/working in China, 
although the government requires foreigners employed in China to participate in the 
insurance. Unemployment protection of foreigners has not yet become a major pol-
icy issue for the Chinese government, but according to the prevalent policy frame-
work, foreigners with legal employment status are required to participate in the 
unemployment insurance program that gives them the same access to basic financial 
protection. Chinese nationals residing in other countries are not eligible for unem-
ployment benefits in their home country.
4.2.2  Health Care
The Chinese health care system is dominated by public providers partially funded 
by the government, with private sector playing a supplementary role. Health insur-
ance and private out-of-pocket payment account for the lion’s share of providers’ 
incomes. Owing to a series of misaligned incentives created in China’s misguided 
health care reforms between 1980s and early 2000s, supplier-induced demand and 
the resultant vast provision of unnecessary care have been plaguing the Chinese 
health system for more than three decades. Health care costs escalate at rapid rate 
while financial accessibility remains a key barrier for many low-income people, 
despite the financial protection aided by China’s expanding social health insurance 
(He and Meng 2015).
Social health insurance is the most salient characteristic of the Chinese health 
financing system. Three schemes co-exist. Contributed by both employers and 
employees on a fixed formula, the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance 
(UEBMI) covers employees of the urban formal sector. The New Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (NCMS) insures rural households which receive generous pre-
mium subsidies from central and local governments. Also generously subsidized by 
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government, the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) covers those 
who are not protected by either UEBMI or NCMS.  The two urban schemes are 
operated by prefectural social security bureaus while the NCMS is managed by 
county-level health bureaus. The central government has been steering the integra-
tion of NCMS and URBMI since 2017, in order to reduce systemic inefficiency and 
inequity (He and Wu 2017).
Although NCMS and URBMI are designed as voluntary programs, their cover-
age is fairly wide, if not universal. Covering nearly the entire population, all three 
programs are mainly intended to protect enrolees against catastrophic medical 
expenditures. Both inpatient and outpatient care are included. Despite universal 
insurance coverage, the fragmentation of the social health insurance system has cre-
ated various negative consequences. In particular, depending on local condition and 
financing capacity, benefit package varies considerably across schemes and locali-
ties, leading to systematic inequity (He and Wu 2017). Financial protection of the 
NCMS and URBMI remains shallow.
For Chinese nationals, those formally employed, self-employed, and farmers can 
join social health insurance voluntarily, albeit to different schemes. Individual 
accounts still exist in many local schemes, from which individuals pay their outpa-
tient costs. Social pool benefits commence after individuals have paid deductibles. 
In principle, foreign nationals employed in China are required to join the UEBMI 
that gives them same level of financial protection as the Chinese citizens enjoy, but 
enforcement is not rigid in practice, as many foreigners own private health insur-
ance policies that also give them access to health services provided by both private 
and public hospitals. Self-employed foreign nationals are allowed to join the 
URBMI on a voluntary basis, but in reality the subscription rate is rather low.2 
Chinese nationals residing/working abroad are typically not protected by China’s 
social health insurance unless they have made regular contribution and receive care 
in China. Medical expenses incurred overseas are usually not reimbursable in the 
Chinese social health insurance system. In practice, any patient, regardless of 
nationality, can access China’s hospital services on an out-of-pocket basis.
Financial protection against sickness in China is predominantly provided through 
social or self-purchased commercial health insurance. There had been no nation-
wide cash benefit program in case of sickness until 2016, when the Chinese govern-
ment started to implement cash allowance schemes for the low-income disabled and 
those in severe disability. Administered by county and prefectural civil affairs 
authorities, respectively, the two schemes give eligible individuals monthly allow-
ance on a means-tested basis. Medical proof of the level of disability is a necessary 
requirement. However, the payment by these two new schemes is rather low, rang-
ing from 50 RMB to 100 RMB per month. Foreign nationals residing in China or 
Chinese nationals residing abroad are ineligible.
2 “How should foreign employees participate in China’s social security programs?”, People’s Daily 
(International Edition), May 31, 2014, retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2014/05- 
31/6233679.shtml
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4.2.3  Pensions
China’s urban old-age pension system is built on a three-layer structure. As the first 
layer, the so-called basic pension plan is a mandatory social pool that gives retirees 
a defined-benefit financed by a pay-as-you-go system. Employers contribute 22% of 
employees’ wages to a basic pension fund managed by prefectural social security 
bureaus. Employees with 15 years of contribution are eligible to receive basic pen-
sion income after retirement. In addition to the requirement of contribution history, 
the qualifying conditions also require that an employee must have reached the statu-
tory retirement age of 60 for men or 55 for women. The first tier ensures a replace-
ment rate of 35% of the city’s average wage after 15 years of contribution. Payment 
is subject to periodical adjustment according to an index combining local average 
wage and price inflation.
The second layer is a defined-contribution system fully funded by individual 
accounts. It requires compulsory contribution (approximately 8% of wage) from 
employees to their individual accounts. The target replacement rate of this layer is 
about 24%, assuming 15 years of continuous contribution and a monthly payment 
formula. The third layer is voluntary pensions including annuity programs of indi-
vidual firms, individual retirement plans, and other supplementary pension schemes 
that are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Overall, the first two layers constitute the mandatory part of China’s old-age pen-
sion system. Under normal circumstance, a retiree receives two distinct pensions. 
The first pension comes from the social pooling account based on the accumulation 
of employer’s contribution and benefit level depends on the average wage, the 
employee’s salary before retirement, and history of contribution. The second pen-
sion comes from the individual account financed entirely by the individual’s contri-
bution before retirement. Retrospective lump-sum contribution payment is possible, 
should an individual fail to meet contribution requirement but wish to claim pension 
after retirement.
Not until the recent decade has China instituted old-age pension schemes for the 
vast rural population and the urban population that is not protected by the employ-
ees’ pension programs. The Urban-Rural Resident Basic Social Pension Scheme 
(URRSP) covers rural residents and urban residents excluded from other pension 
systems. This scheme is also a combination of basic social-pooling fund and an 
individual account, while the former is not accumulated by employers’ contribution 
but subsidized by central and local governments. The URRSP pays recipients in flat 
rate, regardless of income or contribution. However, large disparity of monetary 
benefits exists among localities, reflecting local socioeconomic status and generos-
ity of government subsidies (Tao 2016; Zhu and Walker 2018). In principle, both 
employed and self-employed foreign nationals may voluntarily participate in the 
URRSP but the situation is rare, largely owing to its low level of financial protection 
which is hardly attractive to foreign nationals.
Foreign nationals employed in China are required to contribute to the urban 
employee pension scheme on the same conditions and entitlements as their Chinese 
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counterparts apply, but actual enforcement varies while exemptions are given to 
nationals of selected countries which have signed bilateral social security agree-
ments with China. Chinese nationals residing/working abroad are normally excluded 
from the old-age pension system at home, with exception given to the expatriate 
personnel who may continue their contribution. A retiree residing abroad can still 
receive pension payment provide that he or she has made 15 years of contribution 
and remains a Chinese citizen, despite overseas residence. In collaboration with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
has simplified the procedures for this group of Chinese retirees to claim pension 
overseas. An annual endorsement certifying the retired individual’s foreign resi-
dence status must be issued by the Chinese embassy or consulate office.
4.2.4  Family Benefits
All employed women in China, independently of their nationality, are entitled to 
statutory paid maternity leave of up to 98 calendar days (14 weeks; 15 days before 
and 83  days after delivery). The standard qualifying period is between 12 and 
24 months. The provision was extended from 90 days in 2012, in order to meet the 
maternity leave suggested by the International Labour Organization. Despite this 
centrally set maternity leave provision, there is significant local variation. Many 
local governments have further extended maternity leave, ranging from 128 days 
(such as Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, etc.) to 190 days (Hainan and Henan). 
In light of the relaxation of the One Child Policy, the Chinese government has 
adopted a variety of policy measures to encourage birth. For instance, female 
employees who have made more than one birth are entitled to an additional 15 days 
of leave for each additional birth. Moreover, a female employee who gives birth to 
her first child at age 24 or above is regarded as a case of “late childbirth”, and is 
entitled to an additional “late maternity leave” of approximately 4–5 weeks on aver-
age (local variation exists). Women who are unemployed, self-employed, or flexibly 
employed are not entitled to maternity leave.
All employers in China are responsible to contribute to mandatory maternity 
insurance while employees are exempted from contribution. The insurance fund 
forms the pool from which employers pay full salary to their female employees in 
the name of maternity allowance. In the rare event that the female employee does 
not participate in the maternity insurance, the employer is responsible to pay the full 
cash benefit from its own welfare fund. The maternity allowance is made retrospec-
tively. Central government ordinance stipulates that female employees shall be 
granted with at least one breast-feeding hour per day during the “breast-feeding 
period” of up to 1 year, but actual enforcement is not rigid and may vary signifi-
cantly among employers.
There is no centrally stipulated paternity benefit in China. The central govern-
ment has encouraged local authorities to introduce more family-friendly policies 
since the relaxation of the One Child Policy. Most localities offer paid paternity 
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leave to male employees, with the actual provision varying from 10 to 30 days. 
Full salary is payable from the maternity insurance fund, or by employers, depend-
ing on local policies.
Foreign employees in China are entitled to both paid maternity leave and pater-
nity leave, but female employees are not eligible for the late maternity leave that 
applies to Chinese nationals only. The maternity allowance and paternity allowance 
apply to foreign employees who are enrolled to the maternity insurance scheme. 
Chinese nationals residing abroad are not entitled to any of the aforementioned 
benefits. China has not yet introduced parental benefits or child benefits.
4.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
As mentioned above, China’s last-resort social protection program is the Minimum 
Livelihood Guarantee Scheme (MLG), or dibao. Centrally organized by the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs, the actual administration of MLG is by local governments. The 
financing formula of this scheme combines local taxation and central fiscal subsi-
dies. The MLG started as an urban scheme in 1999 while the rural MLG was estab-
lished nationwide in 2004 and has experienced impressive development since then.
Any household whose per capita income falls below a locally determined mini-
mum living standard is eligible to apply MLG. MLG benefits are paid in the form of 
cash allowance that is supposed to be sufficient to cover the costs of basic necessi-
ties. Means-test is necessary and is usually conducted in a fairly rigid manner. 
Applicants must meet both income and assets criteria set by local governments. 
Other cash benefits such as medical assistance and education allowance have been 
provided to MLG recipients in recent years. The generosity of MLG payment also 
varies considerably across localities, contingent largely on the level of socioeco-
nomic status and fiscal capacity of local governments (Solinger and Hu 2012). 
Despite the rising generosity of MLG in recent years, it is widely seen that its effect 
in poverty reduction could have been more significant, especially in the rural areas 
(Li and Walker 2018; Guo et al. 2017).
The MLG scheme started with no requirement for active reemployment, but in 
recent years, many local governments have introduced a series of measures to solve 
the incentive problem, including job-search allowance. Some cities, such as 
Guangzhou, now require MLG recipients with working ability to participate in 
community service. The eligibility of MLG is strictly tied to local hukou that is 
granted to Mainland Chinese citizens only, and therefore, foreign nationals residing/
working in China are not protected by this scheme. In principle, Chinese nationals 
living abroad are not eligible to apply MLG either, even in possession of local 
hukou, because the status of local residence is a necessary eligibility condition. In 
practice, either situation is extremely rare.
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4.2.6  Obstacles and Bilateral/Multilateral Social 
Security Agreements
There are few obstacles for foreign employees to participate in the Chinese social 
insurance programs. In the formal sector where participation enforcement is rela-
tively rigid, monthly contribution is automatically deducted from one’s payroll, and 
therefore, contribution leakages tend to be small. Self-employed and unemployed 
foreigners are eligible to join insurance schemes designated for urban residents 
(such as URBMI and URRSP), but their participation is entirely a personal decision. 
Some social security benefits are available to Chinese nationals only (such as MLG, 
disability allowance, and late maternity leave). The take up of social benefits does 
not affect foreigners’ access to residence permits nor their family reunification 
in China.
On the other hand, China is a member of several loosely-organized regional 
cooperation networks, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Greater Mekong Subregion Economic 
Cooperation, but multilateral social security cooperation has not yet become an 
issue of concern in these institutions. To date, China has signed bilateral social secu-
rity agreements with 10 countries, namely, Germany, Republic of Korea, Denmark, 
Finland, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Luxemburg. 
These agreements grant mutual exemption of selected social security contributions 
to Chinese employees working in these countries, as well as employees of these 
countries who work in China. In practice, nationals of these selected countries may 
decide whether or not to participate in China’s social insurance program, as the 
agreements do not exclude them from the system.
4.3  Conclusions
China has made impressive strides in social security development in the past two 
decades. Now, major segments of the population—the urban employed, farmers, 
and the urban unemployed—have been covered. Notwithstanding criticism on shal-
low protection and inequality, the way in which welfare reforms have been under-
taken is arguably an appropriate strategy for such a huge country with vast regional 
disparities. The achievements made thus far are attributable to China’s program-
matic strategy of first achieving wide but shallow coverage before expanding ben-
efits (Yu 2015).
Moving forward, three key tasks are high on the government’s agenda of social 
security reforms. The first is to consolidate the fragmented social insurance system, 
especially in retirement protection and health care. Financial protection will be 
4 Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, Emigrants and Resident Nationals…
88
steadily increased for urban and rural residents, reducing the vast gap in entitle-
ments among different schemes. The second is to strengthen administrative capacity 
of social security institutions and adopt the best practice of welfare governance. 
Operational efficiency of social security programs is expected to improve (Liu and 
He 2018). The third is to make proactive and strategic preparations for the rapidly 
ageing population. For instance, long-term care insurance is now being experi-
mented in some cities (Yang et al. 2016). Tremendous investment has been made to 
foster the development of elderly care network.
Migration is certainly a key issue for social security systems, but internal rural- 
to- urban migration is much more significant for the Chinese system when compared 
to international migration. Approximately 280 million migrant workers—more than 
half of the entire European Union’s population—reside in Chinese cities and have 
made an enormous contribution to the country’s economic achievement.3 Due to the 
hukou restriction, most migrant workers were excluded from- or had limited access 
to the urban welfare system (Gao et  al. 2012; Wong et  al. 2007). This systemic 
inequality had long been the subject of international as well as scholarly criticism. 
While significant government efforts have been paid to reduce the inequality in the 
past years, social protection of this vulnerable group of population remains a critical 
policy problem.
Transnational immigration is an issue of lower policy significance for the Chinese 
social security authorities, as there are merely 850,000 documented foreigners 
engaging in full-time employment in China (Center for China and Globalization 
2014). Nevertheless, the Chinese government is certainly not blind to the social 
protection needs of this non-national population. Most contributory social insurance 
programs have required foreign residents with legal employment status to join. 
The participants, therefore, are granted with access to unemployment benefits, 
health care services, contributory old-age pension, and maternity benefits. Yet, a few 
programs have not yet included foreign nationals, such as guaranteed minimum 
income and disability allowance. However, a much larger population of self-
employed and undocumented foreigners reside in China. Getting this group of peo-
ple included into the social security system is a much thornier task (Hanley and Wen 
2017). Compared to their fellow citizens at home, Chinese nationals residing abroad 
are excluded from most social security benefits in China, except old-age pension, 
provide that qualifying period of contribution is met.
Overall, China represents an interesting case to observe how a rising developing 
country confronts and tackles the variety of social security issues and challenges 
brought about by rapid and extensive cross-border personnel movements. Yet, the 
issue of (international) migrants’ access to social security is much less pronounced 
in China, as compared to what many European countries have been experiencing. 
The extraordinary size of the Chinese population makes the number of foreigners 
appears very small. Moreover, the Chinese social security system has been 




undergoing gradual expansion in both coverage and benefits, without much popular 
fear about welfare retrenchment. As explained above, the current provision of social 
security benefits is largely unattractive to foreign nationals. Therefore, there is no 
evidence of welfare chauvinism in the Chinese society till now. The policy efforts 
spent thus far are apparently towards a more inclusive approach. Moving forward, 
with further development of China’s social security system and growing number of 
immigrants and emigrants, how the Chinese government responds to new chal-
lenges warrants close attention.
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This chapter offers an overview of the recent policy developments initiated by the 
government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China hereafter) in the area 
of social protection of its citizens living abroad. Chinese leaders regularly empha-
sise the importance of China’s sizeable overseas population towards achieving 
China’s goals of socio-economic development, technological advancements, and 
territorial sovereignty. The 2018 State Council Report on the Protection of Overseas 
Chinese Rights and Interests stresses that ‘the overseas Chinese have an irreplace-
able important role in realizing the Chinese dream’.1 Since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, China’s imperial officials and reformers – and latterly, its revolutionaries – have 
recognised the socio-economic value and political potential of overseas Chinese for 
their homeland. For example, Sun Yatsen, the leader of the 1911 Revolution, widely 
viewed as the father of modern China, famously called overseas Chinese ‘the 
Mother of the revolution’.
Recent official estimates put the number of overseas Chinese nationals at six 
million,2 with the following five countries hosting the largest numbers of China- 
born population: the United States (US-2,335,000 residents born in China according 
1 Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress. (2018). 国务院关于华侨权益保护
工作情况的报告 [Report of the state council of protection of overseas Chinese rights and inter-
ests”]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-04/25/content_2053574.htm. Accessed 4 
March 2019.
2 See footnote 1.
E. Barabantseva (*) · T. Wang 
University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
e-mail: E.V.Barabantseva@manchester.ac.uk
94
to the 2016 data of the US Census Bureau),3 Canada (649,260 according to 2016 
Census),4 Japan (878,000 by media estimates in 2017),5 Australia (318,969 accord-
ing to the 2011 Census),6 and the United Kingdom (UK- 182,628 residents born in 
China according to the 2015 Census).7 Characterised as a ‘high-end’ wave of 
Chinese migration, it was made possible by the government relaxation of institu-
tional and legal barriers for leaving China that opened up opportunities for highly- 
skilled and well-off people to seek new educational, investment, and career prospects 
abroad (Xiang 2016). The majority of these ‘new migrants’ left China after the 
beginning of reforms in the late 1970s and are now the main target of the state dias-
pora policies.
“Overseas Chinese affairs work” (qiaowu gongzuo 侨务工作) is the traditional 
term that the PRC uses to refer to its policies towards Chinese people abroad and it 
has not changed since the Mao era (1949–1975). The range of state activities, how-
ever, has in recent decades expanded in multiple directions, including flexible exit 
and entry arrangements, incentives for investments, favourable social protection for 
overseas Chinese returnees, soft power projection, and pro-China propaganda.8 
Since the late 1970s, when China introduced pro-market reforms and became 
single- mindedly focused on economic growth, the core of “Overseas Chinese affairs 
work” has been economic policies. Policymakers across the country try every means 
to entice Chinese diaspora to invest in China, using tax exemption, cheap land, low- 
interest loans and even free cash.
As China’s economic engine has begun to shift from manufacturing to technol-
ogy, recruiting overseas Chinese talent has become a new mission. Scientists, pro-
fessors, and bankers of Chinese descent have frequently been recruited back to 
3 Zong, Jie and Batalova, Jeanne. (2017). Chinese Immigrants in the United States. Migration 
Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chinese-immigrants-united-states. 
Accessed 12 June 2019.
4 Statistics Canada (2019). Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity Highlight Tables – Immigrant 
population by place of birth, period of immigration, 2016 counts, both sexes, age (total), Canada, 
2016 Census  – 25% sample data, https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/
hlt-fst/imm/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=21&Geo=01&SO=4D. Accessed 12 June 2019.
5 Schreiber, M. (2018). Media stews over growing Chinese numbers in Japan. The Japan Times. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/14/national/media-national/media-stews-growing-
chinese-numbers-japan/#.XP-artNKjdc. Accessed 12 June 2019.
6 Department of Social Services of the Australian Government (2014). The China-Born Community. 
https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-services/programs-policy/a-multicultural- 
australia/progra ms-and-publications/community-information-summaries/the-china-born-com-
munity. Accessed 12 June 2019.
7 Office for National Statistics (2018). Table 1.3: Overseas-born population in the United Kingdom, 
excluding some residents in communal establishments, by sex, by country of birth, January 2017 
to December 2017, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmi-
gration/internationalmigration/methodologies/populationbycountryofbirthandnationalityqmi. 
Accessed 12 June 2019.
8 Overseas Chinese Affairs Cadres’ School of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State 
Council (2015). Q&A on Policies and Regulations about Overseas Chinese Affairs. Beijing: Shijie 
Zhishi Press.
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China, often with incredibly generous offers. By contrast, when it comes to social 
welfare protection of Chinese nationals living abroad, the resources provided by the 
government are stunningly sparse. In this chapter, we show how China’s welfare 
policies towards its nationals abroad varies from one field to another. We find that 
under almost any circumstances including unemployment, medical emergency and 
economic hardship, Chinese consulates do not provide financial assistance to citi-
zens abroad. Social protection is limited to providing information, visa arrange-
ments, contacting family members in China and other logistical support. Outside of 
crisis situations affecting a large number of Chinese workers overseas, the areas of 
social welfare and protection of nationals abroad remain largely outside of the 
state’s concern.
5.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
Since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power in 2012, overseas Chinese have been given an 
increasingly important role in China’s soft power strategy abroad including cultural 
and educational exchanges, internationalisation of Chinese media, and transmission 
of Chinese culture and language (Ding 2015: 235). Furthermore, with the growing 
expansion of China’s “Go Global” policies and their most recent reincarnation of 
the “One Belt, One Road” initiative introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013, the impera-
tive nature of overseas Chinese citizens’ protection has increased. With the expan-
sion of Chinese development and infrastructure projects abroad, the exposure to 
social unrest, violence and political volatility among Chinese nationals working on 
overseas projects has increased. Since the attacks on Chinese workers in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan in 2004, and a major rescue operation in East Timor in 2006, overseas 
citizens’ protection has become a ‘new diplomatic imperative’ (Zerba 2014: 1094). 
In 2011, China carried out the first large-scale evacuation operation of 35,000 
Chinese nationals from the civil war in Libya (Zerba 2014). The significance of 
such operations for China’s global image-making is reiterated by the fact that they 
have informed the storylines of state-funded nationalistic blockbusters such as Wolf 
Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea (Connolly 2019). This latest phase in the evolu-
tion of China’s policies towards its nationals abroad builds on the long history of 
diaspora engagement. The surprisingly high number of Chinese residing in Libya is 
simply the tip of the iceberg of China’s diaspora across the world. Indeed, the bond 
between China and its diaspora communities has never been weak.
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5.2.1  The Chinese Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
The Chinese diaspora has historically played a central role in the Chinese national 
projects of modernisation and development. Since the late nineteenth century, when 
a sizeable number of Chinese migrants started settling in Asia, the Americas, and 
Europe, Chinese rulers recognised the potential economic and political role that 
these communities could play in realising China’s transformational objectives. In 
recognition of the hardship and plight of Chinese labourers overseas, the first 
nationality law of 1909 introduced by the Qing Imperial Court adopted the jus san-
guinis principle and offered them consular protection. This law was predicated on 
the idea that all people of Chinese descent are members of the Chinese nation and 
should be protected by its government. During the late 19th - early twentieth cen-
tury’s revolutionary campaign led by Sun Yat-sen against the dynastic rule of the 
Qing and foreign domination, overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and 
the US were central to his efforts to raise funds for the national survival project. 
Although the dual citizenship principle was repudiated in favour of the single citi-
zenship by the PRC government in 1956, state policies towards overseas communi-
ties have developed into an area of important ideological and economic policy 
activities. In the pre-reform period, overseas Chinese communities were part of the 
United Front campaign which was dedicated to the revolutionary struggle, while in 
the post-reform period, modernisation became its foremost goal. Historically, the 
main objective of China’s engagement with its overseas populations has been 
improving China’s “international image, promoting China’s domestic and foreign 
advancement, and raising the status of the OC in their places of residence” (To 2014).
Most official pronouncements about state policies towards overseas Chinese 
begin with an estimation of the number of Chinese living abroad. In the 1990s, 
Chinese policymakers gave the number of 30 million overseas Chinese worldwide, 
which ambiguously referred to overseas Chinese nationals (huaqiao) and people of 
Chinese descent (huaren) (Zhao 1994: 8). By 2017, according to official publica-
tions, this figure had doubled to 60 million (Wang and Kang 2017). Developing a 
comprehensive and complex apparatus to include overseas Chinese into China’s 
domestic reforms and overseas strategies has become an essential part of China’s 
post-1978 development model. Central to this project are China’s goals of economic 
and technological development, revival of national strength, and growing global 
influence. The protection of rights and interests belonging to overseas Chinese is 
enshrined in the Constitution of the PRC, with Article 50 specifically dedicated to 
the subjects of overseas Chinese and returned overseas Chinese. It states: “The 
People’s Republic of China protects the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese 
nationals residing abroad and protects the lawful rights and interests of returned 
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overseas Chinese and of the family members of Chinese nationals residing abroad”.9 
This area of state activities has been in constant fluctuation.
5.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
The institutional network involved in delivering China’s diaspora policy is vast, 
ranging from government agencies, party apparatus, and non-governmental associa-
tions to consulates, embassies and representative organizations across the globe. It 
is not only enormous in size, but also complex. Owing to a unique party-state sys-
tem, there is a fine line between state and party, between legislative and executive 
branches, and between governmental and non-governmental agencies.
In terms of international infrastructure, the PRC has an extensive consular net-
work in 178 countries across the world, in addition to mobile consular services in 
areas where there is no physical consulate in operation. In each consulate, there is 
usually a department named Overseas Chinese Team tasked to deal with diaspora 
issues. This team consists of career diplomats appointed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It is the first official contact point for Chinese abroad who need consular 
services and social protection. Beyond the bricks and mortar of Chinese consulates, 
semi-governmental agencies are set up all over the globe. For example, in 2004, the 
government launched Confucius Institutes around the world with the mission to 
promote Chinese culture and language. Although primarily aimed at foreign popu-
lations, Confucius Institutes work actively with Chinese consulates. In addition, the 
Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA), operating across university 
campuses outside of China, also plays a role in the diaspora infrastructure. By hold-
ing cultural events such as annual Chinese New Year galas and food festivals, the 
CSSA fosters new links connecting Chinese diaspora communities with overseas 
Chinese students. Since 2014, a network of grassroots Overseas Chinese Mutual 
Aid Centres staffed by volunteers and receiving support from and acknowledgment 
by the Chinese central government have started appearing around the world.
These institutions abroad, however, should be considered as an extension and the 
tip of the iceberg of the massive superstructure within China. Domestically, at the 
centre of this superstructure are five interrelated governmental and party institu-
tions, also known as five qiao (wu qiao 五侨) (Liu and van Dongen 2016). “The big 
five” are: the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Hong 
Kong, Macau, Taiwan Compatriots and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, and the China 
Zhi Gong Party.
9 The National People’s Congress (2004). Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. http://
www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm. Accessed 4 March 2019.
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Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) of the State Council stands at the core 
of China’s diaspora infrastructure. Once a ministry, in 2018 it was merged into a 
party apparatus of the Communist Party of China (CPC), namely, the United Front 
Work Department of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.10 The OCAO is 
an overarching unit in charge of proposing laws and regulations regarding overseas 
Chinese, coordinating, supervising and implementing China’s diaspora policies 
throughout all levels of the government. It also formulates and promotes China’s 
soft power agenda abroad and provides guidance for overseas Chinese 
organizations.
The National People’s Congress is the PRC’s legislative branch. The Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Committee is thus a legislative sub-organization with a specific 
duty in the area of diaspora issues. Currently consisting of 20 members, the 
Committee proposes and evaluates laws related to overseas Chinese; monitors exec-
utive branch performance and reports any inconsistencies when the executive branch 
does not follow the Constitution and national laws; undertakes hearings; and gathers 
information and investigates issues relevant to diaspora.11
The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), in practice, is the country’s top political advisory body, a 
restricted version of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords. In China’s party-state 
system, the main mission of the CPPCC is to draw support for the CPC among non- 
party members including Chinese nationals residing abroad. At the CPPCC, the 
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan Compatriots and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee 
handles issues related to Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and overseas Chinese.
The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese is a “non-governmental 
organization” under the leadership of the CPC. Although its main task is focused on 
returned overseas Chinese, the organization is also in charge of addressing the needs 
of nationals residing abroad. Unlike governmental organizations in China, the 
Federation has its emphasis on public diplomacy. This is reflected in its own slogan: 
“consolidating old friendship and broadening new friendship.”
The China Zhi Gong Party is one of the eight minor parties that are legally per-
mitted but are subordinate to the Communist Party of China. The Zhi Gong Party 
largely consists of returned overseas Chinese, their relatives, and those who have 
overseas connections. Its core mission is to maintain ties with overseas Chinese 
communities, using its intermediate role to promote Chinese culture and language, 
and most importantly, developing pro-China patriotism among Chinese nationals 
residing abroad.
Each of “The Big Five” is a national institution which maintains a top-down 
hierarchy ranging from national, provincial to local offices. Besides “The Big Five”, 
10 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (2018). 深化党和国家机构改革方案 [The plan 
for deepening the reform of party and state institutions]. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/
content_5276191.htm#1. Accessed 18 October 2018.
11 The National People’s Congress (1982). 中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会组织法 [Organic 
law of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/
wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4425.htm. Accessed 30 October 2018.
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many semi-official organizations such as the China Overseas Exchange Association 
serve as peripheral institutions of China’s diaspora infrastructure. In addition, schol-
ars estimate that several tens of thousands of grassroots overseas Chinese associa-
tions organized on the principle of kinship, place of birth, educational and 
professional affiliation and business networking are active worldwide (Liu and van 
Dongen 2016: 817).
5.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
The Chinese state’s engagement with its nationals abroad places an overwhelming 
emphasis on encouraging investment and return of overseas Chinese talent back 
to China.
In China, foreigners’ investment in the private sector enjoys a privileged status 
with substantial benefits, as the government is particularly interested in attracting 
foreign direct investment. Interestingly, investment by Chinese nationals residing 
abroad is treated as foreign direct investment. Furthermore, the equipment, vehicles 
and consumer goods that overseas Chinese import are exempted from import duty 
and commercial tax. In instances where overseas Chinese run companies that pro-
duce goods for export, the imported raw materials, components, equipment, and 
fuel are exempted from import duty and commercial tax. The final products for 
export are also exempted from export duty.12
In addition, the OCAO, in coordination with local governments, brought about a 
variety of policies to promote overseas Chinese business start-ups. For example, 
“Dream Incubators of Overseas Chinese” is a programme which aims to help over-
seas Chinese to develop new companies in China. Run by local governments, the 
incubators offer office space, low interest loans, government subsidies, and tax 
deduction among other incentives.
Investment in real estate in China is not particularly encouraged, given the satu-
rated housing market. Chinese nationals residing abroad are allowed to purchase 
only one residential property for personal use. Although it appears to be a restric-
tion, this policy is actually in favour of overseas Chinese when it comes to metro-
politan cities. In Beijing, for example, the government has placed a cap on who is 
eligible to buy residential properties in order to control skyrocketing housing prices. 
Only those who are registered in Beijing’s household system or have worked in 
Beijing for more than five years are permitted to buy. The Chinese citizens residing 
abroad, however, are required to revoke their household certificate before leaving 
the country. Thus, the special housing policy allows them to purchase one property 
12 The State Council (1990). 国务院关于鼓励华侨和香港澳门同胞投资的规定 [Regulations on 
encouragement of investments from overseas Chinese and Hong Kong and Macao compatriots]. 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/f/200207/20020700031072.html. Accessed 19 October 
2018.
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in a highly restricted market, regardless of their household certificate or work-
ing years.13
Not only overseas Chinese investment, but also overseas Chinese professionals 
are actively encouraged to return to China. Mainly targeting overseas Chinese, the 
government initiated the “Thousand Talents Plan” in 2008.14 This policy aims to 
bring about 2000 “top international talents” within five to 10 years to China, includ-
ing scientists, researchers, entrepreneurs, and bankers. The recruited overseas 
Chinese usually hold full professorships in elite universities in the West, or manage-
ment positions in multinational companies or international banks. The benefits that 
come with the plan are enormously attractive, even in comparison to similar posi-
tions worldwide. It is common for these scientists to be awarded research grants in 
excess of $1.5 million, annual salaries of $150,000, in addition to generous bonuses 
and housing allowance.15 Indeed, some universities even advertise positions offer-
ing research grants of up to $15 million.16
Young overseas Chinese talent is also a target of overseas Chinese policies. 
When applying for Chinese universities, overseas Chinese high school students 
receive bonus points for the National College Entrance Exam (gaokao 高考). Once 
admitted, there are scholarships exclusively aimed at this group of overseas Chinese. 
The scholarships start at 4000 RMB ($600) on an annual basis and can be as high as 
30,000 RMB ($4500) per year. Each year, the government offers scholarships to 
thousands of students from overseas Chinese families.
Compared to their considerable efforts to attract investment and talent, consular 
services and social protection provided by the Chinese government to overseas 
Chinese are a recent development and remain limited. Information outlets including 
the “Consular Voice” (ling shi zhi shen 领事之声) on social media, an emergency 
hotline, and the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12308” (wai jiao bu 外交部12,308) 
smartphone application were set up to announce security warnings and important 
information concerning overseas Chinese. A gradual improvement in the area of 
“overseas citizen protection” (haiwai gongmin baohu 海外公民保护) has been 
developed in response to the mounting pressure to protect the growing number of 
Chinese nationals working on China’s overseas infrastructure projects. The 
13 Chinaqw (2016). 华侨、华人如何在中国买房?需要注意这些程序 [How should overseas 
Chinese buy properties in China? Note this procedure]. http://www.chinaqw.com/
sqfg/2016/07-08/94588.shtml. Accessed 4 March 2019.
14 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (2008). 中央人才工作协调小组关于实施海外
高层次人才引进计划的意见 (千人计划) [Opinion by the central committee of CPC human 
resources coordinating team about the plan of recruiting leading international talents, also known 
as the thousand talents plan]. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/244800/244856/18246001.html. 
Accessed 3 November 2018.
15 Harbin Institute of Technology (2015). 哈尔滨工业大学诚聘‘千人计划’人选 [Harbin 
Institute of Technology to recruit candidates of the Thousand Talents Plan]. http://www.hit.edu.
cn/282/list.htm. Accessed 4 March 2019.
16 Western Returned Scholars Association (2018). 2018年千人计划即将启动 补贴最高450万 
[2018 Thousand Talents Plan to start, subsidy up to 4.5 million]. http://www.wrsa.net/con-
tent_40351214.htm. Accessed 4 March 2019.
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Department of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a division 
for consular protection in May 2006 with its subsequent upgrade in 2007 to the 
Centre for Consular Assistance and Protection (Zerba 2014). Although in recent 
years China has expanded the network of its consular support, improved emergency 
response and protection mechanisms of its citizens abroad, they remain limited out-
side of large-scale emergencies such as the Libya operation. By and large, Chinese 
consulates have a laissez-faire policy toward the social welfare of its nationals 
abroad. They do not, for example, offer any type of financial help such as subsidis-
ing medical costs, flights or hotels under any circumstances.
5.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in the PRC
The engagement of the PRC’s consular network, diaspora institutions and ministries 
in the area of social protection of Chinese nationals abroad is restricted. According 
to the Report of the State Council on the Protection of Overseas Chinese Rights and 
Interests that was adopted at the second meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
13th National People’s Congress in April 2018, “the rights and interests of overseas 
Chinese” are protected by law.17 The report provides an overview of the govern-
ment’s activities in the following three areas of overseas Chinese affairs: legal pro-
tection of the rights and interests of overseas Chinese; expansion of the mechanism 
to implement overseas Chinese policies; and propaganda among the overseas 
Chinese communities. In the area of social protection regarding the interests and 
rights of overseas Chinese, the report emphasises the right of the overseas Chinese 
to return to China in accordance with the “Regulations on the Procedures for the 
Return of Chinese to Settlement”.18
Chinese schools abroad have traditionally constituted one of the central pillars 
(along with Chinese media and associations) of China’s diaspora policies and have 
been a major source for identity orientation providing linguistic and cultural sociali-
sation for new generations of overseas Chinese. They promote new kinds of global 
Chinese identities while maintaining strong cultural ties to their diasporic home 
(Ding 2015; Pieke 2012). By the 2010s, over 1000 supplementary Chinese language 
schools operated around the globe. In the United States alone, the Chinese School 
Association had 433 member schools listed on its website in 2019.19 The right to 
17 Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress (2018). 国务院关于华侨权益保护
工作情况的报告 [Report of the state council of protection of overseas Chinese rights and inter-
ests”]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-04/25/content_2053574.htm. Accessed 4 
March 2019.
18 China Overseas Network (2017). 华侨回国定居应如何办理手续?[How should overseas 
Chinese return to China to settle down]. http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2017/0207/41734.shtml. 
Accessed 10 November 2018.
19 Chinese School Association in the United States (2019) 全美中文学校协会简介 [About the 
Chinese School Association in the United States]. http://csaus.org/FHFRONT/csaus/about.jsp. 
Accessed 19 March 2019.
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education for the children of overseas Chinese is guaranteed in the PRC with two 
institutions of higher education, Jinan and Huaqiao Universities, recruiting returned 
overseas Chinese students.
The protection of social insurance rights and interests of overseas Chinese is 
administered by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security20 in accor-
dance with the Law on Social Insurance.21 The PRC grants more social rights and 
economic opportunities to overseas Chinese returnees in China rather than to the 
Chinese communities abroad. The Guidance on China’s Consular Protection and 
Assistance (2018) is the latest document outlining government policies and services 
for nationals abroad.22 It details the services that Chinese consular offices provide, 
in particular available sources of information and links to current government poli-
cies. The consular activities are limited to the traditional domains of consular pro-
tection, including provision of notarizations, certifications, and other 
document-related services. In case of health emergencies, the consulate can provide 
assistance with accessing health and legal aid, and repatriation in case of death, yet 
the cost of these services is covered by the person concerned or their family in 
China. As our survey of the government activities in the area of social protection of 
overseas Chinese shows, outside of large-scale operations, like the Libya crisis that 
affected a substantial number of Chinese nationals and cost the government 1 bil-
lion RMB, government agencies limit their protection of citizens abroad to the area 
of information rather than service provision.
5.3.1  Unemployment
In the area of unemployment, Chinese state institutions offer minimal support to 
overseas Chinese. The Guidance on China’s Consular Protection and Assistance 
(2018) clearly states that Chinese consulates cannot offer any type of financial help 
to Chinese nationals abroad under any circumstances. This includes the loss of 
income and unemployment abroad. The consulate services have a function to inform 
the family in China of the overseas Chinese about their financial difficulties and can 
advise the family on how to transfer the funds needed.
20 Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (2009). 关于进一步做好在国内就业的华侨
参加社会保险有关工作的通知 [Notice on the overseas Chinese participation in social insurance 
for further employment]. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-10/30/content_1452856.htm. Accessed 4 
March 2019.
21 The National People’s Congress (2010). 中华人民共和国社会保险法 [PRC’s Social Insurance 
Law]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2010-10/28/content_1602435.htm. Accessed 4 
March 2019.
22 The Consular Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). 中国领事保护和协
助指南 [Guidance on China’s consular protection and assistance]. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press.
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5.3.2  Health Care
In the area of health care, the government institutions offer updates on health risks 
and healthcare provision on their website.23 In January 2018, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs introduced a new service on Weibo (Chinese version of Twitter) called 
Consular Voice (ling shi zhi shen 领事之声) where it publicizes consular updates 
and announces important information concerning overseas Chinese, including 
healthcare.
There is no national policy requiring Chinese consulates to assist overseas 
Chinese to access health insurance and benefits in China. In the PRC, participation 
in the medical insurance fund is arranged through the domestic employer in line 
with the 2011 Social Insurance Law. However, Chinese nationals residing abroad 
can maintain a form of health coverage in China if they continue to contribute to the 
National Health Insurance programme (yiliao baoxian 医疗保险).24 In case of med-
ical emergency abroad, Chinese consulates do not provide medical services on their 
premises and do not provide any cash payments. Yet, they can supply a list of local 
medical institutions in the country of residence and assist the person to contact their 
family in China. The consulate’s assistance in this area is limited to providing infor-
mation about available services (legal support, translation services or medical care 
providers), but the cost of services and repatriation has to be covered by the person 
concerned or their family in China.25 If a Chinese national abroad develops a serious 
health issue and their family in China cannot make arrangements for their repatria-
tion or arrange medical care, a Chinese consulate employee will assist family mem-
bers with visa arrangements. However, all related medical, travel and other costs 
will have to be covered by the person concerned or their family in China.26
5.3.3  Pensions
According to the “Notice regarding benefits issues involving the retired and resigned 
personnel residing abroad”,27 overseas Chinese retirees should be treated equally 
with retired nationals domestically.
23 http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/. Accessed 6 April 2020.
24 The National People’s Congress (2010). 中华人民共和国社会保险法 [PRC’s Social Insurance 
Law]. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2010-10/28/content_1602435.htm. Accessed 4 
March 2019.
25 See footnote 22.
26 See footnote 22.
27 Overseas Chinese Affairs Cadres’ School of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State 
Council (2015). Q&A on Policies and Regulations about Overseas Chinese Affairs. Beijing: Shijie 
Zhishi Press.
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The legal framework in the area of retirement is regulated by the PRC’s Social 
Insurance Law (2011) and the “Implementation of the PRC’s Social Insurance 
Law”. Overseas Chinese can receive pensions abroad if they satisfy two conditions: 
1) have participated in the national basic old-age insurance scheme and have con-
tributed to it for at least 15 years, and 2) have reached the legal retirement age. To 
receive a pension, the person has to complete relevant procedures and obtain a pen-
sion account in China. The procedures for pension registrations vary across local 
social insurance agencies, and the claimant is advised to consult the local social 
insurance office in their residential area. Applicants can visit the website of the 
social insurance department where the pension is located or call the local 12,333 
consular support line to find out about the specific policy.28
To receive pension funds abroad, retired overseas Chinese who satisfy the crite-
ria for pension payments must present a life certificate entitled “Declaration Form 
for Exit and Retirement of Persons’ Retirement”, issued by Chinese embassies and 
consulates abroad, at least annually at the social insurance agencies responsible for 
pension payments. Overseas Chinese can also entrust relatives or others in China to 
receive pension payments.
As mentioned above, provisions for participation in the pension scheme by over-
seas Chinese vary from one province to another. In accordance with Article 24 of 
Zhejiang Province’s “Regulations regarding protection of the rights and interests of 
overseas Chinese” (2018), if an overseas Chinese originating from the province 
contributes to the pension account for less than 10 years, they can contribute to it for 
another five years. If the payment is still insufficient for the minimum payment 
period set by the state after five years, it may be paid in one lump sum to the mini-
mum payment period stipulated by the state.29
As opposed to Chinese retirees residing abroad, one emerging policy area con-
cerns Chinese citizens working abroad. Since 2011, China has signed social secu-
rity agreements with 12 countries, including Germany, South Korea, Denmark, 
Finland, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Luxembourg, Serbia, 
and Japan (China Business Law Journal 2018). The main purpose of the agreement 
is to ensure that international migrant workers do not pay double social security 
taxes. Without such agreements, Chinese employees working in Luxembourg, for 
example, would have had to contribute to Luxembourg’s pension system. The same 
is true for Luxembourg employees working in China. The agreement exempts 
employees of one country from making social security contributions in the host 
country for a period of time (normally five years). Not every international employee 
is eligible, however. The agreements mainly apply to freelance individuals and 
28 Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (2018). 外籍华人能否在中国领养老金? [Can Chinese of for-
eign nationality receive pension from China abroad?]. http://www.gqb.gov.cn/
news/2018/0830/45316.shtml. Accessed 4 March 2019.
29 Civil and Commercial Law Network (2018). 浙江省华侨权益保护条例全文 [Protection of 
overseas Chinese rights and interests in Zhejiang province]. http://m.liuxiaoer.com/fagui/116029_2.
html. Accessed 4 March 2019.
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people working on an assignment, for instance, employees assigned by Chinese 
companies to work in Japan.
5.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
For nearly four decades, the PRC exercised strict population control policies that 
were relaxed in January 2016. There are no financial incentives for child birth or 
child benefits in China. Maternity leave and pay is arranged through a contractual 
relationship between a domestic employer and employee in accordance with State 
Council Order N619 on “Special provisions for labour protection for female 
employees”.30 These provisions do not extend to overseas Chinese unless they work 
for a domestic employer operating overseas. Chinese nationals born abroad cannot 
obtain a birth certificate from Chinese authorities abroad. They receive a birth cer-
tificate issued by the country of residence that needs to be translated and certified at 
the Chinese consulate for receipt of a Chinese travel document that gives its holder 
the right to cross the border to the PRC as a Chinese national.31
5.3.5  Economic Hardship
Like in other areas of social protection of overseas Chinese, government institutions 
provide minimal support in case of economic hardship or destitution faced by a 
Chinese national abroad. The consulate restricts its role to informing the family in 
China and providing advice on how to transfer money for the overseas Chinese in 
economic hardship.32
In recent years, there have been concerted efforts by the Chinese government to 
mobilise overseas Chinese popular organisations to consolidate their own mutual 
support activities. In 2014, the OCAO in association with local overseas Chinese 
associations started the programme of setting up “Overseas Chinese Mutual Aid 
Centres” in cities around the world which hold a significant concentration of 
Chinese communities. In September 2015, the OCAO in Beijing announced the 
opening in the previous year of Overseas Chinese Service Centre in Houston (US).33 
30 The State Council (2012). 女职工劳动保护特别规定 [Special provisions on labour protection 
for female employees]. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-05/07/content_2131567.htm. Accessed 4 
March 2019.
31 Ministry of Public Security (2001). 公安部关于对出国人员所生子女落户问题的批复 [Reply 
of the office of public security on the settlement of Children born to overseas Chinese]. http://
www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg22598/54807.shtml. Accessed 4 March 2019.
32 See footnote 22.
33 Overseas Chinese Service Centre (2018). 关于‘华助中心 [About overseas Chinese service 
centre]. http://chineseciviccenter.org/ocsc/index.html. Accessed 4 March 2019.
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The declared objective of the Centre was to help overseas Chinese to adapt to local 
life, including providing assistance with housing, employment, investment, resi-
dency, language training, and participation in  local communities’ cultural life 
(International Festivals, Thanksgiving, and so forth). In 2018, the State Council 
reported that 60 mutual aid centres operated in 40 countries around the world with 
the aim of providing legal assistance, volunteering opportunities, and advisory work 
on integration into the local society.34 Established and run exclusively by volunteers, 
the activities of the mutual aid centres are guided and supported by the OCAO – 
which organises annual events in Beijing celebrating their work. Their efforts were 
acknowledged at the 2017 Global Overseas Chinese Awards ceremony.35 Providing 
care to Overseas Chinese who require help and assistance has become an important 
dimension of overseas Chinese work in recent years. Advertised as a non-profit 
service run by overseas Chinese volunteers with the aim of “care, help, and integra-
tion”, the creation of the centres is guided by the assumption that all overseas 
Chinese continue to “love China” from abroad.
5.4  Conclusions
Overseas Chinese have historically played a significant role in China’s national 
development and continue to occupy a central stage among government policy pri-
orities. The State Council publishes annual updates on policy developments and 
achievements in the area of protection of the overseas Chinese rights and interests. 
The report presented at the 13th National People’s Congress states that “the over-
seas Chinese have an irreplaceable important role in realizing the Chinese dream”.36 
In recent years, “overseas Chinese affairs work” has developed through expanding 
policy infrastructure, encouraging China’s diaspora to participate in national econ-
omy and trade, science and technology developments, and large-scale crisis 
response, yet has seen very limited developments in the area of day-to-day social 
protection of Chinese nationals abroad. The integration of the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office into the CPC structure through its merger with the United Front Work 
Department in March 2018, suggests a growing priority and significance of over-
seas Chinese policies for the party-state.
The Outline for the Development of the State’s Overseas Chinese Affairs during 
the 13th Five-year plan (2016–2020) sets a direction for policy development. It is 
apparent from the document’s emphasis on economy, science, technology, culture 
and education, that social protection of Chinese diaspora remains a non-priority as 
a sphere of government policies. The overseas Chinese work is aimed at co-opting 
34 See footnote 1.
35 China News Network (2018). 2018助中心年会回眸:凝侨心侨力共享民族复兴梦 [2018 
China Aid Centre Annual Meeting Review: Consolidation of Overseas Chinese and Sharing the 
Dream of National Rejuvenation]. http://www.chinaqw.com/huazhu/2018/01-14/175152.shtml. 
Accessed 3 March 2019.
36 See footnote 1.
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Chinese citizens abroad into economic, technological and image-making activities 
of the state rather than to responding to welfare needs of Chinese nationals residing 
abroad. This in large part mirrors China’s limited domestic social welfare provi-
sions which are mainly arranged through a contractual employer-employee relation-
ship rather than guaranteed by the state.
Pension has been by far the most developed and debated area of social protection 
policies, with numerous queries from overseas Chinese retirees about how to receive 
pension funds from abroad and requests to simplify the paperwork submitted to 
Chinese consulates. In July 2018, at the press conference of the Ministry of Social 
Insurance, it was announced that the Chinese government is trialling a new internet 
video certification policy that might in the future replace the annual procedure of 
submitting the “Health Confirmation Form” in person to Chinese consulates for 
pension payments.
The lack of knowledge by overseas Chinese about social protection laws in the 
country of residence became a news headline in August 2017, when the China 
Overseas Network, the main portal for overseas Chinese affairs, published an article 
about a Chinese national living and working in Italy for over 20 years, who lost his 
low-income benefits pension after relocating to China, having violated the condi-
tions for qualifying for the low-income benefits. Following this case, the Overseas 
China Network published information on basic pension regulations for a number of 
countries with a significant Chinese diaspora population.37
The growing number of Chinese nationals travelling, working and settling down 
overseas will likely lead to the expansion of China’s activities in the area of social 
and welfare protection of its citizens abroad. Yet, for the time being, protection of 
citizens remains limited to the instances of emergency when China’s national inter-
ests and global image are at stake.
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Chapter 6
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Ecuador
Analía Minteguiaga and Valerie Carmel
6.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in Ecuador
This chapter aims to present and analyse Ecuador’s welfare system and access to 
social protection benefits across five policy areas: unemployment, health care, fam-
ily benefits, pensions, and guaranteed minimum resources. Special emphasis is 
placed on eligibility requirements for migrants, both foreigners residing in the 
country and nationals residing abroad. We start with a brief introduction regarding 
the main features of the country’s welfare system and the main patterns of migration 
to contextualize state intervention and social protection. We later identify the main 
contributory and non-contributory social protection benefits to examine the princi-
ples that inform them, eligibility criteria, inclusion or exclusion of migrants, 
among others.
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6.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Protection System
Scholarly work on social protection and welfare in Ecuador has mostly provided 
fragmented contributions on social policy areas like education (Ponce 1997, 2010), 
health (Velasco 2011; Estrella and Crespo-Burgos 2002), labour (Porras 2010; 
Serrano 2013) or specific social programs (Naranjo 2008; Ponce et al. 2013; León 
2002; León and Alomia 2008). It has also favoured a quantitative approach focused 
on spending and the general argument that the public-state sphere is the sole pro-
ducer of welfare (Ponce and Drouet 2017; Vos 2000; Vos et al. 2002). However, a 
series of comparative regional studies shed light on the main characteristics of 
Ecuador’s social protection system.
Barrientos (2004), for example, stresses that informality must be at the centre of 
the characterization of welfare regimes in Latin America because of low levels of 
labour insertion leading to low levels of inclusion in social security systems. This 
also applies to Ecuador although there have been attempts to include informal- 
sector workers in the social protection system.1 Another main trait of social protec-
tion in Ecuador is the relevant role of families. Martínez (2007) worked on a 
typology for Latin America that defined Ecuador’s welfare regime as “familiarist”2 
due to the great weight placed on family and community arrangements for risk man-
agement and the provision of social services in the framework of an excluding 
labour market and weak public policy. These arrangements range from the substitu-
tion of expenses through women’s unpaid work to migration (Vásconez 2005; 
Vásconez et. al. 2005).
The role of the state and the market in welfare provision and the degree of uni-
versalism in social policy have not remained constant. Rather, they have been 
adapted to the economic and development models adhered to at different moments. 
For example, the rise of structuralism (1940s – late 1970s) was accompanied by an 
endogenous development model and increased state interventionism in economics 
and social policy. Filgueira (2013) labelled it as a period of “narrow corporatism” 
for the region because social protection benefits were granted based on affiliation to 
specific unions or trades and favoured public sector workers. However narrow, it 
was a period when the state enlarged the ranks of those it provided protection for. 
Within this regional context, Filgueira (1998) argued Ecuador had an “excluding” 
1 In 1968, the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS, for its Spanish acronym) ran its first pilot 
program called the Peasant Social Security or Seguro Social Campesino, which has successfully 
incorporated over a million rural workers and small-scale fisherman. In 2015, unpaid domestic 
workers were included in the social security pension scheme as voluntary affiliates through the 
Organic Law for Labour Justice and Recognition of Work in the Home, or Ley Orgánica para la 
Justicia Laboral y Reconocimiento del Trabajo del Hogar.
2 The other two types of welfare regimes in Latin America are the state-productivist regime, in 
which the state invests in human capital for their insertion into labour markets, and the state-pro-
tectionist regime, in which the state also invests in human capital but emphasizes the de-commod-
ification of social protection.
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regime characterized by elitist social security and health systems that reinforced 
social stratification and exclusion in access to social services.
In the 1980s, with the predominance of a neoliberal economic and development 
model, attempts to promote a more active state and the expansion of social protec-
tion were replaced with a general tendency towards focalization, deepening the 
stratifying and stigmatizing effects of social policy (Sojo 1990). Between 1983 and 
2006, social policy in Ecuador promoted what Filgueira (2013) called “restricted 
focalization”. At a regional level, the state was pushed to play a “residual” role in 
social policy as the market and international institutions, including NGOs, became 
predominant. Public services like health and education were redefined as services 
exclusively for “the poor”, while public spending was reduced for the sake of fiscal 
stability. On the other hand, in the modest formal labour market, Ecuador witnessed 
setbacks in social protection through the promotion of labour flexibility, encouraged 
as a way to lure in foreign investment.
A third moment in the development of social protection in Ecuador was inaugu-
rated in 2007 through a series of executive decrees that secured immediate invest-
ment for the failing education and health systems,3 and consolidated in 2008 with 
the re-writing the country’s political Constitution. Since then, Ecuador witnessed an 
expansion of social protection and a shift towards a universal model (particularly for 
education and healthcare). The Constitution paved the way for a new distribution of 
responsibilities among the different spheres of welfare provision (state, market, 
family-community), favouring the state’s role in the provision of welfare and rede-
fining social services as social and economic rights. Likewise, the government of 
then president Rafael Correa enshrined more labour protection through the prohibi-
tion of outsourcing and any form of precarious work,4 increased wages to guarantee 
coverage of the basic consumer basket, and increased access to social security.5 
Filgueira (2013) referred to this shift as a second experiment to build “social citi-
zenship” based on universalism and as a “political solution” to the inclusion crisis 
generated by the austerity policies implemented in the previous decades. An experi-
ment Filgueira (2013) recognized as incomplete because states were unable to 
modify the contributory pillars of social protection and to untie access to social 
security from the logic of the market.
3 In March and May 2007, president Rafael Correa declared the education and health sectors in a 
state of emergency ordering the immediate release of funds for both public systems. In that first 
moment, US$40 million were disbursed to the Ministry of Public Health (MSP for its Spanish 
acronym) and US$80 million to the Ministry of Education to repair infrastructure and obtain nec-
essary equipment and supplies.
4 In the framework of re-writing the Constitution, legislators approved the prohibition of outsourc-
ing and precarious labour. In relation to this mandate, the then Ministry of Labour Relations began 
conducting a series of inspections nation wide.
5 The 2008 Constitution defines social security as the state’s duty and as a right of all inhabitants 
(Art. 55) paving the way for the necessary expansion in coverage. In 2014, through IESS Resolution 
467, the government established the voluntary affiliation process for those without a formal job, a 
direct employer, or people living abroad.
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Ecuador still shows high rates of informal labour and, consequently, a stratified 
social security system (Minteguiaga and Ubasart-González 2013) while attempts 
towards the de-commodification and universalization of access to social services 
did not replace “pro-poor” targeting or the reliance on the family and community 
for social protection (Minteguiaga and Ubasart-González 2014). Access to unem-
ployment, maternity and paternity leave, and pensions depends on individual contri-
butions to the IESS, either as employees or voluntary affiliates. Only health benefits 
in kind are accessible to all residents (either national citizens or foreign residents6), 
regardless of employment or contributions to the public health system. Benefits to 
guarantee minimum resources, such as the Assistance Pension and the Human 
Development Bonus (HDB), are the only non-contributory benefits but they are 
reserved only to those who can prove they are living in a condition of extreme pov-
erty and must be either Ecuadorian nationals or refugees.
6.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
Migration outflows were regular throughout Ecuador’s modern history until 1.5 mil-
lion people fled the country following the economic and financial crisis of the late 
nineties when unemployment reached 15% and the poverty rate 56% (Jokisch 
2014). Spain became the main destination country, accounting for 45.1% of 
Ecuadorian emigrants, while 28.6% settled in the United States (Herrera et  al. 
2012). The massive outflow of people seeking work opportunities had negative 
effects on some communities’ social fabric and positive effects on the economy 
through remittances that peaked in 2007, reaching US$3.3 billion (Jokisch 2014). 
With the onset of the 2008 international financial crisis and in the context of 
Ecuador’s growing economy, the emigration trend reversed. Between 2009 and 
2012, the number of Ecuadorian emigrants dropped by 31% (OAS 2015) and in 
2010, during Ecuador’s last census, the government registered at least 72,000 peo-
ple who had returned from abroad. In light of the influx of returning migrants, the 
Ecuadorian government implemented the “Welcome home” plan to assist returnees.7
Ecuador has also been an important receiving country, especially for Colombians 
seeking refuge after being forcibly displaced by the country’s decades-long internal 
armed conflict (1960 – on going) and drug trafficking-related violence. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (2018) estimates that in 2018, over 500,000 
Colombians lived in Ecuador. Of them, only 200,000 enjoy a regular status.8 Most 
6 However, since September 2018, having public or private health insurance has become a require-
ment for obtaining temporary and permanent residency.
7 The plan allowed returning migrants to enter the country with all their belongings without paying 
import taxes, provided a “housing grant” and credit for entrepreneurs, among others (Sanchez 2014).
8 Over 60,000 have been granted refugee status, 45,486 have Mercosur visas, 18,663 have family 
reunification visas (visas de amparo), and 6773 have been granted humanitarian or international 
protection visas.
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recently, Ecuador has become a destination and transit country for Venezuelans who 
are facing a prolonged economic crisis. Between 2014 and 2018, over three million 
Venezuelans left their country of origin. The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered Ecuador among the top four destinations for 
Venezuelans, preceded by Colombia, Chile, and Peru; there are approximately 
221,000 Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Ecuador (Stein 2018). Of these, only 
97,000 have obtained a residence permit, allowing them to work legally. The other 
two largest groups of immigrants (Cubans and U.S. citizens) are marginal in 
comparison.9
In 2008, through the new Constitution, Ecuador laid out a series of protections 
for immigrants. It guaranteed non-discrimination on the basis of migratory status 
(article 11), recognized the right to migrate and established that “no human being 
will be considered illegal” (article 40), and advocated for the principle of universal 
citizenship and free movement (article 416). In 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Human Mobility (hereinafter referred to as the MFA) began drafting the Human 
Mobility Law.10 The bill, approved in February 2017, ratified the principles of uni-
versal citizenship, free movement, non-criminalization, and non-discrimination. It 
also eased entry for South Americans, requiring only a national Identity Document 
(ID) card and granting them an automatic 180-days visa. However, Venezuelan and 
Colombian immigrants come to Ecuador in search of jobs and the visa does not 
allow them to work legally. Despite the possibility of applying for a temporary and 
then permanent residency once in Ecuador, international organizations point to high 
costs as a serious obstacle to achieving a regular migratory status, leaving immi-
grants “without rights and access to services, and therefore vulnerable to all forms 
of exploitation and abuse, violence, and discrimination” (Stein 2018: 11).
In August 2018, amid rising xenophobia targeting Venezuelans, the government 
of Lenin Moreno announced Ecuador would begin requiring passports for entry. 
Human rights groups succeeded in eliminating the requirement but the MFA later 
issued a ministerial agreement requiring Venezuelans’ national IDs to be validated 
by either the Venezuelan government or a recognized international institution. In 
January 2019, the government again announced extra requirements that single out 
Venezuelans by requesting their police records.11 Finally, since August 2019 the 
Ecuadorian government is requesting visas for Venezuelans. In order to obtain a 
visa they need a passport and police records. The measure will likely produce an 
increase of irregular migratory inflows and make Venezuelans even more vulnerable 
to violence, human trafficking and other forms of abuse. Ramírez (2018) contends 
that this policy shift responds to a global trend favouring a “control and security” 
9 There are roughly 5000 Cubans and 4000 U.S. citizens residing in Ecuador.
10 This law replaced four previous laws: the Travel Documents Law, Naturalization Law, Migration 
Law, and Immigration Law.
11 The announcement was made after the murder of an Ecuadorian woman at the hands of her 
romantic partner (a Venezuelan man). Feminist groups protested against a rising trend of femicides 
and gender-based violence a few days later. They also rejected the government’s measure for pro-
moting xenophobia.
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approach to migration that portrays immigrants “as those responsible for altering 
order and stability as well as placing public social services like health, education, 
and social security at risk” (12).12
6.2  Migration and Social Protection in Ecuador
IESS affiliates, whether national citizens or foreigners residing in Ecuador, are the 
most protected category of population in terms of access to social protection bene-
fits. They have access to health benefits in kind, paid maternity and paternity leave, 
old age and disability pensions, and unemployment. Affiliation for full and part time 
workers is a legal obligation of every employer in Ecuador; not fulfilling this obliga-
tion within the first 15 days of employment is considered a criminal offense and 
carries a penalty of three to five basic salaries for each non-affiliated worker and 
3–7 days of prison (articles 243 and 244 of the Penal Code or Código Penal).13 
However, it is not easy to secure the right to work as an immigrant in Ecuador.
Only recognized refugees are guaranteed the right to work and need no authori-
zation or labour certification to be able to work.14 All other foreigners must have a 
work visa (e.g. 12-VI or 9-IV) or temporary residency visa (e.g. Southern Common 
Market or Mercosur, Union of South American Nations or Unasur, and Ecuador- 
Venezuela Statute) to work legally. These are granted to immigrants who have 
secured labour contracts in the country and does not protect vulnerable, non- 
professional immigrants. Work visas are granted to professionals with high techni-
cal/educational levels,15 while the Mercosur and Venezuelan Migrant Statute visas 
are granted only with proof of a source of income for at least the minimum wage. 
Foreign residents can work as public servants only with a prior report from the hir-
ing institution and a permit issued by the Labour Ministry.16 To work in the private 
sector they need a “certification by the Labour Ministry’s National Director of 
Employment and Human Resources” stating that the hire does not affect the 
“national policy on employment and human resources.”17
12 Generally, there are rising numbers of deportations and non-admissions. While in 2017 the 
Interior Ministry registered 26 deportations and 234 non-admissions, by April 2018 it registered 
191 deportations and 22 non-admissions (Ramírez 2018).
13 Both sanctions will only be enforced if the employer does not pay its debt to the IESS within 48 h 
after being notified.
14 As established through Executive Decree 1182 (2012) and the Labour Ministry’s ministerial 
agreement 118 (2013).
15 Migrants who wish to work in Ecuador must register their higher education degrees at the 
Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, and Technology.
16 As stated by article five of the 2016 Organic Law on Public Service or Ley Orgánica de Servicio 
Público.
17 Article 560 of the Labour Code or Código del Trabajo.
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Only refugees have access to non-contributory social protection benefits like the 
HDB or the Assistance Pension. In general, accessing social benefits in Ecuador 
cannot affect an immigrant’s application for temporary and permanent residency, 
family reunification, or citizenship because the MFA (responsible for granting visas, 
residency, and nationality) does not crosscheck information with the education or 
health ministries that provide the only benefits immigrants can access.
Ecuadorian citizens residing abroad have no access to non-contributory social 
protection benefits. They can only access MSP health services if they are in Ecuador 
regardless of residency. The only social protection benefits they can secure are those 
linked to being an IESS affiliate because they can voluntarily affiliate to IESS gain-
ing access to health services in Ecuador and access to IESS pensions. However, they 
don’t access unemployment benefits, or maternity and paternity benefits. Ecuador 
has signed bilateral social security agreements with Spain, the Netherlands, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Colombia that allow immigrants 
from these countries and Ecuadorians who have worked in these countries to total-
ize the periods worked across territories to access their contributory old age, invalid-
ity and montepío18 pensions.
Ecuador is part of several regional integration organizations: associated member 
of MERCOSUR and full member of the Andean Community (CAN), UNASUR,19 
the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC), but no benefits apply exclusively to 
nationals of one Member State of these regional integration bodies who move to 
another Member State. In 2004, the CAN created the Andean Committee of Social 
Security Authorities and between 2013 and 2016, the Committee worked on a regu-
latory framework for shared norms that would guarantee social security to “com-
munity” migrants working within the CAN. However, no concrete measures have 
been announced so far. In 2009, UNASUR created the South American Sectorial 
Council for Social Development, in which Member States share experiences in the 
field of social protection. However, no specific policies of intra-regional social secu-
rity coordination have emerged from this space.20
In 2008, Ecuador signed the Multilateral Ibero-American Agreement on Social 
Security,21 which includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Spain, 
Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, and Uruguay. According to the Ibero-American 
Organization for Social Security or OISS  (2017), the agreement, “effectively 
applied” in Ecuador since 2011, is applicable to social security benefits in case of 
invalidity, old age, survival, job-related accidents and illness and it ensures the 
18 Pension granted to the children, widow or dependent parents of an IESS affiliate or pensioner.
19 Since March 2019, Ecuador followed through all formal steps for its withdrawal from UNASUR, 
but it is not yet finalized.
20 UNASUR has been practically paralyzed since 12 Members States announced their temporary 
withdrawal in 2018 so progress towards an inter-connected social protection system is highly 
unlikely now.
21 Available here: http://www.seg-social.es/Internet_1/Normativa/index.htm?dDocName=147177
&C1=1001&C2=2013&C3=3053#documentoPDF
6 Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, Emigrants and Resident Nationals…
116
 possibility to totalize periods and “export” the benefits. However, according to the 
IESS website, years worked in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, and Portugal 
are not being totalized and benefits (pensions) are not sent to other countries. No 
social security benefit in Ecuador is exportable. Ecuadorians living abroad can enter 
the social security pension scheme by voluntarily affiliating to the IESS, but they 
cannot export the pension; they must claim it in a national bank account once 
they’ve met the necessary requirements.
Non-contributory social protections (HBD or the old-age Assistance Pension) 
benefits are granted to the “poor” citizen, which is the second most protected cate-
gory. However, only Ecuadorians and refugees who certify living in extreme pov-
erty are eligible to access these benefits that don’t represent even half of the 
consumer basket.22
6.2.1  Unemployment
The Unemployment Insurance scheme went into effect in March 2016 through the 
Organic Law for the Promotion of Juvenile Labour, Exceptional Regulation of the 
Work Day, Unemployment and Unemployment Insurance.23 Only employed work-
ers affiliated to the IESS –national citizens or foreigners– can claim this benefit. 
Those who are voluntarily affiliated or fall under special social security regimes 
don’t have access to unemployment insurance as they don’t have an employer. 
Furthermore, military staff and police officers cannot apply for the unemployment 
insurance benefit as they fall under two special social security regimes that do not 
operate within the IESS: the Social Security Institute of the Armed Forces (ISSFA) 
and the Social Security Institute of the Police (ISSPOL), which have their won 
medical centres, hospitals and higher pensions.
To receive Unemployment Insurance, IESS affiliated workers must register 
24 monthly contributions, 6 of which must be consecutive and immediately before 
claiming the benefit. Claimants must be involuntarily unemployed for 60  days. 
There are no explicit residency or age requirements, nor do beneficiaries have to 
prove job search or register as job seekers. The benefit can be claimed on day 61 of 
unemployment and there is a 30-day waiting period for the first payment. It lasts for 
5 months and it is a percentage24 of an average of the beneficiary’s last 12 salaries.
Before the Unemployment Insurance was created, IESS affiliates could with-
draw accumulated personal savings in the Fondo de Cesantía, or Unemployment 
22 The HDB represents a cash transfer of US$50 to US$150, while the Assistance Pension is 
US$100. According to the National Institute for Statistics and Census (INEC) the basic consumer 
basket for August 2018 is US$710.76.
23 Ley Orgánica para la Promoción del Trabajo Juvenil, Regulación Excepcional de la Jornada de 
Trabajo, Cesantía y Seguro de Desempleo.
24 70% for the first month, 65% for the second one, 60% for the third, 55% for the fourth and 50% 
for the fifth and last month.
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Fund.25 When IESS affiliates claim their Unemployment Fund the IESS transfers 
the total amount in the personal saving account to the affiliate’s bank account. The 
two benefits are not mutually exclusive. If the beneficiary remains unemployed after 
receiving Unemployment Insurance, he/she can access his/her personal fund. Access 
to the fund requires 24 monthly contributions and 60 days of unemployment. This 
benefit, like all others, is not exportable. Nationals residing abroad can only access 
it if they have a bank account in Ecuador, where the benefit can be deposited. 
Nationals or foreigners who are entitled to receive the Unemployment Insurance 
can temporarily leave the country without affecting eligibility requirements.
6.2.2  Health Care
Health is conceived as a universal right granted to everyone, independently of their 
residency, employment status or nationality. According to Ecuador’s 2008 
Constitution, the public healthcare system includes social security,26 and MSP ser-
vices. The MSP only provides benefits in kind in case of sickness, while the IESS 
provides both benefits in kind and cash benefits for sickness and invalidity. We focus 
on benefits in kind provided by the MSP and cash benefits provided by the IESS as 
these are the more general benefit providers in the health area.
Universal public healthcare services managed by the MSP are financed through 
national revenue. The 22nd transitional provision of the 2008 Constitution estab-
lished that the national budget for the health system had to be increased by 0.5% of 
Gross National Product (GNP) yearly, until reaching no less than 4% of the 
GNP. This measure aimed to reverse the tendency to underfund the public health-
care system, which before 2008 was focalized for people living under conditions of 
poverty. In order to access the MSP health services, national and foreign residents 
only have to show their ID.
Despite its stated universal character, there are several reports of refugees being 
denied their right to public healthcare (Jaramillo 2015; ODNA 2010). Organizations 
such as Catholic Relief Services and the Scalabriniana Mission have reported that 
refugees seeking medical attention are routinely rejected by public hospitals and 
health centres, or have to wait more than nationals to access services (Jaramillo 
2015). Immigrants without refugee status also face restricted access to universal 
health care and education services (Cardoso and Mendiola 2008; Sánchez 2013; 
Benavides 2007). The 2017 Human Mobility Law stipulates health providers cannot 
refuse to provide emergency medical attention to migrants. However, article 64 
states that for a foreigner to be granted a permanent residence, the person must 
either affiliate to the IESS or get a private health insurance. In April 23, 2018 
25 While the unemployment insurance is financed 2% by the worker’s salary contribution and 1% 
by the employer, the unemployment fund is financed only by the worker’s 2%.
26 The IESS, the Social Security Institute of the Police (ISSPOL), and the Social Security Institute 
of the Armed Forces (ISSFA) health services and facilities, which are public but restricted.
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Ecuador’s president Lenin Moreno issued an executive decree making the health 
insurance requirement for foreigners in Ecuador mandatory. This marks a clear 
restriction on foreigners’ access to MSP health services.
Access to IESS health benefits in kind is restricted to IESS affiliates and pension-
ers, regardless of whether they are nationals or foreigners, employed or voluntary 
affiliates. Ecuadorian citizens and non-national residents can become voluntary 
IESS affiliates as long as they have an Ecuadorian ID.27 Affiliates must have regis-
tered at least 3  monthly contributions, while pensioners can access the benefits 
immediately. Since 2010,28 the affiliate’s children and registered spouse, either 
nationals or foreigners, can also access IESS health benefits in kind as long as the 
affiliates contribute an additional 3.41% for spouses or cohabitants (coverage for 
children under 18 is free of charge). Pensioners must contribute 4.15% of their pen-
sions for their spouses and 3.41% for their children under 18. For both MSP and 
IESS health benefits in kind, the beneficiary is not required to pay at any moment 
and IESS affiliates and pensioners can use private health service providers that have 
entered into prior agreement with the IESS.
Cash benefits in case of sickness are granted to employed workers affiliated to 
the IESS, regardless of nationality. These benefits are granted in the form of paid 
licenses for a period of up to 185 days. Claimants must have at least 6 monthly and 
continuous contributions immediately preceding sickness. There is no explicit resi-
dence requirement, although the IESS affiliate, regardless of nationality, must be 
working in Ecuador in order to access it. If the affiliate moves abroad and the license 
has not been paid, the IESS will make the payment in a national bank account.
If sickness turns into prolonged incapacity, the affiliate can receive a transitory 
incapacity subsidy for 1  year. This is prior to receiving the Invalidity Pension 
granted to IESS affiliates who are not receiving other pensions and have 60 monthly 
contributions (out of which at least 6 of them immediately prior to the incapacity) 
or 120 monthly contributions (if the incapacity happens between 6 and 24 months 
of the affiliates’ last contribution). There is no explicit residency requirement for 
accessing the Invalidity Pension. The main condition of access is to be “incapaci-
tated to procure through a job proportional to his or her capacities, strengths, theo-
retical and practical formation, a remuneration at least half of the remuneration a 
healthy worker in similar conditions obtains in the same region” (Social Security 
Law, article 186).
The National Evaluation Commission evaluates the request for the Invalidity 
pension. If it is approved, the affiliate has to accept the pension agreement and 
resign from his/her job to start collecting the pension. To prove the existence of a 
permanent invalidity, the affiliate must undergo periodic assessments. Invalidity 
pensions and the transitory subsidy are calculated taking the average of the best 
27 A foreigner who wants to get an Ecuadorian ID must go to the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) 
with a valid passport, a valid visa and an ID issuance order. For the issuance order, the foreigner 
must have a visa for temporary or permanent residency, certification of having public (IESS) or 
private health insurance (since September 2018), and an updated list of migratory movement.
28 Resolution N° CD 334 of the IESS Directive Council.
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5 years of reported salaries. Calculations differ depending on the years contributed 
to the IESS. Nationals and foreigners who are IESS affiliates have an equal right to 
the transitory incapacity subsidy and the invalidity pension; the conditions to claim 
these benefits are the same for all IESS affiliates. These benefits are not exportable, 
but national and foreigner IESS affiliates who move abroad can continue receiving 
the benefit as long as they have a bank account in Ecuador.
Finally, there are two non-contributory health-related cash benefits. The disabil-
ity Assistance Pension is granted to Ecuadorians or refugees living in conditions of 
extreme poverty that have a disability of at least a 40%, whereas the Joaquin 
Gallegos Lara Bonus is granted to Ecuadorians with severe physical disability (at 
least 75%) or intellectual disability (at least 65%), catastrophic disease or to chil-
dren under 14 with HIV-AIDS.  The former receive US$100 and the latter US$ 
240 monthly. These social protection benefits are not available to foreigners resid-
ing in the country or to nationals residing abroad.
6.2.3  Pensions
There are two types of old-age pensions in Ecuador: the contributory pensions 
granted to IESS affiliated and the non-contributory pensions managed by the 
Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion (MIES) granted to people living under 
conditions of extreme poverty. IESS pensions are financed through the “intergen-
erational solidarity” scheme, under which the monthly pensions of “passive work-
ers” or pensioners are financed by the monthly contributions paid by active workers 
affiliated to the IESS and state financial contributions. The 2001 Social Security 
Law sought to establish a mixed system for financing pensions, but this system was 
declared unconstitutional in 2005. Non-IESS pensions are managed by the MIES 
and financed through tax revenue. In 2012, the National Assembly approved the 
Law for the Redistribution of Social Spending,29 which enabled the increase of the 
amounts paid for non-contributory old-age Assistance Pension from US$30 to 
US$50 by capturing part of private banks’ utilities. In December 2017, the Executive 
Decree 253 increased the Assistance Pension to US$100.
To access the IESS old-age retirement pension, the affiliate must either be 
70 years old and have contributed during 10 years; or have 40 years of contributions, 
with no age requirement. This applies to voluntary affiliates, including Ecuadorians 
living abroad, which means an Ecuadorian can live abroad all his/her life and if they 
contributed for the minimum 10 years required and reached the age of 70 they have 
access to the old-age retirement pension. The pension is calculated using an average 
of the best 5 years of reported salaries and the amount varies according to years 
contributed.
29 Ley para la Redistribución del Gasto Social.
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Once the affiliate acquires the right to become a pensioner, there is no residency 
requirement although the pension cannot be exported. A retiree can receive his/her 
pension in an Ecuadorian bank account regardless of where he/she is residing. These 
pensions can be accessed from abroad if the retiree has an international ATM card 
or if he/she transfers the money after the IESS deposited it in an Ecuadorian bank 
account.
Ecuadorians or refugees of at least 65 years of age who can prove they live in 
“extreme poverty” through the Social Registry30 can claim the non-contributory old- 
age assistance pensions. Refugees are the only foreigners who can claim this benefit 
and Ecuadorians residing abroad do not have access to non-contributory old-age 
assistance pensions. There are no qualifying periods of contributions or explicit 
residency requirements. In order to obtain this pension (of US$100 per month), 
eligible claimants must show their national ID and wait for the in situ survey to 
prove living in “extreme poverty.”
6.2.4  Family Benefits
There are several types of family-related benefits in Ecuador and the eligibility con-
ditions applied in each case vary from one benefit to another. Paid maternity leave 
is granted to employed workers affiliated to the IESS who have at least 12 months 
of uninterrupted contributions prior to giving birth. The benefit lasts for 12 weeks31 
and there is no explicit residency requirement. National and foreign IESS affiliates 
have equal access to maternity and paternity benefits. None of these benefits are 
exportable, but individuals can still temporarily move abroad while receiving the 
maternity/paternity paid leaves in an Ecuadorian bank account. In the public sector, 
the employer covers 40% of the worker’s wage while the IESS covers 60%. In the 
private sector, the employer covers 25% and the IESS 75%, respectively.
Eligibility conditions for paid paternity leave are the same as for the maternity 
leave. The benefit lasts 10 days, with a possibility of extension in particular circum-
stances. Like mothers, fathers can claim an optional unpaid leave of up to 9 months. 
Additional benefits for parents are the paid hourly permits to care for children or the 
breastfeeding permits for up to 2 h daily for 12 months after paid maternity leave is 
over. There are no parental benefits (i.e. benefits to replace income for parents who 
want to take care of their children after maternity or paternity benefits) in Ecuador.
30 The Social Registry is a database that uses a series of indicators (e.g. living conditions, school-
ing, income, properties, and access to public services) to create a wellbeing index for determining 
who can benefit from different social programs.
31 Affiliates can access an additional 36 weeks without pay, but with the guarantee they will not be 
fire during the unpaid leave. There are situations that justify an extension of maternity leave (mul-
tiple births, C-section, premature births, etc.). Foster parents have the right to a paid licence for 
15 days, which begin after the child is legally transferred.
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The Human Development Bonus can be considered a child benefit because it is 
granted to heads of family with children (under 18) who live in “extreme poverty” 
(the living conditions are certified through the Social Register). The benefit is only 
granted to resident Ecuadorians and refugees, until the family ceases to live under 
extreme poverty. Beneficiaries must certify periodic health checks and that the chil-
dren are going to school. The HDB has a flat component of US$50 and a variable 
component: US$30 for every child between 0 and 5 years old for up to 3 children, 
US$10 for every child between 5 and 18 for up to three children. The value of the 
variable component is reduced by 10% for every extra child. The maximum amount 
for the benefit is of US$150. People who receive other cash transfers (e.g. Assistance 
Pension) are not eligible to get the variable component.
6.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
In Ecuador there are no guaranteed minimum resources scheme, but there are four 
programs that provide conditional cash transfers: the Assistance Pension, the Human 
Development Bonus, the Joaquín Gallegos Lara Bonus (BJGL), and Eloy Alfaro 
Scholarship Program. These benefits are covered through the national budget, spe-
cifically through tax revenue.
The BJGL recognizes two subjects of intervention: rights holders, who are peo-
ple with serious disability (75% physical disability or 65% of intellectual disabil-
ity), or catastrophic illness, or children under 14 with HIV-AIDS and the caregivers. 
The transfer is equivalent to US$ 240. The transfer is deposited either to the rights 
holder or to the caregiver depending on the degree of dependency of the person with 
disability. From its creation in 2010 the transfer only benefits people within the 
Social Registry database. In 2014, it was established that the program could benefit 
foreigners, but only in an exceptional way and “when there are sufficient financial 
resources”.32 The Eloy Alfaro National Scholarship is given to members of house-
holds that receive the HDB or who can prove a condition of poverty despite not 
receiving the bonus and are enrolled in a national university. The transfer started out 
as a minimum wage, currently US$394, but was later reduced to half the minimum 
salary. The program was designed to only benefit Ecuador citizens and refugees.33
32 This was stipulated in resolution 19 of the extinct Technical Secretariat for Disabilities (Secretaría 
Técnica de Discapacidades), which ran the program until 2016, when it was transferred to 
the MIES.
33 The program has not been eliminated, but it was not launched in 2018.
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6.3  Conclusions
The Ecuadorian social protection system is a highly stratified one in which IESS 
affiliates (whether Ecuadorian or foreigners) enjoy most benefits. This effectively 
means that social protection benefits are contributory and depend on a person’s 
favourable insertion in the labour market. Given the existence of an important infor-
mal labour market, the overall system has a low coverage. To illustrate, the National 
Institute of Statistic and Census revealed that only 42% of all workers were affili-
ated to the IESS in 2018. Furthermore, there were roughly 4 million affiliates and 
400,000 pensioners, while 8.2 million people made up the total labour force accord-
ing to World Bank data (2017). This means that less than half of the working-age 
population has access to unemployment insurance, family benefits, sickness subsi-
dies, old age and invalidity pensions.
State attempts to broaden coverage and access to social protection during the 
2007–2017 period relied on the existing structure of benefits. Affiliation to IESS 
became more inclusive through different forms of voluntary affiliation and new ben-
efits were created. Non-contributory benefits like the HDB –established in the late 
nineties to make up for the elimination of the key subsidies to gas, fuel, and electric-
ity– increased its coverage, but they continue to be too limited to provide adequate 
social protection or the necessary conditions to overcome poverty. Efforts to modify 
and expand social protection through the universalization of access to health and 
education to address the issue of socio-economic inequality did not displace the 
focus on poverty that social policy based on focalized programs has. However, dur-
ing these years there was some innovation in this field through the creation of inter-
connected programs that sought to address the problem of structural inequality like 
the Eloy Alfaro Scholarship. Regrettably, in the context of a new wave of austerity 
measures inaugurated in late 2017, this program has been discontinued.
Universal coverage for health, implemented since 2007, provides a general base 
for social inclusion and protection for all individuals including immigrants, but 
recent legal reforms seek to exclude immigrants by requiring them to either affiliate 
to the IESS or get private health insurance in order to apply for a residence permit. 
Migrants in general, foreigners in Ecuador and Ecuadorians abroad, are the least 
protected group of people. Social protection benefits granted to Ecuadorians living 
abroad are very limited, and they are dependent on monthly contributions to the 
IESS as voluntary affiliates. Even contributing, they only gain access to pensions 
when they meet the necessary requirements. They can’t access maternity and pater-
nity benefits, unemployment, or health benefits.
In Ecuador, there are no political parties with explicitly anti-immigrant plat-
forms. However, the current minister of labour has made references to a “morato-
rium” to replace “foreign irregular workers with young Ecuadorian affiliated 
workers” (Enriquez 2017). Low skilled workers who come to Ecuador as immi-
grants are usually denied IESS affiliation by employers who take advantage of 
irregular migratory status to pay them less than the minimum wage or to avoid pay-
ing IESS affiliation (Zambrano 2018). As previously mentioned, there is a worrying 
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trend of scapegoating Venezuelan immigrants. This has happened at all levels of 
political life, from forms of harassment in the workplace to mob violence34 and 
restrictive measures announced against Venezuelans by high-level authorities, 
including the president. Any “moratorium” or “replacement policy” would further 
deteriorate access to social protection benefits by creating an incentive to refrain 
from hiring Venezuelan immigrants. Immigrants who access IESS social protection 
are mostly those with a high level of education.
In the past years, the country also witnessed a return to a more “restrictive focal-
ization.” As cash transfers within the HDB and the Assistance Pension increased in 
value, it narrowed its target population to people living in extreme poverty, first in 
2013 and then in 2017. Additionally, since 2017, there have been attempts to reduce 
the provision of labour-related protections. In September 2017, the Executive 
Decree 135 ordered a freeze on public hiring, a prohibition of new hires, and the 
elimination of provisional appointments. Since then, there have been several layoffs 
in the public sector and processes to privatize public companies. Because access to 
a formal job is what mainly determines access to social protection benefits, mea-
sures that increase unemployment have direct negative consequences on welfare 
and social protection. With the recent developments and setbacks in the field of 
social and migratory policy, Ecuador’s social protection system is deepening its 
exclusionary, residual, and familiarist character.
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Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 




The analysis of diaspora policies makes it possible to discern, in general terms, 
national states’ relation and commitment to their citizens abroad. Sending states are 
interested in maintaining their ties to their diaspora populations for different reasons 
(Weinar 2017; Collier 2013; Lafleur 2011; Gamlen 2006). For example, Ecuador 
has wanted to respond to its massive emigration, particularly since 1999 when its 
flow of emigrants increased significantly. However, in the Ecuadorian case it is also 
relevant to consider the political and social interest that the 1999–2000 so-called 
‘migration crisis’ aroused during and after the 2006 presidential campaign, when 
the Ecuadorian migration crisis and the Ecuadorian migrants were used as a symbol 
of both the impact of the economic crisis that had been affecting the country and the 
opportunity to rebuild the country (Sánchez Bautista 2017). From 2007 till now, the 
relevance of the migration phenomenon in Ecuador and the state’s sustained interest 
in engaging with Ecuadorians abroad have been made manifest in the recognition of 
“people in human mobility situations” in the national constitution (2008); in the 
creation, adaptation, and reform of infrastructure to address human mobility; in the 
design of various policies and services to serve and protect Ecuadorians abroad, 
their families in the country, and the returnees; and in the new Organic Law on 
Human Mobility (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2017a). 
Electoral motivations have driven this interest, but also the condition of vulnerabil-
ity in which the migration of Ecuadorians often happens. Consequently, voting 
rights for nationals abroad and protection for migrants, particularly those in vulner-
able conditions, have been continuously granted after 2007, alongside other 
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services such as providing information about the rights of Ecuadorians abroad, legal 
assistance, repatriation, and pensions.
Within the diverse bibliography on why and how states relate to their communi-
ties abroad, the two-pronged proposal of Gamlen (2006, 2008) are particularly rel-
evant for the purpose of this chapter. He explains that states may be interested in 
building a community abroad through strategies aimed at expanding citizenship for 
nationals abroad or enlarging cultural policies in destination countries, but, at the 
same time, they may also be interested in maintaining ties with their diaspora. 
Weinar (2017) adds to Gamblen’s classification by observing that the diaspora 
engagement policies are related to socio-economic ties and include the creation of 
institutions and infrastructure to keep those ties alive. Engaging with communities 
abroad and building and maintaining ties between countries of origin and those 
communities can be carried out through various policies, programmes, and services 
that can help to safeguard political, economic, cultural, and social rights, as in the 
case of Ecuador (Sánchez Bautista 2017), and as this chapter will show, with a spe-
cific focus on social protection policies and services implemented by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility since 2013.
In this sense, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. The first is to show that 
Ecuador’s policy towards citizens abroad is connected to a political shift in the 
country and to the new political discourse that appeared as of 2006. The second is 
to present the central social protection-oriented diaspora engagement policies and 
services currently in force to protect nationals abroad, specifically those who live 
overseas permanently and those in vulnerable conditions, although the services are 
available to all citizens abroad. In particular, I will concentrate on existing social 
protection policies in the areas of unemployment, health care, pensions, family- 
related benefits, and economic hardship. In doing so, after providing a general over-
view of the main characteristics of Ecuadorian emigration, I will characterize the 
general institutional framework whereby Ecuadorian authorities interact with 
nationals abroad, and I will present a general review of the primary engagement 
policies for the Ecuadorian diaspora. Then, I will focus on the existing policies, 
programmes, and services offered by the Ecuadorian state to respond to social pro-
tection needs of nationals abroad across the aforementioned specific areas. However, 
I will not assess how these policies and services have been implemented or whether 
they respond to nationals abroad needs because such an assessment would go 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Finally, I will present the main conclusions.
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7.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
7.2.1  The Ecuadorian Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
Ecuador has a history of emigration that began back in the 1960s and the 1970s and 
was mainly to Venezuela, the United States, and Canada (Herrera 2003; Herrera 
2007). During the 1970s, emigration continued, but it was in the late 1990s that the 
first massive wave of Ecuadorian emigration occurred, due to an economic and 
political crisis in the country (Herrera 2003, 2007, 2011; Herrera et al. 2012).That 
crisis forced approximately 1.4–1.6 millions of Ecuadorians to leave the country 
between 1999 and 2005 (Herrera et al. 2012). The most popular destinations during 
this time were Spain, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom. However, 
between 2004 and 2010, emigration declined due to the implementation of the 
Schengen Visa and the economic crises that affected Ecuadorians’ two main desti-
nation countries in particular. During this period, while emigration decreased, return 
movements increased: the Census of Population and Housing conducted in 2010 
reported that, from 2005 to 2010, almost 64,000 people returned to the country 
(Herrera et  al. 2012). These two movements in the recent history of Ecuadorian 
migration—the massive emigration after 1999 and the return of Ecuadorians during 
2004–2010—have impacted and shaped the political discourse around migration 
abroad, Ecuadorian migrants, and migration infrastructure and policies.
Before 2000, the Government’s actions in relation to migration issues were lim-
ited and insufficient and mainly focused on the smuggling of migrants. However, 
after the first massive wave of migration, when a large Ecuadorian community was 
living overseas, the Ecuadorian Government started to deploy multiple responses. 
During the 2000s, it became necessary for the state to recognize and call attention to 
the massive departure of Ecuadorians and to start creating a new body of policies 
and a new infrastructure that would respond to that phenomenon (Eguiguren 2011; 
Sánchez Bautista 2017). The Plan Nacional de Ecuatorianos en el Exterior (2001) 
(National Plan for Ecuadorians Abroad) was then the first attempt to provide com-
prehensive services to people about to leave or interested in emigrating, Ecuadorians 
abroad, and their families in Ecuador (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio 
e Integración 2007). Though its full implementation would be problematic 
(Eguiguren 2011), this national plan was designed with a view to providing attention 
to emigrants’ relatives living in Ecuador; protecting and promoting the rights of 
Ecuadorians abroad, their official status and documents, and their inclusion in 
receiving countries; and developing joint programs between origin and destination 
communities. Additionally, in 2004, one of the Ecuadorian state’s priorities was to 
combat human trafficking and smuggling, yielding as a result the Plan Nacional 
para combatir la trata de personas, el tráfico ilegal de migrantes, explotación sexual 
laboral y otros modos de explotación y prostitución de mujeres, niños, niñas y ado-
lescentes, pornografía infantil y corrupción de menores, which took effect in 2006.
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By 2007, the population of Ecuadorians abroad was about 1.6 million people, 
which accounted for 11% of the total population of Ecuador and about 30% of the 
economically active population (CEPAL 2010). In this context, and since the 2006 
presidential campaign, the migration crisis was central to the discourse of the 
Alianza Pais candidate, Rafael Correa, who took office as president in 2007. The 
promise of facilitating their return to the homeland and their contribution to eco-
nomic recovery and development was a cornerstone of the new political project, and 
Ecuadorians abroad became a symbol of economic recovery and hope (Sánchez 
Bautista 2017). The motto “we are fixing the house so they can come back”1 
(Secretaría Nacional del Migrante 2007) marked the creation and renewal of strate-
gies to respond to emigrants’ needs and the desire of many to be able to return to a 
country that could offer them better living conditions than before (Margheritis 2016).
This discourse, pivotal during the election campaign and sustained during 
President Correa’s Government, was accompanied by other strategies: giving 
Ecuadorians abroad the right to vote in presidential and vice presidential elections 
in Ecuador (granted in 2002, but only enforced as of 2006); extending the migrant 
vote to elect representatives for Ecuadorian citizens abroad to the Constituent 
Assembly (in 2007); creating a new and specialized infrastructure, the Secretaría 
Nacional del Migrante (National Secretariat for Migrants), and redesigning the 
policies on emigration from a perspective of protection of emigrants and their rights 
(as of 2007); and enacting a new national constitution that consolidated the previous 
discourse of Alianza Pais and Correa on migration, which included the recognition 
of migrants’ rights, freedom of movement, and universal citizenship (in 2008). The 
national constitution recognized people involved in human mobility as a group 
deserving priority attention.
Considering not only Ecuadorians abroad and returnees but also immigrants, 
refugees, and people in need of international protection, the concept of “human 
mobility” became central in the national constitution and in Ecuadorian migration 
law and policy.2 This concept refers to the different types of temporary or permanent 
migration movements (emigrants, immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, people in 
transit, Ecuadorian returnees, victims of human trafficking and smuggling, and their 
relatives) and is based on the recognition of the right to migrate and migrants’ right 
to voluntary return (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 
2017a; Asamblea Constituyente 2008). As of Ecuadorian emigrants, the latest docu-
ments such as the Organic Law on Human Mobility and its Regulation (Presidencia 
de la República de Ecuador 2017) refer to them as Ecuadorians abroad (personas 
ecuatorianas en el exterior), which would imply that, as Ecuadorian citizens, they 
1 In Spanish: “estamos arreglando la casa para que vuelvan.”.
2 Definitions according to Article 3 of the Organic Law on Human Mobility are as follows. Person 
in a human mobility situation: The person who mobilizes from one state to another with the inten-
tion of residing or settling temporarily or permanently therein. Human mobility: Migratory move-
ments performed by a person, family or human group in transit or intending to settle temporarily 
or permanently in a State other than its homeland or in which it has previously resided, which 
generates rights and obligations.
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keep their rights even beyond the national boundaries no matter their migra-
tion status.
Finally, after years of joint work between the Government and civil society, 
including social organizations of Ecuadorians abroad and returnees, the Organic 
Law on Human Mobility was launched in 2017—President Correa’s last year in 
office. This Law and its Regulation (2017) stipulate the rights foreseen by the 
national constitution and represent the materialization of the promise of a “‘new 
country’ [that] would recognize and strengthen migrants’ rights” (Sánchez Bautista 
2017, p.  71) made in the 2006 presidential election campaign. In general, they 
established the political, economic, social, and cultural rights of people in human 
mobility situations, but particularly those of Ecuadorians abroad and returnees.
7.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
Since 2000 until now, as mentioned previously, infrastructure and policies have 
undergone various changes, but I will focus on the most representative milestones 
after 2013.
The vice ministry of Human Mobility, created in 2013, is the institution currently 
in charge of the country’s migration policy. This office assumed the responsibilities 
of the former Secretaría Nacional del Migrante (2007–2013) and was incorporated 
into the administrative structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since then, the 
vice ministry, jointly with a network of 84 embassies, 140 consular offices including 
honorary consulates and mobile consulates, has been in charge of maintaining com-
munication with the diaspora and responding to the needs of nationals abroad, fol-
lowing constitutional mandates regarding migrants’ protection.
According to the document Ministerial Agreement 040 (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores y Movilidad Humana May 2017b), the Under-Secretariat of the 
Ecuadorian Community and, mainly, the Office of Attention and Protection to 
Ecuadorians Abroad are responsible for planning and coordinating the migration 
policy to protect Ecuadorians residing abroad. To accomplish this goal, the Office 
of Attention and Protection to Ecuadorians Abroad has, among others, the responsi-
bility to propose protection policies; to design and implement plans, programs and 
projects supporting Ecuadorians abroad; to establish protocols for sponsorship, 
advocacy, and accompaniment in cases of violation of emigrants’ rights; to establish 
guidelines and protocols for the repatriation of corpses and mortal remains of 
Ecuadorian emigrants; to establish guidelines and protocols for the transfer of 
detained or incarcerated Ecuadorian citizens and to follow up on these cases; to 
coordinate and manage international restitution and assistance in cases of separation 
and subsequent reuniting of children and adolescents; to propose and implement 
coordination strategies and international cooperation for the care and protection of 
Ecuadorians abroad; and to define mechanisms to guarantee humanitarian aid to the 
Ecuadorians abroad and their families, especially in cases of natural disasters and 
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emergencies. Generally speaking, these responsibilities reflect the priorities for 
attention to nationals abroad.
As mentioned before, the vice ministry is responsible for migration policy at a 
national level but, more recently, the National Plan of Human Mobility (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2018) has pointed out that the man-
agement of migration policy, programmes, and services is a shared responsibility 
among the state’s institutions, according to their responsibilities. Thus, the minis-
tries of Culture, Housing, Education, Health, Justice, Sports, the Interior, and Labor 
should extend access to some of their programs and services in accordance with the 
rights of Ecuadorians abroad and returnees, as stated in the Constitution and the 
Organic Law on Human Mobility and its Regulations.
Moreover, to respond to the needs of nationals abroad and returnees and guaran-
tee their access to rights, the vice ministry coordinates actions with other national 
institutions, such as the National Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, 
Technology, and Innovation; the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute; the National 
Customs Service of Ecuador; the Superintendence of Information and 
Communication; the Citizens’ Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control; 
and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the only national institution with 
offices currently in the United States, Spain, Italy, and Mexico (see Sect. 7.3 for 
details).
The Executive Order No. 20 (2013) declared that the National Council for 
Equality and Human Mobility, along with the Vice Ministry of Human Mobility, 
must address the mainstreaming of migration policy. The participation of the 
National Council for Equality in the protection of migrants is also reinforced in the 
National Plan of Human Mobility (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad 
Humana 2018), which states that the National Council for Equality and Human 
Mobility is the agency in charge of monitoring and assessing the national goals 
included within the National Development Plan (2017–2021) regarding human 
mobility. The participation of all these entities to ensure access to rights and ser-
vices for Ecuadorians abroad is based on the migration policy’s management model 
and principles of co-responsibility, trans-sectoriality, and mainstreaming (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2018).
The institutional framework for migration is complemented at a local level with 
regional offices of the vice ministry aimed at providing information and services to 
migrants and their families. As part of the institutional infrastructure to address the 
needs of Ecuadorians abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility 
also launched the “virtual consulate” (www.consuladovirtual.gob.ec), a webpage 




7.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
The Organic Law on Human Mobility (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y 
Movilidad Humana  2017), its Regulation (Presidencia de la República de 
Ecuador 2017) and the National Plan for Human Mobility, launched in May 2018, 
now offer the main guidelines for Ecuadorian migration policy.3 Nevertheless, the 
national constitution (2008) and other former policies and development plans and 
documents prepared since 2007 have oriented the policies, programmes, and ser-
vices offered to nationals abroad until now. Some of the programmes and services 
offered by the former Secretaría Nacional del Migrante (Sánchez Bautista 2014, 
2017) are still in force, while other services have been created to respond to the new 
challenges faced by Ecuadorians in destination countries.
In general, the country’s migration policy must respond to constitutional principles. 
Since 2008, these fundamental principles recognize, among others, freedom of move-
ment, universal citizenship, and rights for Ecuadorians living abroad, returnees, immi-
grants and refugees living in the country. In particular, Title II, Chapter Three, Article 
40, states that the country shall provide Ecuadorians abroad with assistance, care, advi-
sory services, and comprehensive protection so that they can exercise their rights; pro-
vide safeguards when citizens have been arrested and imprisoned abroad; promote 
their ties with Ecuador, facilitate family reunification and encourage their voluntary 
return; and protect transnational families and the rights of their members. The national 
constitution also states that Ecuadorians residing abroad may be elected to any office 
and have the right to elect the president, the vice president, and members of the 
National Assembly (equivalent to the parliament) representing Ecuadorians abroad.
On the other hand, the Organic Law on Human Mobility (2017) establishes as a 
principle the protection of Ecuadorian citizens abroad and respect for their rights, 
regardless of their migratory status. These rights are aligned with the national con-
stitution and are the main parameter for the services offered by the Ecuadorian 
Government to nationals living abroad and returnees as well.4 Among their rights, 
the following are mentioned: citizenship, democratic participation, political organi-
zation, and voting rights from abroad; maintaining and transmitting their cultural 
identity; and access from abroad to plans, programmes, and projects developed in 
Ecuador: health services and the Ecuadorian Social Security System, education, and 
justice and legal assistance (see details on this in Table 7.1 and Sect. 7.3).
On another front, the Organic Law on Human Mobility (2017) also provides the 
principles for consular protection and assistance from diplomatic missions or 
3 This law refers to all people in human mobility situations: Ecuadorians abroad, returnees, refu-
gees, asylum seekers, persons in need of international protection, persons in transit, and victims of 
human trafficking and smuggling. However, herein I am specifically referring to Ecuadorians 
abroad and, sometimes, returnees.
4 It is worthwhile to mention that information on services beyond consular procedures for 
Ecuadorians abroad is not available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility’s 
website. However, the Ministry’s website offers complete information about services that returnees 
can access in Ecuador (https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/catalogo-servicios-migrantes/).
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consular offices to complement the aforementioned rights. Consular offices’ duties 
and services are, among others: to coordinate actions with the institutions in charge 
of economic policies and services to promote investments and family savings; to 
assess and coordinate assistance in cases of vulnerability; to provide accompani-
ment in the cases of vulnerable people in hospitals, health centers, or institutions for 
children, adolescents, and older adults; to accompany Ecuadorians abroad before 
courts and to provide effective assistance to Ecuadorians deprived of liberty; to 
coordinate the care and protection of victims of human trafficking or smuggling; 
and to promote access to, and the production and circulation of, arts, and cultural 
heritage.
As for mobile consulates, their goal is to extend consular services to places with 
a significant number of Ecuadorians who have no access to permanent consular 
offices. Mobile consulates offer the same kinds of services provided by consular 
offices, such as issuing passports; renewing national ID renewals or issuing consular 
ID cards in countries where this document is available; issuing police records, pow-
ers of attorney, notarial records, and affidavits; registering place of residence for 
Table 7.1 Policies and main policy strategies concerning Ecuadorians abroad
Policies Policy strategies
To promote universal 
citizenship and freedom of 
movement in the international 
arena
Promoting initiatives to defend Ecuadorian citizens’ rights in 
international settings
To strengthen the protection of 
rights of the population in 
human mobility situations
Reducing paperwork so that Ecuadorian migrants can access 
Ecuadorian public health services; encouraging affiliation to 
the healthcare and retirement system of the Ecuadorian Social 
Security Institute (IESS)
Implementing an accessible and safe remittance system and 
promoting Ecuadorians’ active inclusion in the national 
financial system from abroad
Implementing effective, efficient, transparent, and quality 
consular services
Including Ecuadorians abroad in the commercial, tourist and 
cultural promotion of Ecuador
Promoting Ecuadorian cultural values with particular attention 
to girls, boys, and adolescents
Strengthening mechanisms for democratic participation abroad
To promote safe and orderly 
migration
Promoting the rights of victims of human trafficking or 
smuggling
Promoting regional mechanisms and bilateral agreements to 
prevent risky migration
To preserve diversity, 
integration, and coexistence of 
people in human mobility 
situations
Coordinating reciprocity mechanisms with host countries, so 
that Ecuadorian migrants can have better guarantees for the 
respect of their rights
Supporting associativity and access to resources for the 
implementation of cultural and sports projects
Strengthening solidarity and aid networks
C. Sánchez Bautista
135
census and election purposes according to the law5; and providing attention to cases 
of vulnerability (see details on this below), as well as legal advice and information 
about rights and services available to Ecuadorians abroad. These services vary as a 
function of consular resources and special needs based on local contexts in receiv-
ing countries.
On the other hand, based on premises of the Constitution and the Organic Law 
on Human Mobility as well as the policy guidelines provided by the National 
Development Plan (2017–2021), the National Plan for Human Mobility (2018) is 
built upon four fundamental policies focusing on persons in human mobility situa-
tions. These core policies are as follows: (a) to promote universal citizenship and 
freedom of movement in the international arena; (b) to strengthen the protection of 
rights of the population in human mobility situations; (c) to promote safe and 
orderly migration; and (d) to preserve diversity, integration, and coexistence of peo-
ple in human mobility situations.
Along with the four overarching policies and the policy strategies (see Table 7.1), 
the National Plan for Human Mobility (2018) considers a level of policy action 
which provides advice on the kind of measures that should be considered in imple-
menting the policies. Some of these actions are already being developed, but others 
need to be planned and designed throughout the implementation of the National Plan.
Beyond these rights and policies, and the services offered by the consular offices 
as described above, the Ecuadorian Government has been supporting Ecuadorians 
abroad through a wide variety of services offered in Ecuador by national govern-
mental institutions such as ministries. In the past, the Secretaría Nacional del 
Migrante itself offered services to Ecuadorians abroad and their families. However, 
the new institutional framework in effect since the creation of the Vice Ministry of 
Human Mobility in 2013 has instead encouraged the inclusion and access of 
Ecuadorians abroad to services offered to all other Ecuadorian citizens, including 
returnees living in Ecuador as well.
In this context, it is worth mentioning some of the services available in Ecuador 
to Ecuadorians abroad, their families, and returnees. These include access to mort-
gage loans and economic incentives granted by the national Government through 
the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing. Ecuadorian citizens living in 
Ecuador and abroad, immigrants, returnees, and refugees can apply to the allowance 
for construction of their own housing on their own land (bono para construcción de 
vivienda), the allowance for housing improvement (bono para mejora de vivienda) 
and the Manuela Espejo grant to persons with disabilities who are registered as such 
in the Ministry of Public Health of Ecuador, on the basis of the law and their critical 
5 Although voting is mandatory in Ecuador, it is optional for Ecuadorians living abroad. To exercise 
this right, Ecuadorians must be registered in the consular office nearest their home. Once a citizen 
abroad is registered in a office, he or she can also access services online or in person, such as the 
“4x4 system” among others. Ecuadorians abroad who are in the consular register at the same time 
keep all their data in the Civil Registry and other institutions and can access services inside 
Ecuador, as described in Sect. II.
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or vulnerable socio-economic condition, in order to provide them with adequate 
housing for their needs and or to improve living conditions and accessibility.
Regarding economic programs offered to all Ecuadorians living abroad, their 
families, and returnees, the “4x4 system” service aims to facilitate transfer of goods 
from Ecuadorians abroad to their families in Ecuador through a tax exemption sys-
tem. Similarly, to facilitate the return of Ecuadorian migrants, the Ecuadorian 
Customs Service offers a “Tax-Exempt Household Goods” service (updated in 
2018), aimed particularly at Ecuadorians who have lived abroad for at least 2 years 
and want to take household goods back to Ecuador.
The consular offices also provide services and encourage the social participation 
of Ecuadorians living abroad through activities tailored to migrants’ needs and 
interests in their destination countries. In Spain, for instance, the Centro Cultural 
Ecuatoriano in Madrid, created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human 
Mobility and launched in December 2017, seeks to promote the cultural heritage of 
the country by developing activities related to Ecuadorian art, cinema and literature, 
as well as workshops to promote civic engagement.
Although there is not a particular policy regarding non-formal education courses 
or workshops, training can be offered by consular offices but will depend on local 
needs and the consular offices’ resources. These courses are geared to providing 
skills for economic integration. For example, the Escuela del Migrante program in 
Spain offers free education and training for unemployed Ecuadorians and work-
shops to develop job search skills. Sales, computer literacy, entrepreneurship, tour-
ism, and networking courses are also available for Ecuadorians living in Spain, 
Italy, and other countries.
Regarding formal education, Ecuadorians living abroad can take the exam Ser 
Bachiller, a standardized national exam required to access higher education in pub-
lic institutions in Ecuador. In 2018, Ecuadorians abroad living in Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Panama, 
Peru, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela took the exam (Secretaría de 
Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2018). Likewise, since 2018 
the Ministry of Education has offered an online literacy, primary, and secondary 
education program for Ecuadorians who are residing in Italy, Spain, and the United 
States who are at least 3 years behind in their education or who are over 18 years old 
and have had no opportunity to complete high school. Once the courses are com-
pleted, Ecuadorians abroad can obtain a high-school degree, which will allow them 
to access higher education and technical certifications. For the Vice Ministry of 
Human Mobility, this service makes effective the portability of rights for Ecuadorians 




7.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Ecuador
As already described, the rights of Ecuadorians abroad are enforced in the national 
constitution and the Organic Law on Human Mobility and its Regulation. This law 
is complemented by the policy guidelines provided by the National Plan for Human 
Mobility to meet the needs of Ecuadorians abroad and to ensure their access to 
rights. As for social protection-oriented norms, policies, and services, these are 
addressed to all Ecuadorians abroad but give special attention to those in vulnerable 
situations, whether because of economic or social restraints, health issues, docu-
mentation issues, gender, or age. In the effort to provide attention to the population 
in a human mobility situation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility 
coordinates actions with consular offices and other national institutions to imple-
ment the migration policy and the trans-sectoral strategy. Although Ecuadorians 
abroad do not receive any cash assistance benefit from the Ecuadorian Government,6 
there is a variety of other services from which they can benefit, such as information 
services, legal advice offered by consular offices for specific challenges faced by 
Ecuadorian migrants in host countries, and repatriation.
Ecuadorians abroad can learn about their rights and the services provided by 
consular offices in host countries and national institutions in Ecuador through dif-
ferent resources. The Ministry of International Affairs and Human Mobility’s web-
site provides general information on policies and rights, as well as documents 
related to the human mobility law and regulations. Additionally, the Ministry has 
launched the online application “Ecuador Contigo,” which allows migrants abroad 
to access information regarding services offered by consular offices, a list of 24-hour 
contact telephone numbers to reach out in emergencies, information about the rights 
of Ecuadorians in host countries, and information on how to process the returning 
migrant certificate (certificado de persona ecuatoriana retornada). As part of the 
contingency plan implemented to deal with migration challenges posed by securiti-
zation measures adopted by the United States, this app also provides videos and 
digital bulletins about migrant’s rights, legal advice, and general advice in case of 
detention. Through this app, Ecuadorians abroad can also access information about 
the virtual consulate, a tool included on the webpage of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Human Mobility that allows its users to apply for, request, and manage 
the different services offered by the consular offices, e.g., legalizations and notary 
records, certifications, travel documents, powers of attorney, last wills and testa-
ments, and registration and certification of births, deaths, marriages and divorces. 
All the products and services provided through the virtual consulate may be either 
fully online, which means that they do not require the presence of the person at all, 
or partially online, which means that someone’s presence will be required at some 
point after filing an application.
6 Within the normative framework there is no explicit information about direct cash assistance for 
Ecuadorians abroad, although some home country benefits in involve allowances such as housing 
subsidies and access to loans.
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Each ministry or national institution in Ecuador often provides information on 
special programs or benefits for Ecuadorians living abroad and returnees. For 
instance, the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute’s webpage provides concise infor-
mation about voluntary affiliation to the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS) 
for Ecuadorians living abroad, retirement pensions, health insurance, maternity 
leave and stipends, healthcare subsidies, disability benefits, stipends for the elderly, 
and death-related benefits. In addition, the consular offices’ social media accounts 
usually share news and updated information regarding services offered in Ecuador 
and local services and activities in host countries.
As for legal advice, consular offices provide this service free of charge as part of 
their responsibilities. It is worth mentioning that Article 214 of the Constitution 
states that the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman shall have delegations 
abroad to protect and safeguard the rights of Ecuadorians and provide assistance in 
cases of vulnerability.7 In general, the protection responsibilities of the Ombudsman 
are carried out within the framework of advice, informal negotiations, legal actions, 
strategic litigation, visits to detained persons in the host country in coordination 
with the Ecuadorian consular offices, assistance in cases of deportation, legal advice 
in cases of evictions and mortgages, and dialogue with human rights institutions in 
host countries, as well as with groups of Ecuadorians abroad to listen and attend to 
their particular needs, in keeping with the Ombudsman’s competences.
Legal advice provided by consular offices depends on resources, local immigra-
tion contexts, and migrants’ needs in particular settings as well. For example, in 
Spain, consular offices deliver legal advice in events of unfair dismissals, evictions, 
and mortgages (since 2012), and financial loans. They also offer legal support dur-
ing the process of negotiations with financial institutions, family reunification 
efforts, alimony, detentions and/or expulsions. Likewise, Ecuadorians living in 
Spain can receive legal support in matters related to access to host country social 
protection services.8 In Italy, protection services to Ecuadorian migrants include 
legal sponsorship and psychosocial support in cases of children and adolescents 
removed from their families, and talks and information about gender and family 
violence and the care and custody of children.
Concerning repatriation services, these are offered on a case-by-case basis as a 
function of vulnerability. As part of the key protection measures stipulated in the 
normative and policy documents, the Organic Law on Human Mobility grants prior-
ity attention to Ecuadorians abroad in vulnerable situations. The status of vulnera-
bility is declared by the Vice Ministry of Human Mobility in Ecuador or through 
diplomatic missions or consular offices abroad. Exceptional cases for repatriation of 
people in vulnerable conditions are considered, as will be discussed latter.
7 The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman opened one of its first delegations in Madrid 
in 2001.
8 Affiliation to the Spanish social security regime is possible under the “Security Agreement 
between Ecuador and Spain” (2009). This agreement ensures the portability of rights for both 
Ecuadorians and Spanish living in both countries.
C. Sánchez Bautista
139
There are a few other social protection services that cover Ecuadorians abroad. 
The following paragraphs will discuss policies and services regarding unemploy-
ment, health care, pensions, family-related benefits, and economic hardship.
7.3.1  Unemployment
Although there is a policy regarding national unemployment insurance that covers 
Ecuadorians living in the country, the Ecuadorian Government does not offer unem-
ployment benefits for migrants abroad. For Ecuadorians living in Ecuador, the 
unemployment insurance application should be made from day 61 of being unem-
ployed and up to 45 days after this date. An additional requirement is to have 24 
non-simultaneous contributions to the national social security system through a 
position requiring an employment contract (Ecuadorians abroad only can be affili-
ated on a voluntary basis); to have six continuous contributions immediately before 
unemployment; not to be retired; and not to have voluntarily resigned.
However, Ecuadorians abroad can apply for a severance payment (individual 
unemployment reserve fund) if they have been voluntarily affiliated to the 
Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS) (voluntary affiliation to the Ecuadorian 
Social Security Institute is eagerly encouraged by the national Government). In this 
case, Ecuadorians abroad can request the reimbursement of this contribution (3% of 
their salary income until February 2006, and 2% after this date). The severance pay 
amount is determined on the basis of the amount of the contributions, which are 
established according to individual salaries. The request must be made through the 
web portal www.iessgob.ec. Ecuadorians abroad do not need to comply with the 
requirement of number of contributions (24 for persons living in Ecuador), the wait-
ing time (60 days without paying voluntary or mandatory affiliation to the IESS) or 
the unemployed status. The individual unemployment fund can also be requested 
for maternity or paternity leave (if parents do not receive a salary during this period). 
Ecuadorians abroad can therefore access this benefit if they are voluntarily affiliated 
to the IESS.
On another front, as mentioned before, education and training for economic inte-
gration and development of labor skills are offered by some consular offices in host 
countries. This is not a policy, but consular offices offer this kind of service accord-
ing to the needs of Ecuadorians abroad.
7.3.2  Health Care
Health coverage and assistance for emigrants is provided in Ecuador by the national 
health system. Nationals abroad can maintain health coverage only if they pay for 
voluntary affiliation to the IESS, and they will have the same healthcare options 
designed for citizens in Ecuador. Ecuadorians abroad who are voluntarily affiliated 
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to the IESS can only access health services and benefits in Ecuador, but can do so 
even if they are only in the country temporarily. Healthcare benefits include occupa-
tional risks, sickness and maternity assistance in Ecuador, and health coverage for 
migrants’ children under 18 years old living in Ecuador.
Healthcare benefits for people with disabilities have been a mainstream policy in 
Ecuador since 2007. Specifically, the Ministry for Economic and Social Inclusion 
(MIES) provides free assistance to people with disabilities in conditions of poverty 
or extreme poverty at the national level through direct administrative centers and 
cooperating entities. Nevertheless, Ecuadorians abroad cannot access this type of 
service unless they return to the country and apply for the services delivered by the 
MIES. One exception is made in the case that Ecuadorians abroad wish to apply for 
the disability certification as a requirement to access healthcare and economic ben-
efits in Ecuador. Ecuadorians abroad can apply to a provisional certificate of dis-
ability by presenting the requirements in the Ecuadorian consular office in the 
country of residence. In Ecuador, the Ministry of Public Health is in charge of 
assessing the type and the severity of the disability and issuing the certificates. If 
Ecuadorians abroad meet the requirements, they will receive the provisional certifi-
cate electronically. Once they return to Ecuador, within 90 days after receiving the 
certificate, they must undergo physical verification (qualification or requalification). 
Ecuadorians with disabilities living abroad who have been qualified and who mani-
fest their express wish to return to the country can enjoy state benefits, as well as the 
benefits enshrined in the law and in its regulations, according to their degree of dis-
ability, as soon as they enter the country.
At a regional level, access to health services works differently within the member 
states of the Andean Community (CAN) (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). 
The Andean Social Security Instrument establishes that health services required by 
migrant workers in host countries, when they are affiliated to the social security 
system in their country of origin, will be provided by the host country and reim-
bursed by their country of origin.
Consulates do not seem to play an active role in the effort of Ecuadorians abroad 
to access health services in Ecuador. Any inquiries on voluntary affiliations to the 
IESS and other benefits should be addressed to the IESS in Ecuador through its 
website, via Skype or by phone.
7.3.3  Pensions
Ecuador has signed bilateral social security agreements (BSSA) with pension- 
related provisions with the following countries: CAN member states (Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Peru), Chile, Netherlands, Paraguay, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
According to the IEES in charge of this policy, bilateral agreements do not include 
health care of medical assistance for Ecuadorian emigrants in Ecuador. However, in 
the case of the Andean Community members, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru will 
offer to citizens from the other CAN members states the same treatment as nationals 
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regarding social security benefits, according to local laws. This disposition only 
applies to labor migrants and their beneficiaries affiliated to the national social secu-
rity scheme.
In the case of Ecuadorians living in Spain, the International cooperation social 
security agreement between Spain and Ecuador provides Ecuadorians with eco-
nomic benefits for permanent disability, retirement and survival, and economic ben-
efits for work accidents and occupational diseases. On the other hand, the 
international cooperation social security agreement between Chile and Ecuador 
provides Ecuadorians with economic benefits for permanent disability, retirement, 
and survival. For any other countries without bilateral agreements with Ecuador in 
this matter Ecuadorians abroad voluntary affiliated to the Ecuadorian Social Security 
Institute can apply to obtain pension benefits in Ecuador if they meet the 
requirements.
The IESS requires that Ecuadorians must apply for pensions at the residence 
country only if there exists an international cooperation agreement between Ecuador 
and the country of residence. When submitting the documentation, through the 
IESS portal, the application for both countries will be generated and, if the require-
ments are met, two pensions could be approved, and they will be calculated propor-
tionally, according to the contributions made in each country.
Consular offices can issue documents and certificates needed to apply to cash 
pension rights, such as special powers and life certificates. In case that the life cer-
tificate is required for the retirement pension, beneficiaries should visit the consular 
office and provide originals and copies of their passport and ID and two photo-
graphs. To apply to survivors benefits for dependents the person concerned should 
be present at the consular office and bring originals and copies of the passport and 
the ID; affiliation data with updated marital status for all cases; and marriage, 
divorce, or death certificates when applicable. These certifications are free and have 
1-year validity.
7.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
The services offered by the Ecuadorian state to Ecuadorians abroad include very 
few cash benefits for families besides the individual unemployment fund (see 
above), which can also be requested for maternity or paternity leave, if parents do 
not receive a salary during this period. Family-related benefits are oriented to other 
kinds of services, such as identity documentation and psychological and legal advice.
Consular offices can issue birth certificates and deliver other services such as 
timely and late birth registration. In the Ecuadorian consulates, children born 
abroad, of any age, may be registered as a son/daughter of an Ecuadorian father and/
or mother.
Additionally, in the fulfilment of its duties, the Ministry of International Affairs 
and Human Mobility, through its consular offices and the delegates of the Office of 
the Human Rights Ombudsman, where applicable, provides legal advice on issues 
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related to cases of children and adolescents removed from their families (as in the 
case of Ecuadorian families in Italy), gender violence, family violence, care and 
custody of children, locating of persons (detainees and missing), repatriation of 
people in vulnerable situations, repatriation of the deceased and mortal remains; 
psychosocial care for migrants’ family members, high-risk migration prevention, 
and general information about consular services and ways to access protection ser-
vices in Ecuador for people in a vulnerable situation.
7.3.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
The Ecuadorian Government’s mechanism to protect Ecuadorians abroad from 
extreme hardship is repatriation of persons in vulnerable condition and exceptional 
cases, since there are no other guaranteed minimum cash benefits available for 
Ecuadorians abroad in situations of vulnerability.
Article 21 of the Organic Law of Human Mobility states that Ecuadorians abroad 
in situation of vulnerability, whether in transit or living in the country of destination, 
will receive priority attention. Complementarily, Article 39 refers to exceptional 
cases9 of repatriation of Ecuadorians in situations of vulnerability. Repatriation is 
defined as the assisted return to Ecuador under the partial or total custody of the 
state, in cases of people deprived of freedom, children or adolescents who are not 
accompanied or are in vulnerable situations, victims of human trafficking or smug-
gling of migrants, people with catastrophic or terminal diseases, and other cases 
determined as exceptional by the competent human mobility officials.
The status of vulnerability must be declared by the Vice Ministry of Human 
Mobility in Ecuador or through diplomatic missions or consular offices abroad. In 
general, vulnerability will be recognized in the following situations: limited eco-
nomic resources and irregular status; children or adolescents not accompanied by, 
or separated from their parents; senior citizens, pregnant women, persons with dis-
abilities or catastrophic or highly complex diseases; victims of family or gender 
violence or discrimination and xenophobia; detainees; homelessness; victims of 
human trafficking or smuggling; and persons affected by migration or social poli-
cies in their destination countries.
People in vulnerable situations should request the recognition of this situation 
from the Vice Ministry of Human Mobility or to the consular or diplomatic offices 
abroad. However, the procedures to request this declaration of vulnerability are not 
clear in the Regulations of the Organic Law on Human Mobility.10
9 The Regulations of the Organic Law regard as exceptional those cases described under the defini-
tion of situations of vulnerability. However, the Organic Law on Human Mobility defines in differ-
ent articles the situations in which Ecuadorians abroad are considered vulnerable (Article 21) and 
cases that are considered exceptional (Article 39). These are already included in Article 21.
10 The Regulations only detail the requirements for applying for repatriation of corpse or the mortal 
remains (Sect. III, Articles 10 to 14).
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Repatriation requests are reviewed and approved by the Vice Ministry of Human 
Mobility or consular or diplomatic offices abroad in cases of vulnerability or in 
exceptional cases as described above. To approve the applications, the officials will 
assess the risks for individual and family safety and security. Article 3 of the 
Regulations of the Organic Law on Human Mobility establishes that the person 
identified as vulnerable by the competent authority will be protected and will receive 
priority attention in keeping with the mechanisms that can be implemented by the 
authorities. Family members do not have to reimburse the cost associated with repa-
triation. Additionally, transportation, accommodation or foster care can be provided 
in Ecuador and in the country of destination with no reimbursement obligations.
Finally, the national Government in coordination with the consular offices pro-
vides repatriation of the deceased for families in vulnerable situations. However, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility does not cover the costs of funeral 
services or burial sites, but rather only repatriation expenses for the corpse or the 
mortal remains (ashes) to Ecuador; these costs do not have to be reimbursed. The 
service will be granted only when the deceased person and his/her family have a 
vulnerable socio-economic situation, which must be corroborated before the 
expense is approved. For this evaluation, the applicants both in the country in which 
the person died and in Ecuador must meet certain requirements. There will be two 
applicants: one abroad, who will contact the consulate closest to the place of death; 
the second in Ecuador, who will contact the Vice Ministry of Human Mobility. The 
required documents are the application for repatriation services, which must be sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility of Ecuador; a copy 
of the ID of the family member requesting the repatriation; and a copy of the ID, 
passport or birth certificate of the deceased.
7.4  Conclusions
Since 2000, when the emigration of Ecuadorians became a visible reality, the 
Ecuadorian state has been designing and implementing different strategies to pro-
tect its citizens abroad. However, starting in 2007, the process of strengthening and 
revamping Ecuadorian migration policies became rooted in a strategic electoral dis-
course by the Alianza País presidential candidate, who aimed at leveraging the votes 
of Ecuadorians overseas. Thus, since that moment and after President Correa took 
office, Ecuador has had the time to build a set of laws, regulations, and policies and 
an administrative infrastructure to cope particularly with the needs of its nationals 
abroad and returnees, and to establish strategic relations with Ecuadorians abroad. 
Beyond political will, it is also worth considering that the changes implemented 
regarding the infrastructure, programmes, and services offered have been shaped 
according to the availability of state resources as well. Thus, after Ecuador started 
its economic recovery following the hike in oil prices during President Correa’s 
mandate, it was more feasible for the Government to strengthen the migration pol-
icy despite the fluctuations in their implementation.
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In terms of the relation between the Ecuadorian state and its diaspora, it is worth 
mentioning that, despite the fact that campaign rhetoric had referred to Ecuadorian 
emigrants as “compatriots” and “brothers and sisters”, within the current norms, 
they are called “Ecuadorians abroad”. This term is meant to highlight the fact that 
they belong to the territory, are entitled to their rights as Ecuadorian citizens, and are 
protected by the state beyond its geographical borders—rather than to call attention 
to their migratory status or their circumstances as emigrants overseas. They are also 
referred to as “people in human mobility situations”, which implies the recognition 
of their rights, including the right to migrate.
From 2007 to date, a variety of reforms have been made to the administrative 
infrastructure, norms, policies, and programmes, but the spirit of protection for 
Ecuadorian migrants and their families has remained. At the time of writing this 
chapter (January 2019), in terms of norms and policies, the Constitution (2008), the 
Organic Law on Human Mobility (2017) and its Regulation (2017), and the National 
Plan for Human Mobility (2018) are the main guidelines for the Ecuadorian institu-
tions’ efforts to guarantee the rights of Ecuadorian migrants and, accordingly, to 
provide services in Ecuador and abroad. To this end, in terms of infrastructure, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, with its network of consular 
offices, and in coordination with the different ministries and other governmental 
agencies in Ecuador—in keeping with the trans-sectoral strategy to guarantee the 
rights of Ecuadorian migrants—is actually in charge of implementing the legal pro-
visions and the diaspora engagement policies in force in Ecuador. These protection- 
oriented norms, policies, and services are aimed at all Ecuadorian migrants, but give 
particular attention to those in vulnerable situations, whether because of economic 
or social constraints, health issues, documentation matters, gender, or age.
Specific rights of Ecuadorian migrants are recognized in the documents men-
tioned previously, and services should therefore be provided to allow Ecuadorian 
citizens to exercise their rights from abroad. Despite the fact that the Ecuadorian 
Government does not offer any kind of direct cash support to emigrants in their 
countries of destination, the consular offices are in charge of providing protection, 
assistance, and services such as paperwork and documentation, information about 
rights in Ecuador and in countries of destination, legal advice and accompaniment 
and monitoring in cases of legal actions, assistance in cases of vulnerability, repa-
triation, workshops, and informal programs that promote Ecuadorian culture.
Additionally, the Government has been supporting Ecuadorians abroad through 
a wide variety of services now offered by national governmental institutions such as 
the ministries or secretariats. The Ecuadorian migrants abroad and returnees can 
access mostly the same kinds of programs and services as any Ecuadorian living in 
the country. However, some of the benefits can only be enjoyed in Ecuador, such as 
health services, housing credits, or access to the public higher education system, 
which is free in Ecuador.
Although the social protection policies for Ecuadorians abroad exist and are par-
ticularly focused on cases of vulnerability, they do not include any unemployment 
or cash benefits for Ecuadorians living in other countries. When economic, health- 
related, or any other kind of vulnerability exists, the answer is repatriation, and it is 
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granted on a case-by-case basis. However, in general terms, the programmes and 
services offered by the Vice Ministry of Human Mobility and the consular offices 
are in accordance with the rights of Ecuadorians abroad and their families as stipu-
lated in the Constitution, the Organic Law on Human Mobility, and its Regulations.
After 2 years of having a new Government in the country, some of the services 
provided continue to be implemented, and the infrastructure seems to have become 
consolidated. This is evident in the National Plan of Human Mobility (2018), even 
though the functions of the National Council for Equality and Human Mobility 
would still need to be strengthened. This body is relevant since its role is to monitor 
and assess public policy regarding human mobility. Also, it is important to acknowl-
edge that the implementation of the policies regarding Ecuadorian migrants and the 
services provided to this population might suffer modifications due to the country’s 
current economic situation and the Government’s priorities. In any case, the results 
seen in coming years will make it possible to determine whether Ecuador has finally 
consolidated a migration policy made by the state to supersede a policy made by a 
specific administration, i.e., a policy that can outlast political interests and govern-
mental changes.
Acknowledgements This chapter is part of the project “Migration and Transnational Social 
Protection in (Post)Crisis Europe (MiTSoPro)” that has received funding from the European 
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme (Grant agreement No. 680014). In addition to this chapter, readers can find a series of 
indicators comparing national social protection and diaspora policies across 40 countries on the 
following website: http://labos.ulg.ac.be/socialprotection/
References
Asamblea Constituyente. (2008). Constitución política de Ecuador. Ecuador: Gobierno del 
Ecuador.
CEPAL. (Septiembre de2010). Resumen del estudio sobre marcos institucionales normativos y de 
políticas sobre migración internacional en la Argentina, Chile y el Ecuador. Santiago de Chile.
Collier, M. (2013). Emigration nations. Policies and ideologies of emigrant engagement [online]. 
London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Eguiguren, M. (2011). Sujeto migrante, crisis y tutela estatal. Quito: Flacso Ecuador.
Gamlen, A. (2006). Diaspora engagement policies: What are they, and what kind of states use 
them? (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. Working Paper 32). Oxford University 
of Oxford.
Gamlen, A. (2008). The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination. Political 
Geography, 27(8), 840–856.
Herrera, G. (2003). La migración vista desde el lugar de origen. Iconos, 15, 86–94.
Herrera, G. (2007). Ecuatorianos/as en Europa: de la vertiginosa salida a la construcción de espa-
cios trasnacionales. In I. Yepes & G. Herrera (Eds.), Las migraciones Europa América Latina 
(pp. 189–216). Quito: FLACSO-OBREAL-UCL-Universidad de Barcelona.
Herrera, G. (2011). La familia migrante en las políticas públicas del Ecuador: de símbolo de la tra-
gedia a objeto de intervención. In B. Feldman-Bianco, L. Rivera, C. Stefoni, & M. Villa (Eds.), 
La construcción social del sujeto migrante en America Latina. Prácticas, representaciones y 
categorías. Quito: FLACSO Ecuador, CLACSO, Universidad Alberto Hurtado.
7 Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Ecuadorian Citizens…
146
Herrera, G., Moncayo, M. I., & Escobar, A. (2012). Perfil migratorio del Ecuador 2011. Quito: IOM.
Lafleur, J.  M. (2011). Why do states enfranchise citizens abroad? Comparative insights from 
Mexico, Italy and Belgium. Global Networks, 11, 481–501.
Margheritis, A. (2016). Migration governance across regions. State-diaspora relations in the Latin 
American-Southern Europe corridor. New York: Routledge.
Ministerio de Educación (2017). MinEduc y Cancillería presentan bachillerato a distancia para 
compatriotas que viven en Estados Unidos.. Retrieved from Ministerio de Educación: https://
educacion.gob.ec/mineduc-y-cancilleria-presentan-bachillerato-a-distancia-para-compatrio-
tas-que-viven-en-estados-unidos/
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración. (July 2007). Política migratoria del 
Ecuador. Quito, Ecuador: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49002e312.pdf.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana. (2017a). Ley Orgánica de Movilidad 
Humana. Registro Oficial 938. Ecuador: Gobierno del Ecuador.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana. (2017b, May). Estatuto orgánico de 
gestión organizacional por procesos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad 
Humana. Ecuador: Gobierno del Ecuador.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana. (2018). Plan Nacional de Movilidad 
Humana. Ecuador: Gobierno del Ecuador.
Presidencia de la República de Ecuador. (2017). Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica de Movilidad 
Humana. Decreto 111. Ecuador: Gobierno del Ecuador.
Sánchez Bautista, C. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks: Country report Ecuador. 
INTERACT RR 2014/24, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di 
Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.
Sánchez Bautista, C. (2017). The promise of a welfare state: The Ecuadorian government strategy 
on emigration and diaspora policies between 2007–2016. In A. Weinar (Ed.), Emigration and 
diaspora policies in the age of mobility. London: Springer.
Secretaría de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación. (2018, February 
19). Inicia toma del examen Ser Bachiller. Retrieved from Secretaría de Educación 
Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación: https://www.educacionsuperior.gob.ec/
inicia-toma-del-examen-ser-bachiller-primer-semestre-2018/
Secretaría Nacional del Migrante. (2007). Plan nacional de desarrollo humano para las migracio-
nes 2007–2010. Ecuador: Gobierno del Ecuador.
Weinar, A. (Ed.). (2017). Emigration and diaspora policies in the age of mobility. London: 
Springer.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
C. Sánchez Bautista
147© The Author(s) 2020
J.-M. Lafleur, D. Vintila (eds.), Migration and Social Protection in Europe and 
Beyond (Volume 3), IMISCOE Research Series, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51237-8_8
Chapter 8
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals in India
Sony Pellissery, Saloni Jain, and Geo Varghese
8.1  Overview of the National Social Security System and Key 
Migration Features in India
8.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
Just like other countries in the Global South, India has put forward a social security 
system that is largely influenced by its colonial legacy. Many ‘welfare’ concerns 
were operationalized through the framework of developmental state (Pellissery and 
Sasidhar 2018) that aimed to modernize the nation through a process of state-led 
economic growth. Yet, following the colonial legacy, those close to the state (‘for-
mal’ workers) received social security arrangements comparable to those in 
advanced industrialised welfare states.
Welfare arrangements in India have a segmented nature. This country has one of 
the largest informal economies in place (Pellissery 2013). About 92% of the Indian 
labour force is working in unorganised sector without access to any formal social 
security mechanisms (NCEUS 2007). Those who are in the formal sector are pro-
vided with social security measures, thus being considered as a privileged segment 
of the Indian society. Most international workers (except undocumented migrants) 
work in the formal sector and are considered to be part of the formal labour market. 
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The segmented labour market is reinforced by social security arrangements and 
labour laws largely influenced by India’s colonial past. Employee’s State Insurance 
Act (1948, ESI) is modelled after the British welfare arrangements for industrial 
workers and is currently the overarching framework for social security in India.
Social welfare is a subject placed among the ‘directive principles’ of the Indian 
Constitution, resulting in the state’s engagement in social security as a desirable 
activity, rather than an obligatory sector of intervention. Constitutional articles 38, 
41, 42 and 47 dealing with social welfare were placed in the ‘concurrent list’ where 
there is joint responsibility between regional/local states and central government. 
This categorisation of social policies as a ‘desirable activity’ led to a “needs-based 
conception of justice in theory, but was in practice based on ideas of charity, benev-
olence and paternalism. The idea of a right to welfare or justice was clearly pre-
cluded” (Jayal 2011: 39). Therefore, appeasing the electorate was at the heart of the 
development of the Indian social security system in federal states (Pellissery and 
Barrientos 2013). For instance, until 1995, there was no national level non- 
contributory pension system. Yet, most regional states were providing pensions 
from their local budgets.
Because of the segmented nature of the labour market and the fact that the major-
ity of workers are engaged in the informal economy, labour laws cover only to a 
small proportion of the work force. The main social security instrument for work-
ers – the Employee’s Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) – is applicable only to 
about 12% of the population (CSO 2018).1 Most labour laws applicable to private 
companies (where migrants are largely employed) are within the purview of the 
federal state. Therefore, there is a significant variation between Indian states on 
labour regimes. Such a scenario, coupled with heightened globalization, has resulted 
in approaching labour through the logic of economic production. A recent review of 
the legislation in the post-liberalised India (Pellissery 2008) has shown that court 
interpretations of the law have favoured employers.
This segmented labour market has created a limited possibility for the applica-
tion of human rights. The International Convention of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)2 states that the right to social security implies two pre-
dominant categories of measures: social insurance schemes (contribution based) 
and social assistance schemes (non-contributory and typically taxation-funded mea-
sures through means-tested mechanisms for the vulnerable population). Although 
India is signatory of this declaration, the Constitution of India does not recognize 
1 This low level of take up is primarily since these laws are applicable in establishments, which has 
more than 20 workers. In the informal economy, employers, in order to avoid payment of social 
security benefits, arrange their production units in such a way that in a legal unit, there will be less 
than 20 workers.
2 Also in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 22 and 25; CeRD, Article 11; 
CRC, Article 26; and the Convention for the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families 
(CMW), Article 27. it also appears in regional human rights instruments (Protocol of San Salvador, 
Article 9;, European Social Charter, Article 12), and in several Conventions of the international 
Labour Organisation (ILO), in particular Convention No. 102 on Minimum Standards of Social 
Security. The CRPD explicitly refers to the right to social protection (Article 28).
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social security as a fundamental right. However, Article 41 of the Constitution does 
stipulate that the state should – within the limits of its economic capacity- secure the 
right to work, education and public assistance in case of unemployment, old age, 
sickness and disability. Article 42 further requires the state to secure just and humane 
working conditions and maternity relief. Article 47 also stipulates that the state 
should raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and improve the public 
health sector. These obligations require the state to create a broader outline of a 
social security regime.
In practice, India’s social security schemes cover only a very small segment of 
the organised work force. Out of an estimated work force of around 397 million, 
only 28 million benefit from formal social security protection  (Pellissery et  al. 
2014). Although 90% of the workforce is working in the unorganized sector accord-
ing (Asian Development Bank 2016), the total social protection expenditure in India 
as a percentage of the GDP in 2012 was 1.6 (compared to 6.5  in China, 4.4  in 
Thailand, and 2.6  in Sri Lanka during the same period). In other words, social 
expenditure is primarily an out-of-pocket expenditure for most Indian families.
Since 1991, India formally entered the globalized economy by accepting the 
terms and conditions for loan from the International Monetary Fund. This has 
resulted in several layers of economic reforms. Apart from an open economy (end-
ing the protected economy), state’s intervention in several key social sectors have 
been re-oriented. Consequently, private actors have been allowed to intervene in 
areas such as education, health, and pensions. As the labour market also saw a new 
category of ‘international workers’ in skilled jobs, ESI has been recently modified 
in order to incorporate their concerns, as explained in the next section.
8.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
The rich resources and geographical positioning of India has significantly contrib-
uted to the migration inflows towards this country. The size of the country itself 
has generated large stocks of internal migrants generally moving between differ-
ent places within the same regional state. It is estimated that around 35% of peo-
ple in urban areas and 26% of residents of rural areas have moved from their place 
of usual residence (Census of India 2011). According to the national Census data, 
the total number of internal migrants increased significantly during the past 
decades, from 167 million individuals in 1971 to 315 million in 2001. The National 
Sample Survey revealed that in 2008, about 28.5% of Indians (over 325 million 
people of the total population of 1.14 billion) were internal migrants. Internal 
migration has thus become an important issue from the perspective of social secu-
rity. Although this specific type of migration is beyond the aim of this chapter, 
some of the social security provisions discussed here do include the eligibility 
condition of local residence, thus excluding internal migrants from social security 
provisions.
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Determining who is an immigrant and who is a citizen is a rather complicated 
task in some parts of India, especially in the border regions. In some places (for 
instance, the North East of India) citizenship debates are contentious, and civil 
rights are denied for generations, let alone social rights. There is a recent attempt to 
create a National Register of Citizens according to which those whose names are in 
the official list until 1971 will be considered as citizens. There are various issues of 
documentary proofs. Since 2009, the Indian government has attempted to issue a 
unique identification document (aadhar card). Until July 2018, 1.22 billion identi-
fication cards have been issued (UIDAI 2018), although problems still remain for 
individuals who might be missed out of such registration processes.
In 2006, foreigners accounted for 0.4% of India’s total population – approxi-
mately 5 million people (World Bank 2008), with most of them originating from 
neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar or China.3 The emigrant population represents about 0.9% 
of the total population (above 10 million people).4 Most of them come from few 
states (Kerala, Tamilnadu, Goa, Punjab, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh) and they gener-
ally respond to two different migration trajectories: either skilled workers who 
migrated to the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and other developed countries since 
the 1950s or low-skilled emigrants who have started to move to Middle East or 
South East countries on temporary labour contracts since 1970s (Rajan 2010).5 As 
explained below, these two categories respond to quite different social security 
requirements.
‘Foreigners’ broadly fall into the two categories mentioned in the previous para-
graph. Unskilled foreign workers are typically from neighbouring states (rarely 
from other middle and low developed economies), and they compete for social 
security resources with large number of Indian unskilled labourers. Therefore, for 
political reasons, Indian low skilled labourer are preferred over foreigners. On the 
other hand, when it comes to skilled migrant labourers, they are typically well-off 
than majority of Indian population. They have access to private social security 
3 A significant portion of migration from neighbouring countries, particularly from Bangladesh, is 
sensitive political issue of illegal immigration. Very often this has resulted in communal riots 
between migrants (primarily Muslims) and local residents (primarily Hindus). The Illegal Migrants 
(Determination by Tribunal) (IMDT) Act, enacted in 1983 was later struck down by the Supreme 
Court of India in 2005.
4 Sources based on Indian data (NSSO 2008) suggest there are around four million Indian citizens 
residing abroad. However, the sending country statistics are often unable to capture families that 
have migrated with the migrant. The figure of 10 million is based on the World Bank’s assessment. 
The India Migration Report (2010) estimates six million Indian emigrants working in Gulf coun-
tries alone. The World Bank estimates that US $ 55,000 million was received as remittance in 2010 
alone. Compared to this, outward remittance flow was as small as US $ 4000 million. International 
Organisation for Migration predicts that India will emerge the largest migrant-sending country 
globally by 2050.
5 It is estimated that 90% of migrants of the state of Kerala are living and working in the Gulf 
countries.
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arrangements, and therefore do not make a political demand for the same.6 
Exceptions to this large apathy towards ‘foreigners’ is where India has signed SSAs 
and ‘international workers’ are recognised.
8.2  Migration and Social Protection in India
This section will examine how social protection is being provided in life circum-
stances of unemployment, sickness, old age, difficult family circumstances and 
income loss. In particular, we will examine how social protection is being extended 
to domestic citizens and foreigners. As indicated in the previous sections of this 
chapter, in a segmented economy – formal and informal workers – social protection 
benefits are also extended in segmented manner. Foreign workers, primarily being 
in the private sector, are treated to cover the social protection benefits through pri-
vate sources. However, in recent times, recognition of ‘international worker’ has 
begun to recognise foreigners eligible for certain social protection benefits.
8.2.1  Unemployment
In an informal economy, it is extremely hard to calculate who is employed and who 
is not. The share of people engaged in several gainful activities though the salaried 
jobs have decreased.7 The Centre for the Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE) 
estimated that around 31 million persons were seeking for a job in India in February 
2018 (6.5% unemployment rate).
Three main schemes aim to address unemployment in India. Under the National 
Employment Scheme, some regional governments provide unemployment allow-
ances to specific categories of jobseekers out of their own resources through employ-
ment exchanges.8 The national level Unemployment Allowance Scheme (Rajiv 
Gandhi Shramik Kalyan Yojna) was introduced in 2005 as an unemployment insur-
ance programme managed by Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC). The 
eligibility condition for Rajiv Gandhi Shramik Kalyan Yojna are: (a) the person 
6 It is interesting to note that travel concession (train), seen as a civil right than social right, used to 
be provided to all senior citizens above the age of 60 until 2016. Since then this facility for foreign-
ers is taken away and only nationals are entitled for 50% of travel concession.
7 In economic theory, the complexity of ‘disguised unemployment’ explains this phenomenon. Yet, 
as per the report of National Skill Development Mission, 97% of Indian workforce has not under-
gone any skill training.
8 But the Committee (Forty-second Report of the Standing Committee on ‘The Employment 
Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Amendment Bill, 2013) observe that the 
Employment Exchanges have lost their significance due to changing trends for e.g. rise in number 
of contract workers, use of capital intensive techniques, technological developments, outsourcing 
and emergence of recruitment boards have led to reduced coverage under the Act.
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should have been an insured person (IP) under the ESI Act on the date of loss of 
insurable employment, on account of closure of the factory or establishment, 
retrenchment, or permanent invalidity arising out of non-employment injury; (b) the 
insured person should have contributed under the ESI Scheme for at least two years; 
(c) applications for Unemployment Allowance should be within six months from 
the date of loss of employment; and (d) minimum 1 month waiting period after 
unemployment is needed. However, this scheme has a very low take up,9 mainly due 
to the fact that it applies to factories having at least 10 workers or similar organiza-
tions with at least 20 workers. Furthermore, only national residents can apply for 
this scheme as foreigners and non-resident nationals do not qualify as eligible 
applicants.
India also provides an unemployment assistance scheme in the form of the 
National Employment Guarantee Act. 100 days of wage employment are guaran-
teed in a financial year to every rural household whose adult members volunteer to 
do unskilled manual work.10 National citizens residing in the country are not 
required to have exhausted11 the right to unemployment insurance (RGSKY) ben-
efits to become eligible to claim unemployment assistance under 
MGNREGS. However, the benefit is only for ‘local residents’ (this refers to village 
domicile which is the lowest tier of governance where the demand for job is made) 
as applicants must prove residence in the village. All adult members of the house-
hold who register may apply for work. To register, they have to: (a) be local resi-
dents (‘local’ implies residing within the Gram Panchayat,12 including those that 
may have migrated some time ago but may return); (b) be willing to do unskilled 
manual work; and (c) apply as a household (nuclear or single-member family) at 
the local Gram Panchayat. The Act is not specific about whether foreign residents 
are eligible for employment guarantee even if they stay in the village.
The third scheme- Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana- was introduced in 
2012 in order to provide gainful employment to the urban unemployed and under 
employed poor, by encouraging the setup of self-employment ventures by the urban 
poor living below the poverty line, skills training and also through providing wage 
9 In 2009 a reported number of 3881 were assisted through this scheme.
10 Ref. http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/writereaddata/Circulars/2342AP_drought_letter_6_June_18.
pdf (Accessed on 03 November 2018).
11 Theoretically speaking, the Employment Guarantee scheme is in parallel to unemployment 
insurance benefit. In practice, both are addressed at two separate segments. Employment guarantee 
scheme is targeted at rural unskilled workers ready to engage in manual labour, whereas unem-
ployment insurance is targeted towards skilled graduates (generally in urban areas) who are regis-
tered for a job.
12 Gram Panchayat is the lowest tier of governance in India. It is often translated as village. The size 
and geographical area differs from region to region. However, there is a constitutionally mandated 
elected body and bureaucracy at this lower tier. For various schemes, this lowest tier is devolved 
the responsibility to verify the eligibility conditions for welfare assistance. The expression of ‘local 
domicile’ typically refers to Gram Panchayat certifying the person concerned regularly residing in 
the village.
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employment by utilizing their labour for construction of socially and economically 
useful public assets. The scheme is categorical in nature.
8.2.2  Health Care
India has one of the lowest health expenditure as share of GDP in the world (1.4%). 
It has a thriving private health care market and poor quality public health system. 
Most residents do not have access to any insurance system, and about 70% of health 
expenses represent out-of-pocket expenditure.
The health care system is segmented in two ways. First, only those who have a 
formal employment can enjoy free medical treatment through the chain of hospitals 
run by Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC).13 Currently, the ESI Scheme 
is not applicable to foreigners or citizens residing abroad. National citizens residing 
abroad can claim invalidity benefits under the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (more 
details below) and not under the ESIC scheme. However, this covers only a limited 
segment of the population- less than 2% in 2017. The second type of segmentation 
derives from the access the insurance. The rich segments of the population have 
access to an insurance that covers medical procedures in advanced hospitals. To 
address this second type of segmentation, the scheme Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (RSBY) was launched in 2008 to cover Below Poverty Line families. The 
scheme is jointly funded by the central government and the state government and 
aims to reduce out of pocket expenditure on health, while also increasing access to 
health care. The eligibility condition for RSBY is belonging to the section of nation-
ally defined below poverty line. This is determined by state governments. Most of 
the state governments consider citizenship as criteria for BPL,14 thus, excluding 
foreigners. Recently, some sections of labourers are also brought eligible for RSBY, 
including building and other construction workers registered with the Welfare 
Boards, licensed railway porters, street vendors, MNREGA workers who have 
worked for more than 15 days during the preceding financial year, Beedi workers, 
domestic workers, sanitation workers, mine workers, rickshaw pullers, rag pickers, 
and auto/taxi drivers.15
The Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (PBBY) is a mandatory insurance scheme 
initiated in 2003 with the aim of safeguarding the interests of Indian emigrant work-
ers, both working for Indian companies and companies owned by foreigners in a 
different country. The insured workers are covered for accidental death or perma-
nent disability leading to loss of employment while abroad. The insurance also 
compensates for the costs of hospitalization. Coverage of repatriation for medically 
13 Ref. https://www.esic.nic.in/sickness-benefits (accessed on 02 October 2018).
14 Ref. https://archive.india.gov.in/howdo/howdoi.php?service=7 (accessed on 12 December 2018).
15 Ref. https://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/rashtriya-swasthya-bima-yojana#rsby3 (accessed on 11 
December 2018).
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unfit/premature termination of employment, maternity expenses benefit to female 
emigrants and legal expenses related to emigrants’ overseas employment are some 
of the benefits covered through this scheme (MEA 2017).
The public health centres, where primary services are provided don’t distinguish 
between citizens and foreigners. Yet, the standards of their services are poor and 
often people self-select to receive services if the care could be affordable from pri-
vate sources. However, in the public health system itself, secondary and tertiary 
services are of higher quality. Yet, most of these services are on payment basis.
8.2.3  Pensions
India’s pension system is also highly segmented. The vast majority of the popula-
tion do not have any arrangements for an old-age pension. The law requires children 
to care their parents, such care being provided without legal sanctions in a tradi-
tional joint family system. Only a small share of the population (less than 7%) that 
is in the formal sector enjoys the state pension.
Since 2004, this state-funded pension system was turned into a contribution 
based system through the National Pension Scheme. This is available to any citizen 
of India, whether resident or non-resident, therefore excluding foreign residents. 
Claimants must be aged between 18 – 60 years. After attaining 60 years of age, 
individuals will not be permitted to make further contributions to the NPS accounts. 
NPS account can be operated from anywhere in the country irrespective of indi-
vidual employment and location/geography. An individual is eligible for withdrawal 
before the tenure only if he/she has contributed for at least 10 years in the NPS 
Account. Further, one must contribute at least Rs. 6000 for tier 1 account and 
Rs.2000 for tier 2 account annually for 10 years to avail the benefits of pre-mature 
or mature withdrawal. Since 1991, private companies have been allowed to operate 
in the pension sector. Since 2009, the National Pension Scheme is open to all citi-
zens for contribution-linked pension system. Yet, until December 2017, less than 
1% of population is part of this pension system. In other words, access to these 
private pension funds are hugely dependent on income, and therefore limited.
Contribution-linked National Pension Scheme is open to all citizens of India. 
While employers have the provision to make contributions to supplement that of 
employees, the Government of India does not make any contributions towards this 
scheme. Both residents and non-residents could be part of this scheme. There is also 
a minimum contribution clause of Rs. 2000 per annum to remain in the National 
Pension Scheme.
Only international workers working under an employment visa are subject to the 
regulations of EPF, and contractual work or short-term business travel is exempt. 
However, there are certain exemptions regulated via bilateral arrangements when 
international workers contribute to their home country social security system or 
when they have the ‘detached worker’ status as specified in the social security 
agreement. Furthermore, economic agreement exemptions are granted when: (a) 
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international workers contribute to the home country system; (b) the participation in 
India’s social security system is specifically exempted by the economic agreement 
and; (c) only those employees covered by a bilateral agreement are eligible for with-
drawal benefit under the EPF, 1995, who have not rendered the eligible service (i.e. 
10 years) even after including the totalisation benefit as may be provided in the said 
agreement. In all other cases, withdrawal benefit under the EPS, 1995 will not be 
available to international workers for contributory service less than 10 years.
India also provides a non-contributory pension scheme- the National Old-age 
Pension Programme designed for citizens who are below poverty line. Only those 
who do not qualify for a contributory pension are eligible to apply for this non- 
contributory pension scheme. However, the pension amount is very small (Rs. 200 
per month, although most regional governments complement this with additional 
funds). This non-contributory pension is means-tested and granted a person who is 
60 years or above and belongs to a household below the poverty line. The period of 
prior residence is not an eligibility criterion under the scheme. However, the scheme 
is reserved only for resident citizens as resident foreigners or non-resident citizens 
cannot apply for it.
8.2.4  Family Benefits
In several ways, family as an institution is central to the Indian society and culture. 
Therefore, several life-contingencies are taken care by the family as a unit. For 
workers in the formal sector, though there are maternity and paternity leaves (the 
latter only for some specific categories of workers), there is no system of parental 
benefits or child benefits in the Indian social security system. Maternity benefits are 
paid for 12 weeks, although mothers have 26 weeks of maternity leave. Since mater-
nity benefits are granted to employees covered by the ESI Act, they also cover 
‘international workers’. Hence, foreign residents can access maternity benefits from 
India under the same conditions as national residents.
One major challenge in India is providing support for women who are in the 
informal sector. Neo-natal and maternal deaths are extremely high in India. Since 
2005, a safe motherhood programme was introduced (Janani Suraksha Yojana, 
JSY) as a targeted scheme for all pregnant women below the poverty line. The 
scheme is financed by the central government and provides cash assistance, nutri-
tion and routine physical examination for mothers. As previously mentioned, India 
does not have a child benefit scheme. Yet, since 1975, the Integrated Child 
Development Scheme provides nutrition, health check-up, education, and child care 
until the age of six when children are compulsorily required to be enrolled in a 
school. Around 13,30,000 anganwadi (community based shelters) across the coun-
try provide these services in kind. Several state governments have extended the 
services in these centres to international migrants. However, several study reports 
(PEO 2011) have shown that self-exclusion is the mechanism in these places.
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8.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
There is no non-categorical, non-contributory scheme of guaranteed minimum 
resources in India. However, there are certain schemes that do provide benefits in 
cash to individuals in need. One example is the employment guarantee scheme initi-
ated in 2005 that provides 100 days wage employment for rural areas to every 
household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. 69% of the 
Indian population live in rural areas (Census 2011), hence this scheme covers most 
of the population. A condition of local citizenship (village domicile) prevents 
migrants from accessing this scheme. Secondly, the National Social Assistance 
Programme (NSAP) introduced in 1995 provides support to certain groups of indi-
viduals (aged persons, widows, disabled persons, bereaved families on death of 
primary bread winner) living in households below the poverty line. These are non- 
contributory benefits accessible only to resident citizens. Since the administration 
of these schemes is done through local governments, internal migrants are not eli-
gible since they have to provide a resident certificate of five years. Last but not least, 
the Unorganised Sector Workers’ Social Security Scheme which came into force 
since 2004 is contributory in nature. There have been discussions on universal basic 
income (Economic Survey 2016), although there are no current plans for its 
implementation.
8.2.6  Bilateral/Multilateral Social Security Agreements
As previously mentioned, the category of ‘international worker’ introduced in 2008 
is particularly relevant when discussing migrants’ access to social protection in 
India. An international worker is defined as: a) any Indian employee working or 
having worked abroad in a country with which India has entered into a Social 
Security Agreement (SSA) or; b) any foreigner working in India in an establishment 
where the Employees ‟ Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 is 
applicable. Generally, this refers to any registered work place with more than 10 
workers.
International workers are eligible for the benefits covered by the Employees’ 
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. These are contributory 
benefits through Employees Provident Funds Scheme (1952), Employees’ Pension 
Scheme (1995) and Employees Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme (1976). 
International Workers contributing to the social security of their country of origin, 
with which India has entered into a Social Security Agreement and enjoying the 
status of a detached worker are considered to be excluded.
India currently has bilateral social security agreements with 19 countries: 
Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, France, Denmark, Republic of 
Korea, Netherlands, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, Austria, Norway, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and Portugal. Most of these agreements were signed with 
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are EU member states, It is important to note none of these countries are neither on 
the list of top three destination countries for Indian migrants, nor the workers from 
these countries form highest number of foreigners residing in India. Partly in 
response to the demands of companies with business in both these countries to 
facilitate movement of their employees. For each country, the social benefits cov-
ered in the agreements are different. For instance, the agreement with Canada cov-
ers old-age and survivors’ pension for employed persons and the Permanent Total 
Disability pension for employed persons. Similarly, for those coming from 
Singapore are exempted for Provident Fund contributions since India has a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore.
In terms of international cooperation in the field of social security, it is also worth 
mentioning that India is member of the Colombo Process, a regional consultative 
process on management of overseas employment and contractual labour for coun-
tries of origin in Asia.16 The main aim of the Colombo Process is to provide a forum 
for Asian Labour sending countries to discuss and resolve issues pertaining social 
security. Among this, with some of the Gulf Region Countries (where 6 million 
Indians work) there have been bilateral agreements signed since 2004. These coun-
tries are Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan and Qatar. The Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs has set up several offices in Gulf countries as part of 
India Centre for Migration for various helps.17 What is important to remember is 
these agreements primarily facilitate smoothening of a range of civil issues since 
recruitment in host countries through unscrupulous private agencies create a range 
of problems for illiterate and low skilled workers.
8.2.7  Obstacles and Sanctions
There are several obstacles and sanctions for foreigners or citizens residing abroad 
in accessing social benefits across the five core policy areas analyzed in this chapter. 
In the case of unemployment schemes (Rajiv Gandhi Shramik Kalyan Yojana and 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme), our findings indicate that 
while there are no migration related restrictions per se, citizens living abroad may 
be able to access these schemes only if they are insured under the ESI Act and have 
contributed for a minimum period of five years prior to loss of employment.18 
Similarly, there are no restrictions on foreigners living in India to avail the scheme 
provided they qualify as employees under Section 2(9) of ESI Act and fulfil the 
16 The eleven member countries for the process are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam and eight destination 
country participants are Bahrain, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates.
17 Utilisation of Welfare fund established by this Centre shows about 50% of money is spent on 
supporting people with air travel.
18 Circular, No. N-11/12/2003-Bft.II/Vol.II,Rajiv Gandhi Shramik Kalyan Yojana.
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above mentioned criteria. However, needless to say, the scheme is valid only for the 
companies which are covered under the ESI Act. In the case of MGNREGS, citizens 
residing abroad may not be able to access the benefits of the scheme as it is appli-
cable to only those “rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled 
manual work”19 assigned within the country. As far as the liberal interpretation of 
the law is concerned, foreigners living in India may be able to access the benefits of 
the scheme provided their household is registered by the Gram Panchayat. However, 
in reality, this process is bound to be filled with obstacles as the registration process 
is left to the whims and fancies of the Gram Panchayat.
To avail the social security benefits in the domain of health care mainly covered 
by the integrated need based social insurance scheme provided by the ESI Act, 
1948, there are no migration related obstacles for foreigners or nationals. In 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, we find that there is a major obstacle for foreign-
ers in availing the scheme as the programme is applicable only to the BPL category 
household or specified unorganised sector workers and therefore applicable only to 
Indian citizens. For citizens who are eligible for the scheme but are living abroad, 
the major obstacle arises in using the benefits of the scheme which is applicable 
only in hospitals across India.
There are two schemes that cover the maternity benefits in the area of family 
benefits. The Maternity Benefits Act (1961) does not impose any migration related 
constraints for non-national residents or non-resident nationals to access this 
scheme. The Act only require female employees to have worked for at least 80 days 
during the year immediately preceding the expected delivery date in order to be 
eligible to claim the benefit.20 Similar is the case with the maternity benefits under 
the ESI Act (1948) which are available to insured employees (women), “earning 
wages up to INR 21,000 and who have contributed for a period of at least 70 days 
in the immediately preceding two consecutive contribution periods”.21 However, the 
women employees covered under the ESI Act may not be able to access the benefits 
of the Maternity Benefits Act.
Lastly, in the area of pensions, the contributory pension schemes namely National 
Pension Scheme and Atal Pension Yojana, we find that APY is applicable only to 
citizens and therefore citizens living abroad can access the scheme, provided that 
person is not a non-resident Indian (NRI). On the other hand, any citizen of India 
can access the National Pension Scheme, independently of his/her place of resi-
dence. In the case of Employee pension scheme covered under the Employees’ 
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 there are no migration 
related restrictions on citizens or foreigners living abroad to avail the scheme pro-
vided the employees are members of the Employee Provident Fund Scheme. In the 
non-contributory pension scheme, the applicant must necessarily belong to a house-
hold living below poverty line. Citizens living abroad may be able to access the 
19 Sec 3(1), National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005.
20 Sec 5(2), Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.
21 Sec 50, ESI Act, 1948.
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scheme provided the “applicant is a destitute, having no regular source of financial 
support from family members or any other sources.”22
In general, we can conclude that all labour laws regulating employment relation-
ships in India also apply to foreign nationals employed in India. In our research, we 
find no evidence of sanctions against foreigners and accessing certain benefits in the 
policy areas mentioned above do not constrain their access to residence permit, fam-
ily reunification or nationality in India.
8.3  Conclusions
As we have shown, welfare state is not a home-grown idea to India, as common with 
several countries in Global South, where industrialisation has not prompted the state 
intervention for de-commodification. In predominantly agrarian and service-led 
economies, social security is perceived as a subject that is relevant for a small sec-
tion of the society. In India’s segmented economy, this has particularly favoured a 
miniscule section of formal sector workers who are seen as elite section of the soci-
ety. In the large segment of informal workers, there is significant immigrant popula-
tion from neighbouring countries. However, for this immigrant population often 
civil rights are not also provided, let alone social rights (Pellissery et al. 2014. Their 
civil status is a matter of political contention. Since 2009, the Indian government 
has attempted to issue a unique identification document (aadhar card), which has 
1.22 billion card holders as of July 2018.
Since the opening up of the Indian economy to foreign capital and foreign work-
ers in skilled sector, several changes have taken place. India’s architecture of 
Employee State Insurance Act (1948) was amended in 2008 in order to include a 
new section on ‘International Workers’. However, stringent conditionalities are 
introduced to give them social rights, as discussed in this chapter. These condition-
alities have a logic that formal workers (typically international workers) are far 
better off than informal workers (which form the large voter base) who are the pri-
mary target of Indian welfare state.
Another major development is the ongoing process of signing totalisation agree-
ments with countries where skilled labourers are travelling from India. So far, 19 
countries (primarily from the European Union) have signed such totalisation agree-
ments for transferrable social security arrangements. India also has bilateral agree-
ments with six countries in Gulf Region where six million Indians are working. In 
several regions, this diaspora forms a significant voice and shapes political dis-
courses, which in turn incentivises the ruling parties to create favourable working 
conditions for such population.
22 National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP), 1995.
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Chapter 9
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 




India not only has the largest emigrant population in the world. The country also has 
a long history of establishing an institutional framework and a multi-faceted infra-
structure for its diverse diaspora populations. In the past 40 years, a variety of insti-
tutions have been created, changed, discarded, and merged. Some mechanisms were 
ad hoc and temporary in nature, some were established in partnership with the pri-
vate sector. The varying needs of India’s heterogenous and vast diaspora and emi-
grant populations have led to a plethora of policy initiatives. Because of the political 
will to communicate about the adoption of proactive policies, on the one hand, and 
limited resources of a developing country, on the other, several policies exist more 
on paper or are limited to low-scale implementation.
This chapter provides a broad overview of existing initiatives, shedding light on 
specific policy designs to include and exclude different populations in India and 
abroad. Given limitations in space and scope, this chapter focuses on the current 
institutions with brief references to infrastructure that has recently been replaced. 
While the chapter puts an emphasis on the letter of the law, I attempt to provide 
information on the origins and implementation of policies, where possible. However, 
the dearth of in-depth analysis on the vast majority of India’s initiatives provides 
challenges for establishing clear evidence on drivers and rationales for policy 
processes.
The chapter shows that India has established a set of policies for various diaspora 
populations that are largely separate from the rules and policies adopted for nation-
als at home. Thus, diaspora engagement policies, and especially policies aimed at 
fostering social protection of Indians abroad, are generally not integrated into 
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national social protection policies. There is a clear distinction between diaspora 
policies that are geared towards the engagement of ethnic Indian populations whose 
forefathers have left Indian shores many generations ago, Indian communities in 
OECD countries – mostly US, Canada, Europe and Australia, and migrant workers 
going on temporary assignments to countries in the Persian Gulf. Protection poli-
cies are generally limited to Indian citizens and the majority of special programs are 
limited to temporary migrant workers in specified countries.
9.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
9.2.1  The Indian Diaspora and its Relations with India
Before outlining India’s diaspora infrastructure, this chapter will briefly elaborate 
on different terms that have developed to describe people who trace their origin to 
modern-day India. Some of these terms are colloquially used, some have different 
meanings in official policies and legal documents, making it difficult to assign sin-
gular meanings and definitions. Policy and legal definitions are important to under-
stand specific benefits, collected data, and official narratives.
The most common term used to describe diasporic Indians is Non-resident 
Indians, or NRIs.1 Originally deriving from a tax category, the term used to refer to 
Indian citizens living in India for less than 182 days each year. In this sense, it is 
often used to distinguish Indian citizens living abroad from those who have acquired 
a different citizenship, who are referred to as Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs).2 As 
an overarching category to include NRIs and PIOs, government documents and 
policies refer to the Indian diaspora, Overseas Indians, or its Hindi equivalent 
Pravasi Bharatiya (Naujoks 2018a).3
As seen through the policy eyes of the Indian political system, overseas Indians 
fall into three broad categories:
• NRI temporary workers, mostly in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries;
• NRI and PIOs in the US, Canada, Australia and Europe;
1 It may be added that from a sociological viewpoint, diasporic actors have been defined as all 
persons who originate from a certain country, self-identify with that country, and who maintain a 
meaningful cultural and social relationship with the country (Sheffer 2003; Naujoks 2013, 12).
2 Others understand as PIOs only those born abroad (2+ generation), though this review focuses on 
government policies and thus, adopts the official terminology.




• PIOs in countries where large-scale emigration took places roughly 150 years 
ago (Mauritius, South Africa, Fiji, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.), often referred to as 
the “old diaspora” (Dubey 2011; Lal 2018).4
According to UN data on international migrants, India is the largest source coun-
try of emigrants. About 17.5 million persons born in India are now living abroad, 
followed by 12 million Mexican and 11 million Chinese emigrants (United Nations 
2019). This number includes both first generation NRIs and PIOs, but not overseas 
Indians who were born abroad. The Indian government estimates that in the end of 
2018, out of 31 million overseas Indians, 13 million were NRIs and 18 million PIOs 
(Fig. 9.1).
Note: Per definition, UN emigrants also encompass all first-generation emigrants 
who obtained citizenship in countries of destination, hence becoming PIOs. Second 
generation Indian citizens abroad are NRIs but – generally – not migrants, accord-
ing to UN statistics.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the distribution of Indian emigrants across the major 15 
countries of destination. These 15 countries collectively account for 95% of all 
Indian migrants in the world, excluding though the majority of persons of Indian 
origin. GCC countries host half of Indian migrants (51%), which explains why the 
Indian policy framework has a strong emphasis on migrants to this part of the world.5
Note: This refers exclusively to Indian emigrants captured in UN data, not the 
broader definition of Overseas Indians (Fig. 9.1). The dotted line displays the cumu-
lative share of the host countries in all Indian emigrants. Thus, the eight major host 
4 For an overview of the Indian diaspora, see Dubey (2003); Raghuram et al. (2008); Sahoo, Baas, 
and Faist (2012); Mongia (2018).















Fig. 9.1 Estimates for Overseas Indian populations (2018). (Source: Emigrant data: United 
Nations 2019; all other: Government of India 2018)
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countries collectively account for 80% of the entire Indian migrant population. 
Countries highlighted in a dotted pattern are West Asian countries.
As shown in Naujoks (2010), India’s ‘world view’ of its diaspora has undergone 
a tremendous change, which in turn led to the adoption of a host of diaspora polices. 
Until the mid- to late 1990s, state institutions had a negative policy attitude, which 
can be paraphrased as follows:
The diaspora consists of three elements. First, those who left under colonial rule 
and who live in remote places like the Caribbean, Africa and Fiji, where they face 
significant social difficulties from the indigenous population, which is why India 
should not try to reach out to them. Second, highly-skilled migrants residing in 
industrialized Western countries, most of whom obtained free education in India 
and deserted India for their personal benefit, without caring about the progress of 
the country. Third, laborers who move temporarily to the Gulf countries and whose 
remittances are critical for their communities of origin.6
As the High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002:xi) concluded: 
“Barring some high profile names in the Information Technology and entertainment 
sectors abroad, the Diaspora has been largely out of public sight and awareness.” 
This paradigm changed through a complex interplay of internal and external, objec-
tive and subjective factors7 to a perception that can be described as follows:
The enormous Indian diaspora covers all continents and over 100 countries. The 
diaspora in the Western countries is rich and makes India proud. Indians abroad are 
shining ambassadors of the great Indian civilization. They are remitting money8 and 
6 Whereas temporary migrants used to originate predominantly from India’s Southern states, in 
recent years, the majority hail from Northern India.
7 For a discussion of the factors, see Naujoks (2010).
8 These narratives are supported by official statistics that show that in the past decade, each year 
India receives the largest amount of remittances in the world – in absolute terms. Slightly more 


































Fig. 9.2 Top 15 countries hosting Indian migrant populations (2019) (in thousands). (Source: 
Author’s calculations, based on United Nations (2019) data)
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are an asset to the country—they are a veritable ‘brain bank’ from which the country 
can make withdrawals.
The perception of the temporary Gulf migrants has not changed significantly, 
although there is a greater awareness to safeguard their rights and working condi-
tions. This paradigm shift took place in many different strata of public life. The new 
views are expressed in statements from the political sphere, as in, “if there is an 
Empire today on which the sun truly cannot set, it is the empire of our minds, that 
of the children of Mother India, who live today in Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe, 
the Americas and, indeed, on the icy reaches of Antarctica” or the political party 
BJP, which led the ruling government coalition from 1998–2004, during which sev-
eral new diaspora policies were established, “believes that the growing achieve-
ments of the vast Indian diaspora are a matter of pride and a source of strength for 
India.” Hegde (2018, 77) argues that the Indian establishment revised and institu-
tionalized the relationship with India’s influential diaspora spread across the world 
in an effort to redesign its global image as a serious economic player and techno-
logical powerhouse. This remarkable paradigm shift may be dubbed as ‘from the 
invisible diaspora to the diaspora empire’ and ‘from the traitor tune to a pride para-
digm’ (Naujoks 2010). In the light of the newly perceived value overseas Indians 
bring to India, a large set of diaspora engagement policies have been adopted.9
9.2.2  India’s Diaspora Infrastructure
India’s government institutions are geared towards specific components of these 
three categories of overseas Indians laid out in the previous section. In 2004, India 
established a special Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) that had different 
joint secretaries and divisions to cater to different categories of overseas Indians. 
Gamlen (2014, 2019) shows that diaspora-related government offices have spread 
rapidly in the past decades. Whereas in 1980, only a handful of countries had estab-
lished such institutions, by 2014, over half of all states in the United Nations had 
one. However, in 2015, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi merged 
the MOIA with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), where the bulk of issues 
related to diaspora and NRI affairs are handled now at the ministerial level.10 Within 
the MEA, the diaspora infrastructure is housed in the Overseas Indian Affairs divi-
sion that includes the Protector of Emigrants, which focuses on (mostly temporary 
and low-skilled) labor emigration. Until 2004, the Protector of Emigrants was 
9 Dubey (2003) and Kahali (2017) detail the development of India’s paradigms on diaspora issues. 
Hegde and Sahoo (2018) provide a broad overview of key issues regarding Indian diaspora com-
munities and their relationship with India.
10 Some of the departments had merged already before the final merger was announced. For an 
evolution of diaspora policies and infrastructure in India, see Lum (2014).
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housed in the Ministry of Labor.11 Then it became an integral part of the newly cre-
ated MOIA, before moving with the entire overseas Indian portfolio to the MEA in 
2015. The Protector of Emigrants focuses on protecting less-skilled labor emigra-
tion to the Gulf region and elsewhere. The other sections of the MEA’s overseas 
Indian division focus on the other two segments of India’s diaspora population. The 
MEA overseas embassies and consulates in 160 countries, as well as honorary 
councils in an additional 36 countries that cater to the needs of India’s overseas 
population.
The work by the MEA is flanked by several independent or semi-independent 
bodies. Especially, the India Centre for Migration (ICM) and the Indian Council for 
Cultural Relations (ICCR). The ICM is supposed to act as a government-controlled 
think tank that undertakes research and studies on migration of Indian workers for 
overseas employment and supports informed policy making (MEA 2019c). Lastly, 
the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) under the auspices of the Ministry 
of External Affairs is India’s primary agency to formulate and implement policies 
and programs relating to India’s external cultural relations.
The MEA runs Indian Workers Resource Centres (IWRC) in the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, and Malaysia. They provide 24x7 helpdesks for both intending migrants 
and overseas Indians and an electronic platform attends to queries in 11 Indian 
Languages. These centres abroad are integrated with five domestic Migrant Resource 
Centres (MRCs) based in Kochi, Hyderabad, Gurgaon, Lucknow, and Chennai.12
As India has a decentralized structure of federal governance, some of India’s 
states also created institutional and regulatory frameworks for diaspora and migrant 
populations. At least the states of Gujarat, Kerala, and Punjab pursue particularly 
active policies relating to their expatriate population.13
Since 1998, the Gujarat government maintains a separate Department for Non- 
Resident Gujaratis under which an autonomous Gujarat State Non-Resident 
Gujaratis (NRGs) Foundation aims at promoting social, cultural and linguistic 
bonds among the global Gujarati family, exploring the possibility of how NRIs and 
NRGs can play a vital role in the development of the state and identifying the areas 
in which the government can be of assistance to NRIs and NRGs.
In Kerala, the Department of Non-resident Keralites’ Affairs (NORKA) was 
established in 1996 and 6 years later, its field agency Norka-Roots. Also in 1996, the 
NRI Sabha (assembly), Punjab, was founded as a non-governmental organization 
whose primary object was to strengthen the ties between the Punjabi diaspora and 
the people and culture of their motherland, and to help with their grievances, espe-
cially those concerning properties issues. Despite its set-up as an NGO, the NRI 
Sabha is chaired by the state government’s Commissioner for NRI Affairs. Its chief 
11 Mongia (2018) provides an interesting analysis of the origins of the protector of emigrants under 
British colonial rule and its role in the system of indentured labor.
12 For more information, see MEA (2019d).
13 In addition to these three states, an increasing number of states have established NRI departments 




patron is the Chief Minister of Punjab ex-officio, while its elected president has to 
be a former NRI, which includes foreign citizens of Indian origin. Furthermore in 
2007, the Government of Punjab established a Department of NRI Affairs. In addi-
tion to the three states mentioned above, various other states have created Non- 
resident Indian (NRI) centres and cells to facilitate the relationship with overseas 
Indians and to address their problems.
9.2.3  Key Diaspora Engagement Policies
Over the past 20 years, Indian state institutions have established a wide spectrum of 
diaspora engagement, as well as labor migration policies and programmes.
Participation and Representation
While there is no specific consultative or representative mechanism between the 
central government and overseas Indians, since 2003, the Government has held a 
large diaspora conference – the Pravasi Bhartiya Divas, one of the objectives of 
which is to consult with the diaspora and emigrant workers.14 At the regional level, 
in the state of Punjab, the NRI Sabha is set-up as a consultative body that includes 
government officials, as well as elected NRIs.
Before 2010, with the exception of Indian diplomats and other limited catego-
ries, Indian citizens living abroad were not allowed to cast their vote in elections 
back home. However, a 2010 amendment of the Representation of the People Act 
allowed NRIs to be included into voter rolls. However, NRI voters needed to return 
physically to India on election day to cast their vote and could not use postal ballot, 
voting at voting stations abroad or other remote procedures. As expected, this leads 
to no significant NRI voter turnout. In the end of 2017, the Government introduced 
the Representation of People Act Amendment bill 2017 that would allow NRIs to 
avail themselves of proxy voting. However, the bill lapsed with the dissolution of 
the 16th Lok Sabha and has since then not been reintroduced. It is interesting to note 
that the major political parties have affiliate groups, namely the “Friends of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)” and the “Overseas National Congress.”
Economic Policies
Overseas Indians have long served as a textbook example for the positive relation-
ship between migration and development in migrants’ countries of origin (Hunger 
2004; Kapur 2010; Naujoks 2013). For this reason, for the past 20 years, economic 
policies with regard to overseas Indians have long been a central area of government 
intervention.
As there are restrictions for both, foreign direct and portfolio investments, it is 
important to note that India has created a range of special rules and facilities for NRI 
14 In addition, Mani and Varadarajan (2008) observe several critical attempts of the government to 
foster a neoliberal and nationalist agenda. See Singh (2018a, b) for a recent assessment of the 
convention.
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investors (Naujoks 2018a).15 Even though India receives the largest amount of 
remittances, in absolute numbers, there are no policies on remittances.16 However, 
India created special savings accounts for NRIs. In the 1970s, the government of 
India felt the need to stock up the country’s foreign-exchange reserves. For this 
purpose, it authorized special deposit schemes for NRIs. From the 1990s onward, 
the policies kept in focus that a high volatility of such deposits could be detrimental 
to the country’s economic stability, which is why it was sought to attract stable 
deposits. In order to increase the attractiveness of such schemes, accounts could be 
denominated in foreign or domestic currency. They also had a higher than normal 
interest rate and accounted for certain tax exemptions (Naujoks 2018a). While there 
are no financial incentives for overseas Indians to buy real estate, India has adopted 
legislation that allows non-resident Indians to purchase real estate. Whereas India’s 
FDI policy does not allow any FDI into firms engaged in real estate, FDI can be 
allocated to build townships, housing, and infrastructure. However, while certain 
conditions apply to non-diaspora FDI—such as the minimum area to be developed 
or to invest at least USD five million within the first 6 months of the project—these 
restrictions do not apply to investment by NRIs (Naujoks 2018a).
In addition, when the Indian economy was in urgent need of foreign exchange 
India issued three foreign-currency diaspora bond schemes. In total, India received 
USD 11.3 billion in foreign exchange from the three schemes, which were launched 
in order to help the country over the balance of payment crisis in 1991, strengthen 
the country when it suffered from sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the World 
Bank in response to India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and smoothen the effects of an 
adverse global economy in 2000 (Ketkar and Ratha 2010).
Indian transnational diaspora organizations have been involved in promoting 
social and economic development in India (Agarwala 2018). For this reason, the 
Indian government seeks their contributions and offers organizations to register on 
a voluntary basis with Indian missions. However, given India’s mistrust of any for-
eign contributions, diaspora organizations’ engagement in India is highly regulated 
by the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 1976.17 It channels charitable contribu-
tions from NRIs into local development projects that are suggested and implemented 
by state governments. Furthermore, India signed double taxation agreements with 
more than 130 countries.
15 Only registered foreign portfolio investors, foreign institutional investors, that is, entities estab-
lished or incorporated outside India and that are registered in India, and NRIs can invest through a 
registered broker in the capital of Indian companies on recognized Indian Stock Exchanges. In 
addition, there are facilitations for NRI direct investments in the air transport industry and real 
estate, for investments in partnership firms since 2015, investments by NRIs made on a non-repa-
triable basis are at par with domestic investments made by Indian residents. For more details, see 
Naujoks (2018a).
16 For an introduction to money flows, gender and family among Indian migrants, see Singh (2018a, 
b) and Naujoks (2020b).
17 Since 2008, the Government has been in the process of establishing the India Development 
Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF-OI) that became operational in 2016 and that was finally 
closed in March 2018, as the foundation failed to attract meaningful contributions.
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In order to meet the diasporic demand for dual citizenship and within the state’s 
economic engagement strategy with the diaspora, India created two special mem-
bership statuses. In 1999, the Indian government launched the Person of Indian 
Origin Card (PIO card), and in late 2003, legislation on the Overseas Citizenship of 
India (OCI) was adopted as another membership category and operationalized in 
2005.18 In January 2015, the PIO card scheme was formally absorbed by OCI. By 
the end of 2017, almost 3.2 million persons of Indian origin had obtained OCI, 
about half in the U.S. and Canada, and 20 percent in the U.K.
Cultural and Educational Policies
The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) is the main institution to promote 
Indian culture abroad. Whereas the ICCR deliberately provides cultural assistance 
to diasporic cultural needs, its endeavors are by no means limited to diasporic com-
munities around the world but aim at fostering the cultural relations and mutual 
understanding between India and other countries. The ICCR runs 30 Indian Cultural 
Centers around the world and it funds chairs for Indian culture in other countries. Its 
website informs that in countries that have a sizeable ethnic Indian population, the 
centers focus on teaching Indian dance, music, languages and yoga, and organize 
national days and festivals. Further, since 2006, the Scholarship Programme for 
Diaspora Children grants scholarships of up to USD 4,000 per annum to 100–150 
PIO and NRI students for undergraduate courses “in order to make higher education 
in India accessible to the children of overseas Indians and promote India as a centre 
for higher studies.”
With the Tracing the Roots Programme, the Government aims at assisting per-
sons of Indian origin in tracing their roots in India through a cooperation with pri-
vate organizations.19 To ensure ongoing ties with the descendants of Indian migrants, 
so-called second-plus generation, the Know India Programme (KIP) involves a 
“three-week orientation programme for diaspora youth conducted with a view to 
promote awareness on different facets of life in India and the progress made by the 
country in various fields e.g. economic, industrial, education, science and technol-
ogy, communication and information technology, culture” (MEA 2019b). The pro-
gram is modeled on the Birthright Israel program (High-level Committee of the 
Indian Diaspora 2002, 339). However, whereas between 20,000 and 37,000 Jewish 
youths participate in the birthright program every year, the Indian program is a 
small-scale project. Since its inception in the end of 2003 until end 2017, India’s 
KIP has brought a total of 1,533 diasporic youths to India, or an average of less than 
100 youths every year. The small scale and low-level of implementation of these 
programmes illustrates that many of the programmes are first and foremost discur-
sive tools (Naujoks 2013, 53).
18 For an in-depth analysis of the genesis and impacts of the PIO card and OCI, see Naujoks 
(2013, 2020a).
19 For the first years, the ministry had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the orga-
nization Indiroots, whereas in 2019, these assignments were handled by Singapore-based Alankit 
Assignments.
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9.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in India
As one of the largest sending countries of labor migrants, many of which reside in 
countries where migrants have limited access to host country social protection 
schemes, the country has created a considerable number of policies and schemes to 
provide transnational protections for its citizens abroad. Many of these are restricted 
to Indian nationals residing in specific countries, most importantly the Gulf 
Cooperation Countries.
Welfare and social protection policies for overseas Indians include the now 
defunct Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana (MGPSY) pension scheme for 
NRIs that will be discussed below, legal and financial assistance and the Pravasi 
Bhartiya Bima Yojana (PBBY), as well as the Indian Community Welfare 
Fund (ICWF).
Since 2009, the Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) has assisted Indian 
nationals abroad in times of distress and emergency in the ‘most deserving cases’ on 
a ‘means tested basis.’ Beneficiaries do not have to repay the cost covered. It 
includes legal and financial assistance to Indian women who were abandoned, 
cheated, and/or abused by their NRI/PIO or foreign spouses; emergency medical 
care for accidents with serious life threatening injuries; the payment for small fines 
and penalties in respect of Indian nationals for minor offences/crimes, such as for 
“illegal stay in the host country where prima facie the worker is not at fault”, and 
assistance for repatriation of nationals abroad. The stated target groups are “over-
seas Indian workers duped by unscrupulous intermediaries in the host countries, 
runaway house maids, those who become victim of accidents, deserted spouses of 
Overseas Indians or undocumented Overseas Indian workers in need of emergency 
assistance or any other Overseas Indian citizens who are in distress would be the 
main beneficiaries of the Fund.”20 The ICWF rules further allow consulates to pay 
for the transportation of mortal remains of deceased Indian national to India or local 
cremation/burial of deceased.
In the period 2009–2016, Indian consulates have provided support for 80,000 
beneficiaries (India Center for Migration 2017). As Fig. 9.3 shows, two-thirds of 
these funds were used to provide funds for flights and accommodation. However, 
this also includes large scale evacuations of more than 6,200 Indians from Iraq, 
3,600 from Libya, and most recently 6,700 from Yemen (Ibid.).21
Indian consulates have a large discretion as to whether the “beneficiary deserves 
to be assisted.” Importantly, under ordinary circumstances, the funds are limited to 
Indian nationals who have entered the host country legally. The funds to provide 
such assistance have to be raised by Indian consulates by levying a Service Charge 
on Consular Services, as well as through voluntary contributions by the Indian com-
munity and budgetary support from the Government of India.
20 For more details see, MEA (2019a).
21 On India’s emergency evacuations, see Xavier (2016).
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The Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (PBBY) is a mandatory insurance scheme 
aimed at safeguarding the interests of Indian emigrant workers falling under 
Emigration Check Required (ECR) category going for overseas employment to 
ECR countries. This applies to the 18 official ECR countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, UAE, and Yemen, of 
which, at the time of writing, departures to Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen have 
been suspended because of the security situation in these countries. The scheme, 
initially launched in 2003, has been amended in 2006, 2008, and 2017 with the 
overarching objective of strengthening the coverage of emigrant workers. At the 
regional level, under the Kerala Pravasi Welfare Board, the Non-Resident Keralites’ 
Welfare Fund Act 2008 has developed some welfare schemes for the benefits of 
Non-Resident Keralites, such as several pension schemes.22
The following sub-sections will briefly elaborate on policies and programs that 
address policy issues related to unemployment, health care, pensions, family-related 
benefits, as well as resources for economic hardships.
9.3.1  Unemployment
While there are no specific policies and programs that address unemployment of 
Indian nationals abroad, the Indian government has created several skills upgrading 
initiatives that aim at increasing the employability of Indians abroad. Some of these 
programs are specific programs for prospective migrants, while others are part of 
general skill-upgrading endeavors for the Indian labor market. Specifically, the 
Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PKVY) aims to enhance the skill sets of potential 
migrant workers and facilitate overseas employment opportunities. Launched at the 
14th Pravasi Bhartiya Divas convention in 2017, it involves programmes of 2 weeks 











Fig. 9.3 Usage of Indian 
Community Welfare Fund 
(2009–2016). (Source: 
India Center for 
Migration 2017)
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to 1 month23 that engage in capacity building in the areas of development of skills 
standards, curricula, learning material, assessment of standards, testing and certifi-
cation on par with global standards. Initially, it focuses on sectors that are in demand 
in the ECR countries, including domestic workers, drivers and construction work-
ers.24 This program is implemented by the MEA in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE). It is complemented by a com-
pulsory pre-departure orientation (PDO), which prepares migrants for the journey 
to ECR countries.25 However, at the time of writing, the program was still in the 
development stage, though the Government of India has allocated funds for it in 
2018. As of January 2018, India’s National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) 
enrolled 400 students in 13 India International Skill Centres in the pilot phase cov-
ering eight sectors, namely domestic workers, retail, hospitality, capital goods, 
healthcare, construction, automotive and security.26 Around 400 students have been 
enrolled in these centres.
At the sub-national level, there are no specific programs for unemployed emi-
grants. However, there is a regional pre-departure program and a skill enhancement 
program in the state of Kerala. Norka-Roots conducts one-day pre-departure train-
ing courses to overseas job aspirants to make them aware of the general job situa-
tions abroad and to impart essential information relating to visa, emigration rules, 
employment contract, customs regulations, and travel formalities etc.27 In addition, 
a program focuses on upgrading the skills of Keralites to meet the challenges in the 
employment market.28
9.3.2  Health Care
India’s health care system is based on government health insurance schemes, as 
well as on private insurance schemes. The public insurance system includes 
government- owned companies, such as New India Assurance Co, Oriental Insurance 
Co, National Insurance Co and United Insurance India. NRIs could buy health 
insurance policies from such insurers for treatment in India, though there is no spe-
cial provision or communication strategy on the part of the Government or these 
companies. For policies that allow accessing health care abroad, residential guide-
lines generally state that policies can be issued to Indian citizens residing in India 
alone. They explicitly stress that cover is not allowed to NRIs (and equally not to 
23 Ministry of External Affairs, mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?…Pravasi+Kaushal+Vikas+Y
ojana+PKVY
24 For more details, see MEA (2019e) and India Migration Centre (2017, 7). However, no official 
announcements were made since the launch of the scheme in January 2017.
25 See Rajan, Bhaskar, and Wadhawan (2017) for the content of this training.
26 50 centres are slated to be further opened under this initiative (India Migration Centre 2017, 9).
27 For more information, see Norka Roots (2019a).
28 For more details, visit Norka Roots (2019b).
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foreign citizens living in India).29 NRIs are also not covered by India’s Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) health insurance scheme for the poor, though they 
might be eligible upon their return. However, the lack of any communication and 
outreach material in this regards highlights that these polices are not geared towards 
citizens abroad.
Apart from access to general health care systems, specific, though rather small- 
scale schemes have been adopted by the national and state governments to address 
select migrants’ health concerns. The Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) that 
was introduced in the beginning of this section can provide emergency medical care 
on a means tested basis to overseas Indians who are involved in an accident with 
serious life-threatening injuries, who have life-threatening medical conditions or 
suffer a serious disability. However, in the first 10 years of the fund’s existence, 
fewer than 500 individuals have received support for emergency health care (India 
Migration Center 2017, 7). The Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana insurance scheme 
for emigrant workers in the ECR category covers birth-related hospital costs of up 
to USD 350 in India, though to avail themselves of these maternity benefits abroad, 
all required documents need to be certified by the Indian Mission, thus creating a 
significant barrier to access said benefits.
In the Indian state of Kerala, the Kerala Pravasi Welfare Board can provide finan-
cial assistance under its medical treatment, accident–cum-death insurance scheme. 
Under this scheme, a member Non-Resident Keralite (NRK) who is afflicted with 
critical illness is eligible for obtaining a maximum financial assistance of INR 
50,000 (approximately USD730) during the entire period of his or her membership. 
The Welfare Board can also engage with national insurance companies to provide 
such services. Furthermore, through the Santhwana Financial Assistance scheme 
for returned NRKs in distress, financial assistance is provided to NRKs or their 
dependent family members in case of medical treatment expenses, death assistance 
or the acquisition of artificial limbs, crutches, wheel chair or other aids to overcome 
physical disability.
9.3.3  Pensions
India’s National Pension Scheme (NPS) is a government-sponsored contribution 
pension system. Whereas it was initially launched for government employees only, 
since 2009 it is open to all employees in India. In 2015, NRIs were allowed to obtain 
a unique Permanent Retirement Account Number (PRAN) and thus subscribe to the 
pension scheme. NRIs pay into the scheme either by inward remittance through 
normal banking channels or out of funds held in their special diaspora savings 
accounts. Importantly, this is only open to Indian citizens and migrants’ NPS 
account will be closed if they acquire a different citizenship, thus forfeiting their 
29 See for example New India’s Global Mediclaim Policy (New India Assurance 2019).
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Indian citizenship.30 Consulates and the MEA provide online information on how to 
access the pension scheme for NRIs.
In 2012, the government had launched the Mahatma Gandhi Suraksha Pravasi 
Yojana (MGPSY), as a voluntary scheme to provide social security coverage to 
Indians in emigration check required (ECR) countries. However, the lack of suffi-
cient subscribers led to abandoning the scheme in early 2017 (MEA 2019h).
In the state of Kerala, Non-Resident Keralites who continuously contribute to the 
Welfare Fund up to the age of 60, are eligible for a monthly pension of INR 2,000 
(approximately USD 30) after the age of 60.
9.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
While the Indian government does not grant specific family-related benefits to its 
nationals abroad, consulates are tasked with keeping the registers of births and 
deaths for the district and to issue duly certified copies of entries in the registers.31
9.3.5  Economic Hardship
Countries often provide specific resources for economic hardships that their citizens 
abroad experience. Such measures consist of means-tested benefits that are con-
ceived as the last resort of social protection, i.e. the ultimate “safety net” that aims 
to prevent extreme hardship and protect single persons and households from severe 
poverty (Vintila and Lafleur 2020). The Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) 
that has been introduced above is meant to assist Indian nationals abroad in times of 
distress and emergency – though as discussed above on a discretionary basis. Under 
the ICWF, consulates can provide distressed nationals abroad with boarding and 
lodging in a budget category or in shelters run by the Indian mission or an NGO 
empanelled with the mission. It can also pay for air passage to India for stranded 
overseas Indian nationals, as well as legal assistance for Indian nationals abroad 
who have committed minor crimes, offences or have been falsely implicated by 
their employer and put in jails. The consulate can further provide legal and financial 
assistance to Indian women, who were abandoned, cheated, or abused by their NRI/
PIO or foreign spouses. It can also pay small fines and penalties in respect of Indian 
nationals for minor offences, such as for illegal stay in the host country where prima 
facie the worker is not at fault, and to enable release of Indian nationals from jail or 
a detention center. There are no regional policies or schemes to cover such resources.
30 On dual citizenship in India, see Naujoks (2013). For more details, see MEA (2019g).
31 Cf. Citizens (Registration at Indian Consulates) Rules 1956, in exercise of the powers conferred 





As the country with the world’s largest emigrant population and a long history of 
international mobility, India has adopted a multi-faceted institutional and policy 
framework to govern migration and diaspora engagement. However, India is also a 
developing country with a large domestic population and severe development chal-
lenges at home. Almost 300 million people are considered poor by national poverty 
standards32 and its per capita Gross Domestic Product of USD 7,000 places it 
between Angola and Uzbekistan.33 This means that India experiences significant 
budgetary limitations when it comes to establishing meaningful social and legal 
protection system and diaspora engagement strategies. While there is not an urgent 
need to spend scarce resources on skilled and highly skilled emigrants in the US, 
Canada, Australia, Europe or other parts of the world, social protection schemes 
focus on low-skilled Indian migrants. For this reason, it makes sense that policies 
focus on the emigrant populations that reside in countries in the Gulf region, which 
do not have strong social protection systems for their large immigrant populations 
(Rajan 2017). Other diaspora engagement strategies focus on more socially inte-
grated and often economically richer diaspora communities. Thus, India’s differen-
tiated approach takes into account the various socio-spatial positionalities of specific 
Indian migrant and diaspora populations.34
Gamlen (2014) conceptualized three rationales for establishing diaspora engage-
ment policies. States can attempt to tap into the potential they see from looking at 
resources in the diaspora; they can embrace diaspora populations as part of nation-
alistic strategies of nation-building or they can be prompted by international debates 
and governance discourses. All elements are present in India’s engagement strate-
gies. Délano and Gamlen (2014, 44) argue that much recent interest in state- diaspora 
relations is linked to a resurgence in optimism about the relationship between 
migration and development. This can be confirmed for the case of India’s engage-
ment. While the major drivers seem to be the wish to tap into remittances and over-
seas employment opportunities, India also exemplifies the growing infrastructure 
around governing migration and a management approach to temporary migration. 
This appears to be based on domestic political pressures, the conviction that human 
rights issues of Indian migrants abroad create problems for the Government of 
India, as well as the international discourse on the protection of migrant workers.35
32 Based on the World Bank’s ““lower middle-income”” poverty line, 660 million people in India 
were living below this poverty line in 2015 and 176 million were living in extreme poverty (World 
Bank 2018).
33 2019 Gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (PPP) and current USD, accord-
ing to World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
34 Koinova (2018) highlights the importance of diaspora actors’ socio-spatial positionality, as their 
power deriving from linkages to homeland, host-land and a variety of other global contexts.
35 While this observation is based on the author’s long-stranding research on policy processes in 
India (see Naujoks 2010, 2013, 2018a), there are limitations to fully understand the black-box of 
what drives policies and how to meaningfully conduct a meaningful policy analysis of these issues.
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Often India’s diaspora policies are rather small in scale, indicating that a major 
objective of the policies is to announce said policies at government sponsored dias-
pora meetings, rather than actually having a measurable impact on outcomes 
(Naujoks 2013, 53). This is reflected in the relatively low budget that is available for 
such programs and in many cases the low number of beneficiaries.36
Endeavors to integrate migrants into development strategies in their countries of 
origin and destination is part of the global agenda for sustainable development 
(Naujoks 2018b). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that form the core of 
the globally agreed-upon development roadmap stress the importance of imple-
menting social protection measures for all, social protection policies to achieve 
greater equality, and achieving universal health coverage for all.37 Combined with 
the SDGs’ call for well managed migration policies,38 India and other countries of 
emigration may expand the scope and quality of their programs targeting migrant 
workers and their families.
In May 2018, during the regional election in the state of Karnataka, only six non- 
resident voters participated in the process.39 During the 2019 general election, some 
900 million voters were eligible to cast their vote in India. It is obvious that an 
additional ten million Indian voters from abroad would not be able to substantially 
alter the outcome of a national election. However, since Indians have to return home 
on election day to exercise their vote, very few have availed themselves of this pos-
sibility. While close to 100,000 NRIs had registered as voters, the Indian Election 
Commission reported that only 25,000 of them voted – 98% of which in Kerala and 
only 4% were women.40 As mentioned above, the previously introduced bill to allow 
proxy voting for NRIs has lapsed. It remains to be seen what reforms India will 
introduce to provide meaningful political participation for citizens residing abroad 
and whether more political power for NRIs will also lead to more comprehensive 
and extensive social policies for Indian nationals living outside of India.
36 Kapur and Nangia (2015) show that India’s general social welfare policies have focused more on 
specific social protection programs than on the expansion of basic public services. As one of the 
possible explanations, the authors suggest that this may be the case as such programs have a stron-
ger ‘visibility,’ as they are observable outcomes, which is connected to the more limited nature of 
their stated goals.
37 See SDG targets 1.3, 3.8, and 10.4, respectively.
38 See SDG target 10.7.
39 Times of India, “Pravasi peeve: Despite Election Commission drive, only 6 NRIs registered 
to vote,”
April 24, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pravasi-peeve-despite-election-com-
mission-drive-only-6-nris-registered-to-vote/articleshow/63890252.cms
40 Economic Times, “25,000 of 1 lakh overseas Indians registered in e-rolls voted in LS polls: EC,” 
October 20, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/25000-of-
1-lakh-overseas-indians-registered-in-e-rolls-voted-in-ls-polls-ec/articleshow/71673081.
cms?from=mdr. In August 2017, only 24,000 NRIs had registered as voter with the Indian Election 
Commission and it is estimated that only 12,000 of them voted, see Economic Times, “Only 
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Chapter 10
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Lebanon
Paul Tabar, Andrew Denison, and Maha Alkhomassy
10.1  Overview of the National Social Security System 
and Main Migration Features in Lebanon
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the legal framework regulating Lebanon’s 
welfare system for Lebanese nationals living at home or abroad and foreigners 
residing in the country. Five specific policy areas will be outlined: unemployment; 
health care; pensions; family benefits; and guaranteed minimum resources.
10.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
The fragmented and decentralised nature of Lebanon’s welfare system has resulted 
in significant segments of the population maintaining comprehensive protection, 
partial protection, no protection or restrictive protection based on ad hoc schemes 
provided by third parties. The National Social Security Fund (NSSF)1 was created 
in 1963 under the tutelage of the Ministry of Labour (MoL) and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs (MoSA).2 The original aim of the fund was to establish a universal 
mandatory insurance scheme following the French model. Although the NSSF 
1 https://www.cnss.gov.lb/
2 Decree No. 13955 of 1963 established the Social Security Law. It is the primary governing law 
from which the social protection schemes derive.
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maintains financial and administrative independence, it is ultimately controlled by 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) and the MoL.  The NSSF is 
primarily financed through monthly contributions by the employer3 and employee 
based on a percentage of the employee’s earnings up to a monthly revenue of 
1,500,000 Lebanese Liras (LBP) (US$ 1000, except for end-of-service indemnity 
benefits which has no ceiling) and government subsidies. The NSSF covers: (i) 
Health and Maternity Insurance4 – financed by employer contributions at 8% and 
employee contributions at 3%5 (in addition, government subsidies amount to 25% 
of the total expenditures of the health and maternity insurance); (ii) Family and 
Education Allowances6 financed by employer contributions at 6%; (iii) End-of- 
Service Indemnity7 – financed by employer contributions at 8.5% (with 0.5% goes 
towards NSSF administrative costs) (Rached 2012; Ammar 2009; EGYM 2017).8
For the approximately 50% of Lebanese without formal social protection 
insurance, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) provides some degree of health 
care protection (MoPH 2016; Ajluni and Kawar 2015).9 Otherwise, those that are 
uninsured must rely on out-of-pocket expenditures for any medical services not 
covered by the MoPH.10 The MoPH is financed by the Ministry of Finances’ 
treasuries which amount to approximately 1% of GDP.  In terms of the total 
government budget, it has not exceeded 4% in any given year up until 2005 (Nasnas 
2016; Ammar 2009).11
3 Private employers with over 10 employees are required to submit reports and pay contributions 
every 3  months. Larger enterprises with more than 10 employees are required to do so on a 
monthly basis.
4 Health and maternity insurance is governed by Decree. No. 14035 issued on the 16th of March 
1970. It was amended by Decree No. 5101 on the 24th of March 2001.
5 NSSF issued Law No. 27 dated on the 10th of February 2017 followed by Decision No. 224 dated 
on the 12th of July 2017 issued by the MoL and their application memo No. 559 dated on the 24th 
of July 2017 which increased the health and maternity contributions by 1% for employer and 
employee (2% in total).
6 Family and education allowances are governed by Decree No. 2957 dated on the 20th of 
October 1965.
7 End-of-service indemnity is governed by Decree No. 1519 dated on the 24th of April 1965.
8 There are a number of additional social protection schemes for different segments of the 
population (i.e. Civil Servants Cooperative and various schemes for military/security institutions).
9 Ministry of Public Health: https://www.moph.gov.lb/en
10 From 1998, Lebanon was spending 12.4% of its GDP on health and out-of-pocket payments 
which constituted 60% of total health spending. This was among the highest in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region. Importantly, with the utilisation of preventative, promotive and curative 
services, especially among poorer Lebanese, total health spending as a share of GDP has fallen 
from 12.4% to 8.4% and out-of-pocket spending as a share of total health spending fell from 60% 
to 44% (WHO 2010).
11 Importantly, in terms of budget and government revenue expenditures, there has been no formal 
state budget for Lebanon since 2005. Additionally, without any formal budgeting process over such 
an extended period of time, it is difficult for the MoPH to effectively coordinate or adapt to future 
conditions (MoPH 2016).
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Finally, there are a number of ad hoc social protection programmes that have 
attempted to fill the gaps of Lebanon’s social protection, especially after the 2011 
Syrian crisis. Some examples are the National Poverty Targeting Programme 
(NPTP) and Public Employment Programmes (PEP). These are often funded by a 
variety of (international) non-governmental organisations, United Nations agencies 
and/or the assistance of national governments.
10.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
For over 150 years, Lebanon has experienced waves of emigration resulting from 
lopsided economic development, undemocratic communal politics and national/
international conflict (Tabar 2015). The first wave of emigration occurred in the mid 
to late nineteenth century with a small number of mainly Christians who were sent 
to Rome in order to return and serve as clergy. Also, with increasing integration of 
British and French capitalist markets, a number of Lebanese Christians emigrated to 
the main centres of trade between Europe and the Near East, including Egypt, 
Livorno, Marseille and Manchester. The second wave is marked by rapid population 
growth with an increasing number of educated and skilled persons. By World War I, 
a third of the population (mostly Christian) had left the country in order to seek bet-
ter economic opportunities mainly in North and South America, Australia, West 
Africa, Europe and New Zealand. The third wave of emigration occurred between 
1945 and 1975, due to increasing political instability and economic deterioration 
from the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 and labour demands from the Gulf States. The 
fourth wave is marked by the onset of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989) with 
approximately 990,000 people leaving the country. This accounted for approxi-
mately 40% of the total population. This fourth wave of emigration led many 
Lebanese to flee primarily to Canada, Australia, the United States, France, Germany 
and the Gulf States (Tabar 2015). Since the 1990s, Lebanon has seen increased 
confrontations with Israel which resulted in the 2006 Israeli invasion, political 
instability, assassinations and civil strife, including the impacts of the Syrian civil 
war which began in 2011.
Presently, population growth, immigration, high levels of inactivity in youth, 
lack of demand for a skilled and educated workforce and low-standard working 
conditions are some of the push conditions that cause many Lebanese to emigrate 
abroad leaving a significant brain drain effect in the country.12 Moreover, the 
Lebanese government has used migration outflows as a tool to ease unemployment 
pressure and increase the remittance flows back into the country (Hourani 2007). 
The impact of remittances from the Lebanese diaspora has resulted in approxi-
mately US$ 7.3  billion in 2016 which amounted to about 14.1% of Lebanon’s 
12 According to a Gallup survey in 2010, an estimated 37% of Lebanese youth expressed their 
willingness to emigrate permanently. Moreover, approximately 50% of Lebanese emigrants have 
at least secondary education and an estimated 25% with tertiary education (ETF 2017).
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GDP. This figure is considered to be among the highest in the world (KNOWMAD 
2017). Ajluni and Kawar (2015) explain that these significant inflows of remittances 
to family members in Lebanon have impacted the activity rates of working-aged 
people which has limited the rate of unemployment and has led to the expansion of 
low productivity economic activities in the country.13 Moreover, demographic num-
bers of Lebanese, whether in Lebanon or abroad, have major political implications 
which can affect the country’s sectarian balance and disrupt sect-based power- 
sharing arrangements. De Bel-Air (2017) estimates that 885,000 Lebanese migrants, 
either first-generation or born in Lebanon, are residing abroad as of 2014. Of these, 
41% reside in the Gulf States, 23% in North America, 21% in Europe (including 
Norway and Switzerland) and 16% in other countries including Australia and Brazil. 
Moreover, given the selective process of immigration, Lebanese emigrants are 
almost twice as educated as non-migrants with at least 25% maintaining tertiary 
education (De Bel-Air 2017; ETF 2017).
Lebanon, also being a country of immigration, has experienced inflows of 
migrants and refugees over the years. The twentieth century witnessed the immigra-
tion of Armenians fleeing genocide from the Ottoman empire in the early 1900s, 
Palestinians fleeing Israeli occupation since 1948, Iraqis escaping Iraq from the 
Gulf wars in 1990–1991 and early 2000s and more recently Syrians fleeing the civil 
war since 2011. Furthermore, there are a number of migrant populations working 
under the kafala14 system from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
Since it is rather difficult to provide accurate figures on the number of foreigners 
residing in Lebanon, most statistics derive from research conducted by international 
non-governmental organisations. In 2015, a total of 209,647 foreign labour work 
permits were issued by the MoL. The largest groups of legally registered foreign 
workers are Ethiopians (73,419), followed by nationals of Bangladesh (49,136), the 
Philippines (23,606) and Sri Lanka (8,867) (De Bel-Air 2017). Palestinians, 
although the majority were born in Lebanon, are considered foreigners. There are 
approximately 300,000–350,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, including the 42,000 
Palestinians from Syria (De Bel-Air 2017; UN and GoL 2017; Chaaban et al. 2010). 
Syrian nationals currently constitute the largest foreign group in Lebanon. Although 
the Lebanese government has claimed the figure of 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon 
since 2016, the UNHCR states that there are 950,000 registered Syrian refugees, 
14,000 Iraqi refugees and almost 2,000 Sudanese refugees in the country (UN and 
GoL 2017; UNHCR 2019). Additionally, it is quite challenging to estimate the num-
ber of unregistered Syrians residing in Lebanon.
13 Remittances are mainly used by individuals and families for consumption and to raise their 
standard of living. According to a mini-survey conducted by Barendse et al. (2006), researchers 
found that 56% of respondents used remittances for ‘daily expenses,’ 24% on school fees, 10% 
were used for investments and 5% for the building of a house.
14 The kafala system is a work-sponsorship system in Lebanon which is applied to mainly 
construction and domestic workers and other unskilled labourers. The kafala system has been 
criticised for facilitating exploitation of foreign workers as employers oftentimes hold the 
employees’ passport with employees having little legal protection.
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Emigration, for many Lebanese, has been a vital social ‘safety net,’ particularly 
for the most vulnerable segments of the population (i.e. elderly, unemployed). The 
absence of decent-pay employment, poor infrastructure, anaemic social protection, 
a lack of essential services like water and electricity and a persistence of domestic 
and international crises cause many Lebanese to emigrate. Regularly, those who 
have the economic means (i.e. formal employment) enjoy the protection and secu-
rity of social protection schemes. In tandem, foreign nationals from a limited num-
ber of wealthy countries are eligible by law to enrol in the social protection schemes. 
Nevertheless, it is the most vulnerable migrants (refugees, displaced, domestic 
workers) who are left with little protection, as explained below.
10.2  Migration and Social Protection in Lebanon
Technically, all formal employers are required to register their employees with the 
NSSF.  This includes full-time employees of the private sector and contractual 
employees in the public domain. NSSF benefits are also extended to employees’ 
dependents (unemployed spouse, children and parents over the age of 60). Self- 
employed Lebanese nationals have the choice to voluntarily join the NSSF.15 
Unemployed Lebanese nationals or those working abroad are excluded from par-
ticipating in the NSSF. Foreign employees working in Lebanon with a valid work 
permit and residency permit are entitled to join the NSSF only if their country of 
nationality offers equal treatment to Lebanese workers as stipulated by Article 9 of 
the 1963 Social Security Law. Officially, only four countries meet this criterion: 
France, Belgium, the UK and Italy (IDAL 2016). According to Nasnas (2016), there 
were an estimated 34,000 non-Lebanese insured in the NSSF’s sickness and mater-
nity branch in 2012. Additionally, foreign employees are not entitled to end-of- 
service benefits. For those Lebanese nationals registered with the NSSF, their 
benefits are not exportable.
The exception to these particular regulations are the Palestinians in Lebanon.16 
They remain a special category of foreigners as the 1964 law17 classified them as 
foreigners in the Lebanese labour market, thus obliging them to obtain a work per-
mit prior to employment. Furthermore, because of Article 9 of the 1963 Social 
Security Law (the stipulation of reciprocity of treatment for social protection by a 
foreign state), the Palestinians’ status as foreigner and stateless does not allow the 
15 As self-employed Lebanese may join the NSSF on a voluntary basis, according to Ammar (2009), 
voluntary adherents have never surpassed 6.5%.
16 Over 90% of Palestinians were born in Lebanon. The remaining 10% consist of the older 
generation who were born in Palestine but were forced to flee in 1948 — known as the Nakba 
(“catastrophe”) (Al-Nashif and El-Khoury 2012). The Government of Lebanon considers 
Palestinians in Lebanon as refugees.
17 Ministerial Decree No. 17561 of 1964.
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eligibility of enrollment in the NSSF. (Al-Nashif and El-Khoury 2012).18 In 2010, 
the House of Representatives approved an amendment of the Social Security Act 
which exempted Palestinians from paying the work permit fees, cancelled the prin-
ciple of reciprocity and provided Palestinians end-of-service benefits by the 
NSSF. Palestinians and their employers registered with the NSSF are required to 
pay full social protection contributions while still being deprived of health and 
maternity insurance and family and education allowances (Solidar 2015; Abi 
Yaghi 2014).19
There is no comprehensive public non-contributory social protection scheme in 
Lebanon. Citizens who are unemployed, the often self-employed and foreigners 
residing in Lebanon are generally left without any semblance of public social pro-
tection. Furthermore, given the high degree of informality in the labour market, a 
significant number of Lebanese workers do not maintain access to formal social 
protection benefits at all. However, the MoPH does provide non-exportable health 
care to resident Lebanese nationals that are uninsured by covering what is considered 
as ‘catastrophic’ health care payments (Ammar 2009; WHO 2006).20 However, 
foreign residents cannot access these benefits. The MoSA is also responsible for 
coordinating social protection in Lebanon and is in charge of implementing a 
program called The National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) launched in 2011. 
The NPTP provides a combination of social assistance and social service provisions 
(partial medical bill payments, school fee waivers, free books, food assistance) to 
‘extremely poor’ Lebanese citizens (Kukrety 2016).21 In order to access these provi-
sions, Lebanese citizens must register with the nearest Social Development Centre 
(SDC).22 A Proxy Means Test formula is applied to determine their ‘poverty level’ 
and whether they are able to register as beneficiaries.23
Lebanon is also a member of several regional integration organizations including: 
the Arab League; the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM); the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC); the Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States 
(PUIC); and the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF). However, 
18 95% of Palestinians in Lebanon possess a Lebanese-Palestinian passport (known as a Wathika). 
Additionally, 96% also maintain a UNRWA card which claims they are registered with the Ministry 
of Interior’s General Directorate of Political and Refugee Affairs (Al-Nashif and El-Khoury 2012).
19 Despite the legal reforms in 2010, Palestinians who obtain work permits are very low. One 
primary reason for this is because the issuance of a formal work permit automatically entails the 
commitment to register with the NSSF. Approximately less than 2% of Palestinians in Lebanon 
have a work permit (Al-Nashif and El-Khoury 2012).
20 ‘Catastrophic’ payments are considered emergency hospital care and expensive medication and 
treatment for diseases such as cancer, mental illness, multiple sclerosis and other financially 
complicated diseases.
21 According to figures from the MoSA, as of June 2015, approximately 160,985 Lebanese 
households had applied for benefits from the NPTP.
22 Social Development Centres (SDCs) are local centres distributed throughout Lebanon and are 
designed to implement the social development policies of the MoSA.
23 The MoSA reaches around 350,000 beneficiaries yearly through SDCs or contracting NGOs and 
welfare institutions (World Bank 2013).
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only some of these organisations aim to make progress in the field of social security. 
For instance, the Council of Arabic Economic Unity (CAEU) of the Arab League 
aimed to coordinate legislation concerning labour and social security.24 However, 
Lebanon has not enacted nor made significant progress in terms of social security 
coordination. As for the UfM, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement 
addresses some key issues regarding social protection.25 Yet, the EMP does not go 
beyond the arrangement of ‘dialogue’ on core issues of social protection and on the 
coordination and extension of social security benefits to migrants of member states 
in Lebanon (Ayadi and Gadi 2013; García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016).
10.2.1  Unemployment
Lebanon does not have a formal scheme of unemployment insurance or assistance. 
Those who are employed and enrolled in the NSSF receive an end-of-service indem-
nity (ESI) if they retire or lose their job. If the employee loses their employment 
prior to completing at least 20 years of service, s/he is subject to a reduction sched-
ule of entitlements (Jarmuzek and Nakhle 2018).26
As a result of the impact from the Syrian crisis, Lebanon’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fell from an average of 9% during 2007–2010 to less than 2% per 
year since 2011 (World Bank 2015; Nasnas 2016). It is estimated that due to the 
Syrian crisis, some 200,000 additional Lebanese have been pushed into poverty 
adding to the existing 1  million poor in the country. Furthermore, an additional 
250,000 to 300,000 Lebanese are estimated to have become unemployed (World 
Bank 2018). Consequently, a burgeoning of Public Employment Programmes (PEP) 
have developed to mitigate the impacts of increasing unemployment. Specifically, 
cash-for-work (CfW) programmes are short-term interventions used by humanitar-
ian assistance organisations to provide temporary employment in public projects to 
the most vulnerable segments of the population (Mercy Corps 2007). As a number 
of differing organisations implement CfW programmes, most decisions regarding 
beneficiaries are taken by the organisations themselves. CfW programmes are often 
extended to displaced Syrians and Palestinians from Lebanon or Syria. Of the esti-
mated 300,000 to 350,000 job opportunities programmes like PEPs are expected to 
create, the Republic of Lebanon has stated 60% will be for displaced Syrians living 
in Lebanon (Republic of Lebanon 2016).
24 See Article 2 and Article 9 of the Agreement of Economic Unity Among Arab States.
25 See Article 65(2) of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement.
26 The reduction schedule of ESI entitlements for less than 20 years of service are the following: 
less than 5 years contribution, 50% reduction; between 5 and 10 years contribution, 35% reduction; 
between 10 and 15 years contribution, 25% reduction; between 15 and 20 years contribution, 15% 
reduction.
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10.2.2  Health Care
For Lebanese formally employed, the NSSF is the most important source of public 
health care providing 90% of hospitalisation costs and 80% of medical consulta-
tions and medication. NSSF benefits also extend to the dependents of the insured. 
Hospital admission is secured through the insured’s physician and reviewed by 
NSSF medical inspectors. Outpatient care is paid by patients and later reimbursed 
by the NSSF; however, these reimbursement procedures have been criticised as 
tedious, time-consuming and bureaucratic. This has led many insured Lebanese to 
forego their claims due to the hassle of obtaining their reimbursements (Kronfol 
2002). NSSF health care benefits are not exportable to other countries. Foreigners 
may enrol in the NSSF’s health care insurance only if they originate from a country 
which provides the reciprocity of treatment for Lebanese nationals (i.e. France, 
Belgium, the UK and Italy).
The MoPH has evolved from its original role of providing health care to the poor 
to become a non-contributory safety net for all non-insured Lebanese (otherwise 
known as the ‘insurer of last resort’).27 It covers ‘catastrophic’ health care payments 
like hospitalisation, expensive medication and the costs of treatments for chronic 
diseases (Al-Nashif and El-Khoury 2012). The MoPH is also a key facilitator for 
health care centres in Lebanon.28 Through this public-private or ‘blended’ organiza-
tional management, the MoPH is able to ensure a (primary medical) safety net and 
provide an alternative for secondary care to the uninsured (MoPH 2016). Under the 
MoPH, hospital care is covered up to 85% at private hospitals and 95% at public 
hospitals.29 A significant structural weakness of the MoPH’s health care relates to its 
almost exclusive focus on service provision, with a limited role in prevention, plan-
ning and regulation (Salti et al. 2010).
For migrant domestic workers (i.e. Sri Lankan and Indonesian), health insurance 
is mandatory, however, they are unable to obtain NSSF benefits or to benefit from 
the MoPH’s health care. Their employers must obtain health insurance via private 
providers before they are able to obtain a work permit (General Directorate of 
General Security 2019). For Palestinians living in Lebanon, the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is the only provider of health coverage. 
UNRWA currently operates 28 primary health care facilities in Lebanon. It has also 
formed an arrangement with the Palestine Red Crescent Society hospitals to further 
provide equal access to secondary health care (UNRWA 2019).
27 Those without medical insurance and rely on the MoPH include over 30% of the population 
(Nasnas 2016).
28 There are approximately 1080 health care facilities providing unpaid medications, vaccines and 
access to advanced medical equipment.
29 Private hospitals account for 82% of Lebanon’s total capacity (El Khoury et  al. 2012). The 
number of publicly-run hospitals in Lebanon is 29 (UN and GoL 2017).
P. Tabar et al.
191
10.2.3  Pensions
Lebanon’s primary pension scheme follows a defined-contribution system 
administered by the NSSF. The NSSF provides an end-of-service indemnity (ESI) 
which offers a one-time lump-sum cash benefit equivalent to the accumulated 
contributions associated with past employers and one month of earnings for each 
year of service with final employer.30 ESI recipients primarily include private sector 
contractual and wage-earning employees and contractual government employees 
whose employment was terminated due to reaching the retirement age (60–64 years 
of age) or disability.31 The self-employed may also voluntarily subscribe to the 
NSSF. Eligibility for full ESI benefits requires an employee to accumulate at least 
20 years of service in Lebanon otherwise a reduction schedule on the benefits will 
be applied. Although foreign employees are entitled to join NSSF, they are not eli-
gible for ESI benefits. However, ESI benefits are extended to Palestinians in Lebanon 
with a valid work permit. Yet, upwards of 98% of Palestinians are not enrolled in 
such formal employment mainly due to regulations requiring them and their employ-
ers to contribute to all social protection branches of the NSSF, yet only receiving the 
ESI benefits.
All NSSF benefits are terminated after the lump-sum payment leaving many 
retirees with no pension or health care coverage.32 Furthermore, employers face 
substantial economic strain when an employee retires primarily because of the 
lump-sum cash that is paid out in addition to the contributions made to the NSSF 
(Rached 2012).
10.2.4  Family Benefits
In Lebanon, maternity benefits are granted to all women registered with the 
NSSF. Women may also receive maternity benefits if a family member (i.e. father or 
husband) is enrolled in the NSSF and includes her as a beneficiary. To become eli-
gible for maternity benefits, individuals must have been under the NSSF’s insurance 
coverage for at least 10 months prior to the scheduled delivery date. Maternity ben-
efits are granted for 10 weeks and the amount paid is equal to two thirds of the aver-
age working day. There are no paternal benefits in Lebanon.
In terms of family allowances, families receive 33,000 LBP (US$ 22) monthly 
for every child from the moment s/he is born, up to five children. In the case that 
30 One month of earning for every year of service up to 20 years and 1.5 months for every year after.
31 Taxi drivers, newspaper and magazine vendors, local councillors and permanent agricultural 
workers are also included as well.
32 According to PAPFAM data, 74.8% of elderly Lebanese derive their income from their children 
(Tohme et al. 2010) with more than 80% of Lebanon’s population over 65 having no pension or 
health care coverage (Ajluni and Kawar 2015).
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both parents are insured by the NSSF, family allowances are not paid twice for the 
same child. Child allowances are granted up to 18 years for sons (or 25 years if they 
are still studying) and 25 years for daughters unless they are married before this age.
Only mothers permanently residing in Lebanon are allowed to access maternity 
benefits.33 Maternity and family benefits are extended only to employed foreigners 
originating from a country that maintains reciprocity of treatment for Lebanese 
nationals (France, Belgium, the UK and Italy). In order to receive family allowances, 
the family members of the insured should be residing in Lebanon.
10.2.5  Economic Hardship
Lebanon does not maintain any guaranteed minimum resources nor a comprehensive 
non-contributory welfare scheme to protect the most vulnerable Lebanese at home, 
abroad or foreign nationals living in Lebanon from economic hardship. However, 
the National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) is the first poverty- targeted social 
assistance program aiming to “provide social assistance to the poorest and most 
vulnerable Lebanese households based on transparent criteria that assess each 
household’s eligibility to receive assistance” (Presidency of Council of Ministers 
2016).34 The NPTP was originally launched in October 2011, but since the Syrian 
crisis persisted, it was relaunched as the Emergency NPTP (ENPTP) in 2014 
(Kukrety 2016).35 Both the NPTP and the ENPTP provide social protection only for 
Lebanese nationals (MoSA 2013). Foreigners, including Palestinians, are not 
eligible to enrol in this programme nor are these benefits exportable. For Lebanese 
households (or single individuals) to benefit from the ENPTP, their ‘poverty level’ 
must be assessed by a Social Inspector. This assessment takes into account the 
applicant’s standard of living based on employment status, level of education, 
marital status, physical ability, housing condition, assets owned and their geographic 
location (Kukrety 2016). If deemed below the determined poverty threshold, the 
head of the household is given a Halla card which provides them access to education 
and health benefits at any of the 220 SDCs or local clinics and from the Ministry of 
Education and Higher Education. Benefits are provided for a three-year period 
before a reassessment is conducted.36
33 The only exception for residing abroad while being eligible to receive maternity benefits is that 
if the company is registered and the work contract is signed in Lebanon but are temporarily 
working abroad.
34 Quotation originates from cabinet policy statement on the NPTP which established the program 
(18th of June, 2009).
35 As of October 2016, the Government of Lebanon estimates that approximately 1.5  million 
Syrians were residing in Lebanon. This amount to almost a quarter of Lebanon’s population (UN 
and GoL 2017).
36 According to the World Bank (2016), the ENPTP remains limited in scope and coverage reaches 
less than 10% of the population.
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10.2.6  Obstacles and Bilateral/Multilateral Social 
Security Agreements
Foreigners originating from certain countries (i.e. US, Canada, EU Member States, 
etc.) do not require a pre-approved visa to enter Lebanon. A cost-free visa up to 
3–6 months is granted upon entry into the country. However, for other nationalities 
(including Indonesia and Sri Lanka), a previous authorisation by the General 
Directorate of General Security of Lebanon is required before granting an entry 
visa.37 Once arriving in Lebanon, foreigners must apply for work permits from the 
MoL and residency permits from the General Directorate of General Security. 
Domestic workers (i.e. Indonesian and Sri Lankan migrants) in Lebanon are specifi-
cally required to obtain their residency and work permits following an alternative 
set of guidelines.
The procurement of social benefits from Lebanon appears to have no effect on 
residence permits, family reunification or naturalisation of foreigners38 in the coun-
try. This is primarily because proper legal documents (i.e. residency and work per-
mits) must be established before foreigners may attain social protection benefits 
from the NSSF (the only scheme they are eligible to partake).
The greatest obstacles rest on the approximate 300,000–350,000 Palestinians 
residing primarily in Palestinian refugee camps and surrounding ‘gatherings’ (De 
Bel-Air 2017; UN and GoL 2017; Chaaban et  al. 2010). Although over 90% of 
Palestinians in Lebanon were born in the country, they are still considered as for-
eigners and excluded from the social, economic and political life of the country, 
including social protection. What little social protection that is provided to 
Palestinians (i.e. health care) comes primarily from UNRWA.39 With the effective-
ness of UNRWA often hindered by its reliance on aid money, it endeavours to pro-
vide Palestinians with essential assistance in the areas of shelter, infrastructure, 
education, health care and some limited welfare services (Chaaban et  al. 2010; 
Al-Nashif and El-Khoury 2012). Lebanese have strongly opposed the nationalisa-
tion (or tawteen) of Palestinians. Their position on the ‘right to return’40 of 
Palestinians has been used to justify discriminatory and restrictive economic, social 
and civil policies for over 70 years. Additionally, the debate on naturalisation has 
been a taboo subject for almost all political parties with any discussion examining 
37 For a list of countries and their respective visa requirements, visit: http://www.general-security.
gov.lb/en/posts/38
38 There has been no major citizenship reform since 1924, and access to citizenship for foreign 
residents does not depend on established administrative rules and processes but rather on ad hoc 
political decisions (Jaulin 2014).
39 Palestinians in Lebanon also receive assistance from around 46 Arab organisations and 20 NGOs. 
However, the assistance pales in comparison to that of UNRWA (Chaaban et al. 2010).
40 The ‘right to return’ is the political position or principle which states that Palestinians (whether 
first-generation or their descendants) have the right to return to the land they were displaced from. 
Lebanon, for example, argues that providing citizenship to Palestinians could inhibit them from 
returning to Palestine.
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the economic, social and civil rights of Palestinians becoming disrupted by rival 
accusation of promoting tawteen; an act considered virtually treasonous within the 
political discourse (Chaaban et al. 2010).
According to Article 9 of the Social Security Law of 1963, foreign wage-earners 
and salary-earners are able to benefit from the NSSF if they hold a valid residency 
and work permit and originate from countries which grant Lebanese nationals equal 
or better social protection (Social Security Law of 1963, 2007). Currently, Lebanese 
authorities have approved France, Belgium, the UK and Italy as countries which 
meet the reciprocity of social protection criteria stipulated by the Social Security 
Law. Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement (EMP) was 
signed by Lebanon in 2002 with the final draft coming into force in 2006. However, 
unlike EMP agreements signed with other states (i.e. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) 
Lebanon’s EMP agreement does not go beyond the arrangement of ‘dialogue’ on 
issues pertaining to social protection and includes no reciprocal cooperation in the 
area of social protection (García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016; Ayadi and Gadi 2013).
10.3  Conclusions
The fragmented and decentralised nature of Lebanon’s social protection schemes 
has left upwards of half the population without any comprehensive social protec-
tion. Specific groups (i.e. Palestinians, elderly, migrants) inhabit an even more pre-
carious position due mainly to restrictive policies in place or an impasse on inclusive 
policies to provide protection for larger segments of the population. The lack of 
social protection coverage, coupled with a number of other deficiencies, has both 
historically and presently motivated many Lebanese to seek better opportunities and 
security abroad. For many Lebanese households, having a family member or close 
friend residing abroad has been an indispensable source of social and economic 
protection from the country’s instability. For foreigners residing in Lebanon, the 
only social protection scheme they can benefit from is the NSSF. However, due to 
the limiting stipulations from the reciprocity of treatment for social protection from 
the Social Security Law of 1963 (Article 9), only citizens from France, Belgium, the 
UK and Italy are able to formally benefit. Lebanon has regularly posited itself not 
as a country of immigration nor refuge.41 Most migrants and refugee communities 
are often perceived as a burden on infrastructural needs, security concerns and eco-
nomic opportunities. Most importantly, the tenuous sectarian balance pervasive in 
the country is cited as a primary reason for the lack of social protection and 
naturalisation rights for many migrants. Lebanese authorities have tacitly and 
explicitly stressed the concern about providing particular services and/or rights to 
migrant populations for trepidation that they may not leave the country.
41 Lebanon is not signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 
Protocol.
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In 2004, the office of the Prime Minister and the MoL drafted a bill which 
proposed changes to the ESI component of the NSSF and provided key redistributive 
measures to mitigate vulnerability from employees with poor earnings, the risk of 
longevity and unemployment. In 2011, the MoL proposed another draft bill to adopt 
a “Notional Defined Contribution” system where individuals pay contributions 
from their salary and fund benefits for the retired population. Each individual would 
maintain a ‘notional account,’ and upon retirement, beneficiaries would receive at 
least 40% of wages. However, none of these draft laws have been passed. 
Also, Lebanon moved towards implementing comprehensive and universal health 
care coverage in 2012. The Comprehensive Health Project was presented by the 
Minister of Labour with the explicit objective to unify and include all Lebanese 
under one non-contributory health care system. However, this too has yet to be 
implemented (Nasnas 2016).
As discussed previously, the NPTP (and the ENPTP) has been implemented as a 
short-term social assistance program meant to alleviate the economic and social dif-
ficulties stemming from the Syrian crisis. Recently, the Government of Lebanon has 
been looking into legally institutionalising the NPTP as a permanent feature of 
Lebanon’s social protection system. Although the draft law is still under discussion, 
this would constitute a significant step in providing vulnerable Lebanese a social 
safety net (World Bank 2016).
For the approximate 270,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, UNRWA is the only 
institution to provide some semblance of social protection. Because Palestinians are 
considered foreigners in the country (irrespective of the overwhelming majority 
being born in Lebanon), they are not entitled to any social protection afforded to 
Lebanese citizens. The UN (2019) has stated that UNRWA is facing “the greatest 
financial predicament in its history this year following the abrupt end to funding by 
the United States.” Pierre Krähenbühl, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, fur-
ther describes that the shortage of US$ 446  million42 has threatened the general 
education of 525,000 students, essential primary health care for 3 million patients 
and food assistance for 1.7 million refugees who fled difficult emergencies, includ-
ing Syria. As of late, global funding campaigns are underway to assuage the sub-
stantial financial shortfall.
Finally, endemic in Lebanese institutions and administrations are sectarian and 
clientelist politics which have obstructed and hindered the development, modernisa-
tion and inclusivity of many vital institutions. The NSSF, for example, is not a 
public independent sector nor is it separated from the political Lebanese reality. In 
fact, their internal work practices and the recruitment processes are highly politicised 
and controlled by clientelist agendas (Abi Yaghi 2014). Even official figures 
containing the number of staff in government positions and ministries is classified 
information due to the sensitivity of the sectarian aspect (Mourtada n.d.). What 
Lebanon has managed to create in terms of social protection can be described as a 
‘political safety net’ rather than an essential ‘social safety net’ which would 
42 US$ 446 millions accounts for approximately 40% of UNRWA’s operating budget (UN 2019).
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overcome political or sectarian affiliation and provide a comprehensive and equitable 
welfare scheme to assist all segments of the Lebanese population and non- Lebanese 
residing in Lebanon.
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Chapter 11
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 




This chapter aims to explain, firstly, the characteristics, infrastructure and key poli-
cies relating to the Lebanese diaspora; and secondly, an outline of the key social 
protection policies will be provided, specifically in the areas of unemployment, 
health care, pensions, family-related benefits and economic hardship by Lebanese 
authorities. Principally, the diaspora engagement policies reflect a concerted effort 
to increase investment, capital, tourism and other economic activities back into 
Lebanon. Until recently, Lebanon has also made efforts to engage politically with 
the diaspora. Repatriation and voting abroad were particularly important in terms of 
diaspora engagement as Lebanon underwent a national parliamentary election in 
May of 2018 with Lebanese nationals abroad having the right to vote for the first 
time in absentia. Yet, as Lebanon struggles to enact meaningful social protection 
policies for its own citizens at home, providing such social protection for Lebanese 
abroad has simply not been a priority for the government. The focus of diaspora 
engagement predominately in economic activities stems from the necessity of eco-
nomic remittances, boosting tourism from visits to the homeland and creating busi-
nesses, trade and investment opportunities (Hourani 2007). Remittances not only 
constitute a significant portion of Lebanon’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it also 
provides numerous citizens some semblance of a social safety net as well. 
Engagement with the diaspora politically will become more active in the future as 
the importance of the diasporic vote may not only impact the parliamentary election 
outcomes, but also disrupt the delicate sectarian balance of the political 
establishment.
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11.2  Diaspora Policy Infrastructure and Key Policies
A brief historical account of Lebanese emigration including a number of difficulties 
encountered with the diaspora will be summarised. Furthermore, infrastructure, 
central to the engagement with the diaspora, will be described along with key poli-
cies implemented by the government.
11.2.1  The Lebanese Diaspora and Its Relations 
with the Homeland
Accurate figures on the number of Lebanese emigrants and their characteristics are 
in large part fragmented and/or uncertain. Due mainly to historical controversies 
and political concerns over the true size of the Lebanese diasporic population, fig-
ures have differed drastically depending on how quantitative data is gathered, 
whether children and grandchildren of former migrants are considered and who 
may be collecting the data (MPC 2013).1 Such concerns derive from the fragile 
political system which functions according to sectarian affiliation. Hence, demo-
graphic numbers of Lebanese, whether in Lebanon or abroad, have major political 
implications which can affect the country’s sectarian balance and disrupt sect-based 
power-sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, De Bel-Air (2017) estimates that 
885,000 Lebanese migrants, either first-generation or born in Lebanon, are residing 
abroad as of 2014. Of the 885,000 Lebanese migrants abroad: 41% reside in the 
Gulf States; 23% in North America; 21% in Europe (including Norway and 
Switzerland); and 16% in other countries including Australia and Brazil. Moreover, 
given the selectivity of many immigration countries, Lebanese emigrants are almost 
twice as educated as non-migrants with at least 25% maintaining tertiary education 
(De Bel-Air 2017; ETF 2017).
Historically, Lebanon has experienced waves of emigration for more than 
150 years as a result of lopsided economic development, undemocratic communal 
politics and national and international conflicts (Tabar 2015). The first wave of emi-
gration occurred in the mid to late nineteenth century with a small number of mainly 
Christians who were sent to Rome in order to return and serve as clergy. Also, with 
increasing integration of British and French capitalist markets, a number of Lebanese 
Christians emigrated to the main centres of trade between Europe and the Near East, 
including Egypt, Livorno, Marseille and Manchester. The second wave is marked by 
rapid population growth with an increasing number of educated and skilled persons. 
By the end of the late nineteenth century and with the collapse of the silk industry, the 
local population sought better economic opportunities abroad. By World War I, a 
third of the population (mostly Christian) had left mainly to North and South America, 
Australia, West Africa, Europe and New Zealand. Between 1945 and 1975 
1 E.g. in 2009, the UN Lebanese national population estimates differed by almost 400,000 people.
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constituted the third wave of emigration. Because of political instability and eco-
nomic deterioration from the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 and also the demand of labour 
in the Gulf States, many Lebanese decided to emigrate. With the onset of the Lebanese 
Civil War (1975–1989), approximately 990,000 people left the country which 
accounted for 40% of the total population. This fourth wave of emigration led many 
Lebanese to flee primarily to Canada, Australia, the United States, France, Germany 
and the Gulf States (Tabar 2015). Since the 1990s, Lebanon has seen increased con-
frontations with Israel which resulted in the 2006 Israeli invasion, political instability, 
assassinations and civil strife. The Syrian civil war which began in 2011 has also put 
considerable strain on the Lebanese economy and infrastructure as well.
The long and complex history of emigration can help explain the rough estima-
tion of 4–13 million Lebanese immigrants abroad. Furthermore, such numbers can 
become inflated due to the prevalence of urban myths, a natural desire to exaggerate 
the presence of the Lebanese diaspora and the difficulty of locating and disseminat-
ing accurate data (Muglia 2015; Joulin 2006). This brief historical account of 
Lebanese emigration can shed light on why there is a lack of meaningful engage-
ment between state-diaspora relations. It is often the inability of the government to 
provide economic opportunities or protect its citizens from national/international 
conflicts. As emigration is often used as a means to flee conflict and find economic 
prosperity, the diaspora is often held up as the safeguard for many Lebanese at 
home. Economic investments, remittances, trade, etc. have been employed not only 
to provide a safety net, but also to stimulate the economy and for reconstruction and 
development efforts after conflict and war.
Presently, in most official capacities, Lebanese ministries and sub-ministries refer 
to Lebanese nationals abroad as such or as emigrants. However, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, makes numerous references to Lebanese nation-
als, expatriates, co-ethnics or children of Lebanese parents as the “Lebanese Diaspora” 
as a means to stimulate engagement when encouraging investment or tourism in 
Lebanon. This is done, in particular, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants’ engagement programme, the Lebanese Diaspora Energy.2
11.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
Lebanese diaspora infrastructure consists of consulate networks, government min-
istries and sub-ministries and consultative institutions which facilitate engagement 
with the diaspora. Within Lebanon’s top five destination countries, the consulate 
networks maintained are relatively sparse. The United States of America contains 
three consulates with three honorary consulates; Canada contains one consulate 
with one honorary consulate; Australia contains two consulates with two honorary 
consulates; Germany does not contain a consulate but does have one honorary 
2 See the Lebanese Diaspora Energy webpage at http://www.lde-leb.com/index.php
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consulate; and France contains two consulates with zero honorary consulates.3 
Furthermore, Lebanon does not support any mobile consular services to any of the 
top destination countries.
The primary Lebanese public institution and national authority relating to 
Lebanese nationals residing abroad is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants 
(MoFAE). Formerly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was merged with the Ministry 
of Emigrants to create one entity.4 Under the auspices of the MoFAE, Lebanon has 
two main sub-ministries which maintain specific mandates in addressing the needs 
of Lebanese nationals abroad: the General Directorate of Emigrants (GDE) and the 
Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs (DPCA). The General Directorate of 
Emigrants is primarily tasked with outreach activities as a means to boost and 
develop the cultural and educational bonds with Lebanese nationals abroad. It fur-
ther attempts to serve the needs by acknowledging the importance of the contribu-
tions made by them. Moreover, the GDE pushes for Lebanese nationals abroad to be 
considered as de facto investors and should be provided the proper securities and 
incentives for increased contributions to the home country (Zbeeb 2015).5 The 
Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs was established to provide the Lebanese 
nationals abroad assistance for important services including (but not limited to): 
renewal and authentication of official documents and passports; information on 
investment opportunities; registering and recording personal status related matters; 
and registration of voting abroad.6
The Economic and Social Council of Lebanon (CES) is a consultative body with 
its mission to develop inter-dialogue, cooperation and coordination within/among 
various social, economic and professional sectors and actors.7 The CES formulates 
relevant economic and social policies for the Lebanese government to implement if 
they so choose. Although the CES primarily functions within Lebanon and between 
numerous sectors, associations, syndicates and vocations, it also seeks cooperation 
and coordination with expatriate institutions through the mobilisation of interna-
tional conferences reckoning that dialogue between the CES and Lebanese nation-
als or expatriates abroad can enhance/facilitate collaboration.8
The Lebanese Diaspora Energy (LDE) was established in 2014 by the MoFAE as 
a means to encourage engagement with the Lebanese diaspora and the home coun-
try in order to stimulate investment and tourism in Lebanon. The LDE’s major 
3 See a complete list of Lebanese embassies and consulates at http://www.lebanity.gov.lb/down-
loads/MF-List-Of-Embassies-EN-2016-08-17.pdf. The MoFA does not maintain a comprehensive 
list of consulates.
4 Law No. 247 of 2000 incorporated the Ministry of Emigrants and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5 The General Directorate’s official website is emigrants.gov.lb. However, the website is not opera-
tional at this time.
6 The Directorate of Political and Consular Affairs does not have an official website to provide 
information regarding its services or programmes.
7 The Economic and Social Council of Lebanon (CES) was established by Law No. 533/096 in 1999.
8 For more information on the Economic and Social Council of Lebanon’s contributions see 
Nasnas 2016.
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initiative is the organisation of annual international conferences at crucial locations 
where Lebanese nationals abroad are present.9
Since the passing of Lebanon’s Parliamentary Election Law in 2008,10 Lebanese 
nationals abroad have the right to vote. Registering to vote was done online via an 
application from the MoFAE or at the nearest Lebanese consulate. Voting abroad 
took place at designated polling centres most often at the consulates themselves. 
The most recent election and first to include Lebanese nationals abroad occurred in 
May 2018. A total of 46,799 votes were cast abroad (UNDP 2018). Most notably, 
the Lebanese Forces political party, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Syrian 
Socialist National Party (SSNP)11 offered the most developed infrastructure in place 
for voter engagement of Lebanese nationals abroad. This infrastructure consists pri-
marily of dedicated diaspora engagement within their official website in the form of 
information and donation portals. The Lebanese Forces provided a mobile phone 
application which helped facilitate information regarding how to register and vote, 
to connect with other Lebanese Forces supporters and to obtain donations.12 The 
Free Patriotic Movement also maintains online websites providing news and infor-
mation for voting and investment. Notably, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, has also been the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement 
since 2015. The SSNP also has a directorate of foreign affairs with the role to estab-
lish connections and networks between Syria and the diaspora.
11.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
Although there has been no transversal strategy in which authorities respond to the 
social protection needs of Lebanese nationals abroad, there has been a concerted 
effort by government officials to not only stimulate economic activities between 
Lebanon and the diaspora, but also repatriate Lebanese expatriates abroad.13 Since 
the drafting of the law that extends the Reacquisition of Lebanese Citizenship to the 
Descendants of Lebanese Emigrants in 2011 and passed by the Lebanese Parliament 
in 2015, significant effort has been focused on the acquisition of Lebanese citizen-
ship to those who have either renounced their Lebanese citizenship or are 
9 See LDE conference in Montreal http://www.lde-leb.com/northamerica2018.php
10 Parliamentary Election Law (No. 25 of 2008).
11 The SSNP is an active and secular political party operating in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine 
and Syria which advocates for a greater Syrian state based on historical and cultural boundaries of 
the Syrian nation-state. The party originated as an anticolonial organisation in Beirut in 1932.
12 For more information on the Lebanese Forces app, visit http://lebanese-forces.info/app/
13 See Lebanon’s simplified citizenship programme; http://www.foreign.gov.lb/Library/Assets/
LEBANESE%20CITIZENSHIP%20PROGRAM.pdf. Furthermore, see http://www.lebanity.gov.
lb/ whereby the MoFAE advocates the Lebanese diaspora to repatriate.
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descendants of Lebanese emigrants.14 As discussed earlier, the enactment of the 
2008 Parliamentary Elections Law which guaranteed the right of Lebanese nation-
als abroad to vote has placed a focus to encourage Lebanese descendants and nation-
als abroad to register for elections in their home country. As mentioned previously, 
Lebanon’s first election after implementing the Parliamentary Elections Law wit-
nessed a total of 82,965 registered voters abroad with 46,799 Lebanese nationals 
actually voting (UNDP 2018). Comparing these figures to an estimated 885,000 
Lebanese nationals abroad (first-generation, born in Lebanon) in 2014 and a roughly 
4–13  million people of Lebanese descent worldwide in the Lebanese diaspora, 
Lebanese officials and political entities are fully cognisant of the latent and vast 
political and economic capital that will require harnessing and, subsequently, con-
tending over (De Bel-Air 2017; Al Kantar 2016; Joulin 2006).15 Therefore, boosting 
engagement with the Lebanese diaspora is of substantial importance particularly as 
overall remittances have been dropping over the last several years.16 One example of 
such engagement is clearly seen with the MoFAE’s organisation of LDE interna-
tional conferences at locations with sizeable diaspora populations. The Lebanese 
government’s strategy with regards to the LDE conferences has involved appealing 
to the nostalgia between Lebanon and the diaspora for deeper engagement and con-
sequently increased economic and political capital back into the home country.17
Lebanon has also taken legislative steps to ease legal restriction on foreign prop-
erty ownership. The Foreign Acquisition of Property and Property Rights in Lebanon 
is one such legislation designed to encourage investments in Lebanon, particularly 
in the industry and tourism sectors.18 The law also lowers real estate registration fees 
for both Lebanese and foreign nationals (Zbeeb 2015). Encouraging Investment in 
Lebanon is another example of a law which provides a series of incentives for for-
eign investments in Lebanon.19 This law also established the Investment Development 
Authority of Lebanon (IDAL); a public agency entrusted to encourage and attract 
Lebanese nationals abroad to invest in Lebanon (ICMPD  and IOM 2010; IDAL 
14 The acquisition of Lebanese citizenship follows the jus sanguinis principle, however, only pater-
nally. For more information on the eligibility to reclaim Lebanese citizenship see http://globalcit.
eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Translation_Draft%20Law%20_Lebanon.pdf
15 According to the World Bank, the population of Lebanon in 2016 was estimated at six million. 
Consequently, Lebanon has not had an official government census since 1932. This is because of 
the sensitivity of demographic figures in politics.
16 Remittances as a percentage of GDP was estimated at 23.9% in 2008; the peak in the last 
20 years. However, remittance levels as a percentage of GDP stands at 14.1% in 2016 (Adweh 
2014; KNOWMAD 2017).
17 “Keep that flame of love for Lebanon alive in your heart, while keeping your success in the dias-
pora.” Quote from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gebran Bassil, from the Lebanese Diaspora Energy. 
LDE conferences primarily involve gathering the diaspora’s business elite abroad and fostering 
engagement.
18 The Foreign Acquisition of Property and Property Rights Law No. 296 of 2001.
19 Encouraging Investment in Lebanon Law No. 360 of 2001.
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2001).20 IDAL has been responsible for implementing investment incentives in the 
form of tax exemptions granted in the fields of technology, information, telecom-
munications/media, tourism, industry and agriculture. IDAL is also managing 
agency responsible for bilateral Promotion and Protection of Investments agree-
ments between Lebanon and Canada, France and Germany (IDAL 2016a).21 These 
bilateral investment agreements are meant to create and maintain favourable invest-
ment conditions through contractual protection of such investments. Furthermore, 
the agreements are meant to provide fair and equitable treatment on a non- 
discriminatory basis and full protection and security of foreign investments in both 
countries (Zbeeb 2015). Lebanon also participates in bilateral agreements to avoid 
the double taxation and to also encourage the exchange of goods, technology and 
the inflows of capital (IDAL 2016b).22
Partnered with the MoFAE and the UNDP, Live Lebanon is an initiative to pro-
vide an online platform for the Lebanese diaspora to contribute funds, investments 
or professional expertise for local development projects in the areas of health, envi-
ronment and education in struggling communities. One example of Live Lebanon’s 
activities involved the procuring of a power generator for the Bhamdoun Al Mhata 
village. The funds were generated by donations made from the Lebanese diaspora 
towards Live Lebanon’s project initiatives. Utilisation of the term diaspora is preva-
lent as a means to emphasise the importance of assisting communities that are strug-
gling in the homeland.
The Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) is another 
relevant programme organised by the UNDP and executed through the Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (CDR).23 Although CDR is not an agency that 
directly engages with Lebanese nationals abroad, it is involved with this particular 
project. TOKTEN’s primary objective is to obtain the technical experience of 
Lebanese nationals abroad (or Lebanese descendants) in order to reinforce the 
national development efforts in Lebanon and transfer their skills and know-how.24 
TOKTEN encourages the return of Lebanese abroad for short-term consultancy 
assignments in the form of volunteerism (Tabar 2009).
The World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU), originally founded by the 
Lebanese government in 1960, is a civil organisation which maintains a 
20 Although IDAL does maintain a specific focus for attracting investment from Lebanese nationals 
abroad, it also encourages investment from non-Lebanese and local Lebanese nationals as well.
21 Among Canada, France and Germany who have signed investment protection agreements, 
Lebanon also maintains a bilateral investment agreement with 51 other countries. For a compre-
hensive list and description see IDAL’s Investment Protection Agreements at investinlebanon.gov.lb
22 Countries that Lebanon signed an agreement with to avoid double taxation are: Algeria, Armenia, 
Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Gabon, Iran, Italy, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Senegal, 
Sudan, Oman Sultanate, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, U.A.E., Ukraine, Yemen.
23 Established by government decree No. 5 of January 31, 1977, the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR) is a public authority unit established by the Lebanese government.
24 One example of TOKTEN’s consultancy assignments was the training of army officers on cyber 
defence. See TOKTEN article: http://www.toktenlebanon.org/annoucement/more.php?id=22
11 Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Lebanese Citizens…
206
non- political, non-religious and non-profit position. Its primary goal is to strengthen 
ties, promote mutual friendships and understanding among the Lebanese diaspora 
(anyone of Lebanese decent abroad) and Lebanon. This is primarily achieved by 
establishing, promoting and enhancing understanding via encouraging and exchang-
ing cultural, educational, social and tourist activities (Hourani 2007). Lebanon’s 
Ministry of Tourism is also tasked with promoting Lebanon’s cultural heritage at 
home and abroad. Although not mandated to specifically engage with Lebanese 
nationals abroad, the Ministry of Tourism does engage with them in the capacities 
of promoting return to the homeland for seasonal tourism and also to invest in 
tourism- related projects.
11.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Lebanon
Lebanese engagement with nationals abroad in the area of social protection can be 
summed up as almost entirely absent. Outside the basic services offered by consul-
ates described below, Lebanese consulates provide assistance to nationals abroad in 
the case of arrest, detention, serious illness/accident, or in the case of death. 
Moreover, what engagement Lebanese authorities and institutions do have with 
nationals abroad consists almost exclusively of enticing, incentivising or rousing 
engagement for political and/or economic benefits of the home country. One attrib-
utable reason is that social protection in general is considered to be at a nascent 
stage in Lebanon. The social protection system is characterised by a multiplicity of 
social assistance and insurance programmes that more or less operate in an ad hoc 
manner in response to crises (Kukrety 2016).25 Additionally, the approximate share 
of informally-employed persons in Lebanon is estimated at about half the Lebanese 
workforce, and so those within the informal labour market are outside of any mean-
ingful social security coverage (Ajluni and Kawar 2015).26 Roughly 40% to 50% of 
the Lebanese population are not enrolled in the National Social Security Fund,27 and 
as a result, the most vulnerable populations (elderly, people with disabilities, the 
unemployed, foreign workers, women, farmers, etc.) are ignored from formal social 
protection systems (Abi Yaghi 2014). As a consequence, the major providers of 
social protection from severe poverty come from individual families, emigrant 
remittances, private/civil institutions, charities, non-governmental organisations, or 
religious/political organisations which, due to the absence of a centralised system of 
25 Lebanon is currently hosting an approximate 1.5 million Syrians as of October 2016 as a result 
of the fallout from the conflict in Syria (UN and GoL 2017).
26 ILO figures are taken from both the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics’ (CAS) 
2004 Household Survey and the 2009 Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey along with the World 
Bank’s MILES report. Self-employed work with limited access to social security or health insur-
ance coverage is also added to informally-employed persons.
27 The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is Lebanon’s national social insurance system.
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effective social protection, strengthen and deepen sectarian or partisan clientelist 
practices within the country (Cammett 2014; Abi Yaghi 2014).
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement (EMP) was signed by Lebanon 
in 2002 with the final draft coming into force in 2006. Although the EMP is primar-
ily an economic and trade agreement, Article 65 of the agreement maintains social 
protection provisions to bolster and improve projects and programmes in the social 
protection field. However, the EMP signed with Lebanon does not contain provi-
sions for the coordination of social protections between the EU and Lebanon as 
compared to the agreements signed with other states (i.e. Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia). Therefore, compared to EMP agreements with other countries, what social 
security provisions that are included are wholly absent from the EMP agreement 
with Lebanon (García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016).
Lebanon’s bilateral agreements for the promotion and protection of investments 
do mention social services, however, they are included in the General and Specific 
Exceptions annex. As a result, social services (i.e. income security, social security, 
health and child care, etc.) are included as exceptions that will not be impacted by 
the bilateral agreement.28
11.3.1  Unemployment
Lebanon does not maintain any official government policy, programmes or services 
to provide benefits or training for Lebanese nationals living abroad in the case of 
unemployment. This is not unreasonable given the fact that the Lebanese govern-
ment does not provide such benefits to its citizens residing in Lebanon. More often, 
successive Lebanese governments have used migratory outflow as a tool to ease 
unemployment pressure and increase remittance flows back into the country 
(Hourani 2007).29 Summarily, in terms of any significant protection for Lebanese 
nationals abroad, neither the Lebanese government nor consulates offer any protec-
tion nor assistance for host country unemployment services in the case of economic 
hardship or unemployment.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement that Lebanon is signatory to 
does address key issues regarding unemployment social protection in Article 65.30 
However, the EMP does not go beyond the arrangement of dialogue on core issues 
28 A complete list of social service exemptions found in the agreement are: public law enforcement; 
correctional services; income security or insurance; social security or insurance; social security or 
insurance; social welfare; public education; public training; health and child care.
29 Unemployment is a prominent push factor for many highly educated Lebanese. Approximately 
50% of Lebanese emigrants have at least secondary education and an estimated 25% with tertiary 
education resulting in a significant brain drain effect for Lebanon (ETF 2017).
30 Article 65(2) The Parties shall engage in a dialogue on all aspects of mutual interest and particu-
larly on social problems such as unemployment, rehabilitation of the less able-bodied, equal treat-
ment for men and women, labour relations, vocational training, safety and health at work.
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of social protection in the area of unemployment, and unlike EMP agreements with 
other countries (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Lebanon’s EMP agreement main-
tains no reciprocal commitments concerning economic or social cooperation (Ayadi 
and Gadi 2013). No mention of unemployment protection is stated in any of 
Lebanon’s bilateral agreements on the promotion and protection of investments.
11.3.2  Health Care
The Lebanese health care system remains heavily fragmented primarily between 
and within public and private institutions with government entities acting as official 
regulators (WHO 2006). Although Lebanon maintains no relevant official policy 
whereby consulates provide healthcare or invalidity services, cash/in-kind benefits 
or coverage to Lebanese nationals abroad, certain public health care schemes do 
provide some form of health care coverage abroad. The Civil Servants Cooperative 
under the tutelage of the Council of Ministers does provide pre-admission health 
coverage abroad up to 90% for Lebanese government employees and their depen-
dents abroad.31 Furthermore, the Lebanese Army retains its own public health ser-
vices as well.32 It provides pre-admission health care coverage abroad up to $10,000 
for Lebanese employed in the army or security services and their families (Ammar 
et al. 2000; Ammar 2009).33
Lebanese consulates or institutions do not provide assistance in accessing host 
country health coverage or benefits. However, consulates have been known to pro-
vide cash assistance to Lebanese nationals abroad in the case of serious health emer-
gencies. Nevertheless, there is no formal policy for these cash benefits, and they are 
given only at the discretion of officials at consulates or embassies.
Lebanon has been struggling to establish a non-contributory health care protec-
tion scheme for all Lebanese citizens. In 2012, Ministry of Labour, Charbel Nahas, 
presented the Comprehensive Health Project. The primary aim of the project was to 
unify the differing health care protection schemes in the country and also provide 
comprehensive health care coverage to those with limited or no income. 
Unfortunately, the Comprehensive Health Project has yet to be implemented 
(Nasnas 2016).
31 Health care coverage under the Civil Servants Cooperation amounts to approximately 4.4% of 
the Lebanese population. However, an estimated 8–9% of the Lebanese may be eligible (Ammar 
et al. 2000; Ammar 2009).
32 The Army’s health care scheme falls under the patronage of the Ministry of Defence whereas the 
Ministry of Interior is responsible for the Internal Security Forces, General Security Forces and 
State Security Forces. However, all army/military health schemes are financed by the Lebanese 
government and contain essentially the same coverage rules for care (Ammar 2009).
33 Health care for the army or security services amount to approximately 9% of the Lebanese popu-
lation. However, an estimated 11% may be eligible (Ammar et al. 2000; Ammar 2009).
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Although Lebanon maintains a large number of private health insurance services, 
a considerable portion of the population is still unable to afford full medical cover-
age. Therefore, Lebanon’s national social insurance system, the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) is the country’s most important social protection insurance 
provider. It offers employees with health and maternity insurance, family and edu-
cational allowances and end-of-service indemnity to retirees. However, the NSSF 
does not cover any medical treatment outside of Lebanon. Additionally, those who 
are informally or self-employed and unemployed do receive basic essential health 
care from the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH).34 This coverage too is not pro-
vided outside of Lebanon.
Article 65 of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement which Lebanon has 
ratified stipulates a cooperation between parties to improve social security and 
health insurance systems and improve the health care system through cooperation. 
However, little meaningful reforms have been undertaken by Lebanon since the rati-
fication of the EMP.
Medical tourism has fared well in Lebanon with the country being a top destina-
tion for medical tourists in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. 
According to Hassan (2015), an estimated 10% of the tourists entering Lebanon 
identified medical treatment as their purpose of visit. As part of an effort to promote 
Lebanon as a health care tourism destination, the Eighth Conference on Medical 
Tourism was held in Beirut in 2013. The conference was a means to promote 
Lebanon as a key destination of medical tourism, health and beauty, along with 
promoting Lebanese tourism in general.
11.3.3  Pensions
Lebanese civil servants and those in the military are covered by generous public- 
sector pension schemes which are financed by a pay-as-you-go method with public 
employees contributing an equivalent of 6% of the wages in the public sector.35,36 
34 The MoPH covers what would be considered as ‘catastrophic’ payments for households without 
health insurance. Approximately 43% of Lebanese citizens possess no health care insurance and 
are only able to rely on the MoPH in dire circumstances (WHO 2006).
35 The pension scheme for public servants was established by the 1959 Public Servants System 
Legislature Decrees and the military follows a 1961 legislative decree. These pension schemes are 
considered unsustainable with expenditures on civil servant pensions at 1.2% GDP and spending 
on military pensions at 2% of GDP (Rached 2012). The pension scheme’s replacement rate is often 
close to 100%. It does not enforce a minimum retirement age, so accrual rate is high with respect 
to the retirement age. Additionally, benefits can distort due to ad hoc and costly additional benefits 
like extra lump-sum payments for retirees who completed 40+ years of service. Variations in pen-
sion payments are also high as they are based on the last salary earned by retiree (Jarmuzek and 
Nakhle 2016).
36 In the case of financial disparities or shortfalls in funds as a result of demographic shifts or an 
unsustainable benefit formula, the government is directly covered by the Treasury’s general reve-
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Lebanese nationals under the public-sector pension scheme are permitted to obtain 
their pension benefits while living abroad. Summarily, Lebanese nationals under the 
public-sector pension scheme must renew their pension benefits annually while 
abroad. This is done by completing and signing the “application from retiree” form 
which then must be brought to the nearest consulate for legalisation. Lebanese 
nationals abroad under this scheme must also provide proof of identification in the 
form of the Lebanese civil identification. Afterwards, the “application from retiree” 
form, along with their Family Registry Record and proof of their Lebanese  residence 
must be sent to the Ministry of Finance. For a Lebanese national abroad as a benefi-
ciary of the public pension, they are able to obtain pension benefits abroad.37 The 
process is similar except the “application from a beneficiary” form must be legal-
ised by the consulate along with either proof of divorce, death or mental illness; all 
documents must be sent to the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance 2016).
The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is an independent institution estab-
lished in 1963 under the Ministry of Labour which provides services primarily to 
private-sector and contractual government employees. The NSSF’s retirement 
scheme involves a lump-sum cash benefit upon retirement.38 All benefits are termi-
nated after the lump-sum payment leaving many post-retirees with no pension or 
health coverage after retirement. For those Lebanese who retire from the informal 
sector, they will only have their savings to survive on. With the absence of public 
safety nets, many elderlies rely on income transfers from their children 
(Rached 2012).39
Consulates are not directly involved in the acquisition of pension benefits for 
Lebanese abroad in the case of acquiring Lebanese benefits or host country benefits. 
However, consulates do provide legalisation of particular documents including life 
certificates.
11.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
Lebanon and Lebanese consulates do not maintain any official policy with regards 
to providing cash or in-kind benefits to assist families in birth or raising a child 
abroad. The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) does contain protection services 
nues (i.e. taxpayers) (Nasnas 2016).
37 Beneficiaries of Lebanese pensioners pertain to divorced, widowed or unmarried daughters, wid-
owed wives, any son or daughter under the age of 18, or a son or daughter with mental 
disabilities.
38 This lump-sum is equivalent to the accumulated contributions associated with past employers 
and one month of earning for each year of service with final employer (up to 20 years).
39 According to PAPFAM data, 74.8% of elderly Lebanese derive their income from transfers from 
their children (Tohme et al. 2010).
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in the field of maternity and family and educational allowances.40 However, to be 
eligible for NSSF’s services, a Lebanese national must be formally employed and 
residing in the country. Those working in the informal sector are also not entitled to 
NSSF’s maternity and family benefits (Kukrety 2016).
Although Lebanese consulates do not provide protection services to Lebanese 
nationals abroad, they are responsible for a number of administrative procedures 
concerning families. Mainly, Lebanese families abroad must register vital events at 
the nearest consulate or embassy; this can be done either in person or by mail. These 
events normally include marriage, divorce, birth or death.41 Lebanese nationals are 
also able to obtain Lebanese birth certificates abroad through consulates. Primarily, 
parents must obtain the host country’s birth certificate certified by the appropriate 
Ministry of the host country and provide it to the consulate. The consulate will then 
send the appropriate documents to Lebanon whereby the Lebanese birth certificate 
is sent back to be picked up at the receiving consulate.
Lebanon’s bilateral agreements have maintained some provisions with regards to 
family protection. Article 65(1)(c) of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Agreement stipulates cooperation within projects and programmes with the aim of 
bolstering and developing Lebanon’s family planning and mother and child protec-
tion programmes. In 2010, Lebanon also ratified the Agreement between Australia 
and the Republic of Lebanon regarding Cooperation on Protecting the Welfare of 
Children.42 In summation, the agreement establishes a structure between the gov-
ernments of Lebanon and Australia to assist parents in either country to resolve 
disputes across international borders concerning their children. The agreement 
helps mediate and coordinate with the proper authorities of each country to: facili-
tate the transmission of information and documents related to applications; encour-
age dialogue between parents and assist in finding an amicable resolution to the 
issues in dispute; monitor and report on the progress of individual cases. International 
Social Service Australia (ISS) further provides international parent child abduction 
services including information, advice, emotional support, counselling for family 
members, mediation and assistance with reunification and returns.43
40 The NSSF provides maternity indemnity in cases where employers do not provide maternity 
leave. Family and educational allowances are provided in the case of an emergency for families 
faced with economic hardship normally due to medical emergencies/shocks. The allowances are 
provided as funds for school to ensure children remain in the educational system. There is a cap of 
five children per family whereby allowances will decrease (Kukrety 2016).
41 Registration of vital events oftentimes comes at no cost. Furthermore, for Lebanese nationals 
abroad, it is important to stay up-to-date with registration of vital events. They are particularly 
salient in the case of, for example, receiving pensions as a beneficiary or repatriation/acquisition 
of citizenship.
42 For the full agreement, see https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_
of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/25november2009/treaties/lebanon_text.pdf
43 For more information on ISS Australia’s protection services in the case of parental disputes 
across international borders, see https://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/Families/
InternationalFamilyLaw/Pages/InternationalParentalChildAbduction.aspx
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11.3.5  Economic Hardship
Lebanon does not maintain policies which provide guaranteed minimum resources 
for Lebanese in economic hardship. As a consequence, Lebanon does not provide 
any such policies for nationals living abroad. However, there have been different 
interventions and safety nets implemented usually in response to particular crises, 
wars or emergency situations.44 Yet, there has been no cohesive nor clear national 
policy/strategy to provide Lebanese relief or protection from poverty.
One such example of a “safety net” is the Emergency National Poverty Targeting 
Programme (ENPTP). ENPTP is a combination of social assistance and social ser-
vices to the “extremely poor” Lebanese households in the form of medical bill pay-
ments, school fee waivers and food assistance. The programme was implemented as 
a response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. However, Lebanon would not be able to 
finance the programme if it were not for the assistance of international organisations 
like the World Bank, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and NGOs to help implement the programme. As of June 2015, a total of 160,985 
Lebanese households had applied to benefit from the programme. However, ENPTP 
services primarily target those vulnerable within Lebanon, and services are not 
exportable to Lebanese nationals living abroad (Kukrety 2016).
In terms of guaranteed minimum resources for economic hardship, neither 
Lebanese public institutions nor consulates abroad assist Lebanese with accessing 
host country benefits. In exceptional cases, consulates may provide cash benefits to 
Lebanese nationals abroad in dire situations, however, there is no formal policy and 
benefits are given by the consulates discretion only. It is only in the most extreme or 
dire cases that the most vulnerable are given any form of assistance and only through 
assistance from international organisations. It is most often the Lebanese dias-
pora  and their remittances which provide any semblance of a “safety net” that 
Lebanese can rely on.45
11.4  Conclusions
The principal effort of Lebanese authorities’ engagement with the diaspora involves 
increasing investment, capital, tourism and other economic flows back into the 
home country. As Lebanon moves from crisis to crisis due in large part to regional 
powers vying for influence, along with the country’s delicate confessional balance 
in parliament, the country struggles to implement meaningful long-term public 
44 Examples of emergency situations have been the 2006 Israeli invasion and recently the Syrian 
crisis which began in 2011.
45 Remittances are mainly used by individuals and families for consumption and to raise their stan-
dard of living. According to Barendse et al. (2006), in a mini-survey conducted, researchers found 
that 56% of respondents used remittances for ‘daily expenses,’ 24% on school fees, 10% were used 
for investments and 5% for the building of a house.
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social protection policies that benefit Lebanese universally. Although there has been 
no shortage of proposals for meaningful social protection programmes, more often, 
financial or political limitations have hindered implementation.46 As current trajec-
tories suggest, Lebanon will likely continue to engage with the diaspora predomi-
nantly to stimulate economic investment while overlooking fundamental social 
protection policy gaps for their citizens abroad.
Lebanon must also look beyond financial and economic gains when interacting 
with the international community. The overwhelming majority of bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements that Lebanon has ratified are primarily focused on economic 
and investment benefits. Vital bilateral social security agreements or noteworthy 
provisions of social protection in existing agreements are virtually absent, particu-
larly with Lebanon’s top destination countries as well.
However, since the enactment of the 2008 Parliamentary Elections Law which 
guaranteed the right for Lebanese nationals abroad to vote and Lebanon’s first elec-
tion in 9 years occurring in 2018, the significance of the Lebanese diaspora may be 
entering a new stage. With roughly 5% of Lebanese nationals abroad casting a vote 
in the 2018 election, there does exist a latent yet considerable political potential 
within the diaspora. Furthermore, slated for the next election, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants, Gebran Bassil, stated that there will be six parliamentary 
seats assigned for the diaspora (Ministry of Information 2018).47 As Tabar (2014) 
explains, by broadening the scope of participation through allotted diaspora seats in 
parliament, migrants may have the political opportunity to make independent politi-
cal demands free from home-based political calculations and benefit more from the 
policies of the Lebanese government.
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Chapter 12
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Morocco
Abderrahim Oulidi and Keivan Diakité
12.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in Morocco
This chapter aims to discuss the legal framework regulating Morocco’s welfare sys-
tem and the access of national residents, non-national residents, and non-resident 
nationals to social benefits across five policy areas: unemployment, health care, 
family benefits, pensions, and guaranteed minimum resources.
The current Moroccan welfare system can be better understood when tracing the 
historical development of its key components. Like in many African countries, the 
social security in Morocco until the protectorate was mainly based on a traditional 
form of solidarity and family mutual assistance (Reimat 1997). Occupational 
groups, such as the traditional trade guilds, developed a solidarity system that guar-
anteed care in case of accidents or illness to everyone.1 It was only after the estab-
lishment of the French protectorate that the Moroccan state started to adopt specific 
legislation in the field of social protection- especially pensions. However, this legis-
lation was mainly intended to protect the needs of French workers and officials 
1 « Le système de retraite au Maroc » Revue Al Maliya, n°40 march 2007, p 22. Available here: 
http://www.finances.gov.ma/Maliya%20tawassol/file_220807_151728869.pdf. Accessed 26 
March 2020.
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residing in Morocco. In 1917, the protectorate’s administration created the Moroccan 
Provident Fund (CPM) with an optional membership. Similarly, several institutions 
were created to respond to the needs of different professional groups of French resi-
dents covering mainly the workers’ compensation scheme managed by private 
insurance companies, the pension scheme for civil servants, the family allowance 
scheme financed by European employers, and the pension plan of the European 
high officials.
12.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
The different components of the Moroccan social protection system have been 
developed in a rather fragmented manner over a very long period of time. The cur-
rent system consists of a contributory scheme (the National Social Security Fund, 
CNSS2; the National Fund of Social Welfare Organisations, CNOPS3; the Moroccan 
Pension Fund, CMR; the group retirement allowance plan, RCAR); a partially con-
tributory system (the Medical Assistance Plan, RAMED4) and a non-contributory 
system (programs for vulnerable populations such as “Tayssir”, “Kafala”, or the 
National Initiative for Human Development, INDH5). The system covers employees 
from all public sectors and a large part of private sector employees,6 by providing 
them protection against the risks associated to maternity, invalidity, old age, sur-
vival, death, unemployment, and family.
Compulsory social security schemes fulfil an important function of risk coverage 
and financial transfers in the form of family allowances and income replacement in 
the form of sickness and maternity benefits, and through the pension scheme (old- 
age, invalidity and survivors). There are several management bodies: CNOPS man-
ages the public scheme and students; RCAR manages the pensions of state 
employees, local authorities and public institutions subject to the financial control 
of the state; CMR manages the pensions of the civilian and military state personnel; 
and the CNSS manages the private scheme. Medical coverage based on a non- 
contributory scheme has also been put in place for the poorest population including 
migrants and refugees (the convention has been ratified, but not yet implemented). 
They will be part of the Medical Assistance Scheme RAMED, which will be man-
aged by the National Health Insurance Agency (ANAM).
2 Caisse Nationale de Securité Sociale, http://www.cnss.ma/fr. Accessed 26 March 2020.
3 Caisse Nationale des Organismes de Prévoyance Sociale, http://www.cnops.org.ma. Accessed 22 
March 2020.
4 Régime d’assistance médicale, http://www.ramed.ma. Accessed 26 March 2020.
5 http://www.indh.ma. Accessed 26 March 2020.
6 Morocco now has 3.8 million employees in the private sector. About 600,000 of them are not 
declared by their employers. Source: www.cnss.ma/fr/content/chiffres-clés-1. Accessed 22 
March 2020.
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The Moroccan pension system is currently based on four schemes. Three of them 
are mandatory and managed by public institutions: two schemes cover public sector 
employees (CMR and RCAR) and the third one covers private sector employees via 
the CNSS. A fourth (optional) scheme is aimed at private sector employees (CIMR). 
Non-salaried workers (traders, craftsmen, individuals with liberal professions, 
farmers, and fishermen) cannot join any of these schemes, although Law No. 99–15 
of December 2017 proposed the creation of a pension plan for these workers. Also, 
there is no non-contributory pillar of solidarity in Morocco and the system covers 
only 40% of the employed labour force.
As for financing, the contributory plans are financed by employers’ contribu-
tions, state contribution, donations and any other resources assigned to basic com-
pulsory retirement insurance plans under legislation or special regulations. The four 
pension plans are also financed by the interest generated by their reserve funds. 
RAMED is financed by the state, local collectivises, tax revenue, donations, other 
resources assigned to basic compulsory health insurance plans and flat-rate contri-
butions from vulnerable populations. Since its entry into force in 2006, the CNSS 
manages the compulsory health insurance (AMO) for private sector employees sub-
ject to the Moroccan social security scheme. Recipients of a minimum pension (500 
dirhams per month) and people with an annual income of less than 5.650 dirhams 
per person are covered by RAMED.
12.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
During the last decades, Morocco has put in place several initiatives aiming to 
ensure the social protection of mobile individuals, including foreigners residing in 
Morocco and Moroccan nationals residing abroad. Bilateral social security agree-
ments have been signed with Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Egypt, 
Spain, France, Libya, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Quebec, Romania, 
Sweden, and Tunisia; and different conventions have been adopted aiming to make 
the living conditions of foreign residents meet equal standards as for Moroccan 
citizens.
Morocco’s special historical-cultural relationship with West Africa is reflected in 
the conditions of access to the territory enjoyed by citizens of different countries. 
While these facilities also concern nationals of European countries, Morocco has in 
recent years made a strategic revaluation of its diplomatic, commercial, political 
and security relations with French-speaking West African states. The deployment of 
various programs has allowed for closer ties between these states and Morocco in 
the framework of bilateral and international cooperation. The limits and challenges 
that Morocco faces as a link between Europe and Africa have been quickly emerg-
ing, especially given the situation of sub-Saharan migrants who transit Morocco to 
reach Europe. If for some foreigners, Morocco is actually seen as a transit country 
in their journey to Europe, for others, it is also and above all a country of immigration.
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Over the years, Morocco has become a destination country for different types of 
immigration, of various geographical origins (Europe, Africa and elsewhere), per-
manent or limited in time. Officially, about 84,000 foreigners are currently regis-
tered as living in Morocco7 (the Moroccan population is 36 million people). The 
majority of foreigners residing in Morocco come from African countries (41.6%) 
and European countries (40%). Among the most represented nationalities, the 
French come first (25.4%), followed by Senegalese (7.2%), Algerians (6.8%) and 
Syrians (6.2%). 15.2% of foreigners come from Asian countries (82.8% from the 
Middle East) and 3.2% from other continents. The advantages and attractions 
offered by Morocco as a host country are geographical, economic, linguistic- 
cultural, but also political. As a politically stable country, in the process of economic 
and social modernization, offering geographical and linguistic-cultural proximity to 
Europe, Morocco attracts a potentially large target group of foreigners wishing to 
emigrate.
Nowadays, a foreign employee of the private sector can benefit from CNSS ser-
vices in the same way as a Moroccan citizen. Furthermore, a framework agreement 
has been recently adopted to allow immigrants and refugees to access the Medical 
Assistance Scheme (RAMED). However, migrants and refugees still do not have 
access to RAMED benefits as technical problems between the Ministry of Interior, 
the Ministry of Moroccans living abroad, and the National Health Insurance Agency 
delayed the publication of affiliation cards to gain access to medical benefits for 
migrants and refugees.
According to the OECD (2017) report on Moroccan emigrants, it is estimated 
that just over 4.3 million Moroccans live abroad. Given that the total population of 
Morocco is 36 million people, the estimated share of non-resident Moroccans cor-
responds to 11% of the population residing in Morocco. It is therefore not a coinci-
dence that a Ministry in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad (MRE)8 exists in 
Morocco. However, the historical reasons for migration and the direction of migra-
tion flows differ. As an example, the labour agreements that Morocco concluded 
with Belgium and France in the early 1960s led to a growing outflow (until the 
1970s - then, thanks to family reunification, until the 1990s) of Moroccan migrants 
residing in France and Belgium, particularly manual labourers settling there and 
raising children. The recent outflow of Moroccans to the Gulf countries (especially 
Saudi Arabia) can also be mentioned.
As shown in Figs. 12.1 and 12.2, the main destination of Moroccan emigrants is 
Europe. 86% of Moroccans residing abroad live in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands. The second destination is North America, where 7.5% of the 
emigrant population is found, followed by Arabic and Middle East countries that 
host around for 4.5% of the emigrant population.
7 High Commission for Planning report (2018)
8 Website of the Ministry of Moroccans living abroad (MRE). https://marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/. 
Accessed 26 March 2020.
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More than half of Moroccan emigrants in Europe mention family reasons as 
reasons for migration, whereas work is the second most common reason. This flow 
includes a considerable number of seasonal workers. 58% of Moroccan emigrants 
have low levels of education (first cycle of secondary education), whereas emigrants 
with a high level of education are proportionally more numerous in North America 
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Fig. 12.2 Main European countries of destination of Moroccan emigrants. (Source: Ministry of 
Moroccans living abroad (MRE))
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12.2  Migration and Social Protection in Morocco
CNSS affiliates, whether national citizens or foreigners residing in Morocco, are 
protected in terms of access to social benefits. To become a CNSS affiliate, a person 
must be employed in Morocco. The entitlement to AMO benefits is conditioned by 
the justification of 54 days of prior contribution for a period of six months. Affiliation 
is a legal obligation of every employer who is required to join CNSS no later than 
30 days after the first employee is hired, to regularly report to the CNSS the monthly 
amount of wages paid and the number of days worked by their employees.
Foreigners residing in Morocco are subject to the same conditions as nationals 
and receive the same benefits. Moroccans living abroad cannot voluntarily enter the 
Moroccan social security scheme if they were not affiliated before moving abroad. 
However, some of the acquired rights are subject to exportability, including the old- 
age pension, the disability pension, or maternity benefits. Since the 1960s, social 
security benefits that are subject to exportability are paid to affiliates even if there is 
no bilateral social security agreement between Morocco and their respective coun-
tries of residence. The only condition is to show a proof of residence in the new 
country. Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that Morocco is part of several 
regional integration organisations, including the African Union (UA), the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
However, none of these regional integration schemes has made specific efforts to 
ensure the social protection of intra-regional migrants or to facilitate their access to 
specific benefits in the countries of residence.
The next section of the chapter discusses the eligibility conditions for accessing 
social benefits for national residents, non-national residents and non-resident 
nationals; and it further highlights the specificities of each policy area.
12.2.1  Unemployment
The National Social Security Fund (CNSS) provides employees who involuntarily 
lose their jobs and are actively seeking for work a minimum income called Loss of 
Employment Compensation (IPE). This allowance is financed by employees (0.19% 
of salary capped at 6.000 dirhams) and employers (0.38% of salary capped at 6.000 
dirhams). The benefit is granted for up to 6 months to employed workers affiliated 
to CNSS.  Resident nationals and foreigners can claim this allowance under the 
same conditions. To claim the benefit, individuals must have accumulated 780 days 
of salary declarations during the last 36  months preceding the date of job loss, 
including 260  days during the last 12  months preceding this date. The monthly 
amount is equal to 70% of the reference salary (average monthly salary declared for 
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the last 36 months), without exceeding the amount of the statutory minimum wage.9 
Those who receive the benefit must register with the National Agency for Promotion 
of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) and actively search for work (although the 
job search is never checked). 25% of people registered for the unemployment allow-
ance have either resumed their job or found a new one (CNSS 2018).
12.2.2  Health Care
The medical coverage system in Morocco consists of a basic system including the 
Mandatory Health Insurance (AMO) and the Medical Assistance Plan (RAMED).10 
AMO is based on the contributory principle and the principle of risk pooling. It 
provides benefits in kind in case of sickness and cash benefits for sickness and 
physical invalidity. Membership is compulsory for companies that are subject to the 
social security scheme and do not have any medical coverage at the date of entry 
into force of the Mandatory Health Insurance.11 Article 14 of the Law 65–00 pro-
vides for a period of five years from the decree of application of the law to allow 
companies to join AMO. However, the application decree has never been released, 
which leads to the fact that today, 1.27 million private sector employees are not 
affiliated to the AMO, including 303.000 employees of the public sector.12 However, 
they remained covered by private insurance.
The right to basic health care AMO benefits13 for private sector employees is 
subject to the completion of a contribution period of 54 working days during the six 
months preceding the care, the actual payment of contributions by the employer, the 
identification of family members of the insured or pensioner with the CNSS, and the 
declaration of long and costly diseases at the CNSS. In order for the CNSS to reim-
burse the care costs (doctors’ fees, prescribed medications, etc.), affiliates must sub-
mit a health care form filled by their physician. The reimbursement period set by 
law is three months from the filing date, and a physical medical check can be sched-
uled as part of the AMO Services. Resident nationals and foreign citizens can access 
benefits in kind in Morocco under the same eligibility conditions. However, medical 
care abroad is only reimbursable or covered if the insured person falls ill 
9 As of January 1, 2018, the legal minimum wages in Morocco (SMIG) is 13.46 dirhams/hour in the 
sector of industry, trade and liberal professions. The monthly SMIG is equal to 13.46 MAD/Hour 
* 191 Hours/Month = 2570.86 dirhams. Source: http://blog.ojraweb.com. Accessed 26 March 2020.
10 This scheme, which entered into force on 18 August 2005, was introduced by Law 65.00 on the 
code of medical coverage.
11 Article 114 Law 65–00, https://www.cnss.ma/sites/default/files/loi-65-00-amo_0.pdf. Accessed 
26 March 2020.
12 ANAM (2017). Convention de partenariat relative à la production et à la délivrance des cartes 
d’assistance médicale pour les migrants au Maroc.
13 The medical coverage taken into account. http://www.cnss.ma/fr/content/que-couvre-lamo. 
Accessed 26 March 2020.
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 unexpectedly. In this case, the refund is made on the basis of national pricing, so 
health benefits in kind are not transferable. Moroccans residing abroad cannot thus 
claim these benefits from Morocco.
Sickness cash benefits are available only to employees. Both resident nationals 
and foreigners can claim the sickness allowance under the same conditions. There 
is no specific requirement of prior residence in the country, although cash benefits 
do depend on a period of insurance (54 days of contribution during the 6 months 
preceding the sickness).Sickness allowances are not transferable for nationals living 
abroad (the benefit is only paid in Morocco during a maximum period of 
52  weeks),but individuals who receive sickness benefits can move temporarily 
abroad if they show up for the medical check in Morocco. However, disability pen-
sions can be transferred abroad if affiliates show a residence certificate. Invalidity 
pensions are available only to employees, foreigners or nationals. The minimum 
period of insurance required to become eligible is 3 years. If the invalidity is caused 
by an accident on the workplace, this condition does not apply and the benefit is 
automatically granted. The amount of the pension is based on the previous earnings. 
The invalidity pension is always granted on a temporary basis and it is replaced by 
an old-age pension when the beneficiary reaches the pensionable age.
The medical assistance scheme is based on the principle of national solidarity for 
the benefit of the poor population.14 RAMED only provides benefits in kind.15 Based 
on the principle of solidarity, this scheme has a semi-contributory part financed by 
a fixed participation of people and households deemed vulnerable.16
The Moroccan health care system was initiated under the French protectorate. 
More than 60 years after independence and despite the progress made since 2002 
with the introduction of health insurance schemes for private sector employees, civil 
servants and the poor, the system is still struggling to comply with the principles of 
universality, solidarity, and quality of care. In 2016, 45.4% of the population did not 
have medical coverage.17 Self-employed persons are not yet covered by any health 
social protection scheme, although they account for a third of the Moroccan popula-
tion. The 98–15 draft law plans to include them in the AMO regime. It will come 
into force once published in the Official Bulletin.
14 Loi portant code de la couverture médicale de base, https://www.cnss.ma/sites/default/files/
loi-65-00-amo_0.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.
15 List of benefits in kind: http://www.anam.ma/lagence/presentation/la-couverture-medicale-de-
base/ramed/ prestation-couverte/. Accessed 26 March 2020.
16 Vulnerable people in urban areas are recognized as having a weighted income of more than DH 
3767 per person per year and DH 5650 per person per year and rural residents whose heritage score 
is greater than 28 and less than or equal to 70 which corresponds to 120 DH per person and capped 
at 600 DH per household and a non-contributory part financed by taxes, reserved for the poor 
(Persons whose income is less than or equal to DH 3767 per person per year when they live in an 
urban area, or whose heritage score is less than or equal to 28, are recognized as being in a poverty 
situation.)
17 “La protection sociale au Maroc “Rapport du conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, 
2018, http://www.ces.ma/Documents/PDF/Auto-saisines/2018/AS34-2018/Av-AS34-VF.pdf. 
Accessed 26 March 2020.
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12.2.3  Pensions
Four different plans provide retirement benefits to public and private sector employ-
ees (national citizens and foreigners) in Morocco: the CNSS, the CMR, the RCAR 
and the CIMR.18 The largest pension fund is CNSS, with 3.2 million affiliates. The 
eligibility conditions for claiming old-age pensions differ from one pension fund to 
another. For CNSS, these conditions include: having reached the age of 60 (or 55 for 
minors who have worked underground for at least 5 years); having ceased all sala-
ried activity; and having contributed at least 3240 days. The minimum pension is 
1000.00 dirhams per month.19 The amount of the pension corresponds to 50% of the 
monthly salary capped for those who totalize at least 3240  days of contribution 
(around 10 years). This amount is increased by 1% for each additional insurance 
period of 216 days.20The maximum is 70% of the average monthly salary. All tax-
able employees, whether Moroccan or foreign residents, are entitled to this pension, 
provided they have made sufficient contributions. There is therefore no differential 
treatment based on the nationality of the employee.
In the public sector, the CMR and the RCAR provide pensions on the basis of a 
contributory pillar. The required period of contribution is 10 years for CMR and 
3  years for RCAR, respectively. The minimum pension for affiliates having the 
required contribution is 1500 dirhams in both schemes. For CMR, the benefits and 
contribution are not capped and the contribution rate is 28% (14% employee, 14% 
state) after the 2016 reform.21 The 2016 reform also changed the retirement age 
from 60 to 63  years gradually from 2016 to 2020. At RCAR, contributions are 
capped22 and the threshold for a contribution salary in 2017 was 17,100 dirhams. 
The normal contribution period is 30 years and the legal retirement age is 60 years. 
Each year of contribution entitles to 2% of average career salary. The maximum 
pension to which an affiliate is entitled to equals 80% of the average career salary. 
The contribution rate is 18% (6% the employee and 12% the employer). The condi-
tion for accessing these two pension schemes are the same for nationals and 
foreigners.
18 However, a draft law (99–15) provides for the establishment of a pension system for non-
employed workers, which will come into force once published in the Official Bulletin. The law, 
which is likely to affect 11 million people, provides that the independent pension plan is managed 
by the CNSS and operates in points.
19 CNSS activity report 2016, https://www.cnss.ma/sites/default/files/files/CNSS%20-%20
Rapport%20D‘activite%CC%81%202,016%20Vf.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.
20 
Pension averagesalary for the last years
contributio







21 www.courdescomptes.ma/upload/MoDUle_20/File_20_466.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2020.
22 Each year the threshold are published here: https://www.rcar.ma/?q=fr/indicateurs/salaires-pla-
fond. Accessed 26 March 2020.
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In addition to these three plans, Morocco also implemented a survivor pension 
scheme allocated to family members23 of an insured person who, at the time of 
death, was receiving an old-age pension or was eligible to receive it.
Old-age pensions are exportable. If affiliates decide to live abroad, their acquired 
rights are transferred to the new country of residence. CNSS also conducts yearly 
life control operations.
12.2.4  Family Benefits
In Morocco, child benefits financing is the responsibility of the employer. These 
benefits are intended for employees who reside in Morocco and exercise an activity 
subject to the social security scheme or pensioners with children born no later than 
300 days after the effective date of the pension (regardless of their nationality). To 
qualify for the benefits, insured individuals must have 108 days of contributions 
during a period of six months of registration and a monthly salary greater than or 
equal to 60% of the minimum wage. The amount of child benefits is flat-rate. Since 
2007, child benefits are paid directly to the insured. There is a residency condition 
for children in order to open access to those benefits that are granted independently 
of the nationality of the beneficiaries, but are non-exportable. Hence, national citi-
zens residing abroad cannot claim this type of benefits from Morocco. Furthermore, 
CNSS periodically conducts legal control operations aiming to check if children 
entitled to family benefits continue to meet the living, schooling, or learning 
conditions.
Regarding maternity benefits, salaried women who cease all wage activity for 
child birth receive a daily allowance for 14 weeks. The condition for granting this 
benefit is to have contributed two months during the last 10 months. The amount of 
the benefit is 100% of the average daily wage (capped). It is exportable if the affili-
ate decides to reside abroad, although she has to show a residency certificate in the 
country she is moving to.
Morocco does not have yet specific schemes of paternity or parental benefits. 
However, it offers some targeted programs for children and families in vulnerable 
situations. Yet, these schemes exclude foreign residents, as they are exclusively 
dedicated to Moroccan citizens. Examples in this regard are the cash transfer pro-
grams for children in precarious situations, such as the program for direct assistance 
to vulnerable widowed women with orphaned children set up in 2014. Financed by 
a social cohesion support fund, the Family Care Fund pays the widow, for each 
orphan child under 21  years of age (with the exception of disabled children for 
whom there is no age limit), an amount of 350 dirhams per month, with a monthly 
ceiling not exceeding 1050 dirhams monthly per family and subject to schooling or 
23 This includes dependent spouses and children under the age of 16, 21 (if they continue their stud-
ies) or 18 (if they are apprenticed) or dependent children with disabilities without a stable income 
regardless of their age.
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child’s registration in vocational training. Likewise, the Fund provides divorced 
poor women and their children (when the father is absent or insolvent) an alimony 
advance of the same amount and with the same ceiling as that granted for the direct 
assistance program for widowed women in precarious situations. There are also 
additional programs for the education of children in need.24
12.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
There is no specific scheme of non-contributory guaranteed minimum income in 
Morocco. Only the members of the liberation army can receive a lump sum allow-
ance from CMR that could be considered a minimum income. However, this repre-
sents a special category, and the benefit cannot be granted on the basis of volunteering 
or membership in the fund.
Also, the compensation fund in Morocco is an opportunity to overhaul the social 
protection system. The compensation system was created in the 1940s to protect the 
purchasing power of the population and allow them to have access to basic necessi-
ties (sugar, flour, soft wheat, butane gas). Until 1973, the compensation fund played 
a real equalization role by financing subsidies from its own resources, particularly 
from the oil sector. After 1973, the fund was deprived of its own revenue, entirely 
dependent on the state budget, thus reducing it to a mere subsidy fund.
12.2.6  Obstacles and Sanctions
Foreigners residing in Morocco may be affiliated to existing social protection 
schemes provided they are employees. In accordance with the provisions of Article 
516 of the Labour Code Law 65.99,25any employer wishing to recruit a foreign 
employee must obtain an authorization from the Government Labour Administration. 
This authorization is granted in the form of a visa affixed to the work contract. This 
formality is mandatory and the Labour Code stipulates penalties in case of  omission: 
24 For instance, the “Tayssir” program is a conditional cash transfer for households living in the 
poorest communes, aiming to combat dropping out of school. The scheme is currently carried out 
by municipalities and benefits all rural communes with a poverty rate higher than 30% and a school 
dropout rate higher than 8%. Also, the Royal Initiative “One Million Schoolbags” aims to fight 
against school dropout and inequalities by allowing reduced tuition fees for families of millions of 
primary schools in rural and urban areas and colleges in rural areas. The Ministry of National 
Education and Vocational Training also distributes schoolbag kits (bags, books, booklets, school 
supplies) according to the school level and the environment. With an annual budget of 400 million 
dirhams in 2013–1014, this initiative has benefited 3,897,542 children aged 6 to 15, including 
2,401,432 from rural areas.
25 www.droit-afrique.com/upload/doc/maroc/Maroc-Code-1999-du-travail.pdf. Accessed 26 
March 2020.
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the employer risks a fine and must pay the repatriation costs of the employee who 
has not obtained the required work visa or its renewal. For its part, the unauthorised 
employee cannot work legally and remain in the Moroccan territory. Employment 
contracts concerning foreigners must be of an indefinite duration. Thus, the affilia-
tion to the social security scheme does not, in any case, affect a foreigner’s applica-
tion for temporary and permanent residency, family reunification, or citizen 
application.
12.2.7  Bilateral and Multilateral Social Security Agreements
Morocco has signed bilateral social security agreements with 15 countries (Algeria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Egypt, Spain, France, Libya, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Quebec, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia). Moroccans who have 
worked in these countries and immigrants from these countries residing in Morocco 
can totalise the periods worked to access contributory old-age and invalidity pen-
sions. National citizens residing in these countries can claim these benefits without 
returning in Morocco. Morocco is also part of three regional integration organisa-
tions, but none of them has made any progress towards the social security coordina-
tion between the member states or facilitated access to social benefits for Community 
migrants. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, social security benefits that are 
subject to transportability are paid to affiliates even if there is no bilateral social 
security agreement between Morocco and the country of residence. The only condi-
tion is to prove a residence certificate.
12.3  Conclusions
This chapter has examined the social protection system in Morocco and the access 
of national residents, non-national residents and non-resident nationals in the field 
of social insurance, social assistance, health, family benefits, employment and 
social action plans. As a general rule, the access to social benefits in Morocco is 
reserved for affiliates- nationals or foreigners without distinction. Current laws 
(laws 98–15 and 99–15) provide for the extension of retirement and health benefits 
to non-salaried workers in the future. This highlights the momentum in which the 
government has been working since 2002 to make social protection more accessible 
to different social categories of Moroccans and foreign residents through the exten-
sion of health benefits to migrants at first. The current social protection system is too 
fragmented and involves a large number of actors whose coordination is not yet 
developed. Through the many bilateral agreements put in place between Morocco 
and its partners, Moroccans living abroad have access to more and more social ben-
efits like retirement pensions and disability fringe benefits even if the question of the 
transportability of other contributory benefits needs to be addressed.
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Chapter 13
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 
and Social Protection for Moroccan 
Citizens Abroad
Rilke Mahieu
13.1  Diaspora Policy Infrastructure and Key Policies
13.1.1  The Moroccan Diaspora and its Relation 
with the Homeland
Moroccans are currently one of the largest and most dispersed migrant populations in 
Europe, with large diaspora communities in France (1,146,000), Belgium (298,000), 
the Netherlands (363,000), Italy (487,000) and Spain (766,000) and smaller ones in 
many other European countries, including Germany (127,000) (De Haas 2014).1
Europe’s need of cheap labour after the Second World War has been an important 
driver for Morocco’s post-war emigration (Charef 2014). Morocco’s signature of a 
series of labour treaties with European states during the 1950s and 1960s can be put 
forward as the decisive factor of the twentieth century Moroccan emigration. While 
the initial labour migration wave was primarily low-skilled and male-dominated, 
this unidimensional picture should be nuanced in at least four ways. First, the pres-
ence of Moroccans in Europe is older than post-war migration, including Moroccan 
soldiers’ participation in the World Wars. Second, Moroccan emigration has always 
been motivated by other than strictly economic factors, such as political repression 
under Morocco’s authoritarian regime following independence. Third, after the 
abandonment of the labour recruitment treaties in 1973, Moroccan emigration con-
tinued, albeit in different shapes. Other types of Moroccan migration emerged such 
as (female) family reunification, student migration, high-skilled migration, 
1 Figures based on consular registration data.
R. Mahieu (*) 
University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
e-mail: rilke.mahieu@uantwerpen.be
232
marriage migration, etc., thus adding to the diversity in the Moroccan expatriate 
population. Fourth, the Moroccan population abroad has expanded geographically 
to an increasing number of destinations. Initially, the Moroccan labour migration 
went to France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (the four countries that had 
signed a labour treaty with Morocco). Among these, France was the primary desti-
nation, with population movements being anchored in the status of Morocco as a 
French protectorate until the Moroccan independence in 1956. From the 1970s and 
1980s onward, while migration to the original destination countries continued, 
Spain and Italy emerged as new major destinations. Since then, Moroccan migration 
flows have also been oriented towards other European countries (e.g. the UK and 
Scandinavian countries), the United States and Canada (Fondation Hassan II & 
IOM 2014). Since the 1990s, the Gulf has become an important destination (Ibid). 
In addition, large waves of Moroccan-Jewish migration have taken place from 1948 
onward, primarily towards Israel, but also to France and North America (De 
Haas 2014).
The Moroccan population abroad, currently estimated by the Moroccan govern-
ment at five million Marocains Résident à l’étranger (about 15% of the total 
Moroccan population), contributes in various ways to Morocco’s economy and 
society. Most notably, there is an annual remittance flow of around $7  billion 
(through official channels only). Remittances are the second source of hard cur-
rency after tourism receipts, which are also, to a large extent, provided by expatriate 
Moroccans during summer holidays (MPC 2013), as more than two million 
Moroccans return every year during holidays. Because of this significant financial 
input, the Moroccan population abroad is often depicted as the “cash cow” of 
Morocco. Many also own houses in Morocco, and at the community level, numer-
ous small-scale non-governmental initiatives improve general welfare and contrib-
ute to local development in Morocco.
Since the beginning of Moroccan mass emigration in the early 1960s, there have 
been attempts by the Moroccan state to control the Moroccan population abroad and 
to manage and consolidate their economic contribution (Iskander 2010). However, 
Moroccan diaspora policies have changed significantly over time and are often 
described as an evolution from a repressive “long arm of Rabat” to a cooperative 
“outreached hand” (Bouras 2012). Notwithstanding this shift, distrust towards the 
Moroccan state persists among expatriate Moroccans. While it is difficult to make 
generalised claims, both historical (Iskander 2010) and contemporary experiences 
of non-resident Moroccans with origin-state institutions (represented, for instance, 
by police and consular staff (Kahmann 2014)), contribute to a general sense of dis-
trust towards the Moroccan state. Diaspora policy institutions in particular are regu-
larly being evaluated as inefficient, non-transparent and undemocratic (Belguendouz 
2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). More generally, major deficiencies in the 
Moroccan political system further spur a sceptical stance regarding Moroccan 
state’s discourses and actions.
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13.1.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
Morocco’s consular network spans all major destination countries. In each of the 
top five destination countries, there are several consulates whose number depends 
on the size and geographical dispersion of the Moroccan populations, as well as the 
size of the territory. There are 16 Moroccan consulates in France, 11 in Spain, 7 in 
Italy, 3  in Belgium and 4  in the Netherlands. Beside the consular infrastructure, 
mobile consulates offering similar services are organised, although on an irregular 
basis. In addition, Morocco has appointed 75 honorary consuls, mainly in countries 
and regions lacking consular representation.
While the Moroccan consular network is vast, the lack of quality of its services 
has been a source of frustration among Moroccans living abroad (Iskander 2010; 
Belguendouz 2006). Among others, Moroccans abroad complain about the very 
long waiting lines and unequal treatment due to favouritism. In response to this situ-
ation, the improvement of consular services has become a governmental priority 
since 2015, under the impulse of King Mohammed VI.23 Among others, a large 
number of consular employees were fired and replaced, and a hotline for complaints 
about the consular services was installed.
Beside the consular network operating under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
various other Moroccan national institutions and foundations have an important 
stake in emigrant affairs. First, there is the Ministry Delegate to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans Residing 
Abroad and Immigration Affairs (MDCMREAM). This Ministry is charged with 
the task of preparing and implementing the governmental policy regarding both 
Moroccans residing abroad and immigrants in Morocco, in cooperation with other 
ministries and institutions inside and outside Morocco in the realm of migration 
affairs. The Ministry for Moroccans living abroad was first created in 1990 and has 
taken different forms since then (sub-ministry, independent ministry). In its current 
form, it has operated since 2017, during the Othmani government.
Second, there is the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad. 
Created in 1990 and presided by the King’s sister Lalla Meryem,4 this Foundation 
2 See the Royal Discourse of the 16th Coronation Celebration on July 15, 2015.
3 In the latest governmental declaration (2016–2021), the following goal has been set “Completion 
of the consular reform project and the process of modernizing and improving the quality of con-
sular and social services, for the benefit of members of the Moroccan community residing abroad, 
as part of a dedicated action program”.
4 It should be noted that while the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad and the 
Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation are, strictly speaking, non-political institutions, they are 
however very tightly connected to the monarchy, which is at the heart of political power in 
Morocco. The Hassan II Foundation has been designed as a quasi-governmental social aid agency, 
the major source of income constituting a direct contribution by the Moroccan financial institu-
tions governing migrant remittances, based on a fixed interest rate on emigrant savings 
(Belguendouz 2006). The Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation’s budget mainly stems from a com-
mittee of around 100 regular donors, including all major financial institutions and a range of other 
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aims to support the ties between Moroccans living abroad and their home country 
and to help non-resident Moroccans to overcome difficulties resulting from their 
emigration. This institution organises language and cultural education and activities 
for children, offers judicial, economic and social assistance and promotes coopera-
tion. In addition, it contains an observatory on Moroccan migration.5
Third, a national consultative body was  created in 2007: the Council of the 
Moroccan Community Living Abroad (CCME). The CCME’s responsibilities 
include the monitoring and evaluation of the country’s public policies with regard to 
its nationals abroad. It is responsible for issuing notices to ensure the defence of the 
interests of overseas Moroccans and strengthening their contribution to the eco-
nomic, social and human development of the country. Furthermore, it also aims to 
reinforce diplomatic relations and cooperation between Morocco and the countries 
of residence.
Fourth, since 2000, the Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation, a humanitarian 
organisation presided by King Mohammed VI,6 is in charge of the annual Marhaba 
mission, described as “a humanitarian mission consisting of the management of the 
transfer of 2.5 million Moroccans between their host countries in Europe and their 
home country, Morocco, during the summer season”.
It should be noted that all diaspora institutions are situated at the national level, 
which reflects Morocco’s centralised political system.7 While the presence of vari-
ous diaspora institutions in Morocco indicates the importance adhered to emigration 
by the central authorities, it has also spurred the criticism that there are too many 
institutions with overlapping competencies in the field of Moroccan diaspora poli-
cies (Belguendouz 2006).
Regarding the target population of Moroccan diaspora policies, the most com-
monly used term for Moroccan nationals abroad is “MRE” (Marocains Résidant à 
l’Etranger or “Moroccans Living Abroad”), while “MDM” (Marocains du Monde 
or “Global Moroccans”) is also increasingly used. These terms are used in the 
broadest sense possible. They include Moroccan emigrants and their foreign-born 
descendants (second, third and further generations). This inclusive understanding 
draws on the Moroccan Nationality Code according to which any child born of a 
Moroccan father or mother is a Moroccan citizen, irrespectively of the place of birth 
or residence (ius sanguinis principle). As the Moroccan nationality is granted auto-
matically and cannot be renounced, all persons with Moroccan origins are 
automatically considered as “MRE”. However, due to the ordinary naturalisation 
process and the acquisition of the host country’s nationality at birth (ius soli prin-
ciple), a large share of Moroccans abroad has dual nationality. For instance, in the 
companies in Morocco. However, the nature of the budget of both foundations should not conceal 
that they are policy instruments employed by the monarchy.
5 For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the Ministry and the Hassan II Foundation, 
see Mahieu (2019).
6 See footnote 4.




main destination country- France, approximately two out of three Moroccans have 
French nationality (Wels et al. 2015).
13.1.3  Key Engagement Policies
The Monarchy sets the course for Moroccan diaspora policies. King Mohammed VI 
(r.1999-present) and his predecessor and father Hassan II (r.1961–1999) have drawn 
the institutional outlines of these policies and define(d) to a large extent the policy 
agenda (Brand 2006). In addition, the new Moroccan Constitution (2011) provides 
some of the guiding principles for Moroccan diaspora policies.8 However, an inte-
grated, transversal Moroccan diaspora strategy is non-existent.
As stipulated in Article 16 of the Constitution, the Moroccan state aims for the 
“strengthening of MREs’ contribution to the development of their home country, 
Morocco, and the tightening of cordial and cooperative ties with the governments 
and societies of the destination countries”. This illustrates well the Moroccan dias-
pora policies’ focus on the contribution of Moroccans living abroad to the socio- 
economic development of Morocco. Traditionally, Moroccans living abroad have 
sent large flows of remittances, which are facilitated by several Moroccan banks 
having agencies in the major destination countries (e.g. Banque Populaire and 
Atijariwafa Bank). While remittances are still considered important, current dias-
pora policies focus more on the mobilisation of Moroccan human resources and 
investment capital. Through supporting transnational entrepreneurship (e.g. by 
offering individual guidance to start-ups), stimulating investment in real estate and 
other sectors (through reduced taxation rates and targeted investment programs), 
setting up platforms to mobilise and create business networks (such as Maghribcom) 
and disseminating information, the Moroccan state takes an active role in this field.9 
Characteristic for policies linking “migration” and “development” is that commonly 
supranational, regional and other international institutions are involved. Examples 
of international actors involved in this branch of Moroccan diaspora policies are the 
International Organisation for Migration, the European Union, the United Nations 
and development agencies of several receiving countries.10 Usually, external actors 
provide a large share of the funding for these policies. Depending on the partnership 
configuration, initiatives in this field are sometimes oriented towards specific seg-
ments of the Moroccan expatriate population.11
8 Art. 16, 17, 18, 30 and 163.
9 On Morocco’s mobilisation strategy, El Asri (2012).
10 A good example here is SHARAKA, a project co-financed by the EU Commission, France and 
the Netherlands (www.sharaka.ma). This project ran between 2014 and 2017 and was part of the 
broader EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership, established in 2013.
11 For instance, the Maghrib Entrepreneurs Program offers support to Moroccan-French entrepre-
neurs in France and Morocco with their start-up business in Morocco. The program was run in 
2014–2015 by the MDCMREAM in cooperation with l’Agence Française de Développement.
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Beside the socio-economic focus, the ideas of maintaining cultural ties and pres-
ervation of the national identity take a pivotal position in Moroccan diaspora poli-
cies and discourses (Mahieu et  al. 2017; Mahieu 2019). To these aims, several 
learning programs are being implemented, including Arabic Language and 
Moroccan Cultural Education (ELACM) in major destination countries and an 
online Arabic language-learning platform (e-Madrassa), both coordinated by the 
Hassan II Foundation. In addition, homeland tours or immersion programs are 
offered to different age groups, with the aim of immersing children and youngsters 
in the Moroccan culture, history and society. Examples of these programs are the 
Seasonal Universities for students in higher education aged between 18–25 (organ-
ised by the MDCMREAM) and summer camps for children (organised by the 
Hassan II Foundation) (Mahieu 2015). Beside visiting programs, Moroccan dias-
pora institutions also aim at supporting the proliferation of the Moroccan cultural 
life in the host societies, for instance by supporting Moroccan theatre tours and by 
creating Moroccan cultural centres (both initiated by the MDCMREAM).
While legally, Moroccan nationals living abroad are entitled to vote and to be 
eligible in legislative elections at the national, regional and local level (2011 
Constitution, Article 17 and Article 30), in practice, this right is not implemented by 
the Moroccan state. According to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, logistic and dip-
lomatic obstacles for the creation of a constituency abroad in the destination coun-
tries impede the electoral participation of nationals living abroad.12
Concerning return migration, returnees currently receive little support from the 
Moroccan state (SHARAKA 2015). However, policy strategies on return migration 
are emerging (Cherti et al. 2013), and targeted support initiatives are being set up.13
13.2  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Morocco
Pivotal for the social protection of Moroccans nationals living abroad are the 
Bilateral Conventions on Social Security. In response to large-scale Moroccan 
labour emigration since the 1960s, Morocco has signed Bilateral Conventions with 
a number of destination countries for Moroccan emigrants.14 Among the top five 
destination countries, four have concluded bilateral agreements on social security 
12 However, during the period 1985–1989, Moroccan nationals abroad were able to directly elect 
five representatives in parliament (Iskander 2010).
13 In 2017, a convention was signed between the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad, and the 
Regional Council of Beni Mellal-Khenifra on the establishment of a reception centre for MRE, 
which would be the first one in Morocco. The centre will aim at both temporary visitors as return-
ees, and would offer a broad range of administrative and cultural services and leisure.
14 Morocco has signed Bilateral Social Security Conventions with 14 countries: Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Germany, Libya, Denmark, Romania, Tunisia, Canada, Portugal, 
Québec, France, and Luxembourg. With several others, negotiations are continuing.
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with Morocco: France (2007),15 Spain (1979), Belgium (1968), and the Netherlands 
(1972). A similar Bilateral Convention with Italy has been drafted in 1994, but due 
to Italy’s refusal to sign it, it has not been implemented.
All Conventions include key principles such as: the fact that the primary legisla-
tion is the one of the country of labour (i.e. the country of residence); equal treat-
ment of nationals and expatriate workers; the exportability of benefits that are 
normally subject to the residence condition (such as pensions and child benefits); 
the coordination of the social security systems of both parties. As such, the 
Conventions guarantee that Moroccan nationals working abroad have the same 
social security rights and obligations as employed citizens of their residence coun-
tries. They also ensure that, under certain conditions, Moroccan nationals, receive 
Moroccan social security benefits while living abroad and, in case of return to 
Morocco, that social rights built up in the destination country are exportable to 
Morocco. Finally, such Conventions also guarantee that periods of activity in both 
countries are totalised for their entitlement to social security benefits and for the 
calculation of these benefits.
However, the Conventions only cover contributory benefits (i.e. benefits the per-
son has contributed to directly, as part of an insurance system) and benefits based on 
non-contributory solidarity mechanisms (welfare redistribution drawing on the 
taxes paid by all tax payers) are not included (Wels et al. 2015). Also, the Conventions 
only cover Moroccan nationals (and their dependants) with a legal residence status, 
who are also workers (or have an equivalent status) in their residence countries.16
In addition to bilateral relations, the protection of social rights of Moroccans in 
Europe is also affected by European harmonization processes. For instance, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement,17 signed in 2000 by Morocco and the EU Member 
States, also addresses the social protection of Moroccans in European countries. 
While primarily a trade agreement, Article 65 of the Euro-Med Agreement concerns 
social security. It establishes the principle of equal treatment of Moroccan nationals 
and the citizens of EU Member States in the domain of social security,18 the principle 
of exportability of social rights from one country to another when nationals move, 
and the aggregation of activity periods of Moroccan nationals in different EU 
Member States for the entitlement to and calculation of certain social security ben-
efits.19 However, the Euro-Med Agreement’s provisions are not directly  implementable 
15 Original Convention signed on 9-7-1965, revised Convention signed in 2007.
16 The various Bilateral Social Security Conventions differ in what refers to the categories of 
employees that they cover. Often, only employed workers are covered, but the French-Moroccan 
and Spanish-Moroccan Bilateral Conventions, also include self-employed workers (but only 
France and Spain do so, not the Moroccan state).
17 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127906.pdf
18 However, this non-discrimination principle has been underpinned by EU Members States earlier 
by the ratification of the International Labour Organisation’s Migration for Employment Convention 
N°97 (1949) in the 1950s and 1960s.
19 The accumulation of social rights across Member States is important, as there have been signifi-
cant migration flows of Moroccan nationals from Southern to Northern European countries during 
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(since regulatory instruments are needed). To take effect, the agreement still needs to 
be endorsed by the Morocco-EU Association Council (García de Cortázar Nebreda 
2016). Notwithstanding, the European Court of Justice has ruled that the non-dis-
crimination principle in social security is directly implementable anyway (Eisele 
2014).20 Also, the principle of aggregation of the beneficiary’s periods of activity in 
different Member States is effective yet (García de Cortázar Nebreda 2016).
While there are overlaps between the protection offered by the Euro-Med 
Agreement on the one hand, and the Bilateral Conventions on the other hand, the 
Conventions offer a far more comprehensive social protection. These differences 
explain why Morocco continues to prioritize a bilateral strategy, by initiating or con-
tinuing bilateral negotiations with other destination countries (like Norway), renego-
tiating existing conventions (for instance, with France in 2007) and concluding new 
administrative arrangements to specify the application of the existing conventions (for 
instance, with Belgium in 2014).21 While the social protection offered by the 
Conventions has become more extensive over the years in several cases (e.g. Belgium 
and France), an inverse tendency of more restrictive application may be noted in the 
case of the Netherlands. In 2016, the Dutch government announced to lower certain 
benefits of Moroccan nationals’ dependants living in Morocco,22 this decision being 
justified by the Dutch government by the lower cost of living in Morocco compared to 
the Netherlands. While the Moroccan government and diaspora institutions initially 
contested the decision as unfair, the dispute was settled in favour of the Dutch position.
Beside the provisions defined in bilateral and European agreements, the social 
protection of Moroccans living abroad receives only limited attention by Moroccan 
public institutions. There is no systematic dissemination of information on the social 
protection of nationals abroad, or on the application of the relevant bilateral and EU 
agreements in particular. Information is disseminated on an irregular basis or to lim-
ited audiences, such as through the publication of studies (e.g. by the CCME), the 
organisation of conferences (e.g. by the Hassan II Foundation) or by organising 
information sessions (by the National Social Security Fund, CNSS).23 Sometimes, 
information gaps are addressed by campaigns of international or foreign national 
development agencies,24 or by host country institutions. A recent study on Morocco’s 
Bilateral Social Security Conventions with Belgium and France found that informa-
tion provision by the host country institutions is seen by beneficiaries as effective, 
the latest European economic crisis.
20 Case C-18/90 Kziber (1991) ECJ I-199.
21 In 2014, a new administrative arrangement was signed, consolidating returning Moroccan pen-
sioners’ rights to health care in Morocco.
22 In particular, dependant widows and children of emigrants would be affected by the measure and 
lose up to 40% of their benefits.
23 For studies, see CCME (2016a) and CCME (2016b). The Hassan II Foundation organised the 
conference « Le troisième âge des Marocains résidant à l’étranger » in June 2005 in Rabat.
24 For instance, with regard to return migration to Morocco, a guide has been developed by the 




while information provision by Moroccan public institutions is considered inade-
quate as administrative staff is often ill-informed (Holzmann 2016).
With regard to the Moroccan consular network, enhancing access to the Moroccan 
social security protection is not considered a core task of consulates, nor do they 
assist Moroccan nationals abroad in accessing host country benefits. Consulates do 
not offer in-kind or cash assistance to nationals abroad and consular services are 
usually limited to arranging civil and administrative affairs. Helping Moroccans in 
dealing with social protection in Morocco or in the destination country is not a part 
of consulates’ formal mission.
As most Moroccan nationals abroad live in stable welfare democracies, repatriation 
in order to ensure the safety of nationals abroad is usually not at stake. However, Article 
56 of the decree regulating consular activities25 defines that, if the citizen abroad is in 
need and does not receive any support yet by the receiving state, cash or in-kind assis-
tance may be provided, including repatriation. However, the Moroccan state may 
demand a reimbursement for a period up to 3 years after repatriation in case the repatri-
ated citizen (or the head of household of his/her family) turns out to have means in 
Morocco. Beside the consulates, also the Hassan II Foundation offers repatriation ser-
vices to particular categories of vulnerable Moroccans. Sick persons or those in need 
can file a request with the Foundation for repatriation support. Under exceptional cir-
cumstances (such as civil war), repatriation is considered on a more collective basis. 
This has been the case for Moroccan nationals living in Libya. In 2011, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs established a “crisis cell” with the aim of following up political events 
in Libya and taking necessary measures, including potential repatriation of Moroccan 
nationals. In addition, there have been several “repatriation operations” for liberating 
Moroccan migrants incarcerated in Libya in the context of the European battle against 
clandestine migration to Europe and enabling them to return to Morocco.
No general state policy exists regarding the repatriation of the remains. 
Repatriation costs are normally covered by special (private) insurances. However, if 
a Moroccan national abroad dies without an insurance and the family has no means, 
the Moroccan state covers the cost of repatriation. Both the Hassan II Foundation 
and the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad include in their services the cover-
age of the cost of repatriation of the body to Morocco, partially or totally. Candidate- 
beneficiaries (i.e. family members) have to file a demand with the Ministry (via the 
local consulate) or the Foundation Hassan II.
13.2.1  Unemployment
The Social Security Conventions with France and Spain and the Euro-Med 
Agreement do not take into consideration the coordination of unemployment bene-
fits. As a general rule, unemployment benefits are considered as non-exportable. In 
25 Décret n° 2-66-646 du 21 kaada 1389 (29 janvier 1970) portant application du dahir n° 421–66 
du 8 chaabane 1389 (20 octobre 1969) relatif aux attributions des agents diplomatiques et des 
consuls à l’étranger.
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the Euro-Med Agreement, it is mentioned though that Moroccan nationals, with 
regard to all social security matters – including unemployment – should receive a 
“treatment free from any discrimination based on nationality relative to nationals of 
the Member States in which they are employed” (Art. 65.1).
However, the Bilateral Social Security Conventions that Morocco signed with 
the Netherlands and Belgium introduce one coordination measure concerning 
unemployment: to determinate the right to unemployment benefits, the insurance 
periods of Moroccan nationals during their residency in Morocco and abroad will be 
aggregated (i.e. the periods the person has worked, or any equivalent period, such as 
the maternity leave).
Beside these legal provisions, the Moroccan state has also adopted a more proac-
tive strategy regarding unemployment among Moroccan nationals abroad: a voca-
tional training program benefitting young Moroccans abroad in a difficult social 
situation. The program was launched in 2011 by the Ministry Delegate to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans 
Residing Abroad and Immigration Affairs. It particularly targets young nationals 
abroad in a number of Arab and African countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and 
Senegal), and aims at stimulating their economic integration in the host societies. 
Candidates are selected via the embassies and consulates in those countries. The 
program aims at the acquisition of vocational skills during a 6–8 months training in 
Morocco, and is implemented in cooperation with the Professional Training and 
Labour Promotion Office (OFPPT) and the Ministry of Crafts, Social and Solidary 
Economy. However, it is a small-scale program with only 30–40 beneficiaries 
each year.
13.2.2  Health Care
The access to general health care, maternity benefits and benefits related to occupa-
tional accidents or occupational diseases are provided by the Bilateral Conventions 
that Morocco signed with France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. These 
Conventions ensure that Moroccan nationals are entitled to a health care insurance 
under the same conditions as the citizens of the country of residence. The 
Conventions also protect the dependants of the insured person. Also, upon return to 
Morocco, Moroccan pensioners are entitled to health care insurance (AMO) in 
Morocco.26
Moroccans nationals in Italy are not covered by a Bilateral Convention, although 
they are entitled to health care insurance in Italy under the same conditions as 
Italians through the non-discrimination clause in the Euro-Med Agreement and 
other treaties (see above). Contrary to their co-nationals in the other top five 
26 This is a recent measure, as AMO was introduced in Morocco in 2006.
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destination countries, dependants of Moroccans residing in Italy are protected only 
if they also reside in Italy, not in Morocco.
Beside the obligatory health care insurance (Assurance Maladie Obligatoire – 
AMO, introduced in 2005), covering illness, maternity and accidents, Morocco has 
introduced the medical assistance program RAMED since 2008. It provides free or 
partially free medical services in public hospitals in Morocco to the most disadvan-
taged who are not covered by any health care insurance. Currently, the program is 
only accessible for Moroccans living in Morocco, but since 2013, the extension of 
the program to expatriate Moroccans nationals (who return to Morocco) and their 
dependants has been “under study” by the Health Care Ministry.
During their stay in Morocco over summer, expatriate Moroccans can also ben-
efit from the basic health care provided by the annual Marhaba operation. The 
Mohammed V Foundation is in charge of assisting them in this period, such assis-
tance encompassing administrative, legal and medical help. In transit regions (air-
ports, ports, stations) and throughout Morocco, 20 temporary support centres are 
equipped with around 800 medical staff members and social assistants. The medical 
aid provided concerns mainly first aid in case of emergencies occurring during 
expatriate Moroccans’ journey to Morocco (e.g. traffic incidents), including assis-
tance to the victim’s family members.
13.2.3  Pensions
As the demographic profile of the Moroccan expatriate population is shifting, the 
exportability of old-age pensions is a relevant issue. In main destination countries 
(France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands), where the Moroccan population is 
ageing rapidly (Fondation Hassan II 2006), the question of return is particularly at 
stake. The Bilateral Social Security Conventions cover this issue. Retired Moroccans 
who return to Morocco permanently continue to receive the pensions they were 
entitled to in the receiving country. In case the pensioner deceases, the dependants 
are usually entitled to a survivor’s pension, no matter whether they live in Morocco 
or in the destination country. Only Spain maintains a residence requirement 
(CCME 2016a).
However, the principle of exportability only applies to regular pensions, not to 
any (non-contributory) top-ups that are offered in the receiving countries to pen-
sioners with a pension below the minimum income. This is an important aspect, as 
approximately one out of three Moroccan pensioners living abroad benefit from 
such top-ups (Holzmann 2016).
Beside the legal provisions regarding pensions, there are also support programs 
for old Moroccans living abroad. One of the Moroccan diaspora institutions, the 
Hassan II Foundation, considers the elderly as an important target group of its 
“Cooperation and Partnership program”. In this social program (in place since 
1998), NGOs or other institutions or individuals working with retired Moroccans 
abroad can request the support of the Foundation Hassan II for their projects (partial 
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financial support or in-kind support). In some of the implemented projects, the aim 
was to enhance the access of Moroccan pensioners to their social rights, but many 
projects focus more broadly on the elderly’s well-being and their ties to Morocco.
13.2.4  Family-Related Benefits
The Bilateral Social Security Conventions that Morocco signed with four of the top 
five receiving countries guarantee Moroccans’ access to family benefits even when the 
dependants (spouse and children) are residing in Morocco.27 In contrast, the Euro-
Med Agreement only guarantees family benefits when the children are residing with 
the worker in an EU Member State. As a result, Moroccan heads of households work-
ing in Italy are not entitled to family benefits when their children are living in Morocco.
In 2010, a scholarship program was launched to support the school careers of 
Moroccan youngsters abroad. The Ministry Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation, in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad 
and Immigration Affairs (MDCMREAM), together with the Ministry of Higher 
Education, Academic Research and Professional Training offers 1000 university 
scholarships annually to students in a “precarious situation”. Their candidacy is 
made via the local consulate and the selection process is done by a Commission 
including members of both Ministries. The scholarship is limited to one student per 
family and the monthly allowance is around 1000 Moroccan Dirham (= around €100).
For Moroccan families living in Algeria and the Ivory Coast, there is another 
specific school support program. Deprived families can apply for financial support 
helping to cover their children’s school fee. The aim is to boost school attendance 
by this group. The MDCMREAM provides support to 1000 Moroccan families in 
Algeria and 120 in the Ivory Coast. The fee depends on the number of children in 
the family (one child: 1000 Moroccan Dirham per year, 500 Dirham extra per child, 
up to a maximum of 5 children.)
13.2.5  Economic Hardship
The Moroccan state does not provide guaranteed minimum resources for Moroccans 
in Morocco. Therefore, unsurprisingly, there are no provisions to guarantee mini-
mum resources for Moroccans living abroad. In the residence countries, guaranteed 
minimum resources are considered as non-contributory benefits and therefore non- 
exportable. To benefit from them, the Moroccans beneficiary needs to reside in the 
receiving country.
27 Sometimes, there is a restriction with regard to the number of children abroad creating an entitle-
ment to family benefits. For instance, the French-Moroccan Social Security Convention defines a 
limit of four children.
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However, in 2013, the government has launched the idea to offer in-cash assis-
tance to needy nationals abroad. The former prime minister announced the creation 
of a National Solidarity Fund for Moroccan nationals living abroad who find them-
selves in a precarious situation. The aim would be to help the “most vulnerable or 
needy citizens abroad”. The Solidarity Fund would contain ten million Moroccan 
Dirham (= €1 million.) and allocation of money would operate via consulates and 
embassies. However, this Fund does not seem to be operational (yet), and it is 
unclear who would benefit from it and under what conditions.
The lack of guaranteed minimum resources does not mean that Moroccan nation-
als who do not have an income are left to their fate. Due to the extensive social pro-
tection in Europe (where the largest share of the Moroccan population abroad is 
located), foreign nationals including Moroccan nationals are usually entitled to wel-
fare benefits in the country of residence, although eligibility criteria vary across 
countries. However, Moroccan institutions (consular services, diaspora institutions) 
do not offer assistance to Moroccans living abroad in accessing these welfare benefits.
13.3  Conclusions
The focus of Moroccan diaspora policies is the mobilisation of Moroccan nationals’ 
human and financial capital for socio-economic development in Morocco. Social 
protection of nationals abroad does not take a central position on the political 
agenda. When considering the state of the Moroccan society, with relatively high 
poverty and unemployment rates28 and an emerging Moroccan social security sys-
tem, this lack of prioritization of expatriate nationals’ social protection is not 
surprising.
However, some important steps have been taken in this regard. The primary tools 
for expatriate nationals’ social protection are a series of Bilateral Social Security 
Conventions that Morocco negotiated with top destination countries, including 
France, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These Conventions pursue coordina-
tion of the social security systems of Morocco and the destination countries and 
allow the exportability of (contributory) social benefits from origin to destination 
countries and vice versa. In the second place, harmonising EU policies towards its 
Mediterranean neighbours have also led to some coordination in the protection of 
social rights. This is especially important for  Moroccans living in countries that 
have not signed a Social Security Convention with Morocco, such as Italy.
While the Bilateral Conventions perform quite well (Holzmann 2016), there is 
room for improvement. Among others, information dissemination on social rights 
28 General living standards in Morocco are moderate (Human Development Index: 0,647; position 
123 out of 188 countries). Out of a population of 35 million, four million Moroccans live under the 
poverty line, while another 5.3 million live under the threat of falling back into poverty (World 
Bank 2017). In addition, unemployment rates have been rising steadily, fluctuating around 10% 
from 2014 on and hitting both rural populations and urban youth.
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could happen more systematically and more effectively by Moroccan public institu-
tions. Due to the profile of the Moroccan population abroad (e.g. among retirees, a 
large share of low-educated or illiterate persons), it is likely that a share of the 
potential beneficiaries is currently not very well informed about their social security 
rights. Also, Bilateral Conventions do not consider social protection comprehen-
sively as they focus on contributory benefits exclusively. Moreover, many territorial 
gaps remain as various important destination countries of Moroccan emigrants are 
not covered by a convention (e.g. the Gulf Countries, the USA, Italy). Moreover, the 
Bilateral Conventions are unable to guarantee the social security rights of Moroccan 
nationals with more complex migration trajectories (García de Cortázar 
Nebreda 2016).
Beside legal provisions that are coordinating the social security systems of home 
and host countries, there are a few programs offering support to particular catego-
ries of vulnerable groups such as elderly, disadvantaged youth or sick persons. 
However, social programs are usually not integrated in the state’s consular services, 
but provided by other public institutions. In addition, these programs tend to be 
small-scale (benefitting only a small group of beneficiaries) and/or targeting spe-
cific receiving countries, rather than being generalised, comprehensive social pro-
tection policies for Moroccans abroad.
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Chapter 14
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in the Russian Federation
Daria Popova
14.1  Overview of the National Social Security System 
and Main Migration Features in the Russian Federation
This chapter discusses the general legal framework regulating Russia’s welfare sys-
tem and access for national citizens, foreigners residing in the country, and national 
citizens residing abroad to social benefits in five policy areas: unemployment, health 
care, family benefits, pensions, and guaranteed minimum resources.
14.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
The current Russian federal system comprises a complex structure of social respon-
sibilities divided between the federal and regional Governments. Pensions and con-
tributory social transfers are regulated at the federal level and financed from social 
insurance contributions (SIC) and general taxes. As a result of the decentralization 
reform carried out in 2005, the majority of responsibilities for legislative regulation 
and financing of non-contributory social transfers and services were transferred 
from the federal to the regional level. Regional authorities may set the size and eli-
gibility criteria within the limits established by the federal legislation. Despite par-
tial privatization, healthcare remains to a large extent public and free at the point of 
use, but there are user fees for services beyond the basic coverage and informal 
payments are still quite widespread in healthcare. Public healthcare is funded 
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through SIC and general taxes. There is a high regional disparity in spending on 
non-contributory social benefits and healthcare.
The social protection programmes are funded from the Consolidated Budget of 
the Russian Federation (which comprises federal, regional and municipal budgets) 
and extra-budgetary funds (the Pension Fund, the Social Insurance Fund, the Federal 
and Territorial Funds of Mandatory Health Insurance). Revenues of extra-budgetary 
funds are financed by SIC paid by employers (on behalf of employees) and the self- 
employed. The revenues of the Consolidated Budget are derived from general taxes 
(federal, regional and local). In total, the contribution of the Consolidated Budget 
amounts to over a half of the total social protection spending.
Since the mid-2000s and until the economic crisis which began in the second half 
of 2014, social spending in Russia had been expanding. Yet, recent studies catego-
rize the Russian tax-benefit system as not very redistributive (Lopez-Calva et al. 
2017; Popova et al. 2018). The social protection system is dominated by pensions 
and categorical benefits which are mainly targeted at people of old age. Government 
transfers cover a large share of the population, but most cash benefits do not reach 
the subsistence level. The attempts to reduce the number of eligible people by intro-
ducing means-testing procedures were largely unsuccessful. In 2005, a reform 
aimed at monetizing the categorical in-kind benefits (former “privileges”) resulted 
in massive public protests. The failure of that reform set limits to further structural 
changes in social policies. The ‘national projects’ initiated in 2006 proposed 
increases in financing of social programmes without any significant restructuring. 
The Government has implemented a series of increases in earnings of the public 
sector workers, the minimum wage, pension benefits and a revision of maternity and 
childcare benefits aimed at promoting the falling fertility rates. At the same time, 
despite the inflow of energy revenues, the fiscal capacities of the state remain lim-
ited due to poorly regulated social insurance markets and large scale informality and 
tax avoidance.
Table 14.1 shows the breakdown of social spending by main social programmes 
in Russia since mid-2000s. Total social spending (including public healthcare and 
social protection), accounted for 16.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2015. Healthcare expenditures remained constant at 3.7% of the GDP, while social 
protection spending have dropped since 2010 due to austerity measures associated 
with the 2014 economic crisis. A significant part of social protection spending goes 
to public contributory and non-contributory pensions (8.2% of the GDP in 2015). 
Spending on social insurance or contributory benefits and quasi-insurance unem-
ployment benefit accounted for 0.8% of the GDP in 2015. Spending on non- 
contributory social assistance programs accounted for 2.4% of the GDP, but a major 
part of these resources was spent on categorical benefits for the elderly. Means- 
tested benefits for the poor remain underdeveloped, accounting only for 0.4% of 
GDP in 2015. The costs of various social services (including social care, childcare, 
youth policy and other programs) amounted to 2.1% of the GDP in 2015.
D. Popova
249
Table 14.1 Social spending in Russia (in mln rubles and as % of GDP)
Year 2005 2010 2015
In current prices, mln rubles
Social spending, total 2,909,487 8,032,267 13,765,296
Healthcare, physical culture and sports 797,056 1,708,805 3,115,864
Social protection 2,112,431 6,323,462 10,649,432
Pensions 1,292,988 3,881,632 6,855,119
Unemployment benefit and ALMPs 26,383 183,884 43,210
Social insurance/contributory 134,090 456,617 639,048
Maternity leave allowance 14,534 67,317 116,685
Lump-sum allowance on childbirth/adoption/family 
placement
8479 18,737 22,251
Childcare allowance up to 1.5 years 5670 121,797 142,312
Temporary incapacity benefit 95,669 185,183 196,684
Workplace accident/work-related disease insurance covers 28,833 46,315 70,562
Social assistance/non-contributory 405,670 1,270,621 1,967,965
Not means-tested benefits 322,306 1,032,367 1,641,609
Monthly cash payments (categorical benefits) 179,989 516,241 706,760
Other categorical benefits (cash and in kind) 133,691 401,357 546,723
Special forms of support for families with children 114,770 388,127
Means-tested benefits 83,365 238,253 326,356
Child allowance up to 16(18) years 18,135 43,607 46,447
Housing subsidies 40,035 55,719 62,757
State social assistance 1629 8305 18,211
Social supplement to pension 23,566 130,622 158,331
Social care institutions 70,234 168,630 251,958
Other social programmes 45,272 158,262 703,239
Childcare and pre-school education 112,998 321,349 692,087
Youth policy 24,796 49,511 58,405
As % of GDP
Social spending, total 13.5 17.3 16.6
Healthcare, physical culture and sports 3.7 3.7 3.7
Social protection 9.8 13.7 12.8
Pensions 6.0 8.4 8.2
Unemployment benefit and ALMPs 0.1 0.4 0.1
Social insurance 0.6 1.0 0.8
Social assistance 1.9 2.7 2.4
Not means-tested benefits 1.5 2.2 2.0
Means-tested benefits 0.4 0.5 0.4
Social care 0.3 0.4 0.3
Other social programmes 0.2 0.3 0.8
Childcare and pre-school education 0.5 0.7 0.8
Youth policy 0.1 0.1 0.1
GDP in current prices, bln rubles 21,609.8 46,308.5 83,101.1
(continued)
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14.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
The migration situation in Russia has been developing according to a scenario of 
migration in Western Europe, but lagging by 30 to 40 years. In the 1960s, Europe 
experienced postcolonial migration flows; currently, the situation in Russia resem-
bles the one in Western Europe in the late 1970s. As of 2017, Russia hosted 11,7 
million international migrants which accounted for 8.1% of the total population 
(UN  DESA 2017). However, the majority of these international migrants comes 
from the former Soviet Union republics, with the three largest contributors being 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The balance of international migration 
increased sharply after the collapse of the Soviet Union, reaching its highest level in 
the mid-1990s (845,7 thousand people, or 5.7 per 1000 people in 1994) (Rosstat 
2017). This was due to the massive flow of Russian expatriates returning to Russia 
from other states of the former Soviet Union. Subsequently, there was a decrease in 
the intensity of international migration until mid-2000s. Starting from late 2000s, 
the balance of international migration has been rapidly growing again due to the 
inflow of temporary economic migrants from less developed Central Asian states, 
including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Currently, these 
are the main group of working migrants in Russia (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2014). In 
2015–2016, the number of migrant workers shrank by at least one third after a 
nearly two-fold depreciation of national currency and the contraction of the Russian 
labour market, but this seems to be a temporary trend (Rosstat 2017).
At the same time, in 2017, 10,6 million people born in Russia lived abroad (UN 
DESA 2017). Among those, three quarters were in former Soviet Union republics. 
Of those not living in the former Soviet Union countries, the majority are ethnic 
migrants who took part in repatriation programs which enabled them to settle in 
Germany, the United States and Israel. Overall, the top destination countries for 
Russian emigration over the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union were 
Ukraine, Germany and Kazakhstan.
Russia’s migration policy has been rather ambiguous. Russia has established a 
visa-free regime with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
which allows citizens of these countries to stay in Russia temporarily and look for 
work. However, a lack of transparent and flexible labour migration policy has 
Table 14.1 (continued)
Year 2005 2010 2015
GDP growth 106.4 104.5 97.5
CPI end-year 110.9 108.8 112.9
Sources: Calculated by Elena Gorina using the data of the Federal Treasury at http://www.roska-
zna.ru (reports on implementation of the consolidated budget of RF and budgets of state extra- 
budgetary funds, Federal Budget of RF, consolidated budgets of regions); federal laws on 
implementation of the budget of the pension fund and social insurance fund; regional laws on 
implementation of budgets of regions; Federal State Statistics Service data (statistical digest 
“social situation and standard of living of the population of Russia”) at http://www.gks.ru/;Federal 
employment service data at http://www.rostrud.ru/
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pushed a major share of them into undeclared work. Estimates of the number of 
undocumented migrants working in Russia vary from 3–4 million in autumn and 
winter to 5–7 million in spring and summer due to seasonal work (Iontsev and 
Ivakhnyuk 2012). They mostly hold low-paying jobs, primarily in trade and con-
struction, which are unattractive to Russian citizens. Widespread undeclared 
employment of migrants is associated with considerable financial losses for Russia 
in the form of unpaid taxes and social contributions. At the same time, this group of 
migrants is deprived in terms of their employment and social rights and have some-
times been met with xenophobia.
Politically, Russia is interested in strengthening integration of the post-Soviet 
space and considers interaction with CIS countries a priority of its migration policy. 
The demographic developments over the past 20 years (low fertility rates and popu-
lation ageing) make Russia increasingly dependent on foreign workforce. Yet, only 
recently has the Russian Government started elaborating a migration policy that 
accounts for labour market needs. The State Migration Policy Concept (2012) sets 
policy until 2025 aiming to make immigration policy more balanced and includes 
the development of legislation focused on various (primarily labour) migra-
tion flows.
One of the major developments in migration policy has been the launch of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Citizens of these countries are subject to preferential 
migration regime which makes them equal to Russian nationals in terms of their 
employment and social security rights (and vice versa). At the same time, new regu-
lations introduced in 2015 made it more difficult and costly for other migrants to 
access the Russian labour market on a legal basis. All potential employees are now 
required to pass Russian language tests, undergo a medical exam and purchase vol-
untary health insurance. Finally, integration of migrants still receives little policy 
attention, which remains a major challenge.
14.2  Migration and Social Protection 
in the Russian Federation
The main legislative act regulating the rights and obligations of foreigners in Russia 
is the Federal Law No 115 of July 2002. The Law defines three main types of 
migrant statuses that condition foreigners’ access to social benefits: temporary visi-
tors (on a migration card/visa), temporary residents (on a temporary residence per-
mit), and permanent residents (on a residence permit)1.
1 Foreigners can apply for a status of a permanent resident within three years after having obtained 
a temporary residence permit. The procedure implies passing the Russian language proficiency test 
(with the exception of citizens of Belarus, pensioners and minors) or providing the certificate of 
secondary education obtained in the Soviet Union or Russia; medical exam; confirmation of means 
(income above the subsistence level); state duty. Some individuals are eligible for the simplified 
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Social security benefits are financed from extra-budgetary funds that receive 
their revenues from social contributions made by the working population. Hence, a 
personal contribution record determines the entitlement to receive social security 
benefits from these funds. Foreigners who are permanent or temporary residents are 
entitled to social security benefits if they are considered socially insured according 
to the law, if they work under an employment contract, or if their employer makes 
social insurance contributions on their behalf. The exception are all social benefits 
for families with children2. Foreigners who are permanent residents are entitled to 
receive them even if they do not have a contribution record, just like nationals. 
Foreigners who reside in the country on a temporary basis are only entitled to tem-
porary incapacity and maternity benefits provided that they have been officially 
registered and made contributions to the Social Insurance Fund for at least six 
months. Neither permanent, nor temporary foreign residents are entitled to the cash 
unemployment benefit.
As for social assistance benefits, all foreigners legally residing in Russia can 
access these benefits under the same eligibility conditions as those applied for resi-
dent Russians. However, social assistance benefits will not be provided in cases of 
illegal residence and employment, work under a civil law contract, deprivation of 
parental rights or leaving children in full provision of the state.
All foreigners, regardless of their status in the Russian Federation, are eligible 
for free emergency medical care in public healthcare institutions. Only foreigners 
who are insured can receive other types of free healthcare. This applies to perma-
nent or temporary foreign residents, as well as refugees. Temporary visitors are not 
eligible and are obliged to have a voluntary health insurance or pay for medical 
treatment. Temporary workers must have a certificate of voluntary medical insur-
ance to be able to work on the territory of the Russian Federation.
A special group of foreign citizens who enjoy a preferential treatment in terms of 
accessing social benefits in Russia are citizens of the Republic of Belarus (based on 
a bilateral treaty of 2007) and citizens of the countries of the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU3, which apart from Belarus and Russia, also includes Kazakhstan, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). Insured citizens of these countries have the same rights 
of access to social security benefits (excluding pensions) as citizens of the state 
where they are employed.
The only type of social benefits that could be received by a non-resident Russian 
citizen is contributory pension. A temporary leave from Russia (without acquiring a 
status of a permanent resident in another country) will not affect the rights of 
Russian citizens to social benefits from Russia, as long as they fulfil the general 
eligibility conditions for those benefits.
procedure for obtaining a residence permit. These include: highly qualified workers and their fam-
ily members, refugees, Russian native speakers, citizens of Turkmenistan and Belarus; participants 
of resettlement program for the expatriates, individuals married to Russian citizens.
2 Federal Law No 81 of May 19, 1995 “On state benefits for citizens with children”.




According to the Russian labour legislation4, there are several types of social sup-
port guaranteed by the state to the unemployed. The unemployment benefit in 
Russia is financed by general revenues and is weakly related to the length of service 
and earnings, hence can be considered as a quasi-insurance program. To be eligible 
for an earnings-related unemployment benefit, applicants should be employed at 
least for 26 calendar weeks of full-time employment during 12 months preceding 
the job loss. The benefit is conditional on applicant’s registration with the employ-
ment service. During the first 12 months of unemployment, the amount of the ben-
efit is defined as a proportion of applicant’s average earnings for the last three 
months of employment, subject to minimum and maximum thresholds. After that 
period, the applicant might be entitled to the minimum amount of unemployment 
benefit. The unemployed lacking a sufficient insurance record (e.g. first-time job 
seekers, those who have exhausted their entitlements, those willing to start working 
after a year long break) and those dismissed due to violation of work discipline are 
entitled to the minimum amount of the unemployment benefit, while each period of 
the benefit payment cannot exceed six months during a 12-month period.
The public employment service provides early retirement pensions to the recipi-
ents of unemployment benefits and material aid to those unemployed who exhausted 
their eligibility for the cash benefit. In addition, there are cash benefits aimed at 
supporting the participation of job seekers in active labor market programs, includ-
ing a training scholarship, wages for public works, etc.
Registered unemployment rates in Russia are substantially lower than survey- 
based unemployment rates (by International Labour Organization - ILO definition), 
predominantly due to limited incentives for registration, as the unemployment ben-
efit amount is very low. However, registration of working age individuals at the 
employment service if they are not in work is a mandatory requirement for obtain-
ing the means-tested social assistance. Only around one third of the unemployed is 
registered with the public employment service. The unemployment benefit is paid to 
nearly 90% of the registered unemployed and overall, recipients constitute less than 
1% of the population (Rosstat 2018a).
Foreign residents cannot apply for the unemployment benefit as the latter is 
exclusively reserved for nationals. Russian citizens permanently residing abroad are 
not eligible either. However, foreigners may apply to the employment service in 
order to receive help with job search.
4 The Labour Code of the Russian Federation (Federal Law of 30.12.2001 No 197); Federal Law 
of 19.04.1991 No 1032-1 “On employment in the Russian Federation”.
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14.2.2  Health Care
Public healthcare is free at the point of use for Russian citizens5. The state guaran-
tees free healthcare including in- and out-patient treatment, rehabilitation/nursing 
care and provision of medicine for specific categories of patients. However, free 
provision is currently quite limited, which results in the growth of private spending 
on healthcare services, including “additional” services provided by public medical 
institutions. Public healthcare for working people is funded through contributions 
paid by employers and the self-employed to the Federal and Territorial Mandatory 
Health Insurance Funds. The cost of health insurance for non-working citizens is 
covered from the regional budgets, with the share of healthcare spending subsidized 
by the budget being over 50%.
All foreigners, regardless of their status, are eligible for free emergency medical 
care in public healthcare institutions6. Insured foreigners can also benefit from other 
types of public healthcare7. This applies to foreigners permanently residing in the 
country and refugees, irrespectively of their working status, and temporary non- 
national employees. Uninsured women are also eligible for medical help during 
pregnancy and childbirth. Foreigners who are temporarily residing in the country 
are obliged to have a certificate of voluntary health insurance valid on the territory 
of the Russian Federation.
Health-related cash allowances are provided by the Social Insurance Fund (SIF)8. 
Its revenues are generated by social insurance contributions paid by employers and 
transfers of the federal budget to cover the costs of payments to some categories of 
uninsured persons. The Fund also accumulates employer contributions on manda-
tory workplace accidents and work-related disease insurance. The main health- 
related cash allowance  – a temporary incapacity benefit – is paid to all insured 
persons (regardless of the nationality or the length of residence in Russia) for the 
whole period of absence from work due to sickness or the need to take care for a 
sick family member. The amount is estimated on the basis of annual earnings of the 
insured person over the past two years subject to an upper limit. The size of the 
benefit is differentiated by a length of the contribution record: 60% of average earn-
ings for employees with less than five years employment record; 80% for employ-
ees with five to eight years record; 100% for those with more than eight years 
record; no more than the minimum wage for employees whose record is below six 
5 Federal Law No 323 of 21.11.2011 “On the basis of citizens’ health protection in the Russian 
Federation”.
6 Government Decree No 186 of 6.03.2013 on the rules of providing medical care to foreign nation-
als on the territory of the Russian Federation.
7 Federal Law No 326 of 29.11.2010 “On Compulsory Health Insurance”, article 10.
8 Federal Law No 165 of 16.07.1999 ‘On foundations of social insurance’; Federal Law No 255 of 
29.12.2006 ‘On mandatory social insurance in case of temporary incapacity and maternity’; 




months. The allowance is not exportable as being employed in Russia is a prerequi-
site for qualifying for this benefit.
The main cash allowance related to disability is the disability pension. In 2017, 
2.183 million people (out of 43.177 million pensioners) received a disability pen-
sion (Rosstat 2018a). There are contributory and non-contributory (or social) dis-
ability pensions. The contributory ones are provided on the same conditions as 
old-age pensions, except that the former can be claimed irrespectively of age. 
Individuals without any contribution record (e.g. disabled children) are eligible for 
the non-contributory disability pensions. The size of disability pension depends on 
the severity of disability. The total number of recipients of disability pensions is 
lower than the total number of the disabled, because some of them choose to receive 
an old-age pension, which is higher for people with the easiest form of disability. 
Contributory disability pension can be exported outside of Russia, but non- 
contributory disability pensions are only available to those residing in Russia 
(nationals and permanent foreign residents).
14.2.3  Pensions
Since 2002, Russia maintains a three-pillar pension system: the first pillar is based 
on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) principle, the second pillar is a funded system (for 
those born after 1966), whereas the third pillar provides mechanisms for additional 
savings towards a better pension on a voluntary basis9. The first two pillars are 
financed by contributions to the extra-budgetary Pension Fund paid by employers 
(on behalf of employees) and the self-employed. Russia also has a “zero” pillar or 
general revenue-financed benefits for uninsured pensioners (the disabled, orphans, 
etc.). Early retirement and postponement are possible and individuals are allowed to 
work while receiving a pension. The share of working pensioners amounts to about 
30% since early 2000s (Rosstat 2018a). Currently, about half of the total budget of 
the Pension Fund is funded by transfers from the federal budget.
Contributory pensions are called labour pensions and comprise old age, disabil-
ity and survivor’s pensions. The pension formula has undergone several changes, 
the latest one in 2015. Currently, the eligibility for the contributory pension depends 
on an ‘individual pension score’ (pension points) calculated based on earnings, 
length of employment and age at retirement. The minimum contribution period to 
9 Federal Law No 167 of 15.12.2001 ‘On mandatory pension insurance in the Russian Federation’; 
Federal Law of 24.07.2002 ‘On investment of assets for financing the funded element of the labour 
pension in the Russian Federation’; Federal Law No 173 of 17.12.2001 ‘On labour pensions in the 
RF’; Federal Law No 166 of 15.12.2001 ‘On public pension provision in the RF’; Federal law No 
56 of 30.04.2008 ‘On additional insurance premiums for the funded part of the labour pension and 
the state support for formation of pension savings’.
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be eligible for a contributory pension is 15 years (prior to 2015 – five years). Prior 
to January 2019, the retirement age was 55 years for women and 60 years for men10.
Social pensions are granted to individuals with insufficient or no labour record. 
This comprises all men aged 65+ and women aged 55+, the disabled, children- 
orphans studying full-time up to the age 23 and representatives of the small ethnic 
groups of the North upon reaching the age 55 for men and 50 for women. There is 
no means-test. In 2015, out of 41.456 million pensioners, 3.007 million received 
social pensions (Rosstat 2018a).
In order to receive a contributory pension, foreigners must have the status of 
permanent residents, be insured in the Russian system of mandatory pension insur-
ance, and fulfill the general eligibility conditions. Social pension may be granted to 
foreigners permanently residing in Russia if they lived in the country for at least 
15 years and reached the state retirement age. Foreigners temporarily residing in 
Russia are not entitled to claim public pension until they receive a permanent resi-
dency status or citizenship. However, the pension rights of foreigners may also be 
regulated by bilateral agreements. Under such an agreement, pension rights acquired 
in one state can be taken into account when claiming a pension in another country. 
For instance, such an agreement currently exists between Russia and Belarus. 
Contributory pensions can be received by individuals living outside of Russia, while 
social pensions are not exportable.
14.2.4  Family Benefits
The system of social protection of children and families comprises cash benefits and 
services for families with children.,11,12 Almost all childbirth-related cash benefits 
were subject to revision in 2007, as a part of the Government strategy to suspend 
population decline. Currently, the duration of paid maternity leave is 140 calendar 
days. The amount of the maternity allowance covered by social insurance is 100% 
of average earnings for the past two years preceding the leave, subject to an upper 
limit set annually by the Social Insurance Fund (SIF). For women whose contribu-
tion record is below six months, the amount cannot exceed the minimum wage 
10 The pension reform approved in 2018 implies a gradual transition to the retirement age from 55 
to 60 years for women and from 60 to 65 years for men during the period 2019–2028.
11 Federal Law No 81 of 19.05.1995 ‘On state allowances to citizens with children’; Labour Code 
of the Russian Federation (Articles 255–257); Federal Law No 255 of 29.12.2006 ‘On mandatory 
social insurance in case of temporary incapacity and maternity’; Federal Law No 256 of 26.12.2006 
‘On additional measures of support to families with children’; Decree of the President of the 
Russian Federation No 431 of 5.05.1992 ‘On measures of social protection of families with many 
children’.
12 Maternity and family allowances that are not covered in this section include lump-sum cash 
allowances in connection with childbirth granted to all nationals and a lump-sum cash transfer to 
mothers who gave birth to a second child (maternity capital).
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established in the region. All socially insured women are entitled to maternity 
allowance, irrespectively of their nationality.
Upon completion of maternity leave, mothers (fathers, adoptive parents, other 
relatives or guardians taking care of a child) are entitled to a paid parental leave that 
lasts up to 1.5 years. For socially insured individuals, the cash allowance for the 
period of parental leave (monthly child care allowance up to 1.5 years) equals 40% 
of the average monthly earnings for the past two calendar years, subject to lower 
and upper thresholds. Individuals whose contribution record is below six months are 
entitled to the minimum allowance. To receive this allowance, foreigners must be 
either permanent residents or socially insured. However, the above mentioned 
allowances are not conditioned by the country of birth, residence or nationality of 
the child.
The parental leave benefits are complemented by several means-tested monthly 
allowances. According to Russian law, eligibility for means-tested benefits is 
derived by comparing the individual, family or household income with the poverty 
line13. The monthly allowance for the third and subsequent children up to three 
years (introduced in 2017) is paid if family income is below the mean income in the 
region. The monthly allowances for the first and second children up to 1.5 years 
(introduced in 2018) are paid if family income is below 150% of the regional pov-
erty line14. The benefit amounts are equal to 100% of the cost of regional pov-
erty line15.
A monthly allowance for children up to 16 (18) years from poor families is the 
largest means-tested program in Russia in terms of its coverage, mainly due to weak 
targeting mechanisms (Popova 2013). The coverage though has been decreasing 
from over 40% of the population under 16 years in 2010 to 27% in 2015 (Rosstat 
2018a). Since the decentralization reform carried out in 2005, the amounts, eligibil-
ity conditions, indexation and forms of payment of this benefit vary significantly 
from region to region.
Both permanent and temporary residents may be eligible to means-tested allow-
ances, irrespectively of their insurance record, if they satisfy the conditions estab-
lished in the region. The residency condition also applies to children, while the 
country of birth and nationality are irrelevant in these case. Nationals residing 
abroad are not entitled to claim any of these allowances as they are linked to employ-
ment or the residency status.
13 The poverty line is referred to as the Minimum Subsistence Level (MSL) and equals the cost of 
a minimum basket of goods and services.
14 In 2020, the age threshold was raised to three years and family income threshold was raised to 
200% of the regional poverty line.
15 In 2020, a new means-tested monthly allowance for children aged 3–7 years was introduced. The 
amount is equal to 50% of the cost of the regional poverty line and the family income should not 
exceed 100% of the regional poverty line.
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14.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
There is no single guaranteed minimum income benefit in Russia. Instead, there are 
a number of allowances, most of which are categorical allowances inherited from 
the Soviet social protection system16. The means-tested programs are poorly devel-
oped and account for a significantly smaller share of spending on social assistance.
The state social assistance scheme17 was established to provide relief to house-
holds in need. The program design, coverage and financing are regulated by the 
regions. Generally, the rules mix the notion of targeting with categorical provision 
of assistance, defining certain groups (pensioners, families with 3+ children, stu-
dents, etc.) eligible for the benefits. In addition, targeted assistance is often confused 
with one-time emergency assistance (e.g. loss of the breadwinner, severe illness, 
natural disaster). Starting from 2010, state social assistance can be provided in the 
form of a conditional cash transfer.18 The inter-regional variation in program rules is 
the highest among all means-tested schemes. The number of those who actually 
received a regular cash benefit amounted to 1.846 million people in 2016, and the 
number of recipients of a lump-sum payment was 1.633 million people, which alto-
gether is less than 2% of the population (Rosstat 2018b). All foreigners legally 
residing in Russia can apply for state social assistance under the same conditions as 
national residents. Non-resident citizens are not entitled to claim this benefit.
A social supplement to pension19 is a special type of means-tested social assis-
tance for the elderly people. Introduced in 2010, this benefit is provided to all non- 
working pensioners whose total income is below the cost of a pensioner’s poverty 
line in a given region. In 2015, 6.672 million people or 13% of pensioners received 
the supplement (Rosstat 2018b). The benefit can be paid to all permanent residents, 
regardless of their nationality. Russian citizens who have left for permanent resi-
dence abroad are not eligible.
16 These are free services or discounts on payment for services, provided to vulnerable categories 
of the population (disabled people, war veterans, victims of the Chernobyl accident, etc.); but they 
also cover privileges for groups based on specific merits (mainly military) and their occupa-
tional status.
17 Federal Law No 178 of 17.07.1999 “On state social assistance”.
18 Beneficiaries have to sign a social contract to confirm their obligations (active job search, enroll-
ment in a professional training, self-employment, school attendance, etc.) upon receipt of the 
benefit.
19 Federal Law No 178 of 17.07.1999 “On state social assistance”, article 12.1
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14.2.6  Obstacles and Bilateral/Multilateral Social 
Security Agreements
Foreigners’ access to social benefits in Russia is determined by their legal status. 
Permanent residents and refugees have the same access to social benefits as Russian 
citizens, with few exceptions20. Temporary foreign residents are eligible for social 
insurance benefits (e.g. temporary incapacity and maternity-related cash allow-
ances, public healthcare services) that are conditional on their employment status 
and social contribution record. They may be eligible for social assistance and family 
benefits that are available in their region of residence. On the other hand, Russian 
citizens permanently living abroad are not eligible for any other type of social ben-
efits granted by Russia, apart from contributory pensions.
As far as obstacles are concerned, the Federal Migration Service has the right to 
recall a previously issued temporary or permanent residence permit if a foreigner 
cannot provide for himself/herself and his/her family at a level which is above the 
cost of the regional poverty line. Therefore, foreigners may be limited in terms of 
their rights of access to unemployment benefits and social assistance. Temporary 
staying workers may lose their job and, therefore, the right to stay in the Russian 
Federation, if they do not have a valid certificate of compulsory or voluntary health 
insurance.
A special group of foreigners who have preferential treatment in terms of access-
ing social benefits in Russia are nationals of Belarus. Being members of the Union 
State21 since 1996, the Russian Federation and Belarus have signed an agreement on 
cooperation in the field of social security and social assistance22. Citizens of Belarus 
permanently residing in Russia are equal to Russians in terms of their rights to 
social benefits and vice versa. This covers maternity benefits, unemployment bene-
fits, old age, disability and survivor’s benefits, benefits in the event of occupational 
disease or accident, and family benefits. Access to public healthcare is conditional 
on permanent residency status or on employment. When calculating social security 
benefits, the work experience acquired on the territory of both countries is taken into 
account. The benefits are paid by the country of residence. For child-related benefits 
(e.g. birth grant, child allowance up to 16(18) years), the child’s place of residence 
is taken into account.
Citizens from the EAEU countries have similar advantages in access to social 
security in Russia. According to the agreement that came into force in 2015, 
migrants from these countries have the same rights for social security (except pen-
sions) as citizens of the state of employment. This includes compulsory insurance 
20 For instance, foreign nationals are not eligible for the unemployment benefit, the maternity capi-
tal (a lump-sum benefit for women who have given birth to the second child) and various categori-
cal cash benefits mainly targeted at the elderly and disabled individuals.
21 See: http://eng.soyuz.by/. Last accessed 05 May 2020.
22 Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the 
field of social security. Done at Saint Petersburg on 24 January 2006.
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against temporary incapacity and maternity insurance, compulsory insurance 
against occupational accidents and diseases and compulsory health insurance.
14.3  Conclusions
The eligibility of Russian nationals to social benefits depends either on their employ-
ment status and contribution record (for pensions and other social insurance bene-
fits), or their residence status (for social assistance and healthcare). The place of 
residence is particularly important because the responsibility for legislative regula-
tion and financing of most non-contributory social benefits and services lies with the 
regions. Since the priorities and budget capacities of regional authorities differ 
greatly across the regions, the overall level of social protection of citizens residing 
in different parts of the country may also differ substantially.
When deciding to permanently move abroad, Russian citizens lose their entitle-
ment to claim most social benefits available in Russia, apart from acquired contribu-
tory old-age and disability pensions. On the other hand, the right of foreign residents 
to social benefits is essentially the same as that of their national counterparts, as 
long as they are legally employed and make social security contributions. However, 
there are two major exceptions: pensions and unemployment benefits. Pensions 
require a much longer contribution history and/or residence in Russia for at least 
15 years. Moreover, foreigners are excluded from accessing unemployment bene-
fits, although they can benefit from job search programs. Social assistance benefits 
provided at the regional level are typically available to all legal residents, foreigners 
included, with few exceptions. However, foreigners’ access to social assistance ben-
efits might also be constrained by the fact that their residency permit or temporary 
registration may be recalled if it becomes evident that they are not able to provide 
themselves and their family with the minimum resources (i.e. income above the 
regional poverty line).
Having said that, the most acute migration problem in Russia is the scale of ille-
gal migration from CIS countries. Estimates of the number of illegal migrants vary 
from 3–4 million in autumn and winter to 5–7 million in spring and summer due to 
seasonal work (Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk 2012). Widespread illegal employment of 
foreign citizens is associated with considerable financial losses for Russia in the 
form of unpaid taxes and social contributions. At the same time, this group of 
migrants is completely deprived in terms of their employment and social rights.
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Chapter 15
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 
and Social Protection for Russian Citizens 
Abroad
Anna Prokhorova
15.1  Diaspora Policy Infrastructure and Key Policies
15.1.1  The Russian Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
Russian diaspora is an arguable concept, and the very existence of the Russian dias-
pora is challenged; it is neither Russian because it includes not only ethnic Russians, 
nor diaspora since the home country – the Soviet Union (USSR) – no longer exists 
(Suslov 2017). However, it is this Soviet diaspora which remains in the focus of the 
authorities of the Russian Federation since collapse of the USSR. When in 1999, the 
long-awaited law On Support of the Compatriots Abroad was adopted, the political 
agenda was focused on Russian-speaking population and ethnic Russians who were 
still living in former Soviet republics, so-called ‘near abroad’.
Russian nationals residing abroad is just a sub-category of a broader category of 
‘compatriots abroad’ introduced in the Russian legislation in 1999.1 The “compatri-
ots” definition came to cover also those who had citizenship of the USSR and their 
descendants, irrespective of current citizenship. As a result, the Russian nationals 
residing abroad are not covered by special Government program, but are included 
into a broad array of measures targeting ‘compatriots abroad’ in general. For 
1 According to the Federal Law “On the State Policy of the Russian Federation in Respect of the 
Compatriots Abroad” of May 24, 1999, the category of “compatriots abroad” also covers people 
who had USSR citizenship, descendants of those who have been historically living in the territory 
of the Russian Federation, and persons whose relatives on the direct ascending line lived in the 
territory of the Russian Federation earlier, including foreign citizens and stateless persons.
A. Prokhorova (*) 
European University at St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg, Russia
e-mail: aprokhorova@eu.spb.ru
264
example, the state program of the work with compatriots abroad makes no distinc-
tion between Russian nationals abroad and other categories of compatriots.2
One should bear in mind that by late 1990s when the law on compatriots was 
adopted, the stock of Russian nationals abroad was made of not only emigrants who 
voluntarily left the home country in the 1990s, but also of the residents of the former 
Soviet republics who had used the opportunity to obtain a Russian national passport 
while remaining abroad. In absolute terms, during the post-Soviet period 1992–2013, 
Russian citizenship was acquired by 8 million people: 5.8 million were naturalized 
through the Federal Migration Service of Russia upon arrival to Russia, while 2.2 
million people obtained Russian citizenship while living abroad, through represen-
tative offices of the Russian Federation (Prokhorova 2017). Unfortunately, there is 
no data on how many of those who acquired Russian citizenship in the 1990s with-
out coming to Russia, were still living outside Russia.
Currently, Russian nationals abroad constitute about 1/5 of all compatriots resid-
ing abroad, or around five million people. These are concentrated in ‘far abroad’ 
destinations, primarily in Israel, the United States of America (USA) and Germany. 
According to the 2010–2011 census data in OECD countries, the number of people 
of Russian origin there was about 660,000 people or 0.46% of Russia’s population 
(146.7 million people as of January 1, 2019). It is less than in case of Germany 
(1.5%) and Great Britain (2.19%), but a little bit more than in case of Turkey 
(0.34%). Russian researchers estimate that, in the period 2011–2017, roughly 2.7 
million people left the country to live somewhere beyond former Soviet republics, 
and around half of these emigrants keep Russian citizenship (Mkrtchyan and 
Florinskaya 2018).
Up to 2005, compatriots abroad have been regarded by Russian authorities as a 
rather static category of Russian-speaking population in the near abroad, in need of 
cultural and language support. However, the situation changed in 2006 with the 
introduction of the State Program for Assisting Compatriots Residing Abroad in 
Their Voluntary Resettlement in the Russian Federation (further – the compatriots 
resettlement program). This program aimed to attract Russian-speaking population 
from the post-Soviet space in order to compensate for the natural population 
decrease in Russia. The compatriots continue coming mainly from Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, Tajikistan, Armenia, i.e. from near abroad, while the share of participants 
coming from beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – Lithuania, 
Germany - is quite insignificant. Upon resettlement in Russia, compatriots without 
Russian citizenship could acquire the Russian passport through a simplified proce-
dure and claim all relevant social protection benefits including pension, maternity 
capital, unemployment benefits, etc. These benefits can be attractive for compatriots 
from comparatively economically worse host countries. While for those returning 
from European destinations, the refugee crisis would serve the key driver of resettle-
ment – as the case of the Russian Germans. In 2012, the compatriots resettlement 
program was prolonged for an indefinite period. In the new Migration Policy 
2 The State Program on the Work with Compatriots Abroad for the period of 2015–2017.
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Concept of November 2018, the resettlement of compatriots is declared as one of 
the priority areas of work. It is estimated that Russia would need to have around 
300,000 compatriots to resettle annually to compensate for the natural population 
decrease.
Today, Russian diaspora policies have a clear post-Soviet focus, prioritizing 
compatriots in the near abroad. In the past 25 years, the role of the Soviet diaspora 
as a specific area of policy has changed due to demographic and geo-political 
factors.
15.1.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
The main implementing agency in charge of compatriots’ policies is the Federal 
Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living 
Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (called briefly 
Rossotrudnichestvo), established in 2008. Together with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Rossotrudnichestvo is responsible for the implementation of the state pro-
gram of work in relation to compatriots abroad. The network of Russian consulates 
and the network of representative offices of Rossotrudnichesvo abroad aim to cover 
the needs of Russian compatriots and nationals in host countries.
Nowadays, Rossotrudnichestvo is represented in 80 states of the world by 95 
representative offices: 72 Russian centers of science and culture in 62 countries, and 
23 representatives of the Agency serving in the Russian embassies in 21 countries. 
This vast network of representative offices was inherited by Rossotrudnichestvo 
from its predecessors – the Soviet Union Society for Cultural Cooperation Abroad 
(established in 1925), the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural 
Cooperation Abroad (acting since 1958), and the Russian International Centre of 
Science and Culture (operating in 1994–2008). The key mission of the mentioned 
agencies was humanitarian cooperation, including organization of exchange visits 
of academia, exhibitions, Russian language training, etc. Today, the overseas offices 
of Rossotrudnichestvo continue functioning as Russian cultural centers. However, 
unlike its predecessors, Rossotrudnichestvo is included into the Government system 
and is responsible for the implementation of the Government program on the work 
with compatriots abroad, with a focus on the CIS, i.e. the near abroad. On top of 
that, Rossotrudnichestvo plays the role of a soft power instrument, promoting a 
positive image of Russia abroad.
The law on compatriots of 1999 had introduced new elements of the diaspora 
institutional infrastructure. In particular, the law established the World Congress of 
Compatriots – the supreme representative body providing interaction of compatriots 
with home country governmental bodies and authorities of the constituent entities 
of the Russian Federation. Each World Congress of Compatriots brings together 
high-level public officials, including the President of Russia, and the delegates of 
the coordination councils of the Russian society organisations working abroad in 
more than 90 host countries. The work of the coordination councils in the host 
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countries and the participation of the delegates is funded by Russia in the frame-
work of the state program with compatriots.
The distribution of the governmental funds allocated for the work with compatri-
ots abroad is overseen in Russia by the Government Commission on the Compatriots 
Living Abroad, established in 1994. The Commission is headed by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. At the legislative level, in the Parliament (State Duma), there cur-
rently works the State Duma Committee on CIS, Eurasian Integration and 
Compatriots Abroad. Finally, within the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 
there is the Commission on Development of Public Diplomacy and Support of the 
Russian Nationals Abroad. The latter is probably the only institution which explic-
itly indicates the Russian nationals abroad as the target category of population 
whose interests it aims to represent.
The state program on the work with compatriots abroad does not cover issues 
related to the compatriots’ resettlement. There is a separate federal program imple-
mented by the Ministry of Interior which oversees internal and international migra-
tion issues. The Ministry has representative offices dealing with migration issues in 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
to process the applications from the compatriots who wish to participate in the reset-
tlement program. About 45% of all applications are submitted in Russia.
Within such diaspora infrastructure, Russian consulates stand out since they have 
been concerned primarily with the needs of the Russian citizens residing abroad. 
However, as of 2017, about 60 Russian consulates in 40 countries – both in the near 
abroad and in the far abroad (for example, in Germany and Brazil) – were involved 
in providing consultations and processing applications for the compatriots resettle-
ment program.3 Thus, consulates came to serve both current and prospective Russian 
nationals.
15.1.3  Key Engagement Policies
Speaking about key policies in relation to Russian nationals abroad, it becomes 
evident that it is rather problematic to single out this specific area. As mentioned, 
there is no normative document addressing directly this category of people, but 
there are rather several laws concerning specifically Russian nationals abroad. Even 
in this case, the distinction should be made between ‘Russians in the near abroad’ 
(i.e. CIS) and ‘Russians in the far abroad’. The first category is covered by legisla-
tion related to the CIS and additional bilateral agreements between Russia and for-
mer Soviet republics. Examples of laws targeting Russians in the far abroad include 
bilateral agreements on the avoidance of the double taxation, bilateral agreements in 
the field of social protection, and the most recent legislative initiative on the 
3 Monitoring report on the implementation of the State Program for Assisting Compatriots Residing 
Abroad in Their Voluntary Resettlement in the Russian Federation for the Q4 of 2017.
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“currency resident status” (see details below) of the Russian nationals abroad. 
However, it makes sense to start with a brief description of the home country policy 
towards compatriots abroad which covers also Russian nationals in the near and far 
abroad and makes no distinction between them.
Culture, Religion, Language and Education
The state policy in relation to the compatriots abroad is declared to be an essential 
part of both internal and external policy of the Russian Federation. The framework 
of relations between Russia and compatriots abroad is outlined across four pillars of 
support provided by the home country: 1) support in the field of fundamental human 
and civil rights and freedoms; 2) support in the economic and social areas; 3) sup-
port in the field of culture, religion, language and education; 4) support in the field 
of information.4
The third pillar – culture, religion, language and education - constitutes the major 
part of home country efforts in relation to compatriots abroad as reflected in the 
state program on the work with compatriots abroad. In terms of the Russian lan-
guage promotion and preservation, the law states that home country authorities cre-
ate conditions for learning the Russian language, getting education in Russian and 
providing access to information in Russian. Additionally, home country authorities 
are to support training of the Russian language teachers for work abroad.
For a long time, Russia’s efforts in the area of the Russian language promotion 
have relied on the facilities of the Russian Centers of Science and Culture, estab-
lished abroad by the predecessors of Rossotrudnichestvo, which are now acting as 
representative offices of Rossotrudnichestvo abroad. Such path dependency 
approach continued up to 2007, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Science and Education jointly established the Russian World Foundation 
with a mission to promote the Russian culture and the Russian language learning 
abroad. The Foundation launched a separate network of Russian Centers implanted 
in the educational organisations in 48 countries. In 2018, Rossotrudnichestvo and 
the Russian World Foundation signed a cooperation agreement to combine effec-
tively their efforts in the promotion of the Russian language learning in CIS.
In the post-Soviet space, the status of the Russian language is a specific area of 
concern for the Russian authorities. While most ethnic Russians moved to Russia in 
the 1990s, those who remained outside turned into ethnic minority, and the Russian 
language lost its positions. Nowadays, only half of the population in 14 former 
Soviet republics speak Russian. On the one hand, it is regarded by Russian authori-
ties as a sign of weakening of the Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. On the 
other hand, low level of the Russian language knowledge appears to constrain the 
social integration of the labour migrants coming to Russia from Central Asia 
republics.
One of the reasons of the worsening of the Russian language learning in the post- 
Soviet space is the limited access to the Russian language education in former 
4 Federal Law #99 “On State Policy of the Russian Federation in Relation to the Compatriots 
Abroad” (1999).
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Soviet republics. This turns out to be especially challenging in the Baltic states. One 
of the most recent instruments addressing this problem of access to the Russian 
language education is the Russian federal program “The Russian Language” for the 
period 2016–2020. In 2015, the President approved the Concept paper “Russian 
Schools Abroad”. The concept paper envisages the creation of four types of Russian 
schools providing access to the Russian language education both to Russian nation-
als permanently residing abroad and to compatriots in the host countries. The state 
support is to be provided to the organizations included in the register of Russian 
schools abroad. Currently, the register includes over 2000 schools and its mainte-
nance is carried out by Rossotrudnichestvo.
Additionally, the Russian Federation provides support to compatriots in getting 
education in Russia, including diploma recognition based on bilateral agreements 
with selected countries. In the Federal law on Education, it is stated that the Russian 
Federation provides scholarships for foreigners and compatriots to study in Russian 
higher education institutions.5 In 2018, the quota for the number of foreigners and 
compatriots was defined at 15,000 students. The scholarship covers education fees, 
but does not cover living expenses and medical insurance. The room in the dormi-
tory is provided. The selection of candidates is conducted in two stages: first, it is an 
interview in a representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo abroad, and secondly, it is 
the selection made by the university. Recently, Rossotrudnichestvo launched a the-
matic web portal Russia.study to facilitate online applications for enrollment into 
Russian universities and applications for the scholarship to cover education fees. 
Additionally, students-compatriots are in some regions eligible for city scholarship, 
for example, in St. Petersburg.6
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is also rather actively involved in the work 
with compatriots abroad. ROC is a frequent beneficiary of the grant program of the 
Russian World Foundation: the Department of External Church Affairs organizes 
cultural festivals, meetings with the Russian diaspora community, workshops and 
the Russian language courses for diaspora. The head of the ROC regularly partici-
pates in the World Congress of Compatriots.
Economic and Social Areas
Access to economic and social protection schemes is available only to those compa-
triots who have Russian citizenship and is based on the national legislation, multi-
lateral or bilateral agreements. For example, Russia is a signatory to a Treaty for the 
Prevention of Double Taxation with over 80 countries all over the world. Additionally, 
all Russian nationals in retirement age are eligible for Russian pensions. Special 
5 In accordance with the Federal law #273 “On the Education in the Russian Federation”, as of 29 
December 2012.
6 The Law of St Petersburg “About establishment of bonuses, scholarships and awards in St 
Petersburg”/Government of the city of St Petersburg grants special student scholarship to 15 com-




agreements address the payment of pension in the «near abroad»,7 and in several 
countries of the ‘far abroad’, namely Lithuania, Spain and Israel.8
Two most recent legislative initiatives targeting Russian nationals abroad are 
associated with control mechanisms rather than support measures, which is 
explained by geo-political constrains. In 2014, amendments to the law ‘On 
Citizenship’ imposed on all Russian nationals an obligation to report about having 
a second citizenship or long-term residence of another country. Citizens residing 
permanently abroad are required to do that within 30 days period after their arrival 
to Russia. The notification cannot be submitted through a consulate.
Under the 2018 amendments introduced into the federal law “On currency regu-
lation and currency control”, all Russian citizens are considered currency residents 
irrespective of their country of permanent residence. Currency residents are required 
to present account statements to the tax authorities for accounts/deposits held with 
banks which operate outside Russia. According to the amendments made, these 
requirements will not apply to Russian nationals with ‘special resident status’ who 
spend more than 183 days outside Russia in a calendar year. However, the ‘special 
resident’ status is established based on the results of the calendar year, rather than 
when a currency transaction is made, or an account is opened abroad. Therefore, the 
authorities have the right to request documents confirming the duration of stay out-
side Russia and the fact of crossing the Russian border.
Political Participation
According to the Russian consulates’ statistics, the number of Russian nationals 
abroad (registered either as permanent or temporary residents of a foreign country) 
amounts to about two million voters, i.e. people aged 18 and older. It should be 
noted, however, that the consulates’ data is inconsistent since the registration with 
the consulate is voluntary.
Russian nationals abroad constitute about 2% of the Russian voters. They can 
hardly radically influence the results of the elections, but their participation rate is 
higher than voters in Russia. In 2016, the greatest number of voting age Russian 
nationals was found in Germany (512,292 people), Moldova (183,194 people) and 
Israel (163,543 people). In the State Duma elections of 2016, the leaders by abso-
lute number of Russian nationals who voted abroad were Moldova, Abkhazia9 and 
Latvia. According to the Central Electoral Committee of the Russian Federation, 
474,616 Russian nationals abroad voted at the presidential elections of 2018, and 
85% of them voted for Vladimir Putin (Mislivskaya 2018).
7 “Agreement on guarantees of the rights of citizens of the member states of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in the field of pensions” as of 1992.
8 For example, “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the State of Israel on cooperation 
in the field of social security”, as of 2016
9 The Republic of Abkhazia is a state in northwestern Georgia, recognized by the Russian 
Federation, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria. While Georgia lacks control over Abkhazia, 
the Georgian Government and most United Nations Member States legally consider Abkhazia a 
part of Georgia, whose Constitution designates the area as the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.
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Consulates play the leading role in coordinating participation of Russian nation-
als abroad in the elections. Traditionally, polling stations are arranged in the consul-
ate buildings. According to the general rule, Russian nationals abroad can vote in 
presidential elections, legislative elections and referendum. To be eligible to partici-
pate, a person should have a Russian national passport and be at least 18 years old. 
Russian nationals abroad vote in person in a consulate and/or polling station. 
Russian citizens permanently living outside Russia, having citizenship or long-term 
residence of another country, do not have passive voting rights.
15.2  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection 
in the Russian Federation
All Russian nationals residing abroad have a right to two types of benefits: on the 
one hand, the pension and, on the other hand, a family benefit called ‘maternity 
capital’ paid by the home country authorities. Both benefits are handled by the 
Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFR). The PFR website provides exhaus-
tive information and regular updates of the rules concerning pension payments to 
Russian nationals residing abroad.10 Usually, the websites of the consulates have a 
special section devoted to pensions and maternity capital. Additionally, consulates 
inform about relevant bilateral agreements which make Russian nationals residing 
abroad eligible to some social protection benefits.
Application for both the pension and the maternity capital can be handled through 
the consulates which accept the documents or/and issue the relevant documents and 
send them further to the PFR. In the framework of bilateral agreements, as well as 
in case of regional organisations membership (CIS, Union State, Eurasian Economic 
Union), home country obligations in relation to pension payments are shared with 
host country authorities. In such cases, consulates can be also operational providing 
the service of requisition of documents from the home country.
15.2.1  Unemployment
Russian nationals residing abroad are not eligible for unemployment benefits paid 
by Russia. However, special rules exist for Russian citizens residing in Belarus. 
According to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the State of 
Belarus on Cooperation in the Field of Social Security, the registered Russian unem-
ployed is entitled to unemployment benefits from Belarus authorities (host country) 
at a rate not lower than the minimum unemployment benefit set in the host country. 
The payments stop when a person changes the country of residence.
10 http://www.pfrf.ru/grazdanam/pensionres/pens_zagran/ (last accessed 15 April 2020)
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15.2.2  Health Care
According to the federal law “On the Basics of Health Protection of the Citizens of 
the Russian Federation” (as of 2010), Russian nationals residing abroad can receive 
free medical care in the Russian Federation. To visit a doctor in any Russia-based 
public hospital, a person needs to present his/her health insurance certificate which 
is issued for all Russian citizens free of charge. Medical services are also provided 
free of charge. Additionally, according to the Agreement between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Belarus “On the Equal Rights of the Citizens” 
(1998), the citizens of Russia and Belarus are granted equal rights in various spheres 
of life, including medical services.
Contributory disability pensions can be exported by nationals deciding to move 
abroad, but non-contributory disability pensions are only available to those residing 
in Russia. However, special rules apply to Russian nationals residing in Israel. The 
Agreement between the Russian Federation and the State of Israel on Cooperation 
in the Field of Social Security indicates that the benefits (including temporary inva-
lidity) being paid to the Russian national by the Russian authorities do not stop in 
case a person changes his/her country of residence for Israel.
In addition, the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides Russian 
nationals going abroad with relevant information about the risks for health associ-
ated with and emergency situations across the globe. The Ministry also developed a 
mobile application ‘Assistant abroad’11 as a means of information and communica-
tion support for Russian nationals abroad. The application is aimed both for tourists 
and Russian citizens who reside permanently abroad. In a situation of emergency, 
the application allows to call or send a text message to the emergency center of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.
In some cases, consulates inform Russian nationals abroad about specific condi-
tions of access to health care services in a host country. As a rule, however, accord-
ing to the Consular Statute of the Russian Federation, consulates only respond to the 
needs of nationals associated with sanitary, phytosanitary and veterinary security: 
upon request, a consulate informs Russian nationals about the rules of importing 
plants and animals to Russia. The consultation is provided free of charge.
15.2.3  Pensions
The Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFR) assigns and pays pensions to 
over 305,000 Russian nationals residing in 128 countries.12 Top five countries by the 
number of pensioners benefitting from Russian pensions are Germany, Israel, 
Latvia, USA and Belarus. As of today, Russia’s pension system distinguishes 
11 www.sos.mid.ru (last accessed 15 April 2020)
12 www.pfrf.ru (last accessed 15 April 2020)
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between insurance pensions (paid from the PFR budget) and state pensions (paid 
from the federal budget). These can be referred to as contributory and non- 
contributory pensions, respectively. Non-contributory (state) old-age pensions are 
paid only to Russian nationals permanently residing in Russia. Thus, those who live 
abroad can apply only for the contributory (insurance-based) pension.
Pension application from abroad can be submitted through the consulates in the 
host country. According to the decree of the Government of the Russian Federation 
“On the Procedure for Paying Pensions to Persons Who Leave for Permanent 
Residence Outside the Territory of the Russian Federation”, consulates issue the 
following documents for Russian nationals applying for the extension of pension 
payments: 1) the Act on the personal appearance of a citizen (life certificate); 2) the 
Certificate confirming permanent residence outside the Russian Federation; 3) the 
Certificate of performance (non-fulfillment) of paid work outside the Russian 
Federation. A national residing abroad can apply for these documents via the con-
sular portal.13 The documents are further submitted by the consulate to the Pension 
Fund of the Russian Federation. The extension of pension payment is made annu-
ally provided that once a year the Russian national obtains a life certificate which is 
issued by the consulate upon personal appearance.
Special rules concerning pension payments exist for Russian nationals residing 
in one of the CIS countries, Belarus and Israel. According to the 1992 Agreement on 
guarantees of the rights of citizens of the member states of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in the field of pensions, pensions are paid by the host country 
considering the employment period in both countries. When a person changes the 
country of residence within CIS, the pension payments can continue in case the 
person is not entitled to pension benefits on accordance with the legislation of the 
new host country. However, for Russian nationals residing in Kazakhstan and 
Belarus additional rules apply.
In the case of Kazakhstan, all residents of the city of Baikonur, including Russian 
nationals and Kazakh nationals working at the Russian spaceport Baikonur, are 
entitled to the Russian pension, paid in rubles and in accordance with the Russian 
legislation.14 Also, in accordance with the 2006 Agreement between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Cooperation in the Field of Social 
Security”, the home and host countries share the costs of pension payments: for 
example, Russian pension covers the years worked in Russia.
Similarly, Russian and Israel authorities share the pension payments, as stated in 
the 2016 Agreement between the Russian Federation and the State of Israel on 
cooperation in the field of social security. Requisition of documents confirming the 
period of employment in Russia is made through the Institute of National Insurance 
of Israel and the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. The application form can 
be downloaded from the PFR website. The agreement with Israel providing for the 
13 https://pension.kdmid.ru (last accessed 15 April 2020)
14 “Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Pension Rights of the Residents of the City of Baikonur in the Republic 
of Kazakhstan”, as of 27 April 1996.
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Russian pension to Israel-based pensioners was opposed in the State Duma by sev-
eral parties, especially by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. The main argu-
ment against was that the Russian budget constraints do not allow for the regular 
increase of payments to the Russia-based pensioners while at the same time the 
authorities find it possible to allocate funds to pay pensions in Israel. The dispute 
around the Israel-Russia agreement on social benefits concerned a special provision 
of the agreement according to which Israeli citizens residing in Israel can apply for 
Russian insurance pension in case they have worked in the former USSR and left 
abroad before 1992 (before the break-up of the Soviet Union). In other words, these 
payments were meant for Russia’s non-nationals, i.e. former USSR citizens.
15.2.4  Family-Related Benefits
According to the federal law “On State Benefits to Families with Children” (1997), 
the birth grant does not cover those who left Russia for permanent residency abroad. 
However, an exception is made for a specific type of birth grant, the so-called 
‘maternity capital’, for which all Russian citizens are eligible irrespective of their 
country of residence.15 The maternity capital benefit was introduced in 2006 as the 
core element of a set of ideological and institutional arrangements aimed at encour-
aging women to give birth to more children. With the maternity capital family ben-
efit, Russian authorities aimed to increase the birth rate in Russia, not abroad. 
Therefore, the applications of women to Russian consulates all over the world came 
as a surprise and it took time to arrange the procedure of application through 
consulates.
The maternity capital is a benefit provided to the Russian families to which a 
second or a third child or more was born or adopted provided that these rights are 
not assigned in the birth (adoption) of a second child (if twins are born, the family 
is not eligible for the maternity capital). Since January 1, 2015, maternity (family) 
capital amounts to 453,026 rubles (around 6000 Euro). The benefit is given only 
once (one-time payment) and exempt from income tax. Although Russian nationals 
residing abroad do have the right to receive this benefit, they cannot spend it outside 
the Russian Federation. The benefit is provided in the form of a certificate, and can 
be only used for special purposes described in the law:
• Improvement of the living conditions (for example, home mortgage)
• Education of the children (since 2018, including kindergarten and services pro-
vided by private educational organizations)
• Pension contribution of the mother
• Expenses associated with goods and services for the needs of children with 
disabilities.
15 Federal law “On Additional Measures of State Support to Families with Children” as of 2006.
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To apply for the maternity capital benefit from abroad, Russian nationals should 
submit the necessary documents to the consulate in their host country, including: 1) 
the Russian passport; 2) the certificate of the place of residence or actual stay of the 
Russian citizen who has the right to receive a certificate of maternity capital; 3) the 
birth or adoption certificate of a second or subsequent child; 4) a document confirm-
ing the Russian citizenship of the child with the birth of which the right to obtain a 
certificate of state emerged. The birth certificate and the child adoption certificate 
are issued by the Russian consulate in the host country.
Special rules concerning maternity and family-related benefits apply to Russian 
nationals residing in Belarus and Israel. According to the 2006 social security agree-
ment between Russia and Belarus, child benefits and family-related benefits are 
assigned and paid by the country where the child resides. The 2016 agreement with 
Israel also specified that Russian nationals residing abroad have the right to mater-
nity leave benefits which are assigned and paid by the host country where the ben-
eficiary has worked. Family-related benefits are assigned and paid by the country 
where the child resides. A one-time child benefit (paid upon the birth of a child) can 
be paid by the home or host country.
Those compatriots who resettled in Russia under the compatriots resettlement 
program, have a right to apply for the maternity capital after the acquisition of the 
Russian citizenship, under the condition that a second child was born after 2007 and 
has Russian citizenship.
15.2.5  Economic Hardship
According to the Federal law “On the Minimum Subsistence Level” (1997), the 
minimum subsistence level is set on a quarterly basis by the Russian Government, 
at the federal and at the regional level. In case a family’s income is below the mini-
mum subsistence level, that family is considered “low-income” and entitled to ben-
efits, which could be both monthly cash payments and in-kind benefits. However, 
the family or individual should be permanent residents of Russia. Thus, nationals 
residing abroad are not entitled.
When a Russian citizen finds himself/herself abroad without any means for liv-
ing and further stay puts his/her life under threat, a consulate can assist him/her to 
return to Russia. This assistance is provided in the form of covering expenses for 
hotel accommodation, travel expenses and food items or/and other first necessity 
things. The assistance is provided at no charge. Cash benefits are never offered.16 In 
other cases, consulates can be involved by handling the issuance of the temporary 
identification document in case a person has lost his/her passport or issue a death 
certificate which is necessary to arrange the repatriation of the body to Russia.
16 According to the Russian Government regulation “On the approval of the Provision of assistance 
in the return to the Russian Federation of citizens of the Russian Federation who have found them-




As a home country, Russia has developed a specific framework of policy providing 
for the support and protection of rights of the compatriots abroad. However, nation-
als residing abroad represent just one of the categories of compatriots defined in the 
law on the state support in relation to compatriots abroad (1999). No specific frame-
work for policy in relation to nationals residing abroad exists in Russia. The institu-
tional infrastructure to support compatriots abroad is outdated: it is based on the 
Soviet legacy of political and cultural propaganda and is meant to serve primarily 
the interests of compatriots in the near abroad, i.e. CIS.
Being included in the category of ‘compatriots abroad’, Russian nationals abroad 
are automatically covered by the home country work program with compatriots. 
However, the program is mostly aimed at providing cultural support to compatriots 
by means of organising cultural events to consolidate the diaspora. The compatriots 
resettlement program launched in 2007 is mostly meant for non-nationals with 
Soviet background. To a certain extent, the inflow of compatriots also compensates 
for the outflow of Russian nationals abroad in the 2000s. However, new citizens 
based in Russia are entitled to a wider range of social protection benefits compared 
to Russian nationals residing abroad.
Social protection schemes developed by the home country to serve Russian 
nationals abroad are based on multilateral and bilateral agreements between Russia 
and former Soviet republics. Besides the agreement on pension payments in the 
CIS, Russia has additional agreements with Kazakhstan and Belarus, and a special 
agreement with Israel. As a rule, Russian nationals abroad are entitled to two types 
of social benefits – pension and ‘maternity capital’ family benefit. The application 
procedure to these benefits is based on the documents exchange between the Russian 
consulate in the host country and the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation in the 
home country. Bilateral agreements with Israel and Belarus in the field of social 
protection provide Russian nationals with additional social benefits paid by the host 
country or shared with the home country.
Russian nationals permanently residing in the so-called far abroad have been 
mostly beyond the outreach of the Russian authorities. Legislative initiatives target-
ing specifically this category of compatriots are rare and often associated with con-
trol mechanisms rather than support measures, which is explained by current 
geopolitical constraints.
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Chapter 16
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Senegal
Adrien Dioh
16.1  Overview of the Senegalese Social Protection System 
and Main Migration Features in the Country
16.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Protection System
Unlike Western countries which have implemented a real social policy (as a result 
of power relations between policy-makers, employers and workers), in Senegal, as 
in many other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, social protection has been a legacy 
from France, the former colonial power. It was therefore well before independence 
in 1960 that the first traces of social protection were found. The system was built on 
the Bismarckian model and pegged to wage earners at a time when informal econ-
omy was considered transitory (AFD 2014). The colonial power first introduced 
social insurance programs in the field of occupational accidents, then maternity 
insurance and family allowances (Merrieux 2013). However, this social protection 
system did not take into account the realities on the field nor it considered the local 
culture.
Social protection is most often part of a particular socio-economic context that 
justifies its relevance and legitimacy. Senegal’s social protection system is therefore 
situated in a specific context marked by socio-economic difficulties and political 
strategies of both social and liberal inspiration. It is a corporatist system built around 
salary relationships. Social security and social benefits are acquired through employ-
ment and the management of the Service is the responsibility of the State and social 
partners through the Social Security Fund (CSS), the Pension Insurance Institution 
of Senegal (IPRES) and Medical Insurance Institutions (IPM).
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The system is disadvantageous to a large part of the population evolving mainly 
in the informal sector, which has become the main provider of jobs in urban areas 
since 1980. In Senegal, formal job offers concern only about 10% of the potentially 
active population, while the informal and agricultural sectors are the main sources 
of income. This large proportion of the population working in the informal sector 
can be justified by the inability of the modern sector to occupy a large and undoubt-
edly growing part of the labor force. In the 1980s and 1990s, the phenomenon, 
which was thought to occur in a short period, increased particularly because of a 
population surge that produced, each year, cohorts of first-time job-seekers 
(ANSD 2013a).
The national social protection system is built around two pillars. First, the social 
action is based on a non-contributory system directly provided by the State, which 
organizes funds and implements it. It is meant for nationals who belong to vulner-
able groups. The aim is to assist people in difficult economic and social situations. 
To put this policy based on national solidarity into practice, the country has an 
institutional framework to develop, implement and monitor social policies and mea-
sures. In recent years, measures have been taken to allow some vulnerable groups to 
receive healthcare through a kind of health insurance provided by the government. 
These include the “Plan sesame” for elderly people, free healthcare for children 
under five, university medical service for students, scholarships, etc.
Second, the social welfare provision is the backbone of the Senegalese system of 
social protection. The system was created during the 1970s, aiming to provide cov-
erage for employees,1 civil servants, and their households. Provision and manage-
ment of the health risk for employees is done through the Social Security Fund 
(CSS)2 and the Health Insurance Institutions (IPM), while pensions are managed by 
the Pension Provision Fund of Senegal (IPRES) for employees and their families, 
and the National Retirement Fund (FNR) for civil servants and their families. This 
diversity of social structures aims to ensure employees (either Senegalese or foreign 
residents) the maximum possible against classic social risks. The funding of the 
system is mainly contributory with contributions paid according to the branches, 
either by employers and employees (retirement and health), or by employers alone 
(other risks). The State assists to a lesser extent with the possibility of giving grants. 
The Senegalese social security system covers all traditional risks (occupational dis-
eases, accidents at work, family and maternity risk and elderly people), with the 
exception of illness. The latter risk is not, however, overshadowed by the public 
1 In line with Article L-2 of Law 97–17 of 1 December 1997 on the new Labor Code, “any person 
who has undertaken to put their activity in business, whatever their sex and nationality, is considered 
to be a professional worker, for remuneration, under the direction and authority of another person, 
physical or moral, public or private”.
2 This public establishment has been entrusted by the social security code adopted by the law 73–37 
of 31 July 1973 (JORS n ° 4308 of 4 August 1973, p.1564), the management of the two main 




authorities given that on the basis of the law on social welfare provision,3 illness 
funds (IPM) could be created for the management of non-occupational diseases.
16.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
In 2009, Senegal has produced its first migratory profile which be repeated in 2018. 
The development of this profile is part of the project “Support of free movement of 
people and migration in West Africa” co-financed by the European Union and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is a privileged frame-
work for the collection and analysis of available data on migratory flows and stocks 
of internal and international migrants related to the current economic context, 
migration policies in force, the factors underlying migration and the consequences 
of migration for Senegal. This tool supports the national migration policy of Senegal 
in a context in which the migration phenomenon has important consequences, espe-
cially in economic terms. For example, the amounts of remittances from the 
Senegalese diaspora have increased substantially over time, reaching 2220 million 
USD in 2017 (Ndione 2018).
Senegal has been confronted with the phenomenon of migration at three levels. 
First, as a host country for people from neighboring countries, attracted by relative 
social, political and economic stability. Second, because of its geographical posi-
tion, Senegal serves as a transit country for emigration candidates waiting for a 
favorable situation for their departure. Finally, the continuing deterioration of living 
conditions in Senegal, along with the removal of obstacles for leaving the national 
territory, has urged more and more Senegalese to make of emigration a strategy of 
adaptation to unemployment and poverty.
Much of the migration is done in an irregular and clandestine way. This is, among 
other things, the reason why, in Senegal, all the studies devoted to migration high-
light the major difficulty related to the collection and production of migration data 
to properly understand the migration reality. The available data are fragmented and 
do not allow for thorough and detailed analysis. Because of these shortcomings, it 
is difficult to analyze the evolution of the migration phenomenon in time and space.
According to the Final Report of the General Population Census (RPGA) of the 
National Agency for Statistics and Demography (ASND 2014), in 2014, the number 
of Senegalese living abroad was estimated at 156,6764 (1,15% of the Senegalese 
population), while the country was hosting nearly 181,651 foreigners (the equiva-
lent of 1,34% of the total population). Most of these foreign residents come from 
Africa, especially West Africa (84.4%), with a majority of Guineans (86,085), 
3 Law No. 75–50 of 3 April 1975 on social welfare provision institutions in Senegal, JORS No. 
4419 of 2 April 1975, p.557.
4 National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANSD), Final Report of the General Census of 
Population and Housing, Agriculture and Livestock of Senegal (RGPHA), September 2014, p. 219, 
RGPHAE, Op. Cit., P. 68.
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Malians (20,660) and Gambians (12,811) who arrive mainly for work reasons. All 
these countries have the particularity of being on the borders of Senegal and, like 
Senegal, being members of the ECOWAS which aims at economic integration and 
which is a means of curbing the phenomenon of balkanization of borders caused by 
colonization. The majority of these people work mainly in the informal sector, nota-
bly trade.
According to the statistics of the United Nations Population Division (see Ndione 
2018), the number of Senegalese living abroad was estimated at more than 533,000 
(3.9%) in 2013, of whom 265,000 resided in Europe (49.7%), 251,000  in Africa 
(47%) and 16,000 in North America (3%). In Europe, France is the first country of 
destination with nearly 116,000 settled Senegalese, followed by Italy (79,000) and 
Spain (59,000). For the African continent, the region of West Africa is the main 
destination of Senegalese (203,000), where flows are mainly marked by Gambia 
(101,000), Mauritania (46,000) and Côte d’Ivoire (21,000). Central Africa is the 
second African destination region for Senegalese migrants (42,000), who settle 
mainly in Gabon (29,000), Congo (10,000) and the Central African Republic (3000). 
North America hosts nearly 16,000 Senegalese, divided essentially between the 
United States (13,200) and Canada (3000).
16.2  Migration and Social Protection in Senegal
Given the demographic changes described above, there is the concern of taking into 
consideration the phenomenon of migration in the field of social protection in 
Senegal. In general, the benefits (social welfare provisions) from the national social 
protection system are intrinsically linked to two requirements: the status of the 
employee according to the Labor Code and the Merchant Marine Code and resi-
dence in the national territory. As a result, foreigners residing and working in 
Senegal have access to the various benefits guaranteed by the system under the same 
conditions as nationals. From a legal point of view, therefore, social protection does 
not discriminate against migrant workers established on the national territory. 
However, because of their territoriality, social welfare provisions/benefits are not 
provided outside Senegal. Hence, Senegalese workers living abroad as well as their 
family members who stay in the home country are covered only if their host country 
is bound to Senegal by a bilateral social security agreement or convention.5
Migrant workers belonging to ECOWAS6 are in a special situation. While it is 
true that they benefit from the national social protection system under the same 
conditions as the indigenous people, in the event of leaving Senegal, their rights are 
not in principle applicable. The General Convention on Social Security of ECOWAS 
5 Senegal has signed several of them with, notably, Mali, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Gabon, Cameroon 
and France.
6 In addition to Senegal, ECOWAS includes Mali, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, 
Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria and Niger.
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Member States7 makes it possible to remedy this situation. Indeed, it enshrines the 
four principles of international social security law, namely, equality of treatment, 
the uniqueness of the applicable legislation, the preservation of acquired rights and 
the provision of benefits abroad. However, although directly applicable, the effec-
tiveness of the said Convention depends on the adoption of administrative arrange-
ments between the different Member States. Mutatis mutandis, the Multilateral 
Convention on Social Security of the Inter-African Conference on Social Welfare 
Provision (CIPRES)8 has the same objective. Undoubtedly, in the future, these two 
normative instruments should contribute to a significant improvement of the situa-
tion of migrant workers from the concerned countries.
16.2.1  Unemployment
In an environment characterized by endemic unemployment and economic 
underdevelopment, with Senegal being one of the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), it is hardly surprising to notice that the country has not integrated a social 
security scheme dedicated to unemployment into its social security system. Hence, 
there is no actual mechanism to deal with the risks of unemployment.
According to the National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANSD 2013b) 
the unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2017 amounted to 12.5%. 
Nevertheless, this figure does not really give any additional information on the num-
ber of unemployed people because it is known that the majority of the active people 
evolve in the informal sector. Of a working age population estimated at 7,827,009 
individuals, at least one out of two is inactive (Ndione 2018).
16.2.2  Health Care
The public health system is open to all individuals regardless of nationality, race or 
origin. Everyone benefits from the same provisions at the same cost. However, the 
Social Security Fund, whose resources come mainly from employers’ contributions 
and refunds from the State budget, covers occupational diseases and accidents at 
work only. As a result, only victim workers, regardless of nationality, are covered. 
In their case, two types of services are provided: benefits in kind and cash benefits.
7 On the material side, the Convention covers invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, survivors’ 
benefits, benefits in the event of accidents at work and occupational diseases, family benefits, 
maternity benefits, medical care and sickness benefits and unemployment benefits.
8 It includes, in addition to Senegal, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, DR Congo, Chad, 
Togo, Union of Comoros.
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Regarding benefits in kind, the employer is obliged to provide first-aid.9 If the 
state of the victim requires treatment, care and additional benefits are covered by the 
Social Security Fund. This includes medical care, pharmaceutical costs, successive 
surgical procedures, functional rehabilitation, among others. The benefit of these 
provisions is subject to reporting the conditions of the illness or accident at work 
within 48 hours by the employer to the Labor Inspector, providing a medical certifi-
cate indicating the condition of the victim.
As for cash benefits, they consist of a replacement income paid to the victim (or 
his/her dependents in case of death) to compensate for the loss of salary during the 
period of total temporary incapacity for work or his/her workforce resulting from 
the permanent partial disability. These benefits, calculated on the basis of the base 
salary, are done either in the form of a daily allowance in case of temporary incapac-
ity for work, or as a pension in case of permanent incapacity for work. Annuity is 
obtained by multiplying the annual salary by the rate of permanent disability. These 
annuities are subject to a revaluation to adapt to the cost of living when the disability 
is greater than 10%. Similarly, aggravation or attenuation of permanent disability 
may result in revision. The buy-back of annuities is possible in the form of a capital 
paid by the Fund. Moreover, the buy-back is mandatory if the victim has a perma-
nent disability of less than 10%.
The management of non-occupational diseases of workers and their families is 
done through compulsory health insurance managed by Health Insurance Institutions 
(IPM). The resources of the MPIs come mainly from the contributions that are owed 
to them as well as from workers and employers. The amount of contributions 
depends on the gross salary as defined for the general income tax base. These insti-
tutions cover 50% to 80% of medical, pharmaceutical and hospitalization costs. To 
fill the gap, some companies take out additional insurance for the benefit of their 
staff. Others, more affluent, choose a health insurance on a flat-rate tax with a com-
pany with a refund rate of 100%. During the period of incapacity for work, the 
employer bears all the compensation, the amount of which depends on the duration 
of the incapacity and the length of service in the company.
The creation of IPM is justified by the low means of workers, the importance of 
the health needs and the high cost of the healthcare. It is therefore a response to the 
needs of health insurance not borne by the Social Security Fund. Participants regis-
tered in an MPI, i.e. workers and their family members, can only claim benefits after 
a two-month period of contributions.
One can infer from this that nationals and foreign residents who are excluded 
from this compulsory health insurance cannot therefore integrate it on a voluntary 
basis. It is possible, however, for some emigrants to subscribe to some companies 
for family insurance for the benefit of their family members who remain in the 
country.
9 The Labor Code requires employers to set up a corporate or inter-company medical service in the 
case of small size entities. But this service mainly fulfills a preventive role. This is why medical 




The disability benefit, which covers for total and permanent loss of ability to 
work, can be granted to any worker regardless of nationality. The disability needs to 
be certified by a doctor and the Medical Advisor of the IPRES. However, one must 
contribute for a period of 10 years or have at least 1000 points, otherwise one is only 
entitled to a refund of the contributions already paid. In addition, nationals residing 
abroad in principle are not entitled to claim this benefit.
In case of confirmation, the employee is immediately admitted to retirement and 
is exempted from the allowance for the remaining years of work.
16.2.3  Pensions
Retirement benefit institutions are regulated by Law of 3 April 1975, which concerns 
all social welfare provision institutions, whatever their purpose. A decree10 makes it 
compulsory for all employees and employers to join a pension plan managed by the 
Retirement Pension Institute of Senegal (IPRES).11 Every employer is obliged to 
join this institution and failing to do so can lead to criminal penalties.
Workers in a broader sense are the beneficiaries of the scheme: former employees, 
adhering members, individuals eligible for the retirement allowance, participating 
members with an age between the minimum age of retirement and who have ceased 
to be engaged in paid employment and receive an allowance, the participating 
members recognized as unfit for work at any age between the minimum age of 
anticipation and the normal retirement age and who receive an allowance, surviving 
spouses of deceased members in active or retired service, dependent children of 
deceased participating members, children who lost their father or mother (the latter 
benefit from a survivor’s benefit).
In fact, only migrant workers affiliated to a pension scheme established by other 
legislation are excluded from the scheme. The old-age pension is not subject to a 
nationality requirement. The conditions of admission to retirement include the need 
to have contributed at least one year, to be aged 60 years and to have ceased all 
professional activity in the country.
The departure from the country does not result in the loss of the right to pensions 
as it is possible for the migrant worker to collect them in his/her country of origin, 
in Senegal or in any other country of his/her choice. The costs of making the 
pensions available are borne by the affiliated organization. In this context, social 
security agreements or technical coordination agreements concluded with other 
social security organizations are significant in that they facilitate the settlement or 
10 Decree 75–455 of April 24, 1975, JORS No. 4422 of May 17, 1975, p. 627, amended by Decree 
76–017 of 9 January 1976, JORS No. 4480 of 2 March 1972, p. 422.
11 Order No. 3043 approving the statutes and rules of procedure of IPRES and conferring upon it 
the management of the general pension scheme applicable to all employees and the supplementary 
executive retirement scheme, JORS No. 4638 of 3 June 1977, p.709.
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payment of the entitlements acquired (or in the process of being acquired) for a 
given person, a migrant worker and his/her family.
Nationals who have acquired the right to a retirement pension in a foreign country 
and who choose to return to Senegal may continue to receive their pension on the 
assumption of bilateral or multilateral agreements.12 The aggregation of contribu-
tion periods when the migrant worker has carried out his/her career in different 
countries also depends on such agreements. Nationals entitled to claim their right to 
retirement and who choose to settle abroad may also, at their request, receive their 
pension provided that they have a bank account where the transfers will be made.
In any case, the basic general scheme covers two contributory benefits (retirement 
allowance and survivor’s allowance) according to the contributions paid and the 
earned points and two non-contributory benefits (solidarity allowance and social 
fund) without any reference to the contributions or years of service of the beneficia-
ries. The retirement allowance depends on the duration of the contribution and the 
level of salary. It is calculated by multiplying the number of points credited to the 
person’s account at the date of settlement by the value of the pension point. The fol-
lowing are taken into account: all contributory periods of service from the age of 18 
to the age of 60, and provided that the services have been done for a minimum of 
30 days at a member institution, and that they are certified by regular work certifi-
cates. Periods of suspension of the contract without consideration of the reasons are 
also taken into account. The number of points awarded for each year of contribu-
tions is obtained by dividing the contribution by the reference salary for the year. 
The total number of pension points is increased by 10% for each dependent child at 
the time of retirement. Nevertheless, the overall increase in points, as such, is lim-
ited to 30%.
The retirement age is currently 60, but the participant is free to apply for early 
settlement, starting at age 55 but in which case the rate of the allowance is reduced 
by 5% per year of anticipation.
16.2.4  Family Benefits
Family benefits are introduced for workers with one or more dependent children. 
They consist of the allocation of sums of money or the provision of goods or ser-
vices to the head of the family in order to partially compensate the financial burdens 
resulting from the occurrence/birth of children. Their benefit is subject to general 
conditions among which nationality is not a requirement.
There are several types of family benefits in Senegal. The prenatal allowances are 
granted to any female employee whose husband is unemployed or spouse of a paid 
worker as well as to any unmarried female employee. Maternity benefits are 
12 Such an agreement exists between France and Senegal so that any Senegalese who have acquired 
the right to a retirement pension in France and who decide to return to the home country to perceive 
their due from there.
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provided from the birth of the child until the age of 2. Family allowances are paid 
from the child’s second birthday up to the age of 14 (or 18 if the child is studying or 
21 in case of further education, disability or incurable illness), up to a maximum of 
6 children. The daily maternity leave allowances due to the pregnant female 
employee on maternity leave for a period of 14 weeks, including 8 weeks subse-
quent to the delivery. This leave can have an extension of 3 weeks in case of conse-
quent disease. They amount to 100% of the last salary received.
For accessing family benefits, it is important to be a worker in line with the Labor 
Code and the Merchant Marine Code. However, workers whose children benefit 
from a more favorable benefit scheme are not covered. The status of worker implies 
a professional activity over a period of 3 consecutive months with one or more 
employers, and a minimum working time of 18 or 120 days in the month, being 
understood that this time may be spread over a period of 2 years or 3 months in 
occupations and jobs which involve intermittent or irregular work schedules. The 
entitlement to benefits is retroactive to the date of the commitment. The worker 
must also have dependent children, meaning that he/she must provide, generally and 
permanently, housing, food, clothing and education of the child (this corresponds to 
the duties of the person exercising paternal authority).
However, workers can claim family benefits only if they and their dependent 
children live in Senegal. Nevertheless, those who perform in another State for the 
execution of their contract, a temporary stay of 6  months maximum (renewable 
once), continue to receive benefits. The same applies for those who perform abroad 
a training or professional development, regardless of the duration of the internship. 
On the other hand, the family benefits of the Social Security Fund cannot be granted 
to employees who have their habitual residence abroad and who, for the perfor-
mance of their contract, have a six-month stay (renewable once) in Senegal. The 
residency requirement also applies to beneficiary children.
16.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
Senegal does not have a general framework guaranteeing minimum resources for 
the most vulnerable group of the population. However, the National Family Safety 
Scholarship Program (PNBS) was launched in 2013. It is based on the reconstruc-
tion of solidarity and redistribution of resources based on equity, social justice cor-
responding to forms of social assistance that can mitigate the risks and poverty 
shocks on the most vulnerable groups. The aim of the program is to fight against 
vulnerability and social exclusion of families through integrated social protection 
with a view of promoting their access to social transfers and strengthening, among 
other things, their educational and productive capacities. The social security bursary 
amounts to Francs CFA 100,000 (about 152 Euros) per year, paid to the most 
vulnerable families. The implementation of this program is accompanied by the 
establishment of a consultation mechanism at the national and regional levels in 
order to cover the social demand for the benefit of the most vulnerable families. 
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Circumscribed initially to some 25,000 families, family grants are intended to be 
applied gradually to the poorest households.
16.3  Conclusions
Due to the limitation of the legal texts to the national framework, the Senegalese 
system of social protection has a limited material scope. Most services generally 
aim to either restore the health of the victim by means of pharmaceutical products, 
or compensate the increase of expenses or reducing income in the form of, for 
example, family benefits or old-age pension.
Spatially, unless an agreement or convention waives residency requirements, the 
compulsory social security scheme applies only in Senegal, in accordance with the 
principle of territoriality of social security laws. On a personal level, the system 
exclusively benefits employees, regardless of their nationality, as well as members 
of their families, in order to protect them against the economic and social risks that 
may result from the partial or total loss of income, their temporary or permanent 
capacity to gain or their means to satisfy essential needs. This means that the guar-
antee of the enjoyment of social security guarantees for workers and their entitled 
dependents is not subject to nationality requirement. Nevertheless, migrants who 
intervene in the so-called informal sector and who are by far the most numerous, are 
left behind. The fact is that the existence of an employment contract is the sine qua 
non condition for the applicability of the national social security system to the indi-
vidual and his/her family.
However, the principle of territoriality of the social security laws results in non- 
taking into account the non-resident nationals as well as the members of their 
families remaining in the country. The non-applicability of social security benefits 
is likely to dissuade immigrants currently residing in Senegal from returning to the 
countries of nationality either during their career or retirement, to give up the idea 
of no longer being able to collect the benefits for which they have contributed over 
years. The question of the applicability of social security benefits for foreigners is 
therefore crucial and must therefore catch the attention of public authorities.
Bilateral or multilateral social security agreements can overcome these 
difficulties. Conventions are only a good part of the solution in that they can make 
up for discrepancies between national laws and establish rules for coordination, but 
also for integration. At the regional or sub-regional level, many social security 
conventions are still not implemented. Despite their normative importance for 
migrant workers, bilateral agreements procrastinate on the difficulties that have on 
their effectiveness. First of all, they are often not well-known by their recipients: 
labor professionals and migrants. Secondly, the institutions responsible for their 
monitoring and enforcement lack oftentimes means and capacities. Still, in the 
absence of social security agreements signed between home and host countries, 
migrants who work in another country cannot benefit their family members who 
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stay in the country. Similarly, those who decide to leave the host country run the risk 
of losing their acquired rights or those to be acquired.
It is true that coordination between social security institutions is not easy. Their 
cooperation is often hindered by a weak development of the social security system 
in some countries, the fact that not all benefits are offered by the host country, dif-
ferences between the social security systems of home and host countries and, finally, 
the insufficiency of the administrative capacities to prove and guarantee that all the 
necessary conditions are satisfied on the one hand, and to ensure efficiently the 
transfer of the benefits during several years, on the other hand.
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Chapter 17
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 
and Social Protection for Senegalese 
Citizens Abroad
Etienne Smith
17.1  Diaspora Characteristics and Home Country 
Engagement Infrastructure
17.1.1  The Senegalese Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
With a population of Senegalese abroad approaching one million for a total popula-
tion of 15 millions, Senegal is unquestionably an emigration country. The Senegalese 
diaspora is estimated at a minimum of 550,000 and up to 2,5 million people by 
some estimates. Based on the most consistent and minimal figures, the Senegalese 
population abroad is divided primarily between Western Europe (approximately 
280,000) and Sub-Saharan Africa (around 230,000), with the rest in North America 
(around 25,000), North Africa and the Middle East (15,000) and very small num-
bers in Asia and South America. According to the estimations, the main destination 
countries in Europe comprise France (around 110,000), Italy (80,000) and Spain 
(60,000); in West Africa, mostly Gambia (100,000), Mauritania (40,000) and the 
Ivory Coast (20,000); in Central and Southern Africa, Gabon (20,000), Congo 
(10,000) and South Africa (5,000); in North Africa and the Middle East, Morocco 
(10.000); in North America, the United States of America (20,000) and Canada 
(5,000) (Lessault and Mezger 2010; Smith 2015b; Ndione 2019).
Historically, Senegalese first emigrated to other African countries (West Africa 
and Central Africa) and France. Emigration flows diversified in the 1990s to include 
notably Italy, Spain and North America, as well as new destination countries in the 
Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Gulf states), North Africa (Morocco), Asia (China) 
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and South America (Brazil, Argentina) (Bredeloup 1992; Robin and Lalou 2000; 
Tall 2002; Diop 2008; Fall 2013; Lessault and Flahaux 2013; Baizán et al. 2013; 
Beauchemin et al. 2014; Ndione 2019). Senegalese emigration is sociologically het-
erogeneous, combining historical flows of labour migration (industrial sector in 
France and Southern Europe, mining sector in West and Central Africa- see 
Bredeloup 1993; Beauchemin et al. 2014) in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by petty 
trade and informal sector (virtually everywhere, see Ebin and Lake 1990), student 
and highly-skilled migration (mainly in France, but also Switzerland, Belgium, 
North America, Morocco, or Asia- see Bava and Pliez 2009), and religious endeav-
ours (Mboup 2001; Tandian 2008; Dia 2014; Berriane 2015).
17.1.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
Engagement with the diaspora started in the 1980s, when students and migrant 
workers in France were the two main categories of Senegalese abroad. In 1979, the 
Service for the Monitoring of Senegalese Students Abroad1 was created by the 
Ministry of Education. Hosted in the Embassy of Senegal in Paris, it manages gov-
ernemental scholarships for Senegalese students abroad (payment, orientation and 
assistance for Senegalese students abroad) and is competent for Senegalese students 
worldwide. In 1983, a deputy-minister in charge of emigrants (ministre délégué 
chargé des émigrés) was appointed for the first time, primarily tasked with provid-
ing assistance to Senegalese in France (Fall 2010, p. 82). In a context of the first 
wave of forced repatriation of Senegalese migrants from France, the Office for 
Reception, Orientation and Monitoring of Emigrants2 was created in 1987 to pro-
vide assistance to returnees.
However, the real policy turn and first attempt at institutionalizing a comprehen-
sive engagement with the diaspora occured in 1993, when the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’s official name became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese 
Abroad3 and with the creation within the Ministry of the General Directorate of 
Senegalese Abroad4. In charge of the promotion, protection and assistance to 
Senegalese nationals abroad, this Directorate became a Ministry of its own in 2003, 
known as the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad5. In 2012, it was reintegrated within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad. The General Directorate of 
Senegalese Abroad currently comprises two divisions: the Directorate for the 
Assistance and Promotion of Senegalese Abroad6, formerly known as the Directorate 
1 Service de Gestion des Étudiants Sénégalais à l’Étranger.
2 Bureau d’Accueil, d’Orientation et de Suivi des émigrés (BAOS).
3 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (MAESE).
4 Direction Générale des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (DGSE).
5 Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (MSE).
6 Direction de l’Assistance et de la Promotion des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (DAPSE).
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for Social Affairs7, in charge of the protection and assistance to Senegalese abroad, 
and the Directorate for the Promotion of Investment and Projects8 responsible for 
the economic promotion of Senegalese abroad (Fall 2010; Toma and Kabbanji 
2017). In 2017, the decree reorganizing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Senegalese Abroad mentions that the Minister “assists, as necessary, Senegalese 
abroad, encourages and coordinates the initiatives aimed at their gathering. It devel-
ops mechanisms for their economic, social and cultural reintegration as well as their 
access to housing and the promotion of their investment projects.”9
The Senegalese consular network is relatively large and well-funded for a devel-
oping country, with a diplomatic presence (embassies and consulates) in 49 coun-
tries (23 in Africa, 11 in Europe, 6 in the Middle East, 6 in Asia, 3 in the Americas). 
Initially, the consular network did not reflect the geography of Senegalese emigra-
tion, but rather historical ties and geopolitical motives (Western Europe, West 
African neighbouring countries, key countries in Africa like Nigeria or Ethiopia). 
However, the geography of diplomatic representations increasingly matches 
Senegalese emigration, with an increased presence in countries with major 
Senegalese communities like Spain and Italy, or with new destination countries in 
Latin America and Asia. Mobile consulate services are offered in some countries, 
notably for passport application, ID card application, and electoral register registra-
tion. A network of honorary consuls also exists. Honorary consuls are habilitated to 
provide assistance to Senegalese abroad (contacts, reaching out to local or home 
authorities, etc.), but they do not issue official documents.
Exceptional repatriation by consulates for health issues is possible, but only for 
severe health conditions. No formal rules apply as the decision remains at the dis-
cretion of the consulates and the Directorate for the Assistance and Promotion of 
Senegalese Abroad of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad.10 In 
case of death, consulates help logistically with repatriation of bodies and adminis-
trative procedures, although there is no formal provision for financial support. When 
the family of the deceased duly declares the death, the consulate issues a “voucher” 
which reduces tax paid at customs for the repatriation of the deceased body.
A consultative institution, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Senegalese Abroad, also exists. The Superior Council of Senegalese Abroad11 was 
officially created in 1995, and then again in 2010, after more than ten years of inac-
tivity. It finally changed its name in 2014 to become the High Council of Senegalese 
7 Direction des Affaires Sociales (DAS).
8 Direction de l’Appui à l’Investissements et aux Projets (DAIP)
9 Décret n° 2017-1565 du 13 septembre 2017 relatif aux attributions du Ministre des Affaires 
étrangères et des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur, https://www.sec.gouv.sn/d%C3%A9cret-n%C2%B0% 
C2%A02017-1565-du-13-septembre-2017-relatif-aux-attributions-du-ministre-des-affaires. Last 
accessed 29 April 2020.
10 Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur, Guide du Sénégalais de l’Extérieur. Mieux communi-
quer avec les compatriotes expatriés, Dakar, 2007, p. 23.
11 Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l’Etranger (CSSE).
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Abroad12, but is still not fully functional. It has a consultative role on all matters 
regarding Senegalese abroad, and is supposed to meet twice a year in Dakar at the 
request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad. Extraordinary 
meetings can also be organized at the request of two thirds of its members. The High 
Council is composed of: (1) members elected among Senegalese residing abroad 
duly registered with the Senegalese embassy and members of associations of 
Senegalese abroad duly recognized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the host 
country and; (2) members appointed by the President of the Republic13.
The major political parties have branches abroad, with a formal presence in the 
parties’ organisation charts.14 Historically, these sections abroad have been particu-
larly active in France, Italy, the United States, Spain and Gabon. Electoral cam-
paigns often begin abroad and some presidential candidates have even launched 
their political campaign from abroad (Salzbrunn 2002; Smith 2015a). In countries 
like France, links with parties and trade unions of the host country have also devel-
opped throughout the years, especially at the local level.
Called émigrés or travailleurs migrants in official policy documents in the 1980s, 
the Senegalese nationals abroad have subsequently been named Sénégalais de 
l’étranger and finally Sénégalais de l’extérieur in the official nomenclature.15 In 
2007, the Ministry used the expression “expatriates” (compatriotes expatriés) in its 
official Handbook for Senegalese Abroad.16 Senegalese abroad are commonly 
referred as les émigrés and la diaspora in daily conversation and media reports. In 
Senegal, views about Senegalese abroad are mixed: a strong desire for migration 
and social emulation triggered by “success stories” of seeminly wealthy returnees 
cohabitate with criticism regarding lifestyle abroad (Riccio 2005; Diop 2008; 
Timera 2014). However, rather favourable overall views predominate as the finan-
cial flows from the diaspora are unanimously considered vital for the Senegalese 
economy (Ndione 2009; Somé 2009; OECD 2012). In 2017, these flows reached 2,2 
billion US dollars, accounting for around 13% of the Gross Domestic Product and 
more than twice the level of development aid (Ndione 2019, p. 17, 68).
12 Haut Conseil des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (HCSE).
13 In its initial stage (1995–2000), the geographical distribution of its 60 elected members was the 
following: Africa (30), Europe (16), Americas (7), Middle East (6) and Asia (1). 15 members were 
appointed by the President of the Republic. In 2010, for the “re-creation” of the Council, 30 mem-
bers were elected and 45 appointed by the President of the Republic.
14 See, for instance, the Delegation for Senegalese Abroad (Délégation des Sénégalais de 
l’Extérieur) of Alliance pour la République (APR); the National Secretary for the Diaspora 
(Secrétaire National Chargé de la Diaspora) of Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS); or the 
National Secretariat for Senegalese Abroad and Migration (Secrétariat National aux Sénégalais de 
l’extérieur et aux questions migratoires) of Parti Socialiste (PS).
15 “Les Sénégalais établis hors du Sénégal” is a term used only very recently, probably modelled on 
the expression in use in French policy documents when referring to French expatriates.
16 Guide du Sénégalais de l’Extérieur. Mieux communiquer avec les compatriotes expatriés, 
Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur, Dakar, 2007.
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17.1.3  Key Engagement Policies
In 2001, the Government of Senegal held a symposium in Dakar to engage with 
associations of Senegalese abroad, which led to the autonomisation of the Direction 
Générale des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur and the creation of the Ministry of Senegalese 
Abroad in 2003. In 2006, the Ministry formalized the official policy commitments 
of the state towards its citizens abroad in a Policy Paper on Senegalese abroad17, 
later updated in 2011, sketching out the main priorities: consular registration and 
assistance, political representation, and economic promotion. In 2018, the Ministry 
issued its policy plan, drafted in partnership with the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 
National Migration Policy of Senegal18 reaffirms these main goals, while clearly 
prioritizing economic development in line with the national development plan of 
Senegal known as Plan Sénégal Emergent and regulation of emigration flows in line 
with the priorities of Senegal’s main partners (France, Italy, and Spain).
Registration and Administrative Documents
Consulates are responsible for the upkeep of the Register of Senegalese Abroad19. 
Consular registration is optional for Senegalese abroad, but necessary in order to 
acquire a consular ID (carte consulaire), a national identity card and a voter’s card 
(the same biometric card for the latter two).20 Only eight consulate generals (in 
France, Italy, Spain, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Morocco, the United States, Saudi 
Arabia) are entitled to produce and deliver biometric passports directly to 
Senegalese abroad.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad centralizes the consular 
register and has been carrying out a comprehensive census of Senegalese abroad 
since 2009. However, it has not yet been published. It also holds an official register 
of associations of Senegalese abroad. In 2008, a total of 741 such associations 
worldwide were registered with the Ministry.
All Senegalese consulates are habilitated to issue birth certificates for Senegalese 
born abroad in the jurisdiction of the consulate. Birth must be declared within one 
month and the birth certificate is issued free of charge by the Consulate within three 
to ten days (birth certificate of the host country and a valid ID must be produced).
17 Lettre de Politique Sectorielle des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur, Ministère des Sénégalais de 
l’Extérieur, Dakar, 2006.
18 Politique Nationale de Migration du Sénégal (PNMS).
19 Registre des Sénégalais établis hors du Sénégal.
20 If they do not register in the Register of Senegalese abroad or the register for external voting, 
Senegalese abroad can keep being registered as residents in Senegal, provided that they have proof 
of residence in Senegal. As a result, they can access health services provided to Senegalese 
residents.
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Electoral Rights and Political Representation
Adopted in 1992, external voting rights have allowed Senegalese abroad to partici-
pate in Senegalese presidential and legislative elections since 1993 (Dedieu et al. 
2013; Smith 2015a, b). While initially only a handful of communities of Senegalese 
abroad could participate (for instance, only Senegalese from 15 countries in the 
2000 elections), now Senegalese living in 49 countries participate in Senegalese 
elections. The electoral register for Senegalese abroad compiled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad comprises more than 310,000 voters (in 
2019), who are required to vote in person at a polling station in the country of resi-
dence. In 2016, in line with the argument that the Senegalese abroad constitute “the 
15th region of Senegal”, special parliamentary representation for Senegalese abroad 
was introduced for the first time: 15 of the 165 seats in the National Assembly are 
now reserved for Senegalese abroad, i.e. just below 10%. The implemention of this 
major constitutional reform took place during the legislative elections of 2017.21
Economic Promotion
Besides political rights, economic engagement with the diaspora is the key priority 
for the Governement of Senegal. Securing housing in Senegal was a major concern 
for Senegalese abroad in the 2000s. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese 
abroad hosted a division specifically dedicated to this task, the Directorate for the 
Promotion of Housing for Senegalese Abroad22. A program of “diaspora estates” 
was launched in two regions for Senegalese from France, the United States and 
Italy. The scheme monitored sale of land plots and five years loans for Senegalese 
abroad organized in associations and willing to pay 20% of the total construction 
costs (Tall 2009). These programs were not continued, but the Directorate for the 
Promotion of Investment and Projects23 continues to organize housing fairs abroad 
(Salons de l’habitat) to promote the purchase of real estate in Senegal by Senegalese 
abroad. Since 2012, a Interministerial Committee to help Senegalese abroad access 
housing in Senegal24 has been given the task to determine quotas for Senegalese 
abroad in accessing constructible land, provide information and assistance to 
Senegalese abroad to access funding facilities for housing.
During that same decade, the official discourse gradually shifted its priorities 
upon realizing that investment made by Senegalese abroad in real estate, transport 
or trade is not ‘productive investment’. By the mid-2000s, the channelling of finan-
cial flows from Senegalese abroad towards productive investment (agriculture and 
agro-business, small businesses, etc.) became the top priority, being recently reiter-
ated within the framework of the long-term development strategy for 2035 (Plan 
Sénégal Emergent).
21 These extra-territorial seats are distributed as follows: Africa (7), Europe (6), America and 
Oceania (1), Asia and the Middle East (1).
22 Direction de la Promotion de l’Habitat des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (DIPHASE).
23 Direction de l’Appui à l’Investissements et aux Projets (DAIP).
24 Comité interministériel pour l’accès au logement des sénégalais établis à l’étranger.
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The major innovation in this respect has been the creation of the Investment 
Support Fund for Senegalese Abroad25 in 2008. This investment and guarantee fund, 
under the auspices of the Directorate for the Promotion of Investment and Projects, 
promotes “productive investment” in Senegal by Senegalese abroad in any sector 
except real estate, trade and transport. Any Senegalese citizen residing abroad, hold-
ing a valid document proving residence abroad, and bringing a 10% personal con-
tribution to the project is eligible. Two mechanisms are in place: either direct loans 
or a guarantee provided for loans with private banks. Technical expertise is also 
provided.
In parallel, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has set up an Investment and 
Guarantee Fund for Senegalese Abroad26, as part of the broader FONGIP program27. 
This investment and guarantee fund is specifically for small businesses in priority 
sectors, as defined by the Ministry. It seeks to help Senegalese abroad access credit 
by decentralized financial services institutions in Senegal and to strengthen these 
decentralized financial services institutions in Senegalese regions, especially those 
contributing the most to international migration flows.
These two initiatives are part of the Policy Plan for Senegalese Abroad28 launched 
by the General Directorate for Senegalese Abroad as part of the Strategic Orientation 
Plan 2014–2017, which aimed at promoting the territorialization of migration in 
favour of local development.
Targetting the remittances of Senegalese abroad, promoting local development 
and encouraging return migration are seen as convergent and mutually reinforcing 
goals by the Ministry, as well as international partners of Senegal’s migration policy 
(IOM; French, Spanish and Italian cooperation especially). A few joint initiatives 
have been experimented in the last decade:
• the Support Program for Solidarity Initiatives for Development29, launched in 
2009. Jointly sponsored by the Senegalese Governement30 and French coopera-
tion, its main goal is to provide support for private economic investment projects 
in Senegal by Senegalese residing in France. Two mechanisms exist: (1) financial 
(up to 70% of the projet) and technical support for associations of Senegalese 
nationals in France to set up local infrastructure development in their regions of 
origin in Senegal and; (2) mobilization of scientific and technically-skilled 
Senegalese from France for short assignments in Senegal. The program also 
25 Fond d’Appui à l’Investissement des Sénéglais de l’Extérieur (FAISE). Within the FAISE, a 
specific fund, Femmes de la diaspora, is devoted to projects led by women from the diaspora
26 Fonds de Garantie pour l’Investissement des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (FOGARISE).
27 The FONGIP is a guarantee fund for priority investment set up by the Government in 2012.
28 Plan d’action en faveur des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur.
29 Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement (PAISD).
30 The institutions responsable for the program in Senegal are the Direction de la Coopération 
Technique at the Secrétariat Général de la Présidence de la République du Sénégal, the Agence de 
Développement et d’Encadrement des Petites et Moyennes entreprises (ADEPME), the Direction 
Générale des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad 
and the Senegalese embassy in Paris.
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includes the specific scheme Solidarity Volunteering for Development31 for sec-
ond and third generation Senegalese born in France who are willing to partici-
pate in Senegal in community-development non-profit projects.32
• the Platform for the Support of the Private Sector and Valorisation of the 
Senegalese Diaspora in Italy.33 This program is a partnership between the 
Microfinance Division of the Ministry of SME(s), Women Entreneurship and 
Microfinance of Senegal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy and the 
Piemonte region in Italy. The Platform provides credit support, loan rate guaran-
tees and technical expertise for small businesses run by Senegalese nationals 
residing in Italy who invest in Senegal (Italians willing to create a small business 
in Senegal are also eligible).
In 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad launched the 
first Support Office for Senegalese Abroad34 outside Senegal, located with the con-
sulate general of Senegal in Milano. Working as a liaison office for the FAISE, 
FONGIP and PLASEPRI national programs, it is mainly an orientation and support 
office providing information for Senegalese in Italy willing to invest in Senegal. 
After this first experiment, the policy goal is to multiply these Support Offices 
abroad in key countries with significant Senegalese migrant communities.
The return of Senegalese migrants is also one of the clearly stated long-term 
goals of the FAISE and PLASEPRI programs.35 The still existing Office for 
Reception, Orientation and Monitoring of Emigrants36 provides information for 
aspiring migrants, first-degree family members with a relative abroad or returnees 
with the aim, in the latter case, of facilitating socio-economic reintegration. It now 
has sub-branches in the regions of Senegal with most emigrants.
Overall, the engagement of the Senegalese state with its citizens abroad has 
clearly intensified over the years, along its two most salient priorities: political rep-
resentation and tapping into the resources of the diaspora. Despite being defined as 
a legitimate policy goal by official policy papers, social protection for Senegalese 
abroad lags behind drastically, especially when compared with the progress noted in 
the two aforementioned policy areas. The main reason is, of course, the embryonic 
state of social protection in Senegal itself in many branches, but also the absence of 
a strong and specifically dedicated institution tasked with advancing social 
31 Volontariat de Solidarité pour le Développement.
32 www.codev.gouv.sn. Last accessed 29 April 2020.
33 Plateforme d’appui au secteur privé et à la valorisation de la diaspora sénégalaise en Italie 
(PLASEPRI).
34 Bureau d’Appui aux Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (BASE).
35 In the period 2006–2007, a sectorial policy was initiated jointly by Spain and Senegal for the 
return of emigrants to agriculture (Plan REVA Retour des Emigrés Vers l’agriculture). The main 
goal of this 20 million euros scheme funded by the Spanish cooperation was to foster jobs in the 
agricultural sector for Senegalese returnees from Spain. Although the program was discontinued, 
some imitative measures to foster investment and return in agriculture are still in place, e.g. the 
reservation of 20% arable land for Senegalese abroad.
36 Bureau d’Accueil, d’Orientation et de Suivi des émigrés (BAOS).
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protection for emigrants. The lack of basic protection and pro-active state policy is 
only partially made up by the self-help schemes and vibrant associational life of 
Senegalese abroad (Dia 2007, 2010; Tandian and Coulibaly-Tandian 2016; 
Hunter 2018).
17.2  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Senegal
As a general rule, in all matters related to social protection, a strict principle of ter-
ritoriality and residence applies in Senegal (Fall 2003; Tounkara 2009; Baumann 
2010). As a result, emigrants lose their rights when they settle abroad, with very few 
exceptions detailed below. The Labour Law, Social Security Law and the founding 
texts of the Institute for Pension Plans of Senegal37 contain no specific disposition 
for emigrants.
Information Policy
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Directorate for 
the Assistance and Promotion of Senegalese Abroad and the consular network have 
the mission to provide basic information and administrative assistance to Senegalese 
abroad. In 2007, the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad, published the Handbook for 
Senegalese Abroad, a 121 pages brochures with basic information about assistance 
and the role of consulates and the Ministry. Information provided about assistance 
is primarily focused on repatriation of corpses, i.e the administrative assistance that 
consulates and the Ministry can provide. Consulates help logistically with the repa-
triation of bodies and administrative procedures, but no formal provision for finan-
cial assistance exists. Exceptional financial help is at the discretion of the Directorate 
for the Assistance and Promotion of Senegalese Abroad. When the family of the 
deceased duly declares the death, consulates issue a “voucher” which reduces tax 
paid at customs for the repatriation of the corpse. In practice, the costs are covered 
by self-help associations, some of which have been structuring themselves as socié-
tés de secours mutuel, but the Ministry plays no part in these associations, except for 
holding the register and disseminating their contacts. One noteworthy exception is 
the particular case of repatriation of murdered individuals: the Ministry has made it 
an unwritten rule to cover the costs of repatriation of Senegalese abroad who were 
murdered38.
Abroad, only Senegalese in France benefit from the presence of a social affairs 
attaché (assistante sociale) at the consulate general of Senegal in Paris. The attaché 
provides protection and legal assistance for Senegalese in France in situation of 
distress or facing legal issues, but no detailed specific information is provided online.
37 Institut de Prévoyance Retraite du Sénégal (IPRES).
38 Interview with Mr. Sory Kaba, Head of the General Directorate for Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 
January 8, 2019. Quite a few cases of murders of Senegalese abroad have been mediatized in recent 
years in Italy, France, Spain, the United States, Brazil, the Ivory Coast or Morocco.
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In Senegal, the Social Security Board39 provides specific information to family 
members in its national office (with a dedicated office for migrants and their family 
members within the Division for Social Protection for Emigrants40 and its regional 
branches).
Bilateral Conventions on Social Protection
As of 2018, the bilateral convention on social protection between France and 
Senegal, signed in 1974, is the only convention that has been implemented. Specific 
information is provided by the social affairs attaché at the consulate general in Paris 
for Senegalese living in France who can benefit from the application of the conven-
tion, which currently covers only family allowances (see below).
Senegal also signed bilateral conventions with Mali (1965, renegociated in 1996) 
and Mauritania (1972, renegociated in 1987), which are very limited in scope.41 A 
convention was signed with Cabo Verde (1998), although it is not implemented yet. 
Conventions with Gabon and Cameroon have also been drafted, but not been ratified 
(Tounkara 2009, p. 23–24). During the last decade, Senegal has been negotiating 
with Spain and Italy for bilateral conventions, but no agreement has been reached 
yet about their future perimeter and the set of rights to include.
Multilateral Conventions on Social Protection
In 1993, 14 Member States of the Zone Franc in Africa established a dedicated 
institution for the harmonisation of social protection regimes, the Inter-African 
Conference on Social Welfare (CIPRES)42 based in Lomé (Togo). The major policy 
goal of CIPRES is to help Member States coordinate their social protection regimes, 
with the explicit objective of improving social protection for migrant workers in 
Member States, as stated in the Preamble and article 1 of the CIPRES Treaty of 
1993. In February 2006, the CIPRES multilateral convention on social security was 
adopted in Dakar. This convention upholds the principle of the continuation of 
acquired rights for migrants (allowing for the suspension of the territoriality prin-
ciple and the transferability of pension and health insurance rights) and equality of 
treatment between citizens of signatory states. However, this convention, ratified by 
Senegal in 2014 only, has been ratified by only seven out of the 17 signatory states.43 
Short of a functional multilateral convention, payment agreements have been 
39 Caisse de Sécurité Sociale (CSS).
40 Division de la Sécurité Sociale des Emigrés.
41 The convention with Mali is merely an administrative agreement between the Social Security 
Boards of each country to facilitate the payment of workplace accident or disease benefits for 
posted workers (travailleurs détachés) on the territory of the other state for less than one year. See: 
Arrangement administratif général relatif aux modalités d’application de la convention générale 
sur la Sécurité Sociale entre la République du Sénégal et la République du Mali, Bamako, 25 July 
1996. With Mauritania, disagreement about the level of family benefits have stalled the process 
(Tounkara 2009, p. 23), as well as currency exchange rate (Ndione 2019, p. 110).
42 Conférence Interafricaine de la Prévoyance Sociale (CIPRES).
43 Current members of CIPRES include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, C.A.R., Congo, Côte 




 negotiated bilaterally between the Social Security Board (CSS) and the Institute for 
Pension Plans of Senegal (IPRES) with their partner institutions in the Ivory Coast, 
Benin, Togo, Mali and Burkina Faso.44
As a Member State of both the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Senegal 
has signed the treaties and protocols of both institutions allowing for the free circu-
lation and settlement of citizens from each Member State in all others Member 
States. To this day, no social protection agreements have been implemented through 
ECOWAS, although a regional social policy framework is clearly on the agenda.45
17.2.1  Unemployment
There is no policy of unemployment benefits in Senegal. The only unemployment 
benefits Senegalese abroad can access are the schemes available in their host coun-
tries, depending on the legislation applicable in each case.
17.2.2  Health Care
Until the mid-2000s, health care provisions in Senegal were only accessible for 
workers in the public sector and formal private sector. In the last decade, major 
policy reforms occured to broaden access to health care for workers in the informal 
sector, children under the age of 5, students and the elderly.46 So far, however, these 
schemes have not been extended to emigrants because the priority remains to extend 
national coverage first.
The Division for Social Protection for Emigrants of the Social Security Board of 
Senegal provides brief information about access to social protection programs avail-
able for Senegalese citizens living in France (and only them) in its brochure 
Handbook for Emigrants47. However, only posted workers (travailleurs détachés) in 
44 As of 2018, only the mutual payment agreements signed with the Ivory Coast, Togo and Burkina 
Faso were fully operational (Ndione 2019, p. 111).
45 In spring 2018, the Social Affairs Division of the ECOWAS Commission, in partnership with 
UNICEF and ILO was recruiting a social protection expert to draft a policy framework with the 
goal of setting regional standards and guidelines for social protection policies and strategies in 
the ECOWAS.
46 See for instance the Plan Sésame, initiated in 2006, providing free basic health care for the 
elderly, and the Couverture Maladie Universelle launched in 2012, aiming at the gradual extension 
of basic health care through mutual health insurance. Health care insurance coverage has increased 
from 7% in 2013 to 20% in 2016. Membership in mutual health insurance organisations has 
reached around 5,3 million (in 2017).
47 Caisse de Sécurité Sociale du Sénégal, Guide des émigrés, http://www.secusociale.sn/docu.
html#guiem. Accessed 4 April 2018.
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France are eligible for the continued access to Senegalese social security benefits in 
the area of health care for a maximum period of three years (with possible excep-
tional extensions). All other Senegalese emigrants in France are encouraged to seek 
access to health and invalidiy schemes provided by France and check their eligibil-
ity status with these programs.
17.2.3  Pensions
Senegalese citizens entitled to claim their right to retirement from Senegal and who 
choose to settle abroad may receive their pension provided that they have a bank 
account where the transfers will be made. The Institute for Pension Plans of Senegal 
(IPRES) has a specific section of its website dedicated to Senegalese abroad, yet 
with relatively little information.48 Within the consular network, only the consulate 
general in France provides information on the bilateral convention between France 
and Senegal through its social affairs attaché. However, the convention applies to 
Senegalese workers in France willing to return to Senegal and keep the benefit of 
their French pension49, and not to Senegalese in France willing to keep the benefit 
of their Senegalese pension50.
Emigrants have consistently called for the renegociation of the bilateral conven-
tion between France and Senegal in order to better accommodate the needs of 
Senegalese workers and pensioners. However, as in other fields of social protection, 
the most pressing issue for the Governement is to increase national coverage before 
addressing the case of emigrants’ access.
17.2.4  Family-Related Benefits
Family benefits in Senegal (allocations familiales) exist for workers in the public 
sector and the formal private sector. Senegalese abroad are not eligible for these 
programs, except those residing in France.
48 www.ipres.sn/institut/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&Itemid=90. 
Accessed 4 April 2018.
49 This is possible only for contributory pension schemes within the general regime, not for non-
contributory benefits such as the guaranteed minimum for the elderly (minimum vieillesse) which 
requires residence in France (at least six months per year). Retired Senegalese migrants returning 
to Senegal, even when eligible to French pensions, may nonetheless face visa or residence permit 
issues with the French administration that can affect their ability to effectively access their pen-
sion scheme.
50 Convention du 29 mars 1974 entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et le 
Gouvernement de la République du Sénégal sur la Sécurité Sociale, modifiée par l’avenant du 
21.12.1922 en vigueur le 01.06.1994 (décret n°94–513 du 20.06.1994).
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In application of the 1974 Franco-Senegalese bilateral convention on social 
security, the Social Security Board of Senegal (CSS), through its dedicated Division 
for Social Security for Emigrants, is responsible for the payment of French family 
allowances to the family members (spouse and children) in Senegal of Senegalese 
workers living in France (pre-birth, birth and family benefits for up to four children 
until 18 years old or 21 years old if students). The French Family Allowances 
Office51 transfers the allowances money to the Social Security Board of Senegal. 
This scheme requires the yearly certification of the family certificate by the Social 
Security Board of Senegal and the consulate general in Paris. Payment occurs in 
cash at the regional offices of the Social Security Board of Senegal. Additionally, 
four times a year, mobile payment teams circulate at the village level (10-day tours) 
for the three regions with most emigrants (Saint-Louis, Matam and Tambacounda). 
The Social Security Board of Senegal also cooperates regularly with its French 
equivalent for the transmission of relevant documents and certificates, which transit 
through the consulate general of Senegal in Paris. Moreover, Senegalese in France 
have access to a personal account on the online portal of the Social Security Board 
of Senegal, which has a specific section of its website dedicated to Senegalese in 
France (Espaces émigrés).
The consulate general in Paris is specifically tasked with providing relevant 
information for Senegalese workers in France about Senegalese family allowances 
for their family members residing in Senegal. It participates in the certification and 
transmission of relevant documents (état de famille- family certificate) to the Family 
Allowances Office in France and the Social Security Board in Sénégal.
17.2.5  Economic Hardship
There is no nationwide program in Senegal providing a guaranteed minimum 
resources scheme. Launched in 2013, the National Program of Allowances for 
Family Safety52 targets the most vulnerable households. Selected households receive 
100,000 FCFA (150 euros) per year during five years. In exchange, families must 
enroll children in school, registry office and vaccination programs. The program is 
run by the General Delegation for Social Protection and National Solidarity53. In 
2018, 300,000 families benefitted from this program. However, emigrants are not 
eligible to apply. Self-help associations among Senegalese abroad and remittances 
from Senegalese abroad constitute one of the many informal social safety nets put 
in place by emigrants for themselves or for their relatives in Senegal in the absence 
of a state policy in this domain (Tandian and Coulibaly-Tandian 2016).
51 Caisse d’Allocations Familiales.
52 Programme national de bourses de sécurité familiale (PNBSF).
53 Délégation générale à la protection sociale et à la solidarité nationale (DGPSN).
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17.3  Conclusions
In matters of social protection, Senegalese emigrants are, for the most part, left to 
their own devices. Reform of the Senegalese legislation and introduction of the 
principle of the portability of social protection rights is regularly called for by asso-
ciations of Senegalese emigrants, especially for health care and invalidity. Despite 
persistent demands for a voluntary insurance scheme backed by the Governement 
for emigrants or the creation of a dedicated and comprehensive institution for the 
social protection of emigrants, little policy improvement has yet materialized.
In response to the grievances of the diaspora, the state of Senegal rather priori-
tises the gradual extension of domestic coverage in Senegal through its universal 
health care scheme (planning to increase coverage from 20% to 50%), while also 
pursuing its policy of negotiating bilateral conventions on social protection with 
new countries with large numbers of Senegalese citizens (Italy, Spain). However, 
even when a bilateral convention exists, reciprocity does not function well when 
social protection policies are found lacking in the sending state or when the destina-
tion country prioritises the management of return migration over the extension of 
new rights. According to emigrant associations and policy experts, the only working 
convention to date, i.e. between France and Senegal, also needs to be reformed as its 
scope remains very limited (family allowances only).
There is much room for change in the future however, as the economic weight of 
the diaspora keeps increasing and the allocation of the 15 new seats to the diaspora 
in the Parliament could amplify the political voice of Senegalese abroad advocating 
policy change, depending though on the extent to which these new representatives 
of Senegalese abroad will take on their new role.
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Chapter 18
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Serbia
Tamara Popic
18.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in Serbia
18.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
Similar to the other former socialist countries from the South Eastern European 
region, Serbia’s welfare policy development at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century was characterized by a reform delay. Due to the protracted transition from 
socialism to capitalism disturbed by severe economic crisis and affected by the 
Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, the country started the so-called ‘de-blocked’ transfor-
mation of its welfare state only in 2000 (Perišić 2016). Since then, the efforts to 
reform the national welfare state have been relatively unsuccessful, mainly due to 
the country’s unstable economic outlook. Consequently, the national welfare sys-
tem is characterized by the focus on the old rather than the new social risks. Today, 
welfare provision in Serbia is one of the public sectors facing fundamental demo-
graphic and economic challenges and a sector that is, to a large extent, shaped by 
economic decisions (Perišić and Vidojević 2015).
The national social security system is based on the social insurance model and 
financed mainly by social insurance contributions and, to a lesser extent, the general 
state budget via taxes. The entitlement for most social benefits is based on employ-
ment period and/or payment of compulsory insurance contributions. More specifi-
cally, unemployment, health benefits and pensions are based on the payment of 
insurance contributions. Some family benefits are based on employment, whereas 
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others depend on citizenship and residence. The guaranteed minimum resources 
scheme is conditioned solely by citizenship and residence.
As most social benefits are contributory, foreigners residing and working in 
Serbia have access to these benefits under the same eligibility conditions as Serbian 
nationals. There are, however, certain exceptions. One of them is in the area of guar-
anteed minimum resources, which is a non-contributory scheme available only for 
national citizens. Another exception are parental benefits. To qualify for the benefit, 
the parent must be a citizen and resident of Serbia. Foreigners are also excluded as 
potential beneficiaries of child benefits as the later are means-tested and require the 
child to be a Serbian national residing in Serbia. However, certain categories of 
foreigners, such as those coming from countries that have a bilateral social security 
agreement with Serbia, can benefit from a differential treatment in terms of access-
ing social protection in Serbia.
As most social benefits are linked to employment and/or previous contributions, 
Serbian citizens residing abroad are generally excluded as potential beneficiaries 
and there are very limited possibilities of exporting these benefits when deciding to 
permanently reside abroad. The only exception are pensions. If during the period 
spent working abroad, Serbian citizens are not compulsory insured with the foreign 
insurance authority, or if they cannot use their rights outside of the territory of the 
state they work in, they can join the Serbian pension insurance scheme. At the same 
time, Serbians living abroad in one of the three countries that represent the 3 largest 
destinations for Serbian citizens (Germany, Austria and Switzerland) are able to 
receive some social benefits based on bilateral social security agreements between 
Serbia and these countries.
18.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
The evolution of Serbia’s migration trends can be better understood in light of the 
country’s political and historical development. From 1945 until 1992, Serbia was a 
communist state and one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia’s breakup, from 1992 to 2006, the country was first in 
federation and then in union with Montenegro. In 2006, Serbia became an indepen-
dent state. These changes in the statehood status and other events such as the 
Yugoslavia’s civil war (1991–2001) and the NATO bombing (1999) had a strong 
impact on the political and socio-economic situation in the country and a significant 
influence on migration flows. In fact, most migration flows have been largely moti-




According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1 in 2018 there are around 4.5 mil-
lion Serbian citizens living abroad, compared to 7 million individuals residing in 
Serbia. At the same time, in 2017, there were around 500.000 foreigners living in 
Serbia, coming mainly from former Yugoslavia republics.2 The three countries with 
the largest number of Serbian nationals are Germany, Austria and Switzerland. At 
the same time, the three largest groups of foreigners residing in Serbia come from 
former Yugoslavia republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro. 
Currently, Serbia has bilateral social security agreements signed with all these six 
countries. These agreements are based on the principle of equal treatment and the 
general condition that foreigners residing in Serbia must be legally entitled to these 
benefits in their home countries in order to receive them in Serbia. The agreements 
also allow for the aggregation of insurance periods between the two countries, as in 
the case of pensions.
Generally speaking, Serbian social protection policies toward migrants can be 
explained by the structure of the country’s welfare system based on social insurance 
contributions. Since employment is the basis of most benefits entitlement, they are 
granted to foreigners living and working in Serbia, while Serbians abroad have 
access to these benefits only depending on social security agreements between 
Serbia and the respective country. More substantially, however, the very limited 
access to non-contributory benefits for both foreigners in Serbia and Serbians 
abroad can be explained by different reasons. For foreigners, by the exclusionary 
principle according to which certain benefits are granted only to resident Serbian 
citizens. For Serbians abroad, by the elites’ perception of diaspora as mainly an 
economic resource, and as a supplement to the country’s social-safety net, rather 
than its beneficiary.
To this date, no recent Serbian government has put forward a pro-active policy 
towards the integration of immigrants or the Serbian diaspora into the country’s 
social protection system. The only move in this direction, regarding immigrants, 
was the adoption of the 2014 Law on Employment of Foreigners,3 which stipulates 
that foreigners employed in Serbia have equal rights and obligations with respect to 
work, employment and self-employment as Serbian nationals (Article 4). However, 
the law also introduces the possibility of limiting the number of non-national 
employees in Serbia, depending on situation on the Serbian labor market.4
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/konzularni-poslovi/dijas-
pora/dijaspora-opste?lang=lat. Accessed on 1 October 2018.
2 United Nations (2019). Monitoring Global Population Trends. http://www.un.org/en/develop-
ment/desa/population/migration/data/index.shtml. Accessed on 13 February 2019.
3 Law on Employment of Foreigners (Zakon o Zapošljavanju Stranaca). Official Gazette 113/2017.
4 Zdravković, M. (2015). Serbia: New Act on Employment of Foreigners is Adopted. https://www.
schoenherr.eu/publications/publication-detail/serbia-new-act-on-employment-of-foreigners-is-
adopted/. Accessed 1 October 2018.
18 Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, Emigrants and Resident Nationals…
308
18.2  Migration and Social Protection in Serbia
As explained above, both citizens of Serbia and foreigners residing in Serbia gain 
access to most social protection benefits based on employment and/or previous con-
tribution period, but access to some benefits is dependent on both citizenship and 
residence. In 2018, contributions for pension (and invalidity) insurance amount to 
26% of the salary, 10.3% for healthcare (including benefits in kind, sickness cash 
benefits and invalidity cash benefits), and 1.5% of the salary for unemployment 
insurance.5 For healthcare, insurance contributions cover workers and their families, 
while contributions of specific social groups independently of their employment 
status (such as pregnant women, children, or blood donors) are covered by the state 
(taxes). Family benefits (including maternity, paternity, parental and child benefits) 
are non-contributory, but eligibility to some of these benefits still depends on previ-
ous employment (maternity and paternity benefits). Pensions and unemployment 
benefits depend on periods of previous employment and contributions. The social 
protection benefits that are non-contributory are those provided under the guaran-
teed minimum resources scheme (financial social assistance) and two types of fam-
ily benefits (parental and child allowance). As mentioned above, these last three 
types of benefits are also granted exclusively to resident citizens, since both citizen-
ship and residence represent key eligibility criteria.
Currently, Serbia is a member in 14 regional integration organisations,6 but none 
of them provides for social security coordination, nor they facilitate in any way the 
access to social benefits for community migrants.
18.2.1  Unemployment
The unemployment insurance (osiguranje u slučaju nezaposlenosti) for both 
national citizens and foreign residents is regulated by the Labour Law,7 the Law on 
Employment and on Unemployment Insurance,8 and the Law on Employment of 
5 MISSCEO (2019). The Mutual Information System on Social Protection of the Council of Europe 
Database. http://www.missceo.coe.int. Accessed 13 February 2018.
6 The South East Europe Cooperation Process; the Central European Initiative; the Adriatic and 
Ionian Initiative; the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin; the Migration, Asylum, 
Refugees Regional Initiative; the Central European Free Trade Agreement; the South East 
European Law Enforcement Centre; the Regional Cooperation Council; the Brdo-Brioni Process; 
the EU Strategy for the Danube region; the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region; the 
Berlin Process; the Visegrad Group and the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2018a).
7 Labour Law (Zakon o Radu). (2005). Official Gazette 113/2017.
8 Law on Employment and on Unemployment Insurance (Zakon o Zapošljavanju i Osiguranju u 
Slučaju Nezaposlenosti). Official Gazette 113/2017.
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Foreigners. The institution in charge of these benefits is the National Employment 
Service (Nacionalna Služba za Zapošljavanje – NSZ).
Unemployment benefits are financed by the social insurance scheme, which 
includes compulsory contributions set at 1.5% of workers’ wages (of which employ-
ers pay 0.75% and employees 0.75%). Resident nationals and foreigners who are 
employed or self-employed are eligible for unemployment benefits if they have pre-
viously been insured for at least 12 months continuously or discontinuously for at 
least 18  months. Prior residence in Serbia is not an eligibility requirement. To 
receive unemployment insurance benefits, nationals and foreigners must be regis-
tered as unemployed/job seekers, available for work, and prove regular job search.
Individuals are obliged to claim the benefit within 30 days since s/he stopped 
paying unemployment insurance. Claimants must wait around 2  months for the 
approval of the benefits, after which they receive the first payment ‘retroactively’ 
(thus covering the whole period since the individual submitted the claim). The 
amount received depends on previous earnings and duration of employment. The 
maximum duration depends on insurance periods.9 Those who need two more years 
until reaching the retirement age can receive the unemployment benefits for up to 
2 years. While receiving unemployment benefits, individuals can temporarily leave 
the country as long as they fulfil their obligations towards the NSZ (including pres-
ence at the NSZ every 30 days, and response to NSZ’s calls, job offers, and partici-
pation in activation programs and trainings). While the law does not actually 
stipulate sanctions, if the individual does not fulfil these obligations, s/he is excluded 
from the national unemployment register, this leading to the temporary suspension 
of the benefit. Those who receive unemployment benefits in Serbia can export them 
when deciding to move abroad only if the country to which they have moved has a 
bilateral social security agreement with Serbia covering unemployment benefits.
After the unemployment insurance benefit comes to an end, there is no separate 
unemployment assistance.
18.2.2  Health Care
The access to health benefits in cash and kind and invalidity benefits is regulated by 
several pieces of legislation.10 Resident nationals and foreigners can access these 
benefits based on the compulsory social insurance scheme financed mainly by 
9 Three months for those who have from 1 to 5 years of insurance; six months for 5 to 15 years of 
insurance; nine months for 15 to 25 years; and 12 months for more than 25 years of previous 
insurance.
10 Law on Social Insurance Contributions (Zakon o Doprinosima za Obavezno Socijalno 
Osiguranje), Law on Healthcare (Zakon o Zdravstvenoj Zaštiti), Law on Healthcare Insurance 
(Zakon o Zdravstvenom Osiguranju), Statute on Conditions and Procedures on Compulsory Health 
Insurance Right (Pravilnik o načinu i postupku ostvarivanja prava iz obaveznog zdravstvenog 
osiguranja), Law on Labor (Zakon o Radu), Law on Pension and Invalidity Insurance (Zakon o 
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contributions and, to a much lesser extent, by taxation. Contributions for social 
health insurance amount to 10.3% of workers’ wages. The institution in charge of 
administrating these contributions is the National Health Insurance Fund (Zavod za 
Zdravstveno Osiguranje). The health insurance contributions for unemployed per-
sons are covered by the state through taxation.
Both employed and self-employed individuals are covered by the social health-
care insurance for benefits in kind. Foreign or national residents who are not com-
pulsory insured (for example, students over 26 years old) can join the social security 
scheme voluntarily to get access to the healthcare system. The national health insur-
ance funds decide the level of voluntary monthly contribution to the healthcare 
insurance. In 2018, this contribution amounted to 2374 Serbian Dinars (around 20 
euros).11 Resident nationals and foreigners who are voluntarily insured receive the 
same health benefits in kind compared to those compulsory insured. There is no 
specific requirement of a minimum period of insurance or prior residence in the 
country to become eligible for benefits in kind. Dependant family members of 
employees are also granted access to health services.
The National Health Insurance Fund covers a large part of the healthcare costs 
directly to the healthcare facility or provider. There are also small flat payments for 
specific services that apply to both national and foreign residents entitled to health-
care. For inpatient care, patients pay a fee of 50 Serbian Dinars (around 50 cents) 
for a day spent in hospital. To claim benefits in kind, individuals have to submit a 
copy of their identity card, a copy of the work contract and (only for foreigners 
working in Serbia) a copy of the work permit.
Nationals and foreigners residing in Serbia who are employed or self-employed 
can also claim cash benefits in case of sickness. These benefits do not depend on a 
minimum period of prior residence in Serbia, but there is a requirement of a mini-
mum period of insurance, which differs depending on the type of sickness. For 
sickness not related to work, the person has to be insured for at least 3 months or 
6 months with interruptions over the last 18 months. There is no minimum insur-
ance period required for employment injury or occupational diseases. Resident 
nationals or foreigners who are not compulsory insured cannot join the social insur-
ance scheme voluntarily to become eligible for sickness benefits.
The access to these benefits is conditioned by a medical certificate proving that 
the claimant is incapacitated (for a period of sickness of less than 30 days) or a cer-
tificate from a specialist committee (for periods longer than 30 days). There is also 
an obligatory monthly examination by a specialist committee. The level of sickness 
benefits depends on earnings, although the amount cannot be lower than the mini-
mum salary nor exceed 65% of the highest contribution base. The employer pays 
the sickness benefits of the employee for the first 30 days (although this is not a 
Penzijskom i Invalidskom Osiguranju), Law on Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of 
Individuals with Invalidity (Zakon o Profesionalnoj Rehabilitaciji i Zapošljavanju Osoba sa 
Invaliditetom).
11 National Health Insurance Fund (2018). Inclusion in Compulsory Health Insurance. http://www.
rfzo.rs/index.php/ukljucivanje. Accessed 1 October 2018.
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salary), but after this period, the benefits are paid by the National Health Insurance 
Fund. After 6 months of receiving sickness benefits, individuals are assessed for 
work incapacity by a committee of specialists. If considered capable of work, they 
return to work. In the opposite case, they become eligible for invalidity benefits. 
Those who receive sickness benefits can leave the country temporarily as long as 
they respond to potential requests for medical examination required by their 
employers.
In Serbia, invalidity is defined as a complete loss of the ability to work due to 
health conditions which cannot be reversed by medical treatment or rehabilitation. 
The invalidity pension is granted to both employed and self-employed. Those who 
are not compulsory insured can join the scheme voluntarily by paying invalidity 
(and pension) insurance. The minimum period of insurance required depends on the 
type of invalidity. For work-related invalidity, there is no minimum qualifying 
period, but for invalidity unrelated to work, the minimum insurance period ranks 
from 1 year (for those up to 20 years of age) to 5 years (for individuals over 30 years 
of age). Invalidity benefits do not require a minimum period of prior residence in 
Serbia. These benefits depend on earnings, the period of insurance, gender, age, 
working place risks and causes of invalidity (work-related or not). Those who 
receive invalidity benefits are periodically re-examined. They can temporary leave 
the country if they remain available for medical checks during the first 3 years since 
the invalidity was certified. They can also export the benefit if they permanently 
move abroad. However, this is possible only for Serbian nationals who move to a 
country with which Serbia has a social security agreement covering invalidity 
benefits.
18.2.3  Pensions
The access to old-age pensions (pension insurance (penzijsko osiguranje) and pen-
sion (penzija)) is regulated by the Law on Pension and Invalidity Insurance,12 the 
Law on Compulsory Social Insurance Contributions13 and the Law on the Budget 
System.14 Pensions are regulated according to the pay-as-you-go model. There is no 
special scheme of a public non-contributory pension. However, individuals who 
have never worked or do not meet the minimum number of contribution years for 
accessing an old-age contributory pension, can still apply for the financial social 
assistance scheme.
Both employees and self-employed are eligible for contributory pensions, inde-
pendently of their nationality. Those who are not compulsory insured can 
12 Law on Pension and Invalidity Insurance (Zakono Penzijskom i Invalidskom Osiguranju). Official 
Gazette 142/2014.
13 Law on Compulsory Social Insurance Contributions (Zakon o Doprinosima za Obavezno 
Socijalno Osiguranje). Official Gazette 7/2018.
14 Law on the Budget System (Zakon o Budžetskom Sistemu). Official Gazette 113/2017
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voluntarily pay their pension insurance. The minimum standard retirement age in 
2018 was 65 years for men and 62 years for women. Individuals can claim an old- 
age pension after at least 15 years of contribution. Periods completed in countries 
with which Serbia has a social security agreement that covers pensions are aggre-
gated with the period completed in Serbia, for both national citizens and foreign 
residents. Serbian citizen who work abroad and are not compulsory insured with the 
foreign insurance authority, or not able to use their rights outside of the territory of 
that state, can join the Serbian pension insurance scheme. The access to an old-age 
pension is not conditioned by a minimum period of residence and there is the pos-
sibility of back purchase of the insurance period (only for periods in which the 
individual was insured, but no insurance contribution was actually paid). The pen-
sion is dependent on previous earnings over the entire working period and the aver-
age wage in Serbia for each year of working period. Exportability of pensions is 
possible only for individuals who move to a country with which Serbia has signed a 
bilateral social security agreement covering pensions.
18.2.4  Family Benefits
Access to family benefits is regulated by the Law on Financial Help for Family with 
Children,15 the Law on Healthcare Insurance,16 the Law on Family,17 the Law on 
Labour and the Law on Social Protection.18 Access to family benefits is not based on 
compulsory social insurance, since there are no special pay-role taxes for this type 
of benefit, but some benefits depend on previous employment. There are five types 
of family benefits. Maternity, paternity and childcare benefits depend on previous 
employment period, which implies that resident nationals and foreigners who are 
employed are eligible to apply. However, parental and child benefits, which do not 
require previous employment, are not available to foreigners as they also include a 
citizenship requirement (of the parent or child).
Both employed and self-employed are eligible for maternity, paternity and paren-
tal benefits. There are no specific eligibility conditions regarding the country of 
birth or residence of the child. The maternity leave is obligatory and lasts for 
13 weeks. There is a minimum period of insurance (less than 6 months) required to 
become eligible for maternity benefits, but there is no requirement of a minimum 
period of prior residence. Employers are legally obliged to pay maternity benefits as 
15 Law on Financial Help for Family with Children (Zakon o Finansijskoj Pomoći Porodici sa 
Decom). Official Gazette 107/2009.
16 Law on Healthcare Insurance (Zakon o Zdravstvenom Osiguranju). Official Gazette 10/2016.
17 Law on Family (Zakon o Porodici). Official Gazette 6/2015.
18 Law on Social Protection (Zakon o Socijalnoj Zaštiti). Official Gazette 24/2011.
T. Popic
313
‘replacement’ for salaries. The amount of the maternity benefit depends on previous 
earnings and period of insurance.19
Serbia offers a quite limited scheme of paternity benefits as the father is allowed 
to take paternity leave only if the mother cannot take care of the child because she 
passed away, abandoned the child, is in prison, has extreme illness or has lost her 
parental rights. The eligibility requirements for accessing paternity benefits are 
similar as those applied for maternity benefits (previous insurance period, no spe-
cific conditions regarding the country of birth/residence of the child, level of benefit 
depending on previous earnings and period of insurance).
There is no legal provision according to which individuals receiving maternity or 
paternity benefits are banned from leaving the country temporarily while receiving 
the benefits. There is a limited possibility of exportability of maternity and paternity 
benefits only in situations in which individuals move to a country that has a bilateral 
social security agreement with Serbia covering family-related benefits.
The parental leave starts after the 13 weeks of maternity leave and is a family 
entitlement that can be shared among parents. It can be granted for up to 39 weeks 
without specific conditions regarding the country of birth or residence of the child. 
As for the “parental allowance” (roditeljski dodatak), this lump-sum benefit is avail-
able independently of the employment status or the prior period of insurance. 
However, the parent who is the bearer of this right must be a resident Serbian 
national and the immediate caregiver for the child. Thus, the child should also reside 
in Serbia, although this is not specified as such in the law. Furthermore, child’s resi-
dence certificate is also one of the documents required to submit the claim for the 
parental allowance. There are no specific conditions on whether the parent receiving 
the parental allowance can leave the country temporarily. When deciding to perma-
nently reside abroad, individuals can export the parental benefits only if they move 
to another country with which Serbia has signed a bilateral social security agree-
ment that covers parental benefits.
Similarly, the “child allowance” (dečiji dodatak) is a benefit available to all 
national residents, independently of their employment status, period of insurance or 
prior residence in Serbia. The benefit is granted only if the child has the Serbian citi-
zenship and resides in Serbia. One of the parents must also be a resident Serbian 
citizen, meaning that foreigners are specifically excluded as potential beneficiaries 
of child benefits in Serbia.
Child benefits are means-tested benefits that can be granted up until the child 
reaches the age of 19 (up to the age of 26 for children with special needs). The 
monthly net income per family member has to be lower than the defined threshold 
(20% of net average wage increased if the child is disabled or raised by a custodian, 
a foster parent or a single parent). Furthermore, the claimant can only possess the 
real estate in which he/she lives, which cannot be bigger than a room per household 
member plus one additional room. Furthermore, the claimant must not possess more 
19 If the mother had been in continuous employment for at least 6 months prior to the maternity 
leave, the employer pays 100% of her previous gross salary, if between 3 to 6 months, then 60% of 
the previous gross salary and if less than 3 months, then 30% of the previous gross salary.
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than two hectares of land per household member; nor money equivalent to more 
than 30 child allowances per family member when the claim is submitted.
The child allowance is flat-rate and available only for the first four children who 
must also attend primary and secondary education. Since there are no conditions on 
whether the parent receiving the child allowance can leave the country temporarily, 
it is possible to go abroad for short time periods. Nationals can also export these 
benefits if they permanently move to another country with which Serbia has a bilat-
eral social security agreement covering child benefits.
18.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
The terminology used to refer to the minimum guaranteed resources scheme in 
Serbia is “financial social assistance” (novčana socijalna pomoć). This scheme is 
managed locally by the branches of the Centre for Social Work and National 
Employment Service and is regulated by the Law on Social Protection and the 
Decree on measures of social inclusion for users of financial social assistance.20
This social protection area is not linked to employment, but it is clearly condi-
tioned by requirements of citizenship and residence. These benefits are exclusively 
reserved for resident nationals only. Both single persons and families are entitled to 
financial social assistance. The benefit is mean-tested and the income and the (real 
and movable) properties are taken into account to determine eligibility. The period 
of prior residence in Serbia is not an eligibility requirement, but citizenship is, 
meaning that foreigners cannot claim social assistance. Moreover, this benefit is 
granted only to resident nationals who have exhausted other social security benefits 
and civic responsibilities of maintenance. Recipients are obliged to actively seek 
“suitable” work and do community work, although there are no sanctions if indi-
viduals do not fulfil these obligations. The benefit is dependent on income/asset and 
family composition. Those who are capable of working receive the benefit for up to 
39 weeks, while those who are not able to work receive the benefit for 52 weeks. 
The application has to be resubmitted at the end of the period for which it was 
granted. There is a periodic re-assessment of personal circumstances, although this 
is not very frequent.
While receiving the benefit, individuals can leave the country temporarily as 
long as they meet their obligations with the Centre for Social Works and National 
Employment Service. They are however not able to claim this benefit if they perma-
nently move abroad. Also, none of the bilateral social security agreements that 
Serbia has concluded with the three main countries of origin of foreigners residing 
in Serbia and the three main countries of destination of Serbian citizens cover the 
area of financial social assistance.
20 Decree on measures of social inclusion for users of financial social assistance (Uredba o merama 
socijalne uključenosti korisnika novčane pomoći). Official Gazette 112/2014.
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18.2.6  Obstacles and Sanctions
The overview of eligibility requirements for different types of social benefits shows 
that the Serbian law partially discriminates between resident Serbian citizens and 
foreigners residing in the country. Non-nationals are eligible for unemployment, 
healthcare, pensions and some family benefits (maternity and paternity benefit/
leave and parental leave) and receive these benefits under the same conditions as 
resident Serbian nationals, based on previous employment or insurance period. 
However, access to parental benefits, child benefits, and financial social assistance 
is reserved only for national residents.
To access social benefits in Serbia, foreigners must also comply with the pre- 
condition for employment, meaning that they must hold a valid residence (regulated 
by the Law on Foreigners21) and labour permit (regulated by the Law on Employment 
of Foreigners). As previously mentioned, the 2014 Law on Employment of 
Foreigners requires non-nationals to have a labor permit not only for the conclusion 
of an employment contract, but also for the conclusion of any other agreement 
based on which foreigners acquire rights derived from their employment, which 
also include social protection rights.
18.2.7  Bilateral and Multilateral Social Security Agreements
Currently, there are 28 countries with which Serbia has signed bilateral social secu-
rity agreements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs22), including the countries whose 
nationals represent the three largest groups of foreigners residing in Serbia (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro) and the three largest countries of desti-
nation for Serbian citizens (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). These six agree-
ments cover healthcare, sickness, invalidity benefits, and pensions, allowing for the 
addition of pensionable/credited employment years from both countries and pay-
ment of pensions in another country. However, none of them covers financial social 
assistance or parental allowances. Some agreements cover both maternity/paternity/
parental benefits and child allowance (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Germany), while others cover only maternity/paternity childcare (Croatia and 
Austria) or only the childcare allowance (Switzerland). Moreover, the agreements 
with Switzerland and Germany do not cover unemployment benefits (while the 
agreements for the other four countries do).
21 Law on Foreigners (Zakon o Strancima). Official Gazette 97/2008.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018b). Implementation of International Social Security Conventions 
Agreements. http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/consular-affairs/implementation-of-international-social-
security-conventionsagreements. Accessed 1 October 2018.
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18.3  Conclusions
This chapter has shown that access to most social protection benefits for foreigners 
residing and working in Serbia depends on the structure of the country’s social pro-
tection system and is based on the same criteria and requirements as those applied 
for national citizens residing and working in the country. As the national social 
security system in Serbia is based on the social insurance model, the entitlement for 
most of social benefits in cash or in kind is based on the employment period and/or 
payment of compulsory social insurance contributions. However, foreigners remain 
excluded from accessing non-contributory benefits such as the parental and child 
allowances or the guaranteed minimum resource scheme. Serbian nationals residing 
and working abroad under specific conditions have access to social protection ben-
efits depending on whether the country they reside in has signed social security 
agreements with Serbia, but range of benefits varies depending on the country. 
Beside the structure of the country’s social protection system, access to social pro-
tection for migrants in Serbia can be explained by the country’s recent history, as 
well as social, political and economic trends. Turbulent political events of the 1990s 
marked by the Yugoslav wars, protracted transition from socialism to capitalism, 
and unstable economic outlook since 2000, have all contributed to the preservation 
of a social protection system focused on old social risks (see Perišić 2016), also 
marked by an exclusionary social protection model which limits access to some 
social protection benefits to migrants – both foreigners in Serbia and Serbians abroad.
The Serbian government has recently announced changes in some social protec-
tion areas, which could have an impact on both nationals and foreigners entitled for 
these benefits. For example, the proposal for the new Law on Pension and Invalidity 
Insurance also stipulates the elimination of penalties for early retirement.23 Another 
debated proposal is the introduction of a minimum old-age pension, which would be 
available for individuals of more than 65 years old who do not have any previous 
contributions.24
Other important changes could emerge as a result of Serbia’s negotiations for the 
entry into the European Union (EU). Serbia was granted the candidate country sta-
tus in 2012, and the EU accession negotiations were opened in January 2014. A 
recent report of the European Commission25 on the negotiation progress states that 
Serbia is “only moderately” prepared for the EU entry in the area of social policy 
and employment. The report suggests that Serbia should mainly focus on increasing 
financial and institutional resources for employment and social policy in order to 
23 Blic (2018). Orbović: Novim zakonom ukinućemo penale za prevremeni odlazak u penziju. 
https://www.blic.rs/vesti/ekonomija/orbovic-novim-zakonom-ukinucemo-penale-za-prevremeni-
odlazak-u-penziju/nd69m73. Accessed 1 October 2018.
24 Informer (2017). Penziju će imati čak i oni bez dana staža: Srbija menja zakon http://informer.rs/
vesti/drustvo/328888/penziju-ce-imati-cak-i-oni-bez-dana-staza-srbija-menja-zakon-
220000-ljudi-nema-nikakva-primanja. Accessed 1 October 2018.
25 European Commission (2018). Serbia Report. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/
sites/near/files/20180417-serbia-report.pdf. Accessed 1 October 2018.
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target in a more systematic manner young people, women and long-term unem-
ployed. It also suggests improvements in the adequacy of the social benefit system 
to provide more effective support for those parts of the population most in need. 
More generally, Serbia’s EU accession is expected to imply significant changes in 
access to social benefits for both Serbian citizens temporarily traveling and/or per-
manently moving to EU countries, and would also have an impact on the social 
protection of EU citizens residing and working in Serbia.
Currently, there are no significant controversies or political debates related to the 
access of foreign residents or nationals residing abroad to social benefits in Serbia. 
Most of the recent debates were instead focused on the status of irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers. However, it is estimated that, in 2018, there were only around 
4.000 irregular migrants in Serbia.26 The governments’ attitudes towards the 
migrants in search of work and better economic conditions was expressed in the 
words of the Minister of Labor and Social Policy, Aleksandar Vulin, who in the 
context of the migration crisis said that “Economic migrants who are not welcomed 
in the EU should not be welcomed in Serbia either”.27
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This chapter provides an overview of Serbia’s diaspora policies, mainly focusing 
on the main features and development of policies in the area of social protection. 
It shows that the country’s diaspora policy programs have given priority to eco-
nomic, but also cultural engagement of Serbian nationals residing abroad. The 
Serbian diaspora also enjoys voting rights, but its turnout is usually low, due to 
practical and political problems. At the same time, social protection for diaspora 
is limited to health and pension benefits, and this only under special conditions. 
Structurally, the character of Serbian diaspora policies can be explained by 
Serbia’s social protection system based on social insurance contributions, i.e. 
employment as the basis of benefits entitlement. More substantially, however, the 
very limited social protection benefits granted to diaspora can be explained by the 
elites’ perception of diaspora as mainly an economic resource, and as a supple-
ment to the country’s social-safety net.
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19.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
19.2.1  The Serbian Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
The evolution of Serbia’s emigration trends and diaspora policies can be contextual-
ized within the country’s political development. From 1945 until 1992, Serbia was 
a communist state and one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia’s breakup, from 1992 to 2006, the country went 
through several changes in its statehood status. In 1992, it formed the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia together with Montenegro, which in 2003 became the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, after Montenegro’s referendum on inde-
pendence, both Montenegro and Serbia became independent states. In 2008, Serbia’s 
Autonomous Province Kosovo and Metohija declared its independence. These 
changes in the statehood status of Serbia were also accompanied by Yugoslavia’s 
civil war (1991–2001) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bomb-
ing (1999).
The turbulent state history of Serbia had strong impact on the political and socio- 
economic situation in the country, which in turn played a role in the development of 
the diaspora trends. Roughly, Serbia’s emigration can be divided in two main emi-
gration waves. The first one, motivated mainly by economic reasons, took place 
during communism and implied the emigration of Serbian nationals to Western 
European countries such as Germany and Austria (Fassmann and Munz 1994). The 
second wave took place in the post-communist period, which can also be divided 
between the Milošević (1992–2000) and post-Milošević eras (2000-today), during 
which emigration was motivated by economic, but also political and educational 
reasons, and implied also increased emigration to non-European countries, such as 
the United States, Canada and Australia (Pavlov 2009). Currently, the five countries 
with the largest number of Serbian nationals are in Europe: Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, France and Croatia.
The unstable political developments led to some confusion in the emigration 
statistics. To this day, the Serbian Statistical Institute does not have its own statisti-
cal data on emigrants, and there are no other official sources that can reliably indi-
cate the total number of Serbs in diaspora (Grečić 2016; Tomić 2016). According to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1 even though there is no census of diaspora, it is 
estimated that Serbia’s diaspora (including Serbian nationals abroad and ‘Serbs in 
the region’- see the next section) includes around 4.5 million individuals. This is 
significant, given that Serbia’s resident population is estimated at 7 million. The size 
of the diaspora could also explain why this segment of the population has been seen 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). Diaspora [Dijaspora]. http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/
konzularni-poslovi/dijaspora/dijaspora-opste?lang=lat. Accessed on 23 September 2018.
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mainly as an economic resource, and not a part of the country’s social protec-
tion system.
19.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
The main developments in diaspora politics and institutions took place in the post- 
Milošević era. During this period, two apparently contradictory tendencies 
emerged – post-territorial nationalism through the extension of citizenship rights for 
the diaspora and the creation of dedicated institutions for nationals abroad (Ragazzi 
and Balalovska 2011). The change in citizenship rights took place through the new 
Law on Citizenship introduced in 2004 (Law no. 135/2004) and amended in 2007 
(Law no. 90/2007).2 This legislation was based on ethnic preferential citizenship, as 
it allowed individuals of Serbian ethnicity who do not have residence in Serbia to 
acquire Serbian citizenship (see Radosavljević 2014).3
Institutional developments were initiated by the establishment of the Ministry of 
Diaspora in 2004, which was later transformed into the Ministry of Religion and 
Diaspora (Tomić 2016).4 In 2006, the government issued a “Declaration on the 
Proclamation on the Relations of the Homeland and Diaspora as Relations of 
Greatest State and National Interest”.5 In 2009, it introduced an important law, the 
Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region.6 According to this law, the term diaspora 
refers to “citizens of Serbia who live abroad” and “members of the Serbian nation 
living abroad, who emigrated from the territory of Serbia and the region, and their 
descendants” (Article 2). This distinction indicated that the Serbian diaspora if 
formed by Serbian nationals who now live abroad, as well as those ethnic Serbs 
(without Serbian citizenship) who emigrated from the region and now live abroad.7 
2 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia in 2004 (Law no. 135/2004). [Zakon o Državljanstvu 
Republike Srbije]. https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_drzavljanstvu_republike_srbije.html. 
Accessed on 20 September 2018.
3 Individuals are allowed to acquire Serbian citizenship on the condition that they have reached the 
age of 18 and that they are not deprived of working capacity. Along with the request for acquiring 
citizenship, it is necessary to submit a written statement that they consider Serbia to be their own 
country (Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia (Law no. 135/2004, 90/2007, Article 14).
4 Previously, there was Ministry of Diaspora, which was founded in 1991 and merged with the 
Ministry of Religion in 2003.
5 Government of Serbia (2006). Declaration on the Proclamation on the Relations of the Homeland 
and Diaspora as Relations of Greatest state and National Interest [Deklaracija o proglašenju 
odnosa otadžbine i rasejanja odnosom od najvećeg državnog i nacionalnog interesa]. http://dijas-
pora.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/deklardijasp01.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2018.
6 Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region (2009). [Zakon o Dijaspori i Srbima u Regionu]. http://
demo.paragraf.rs/WebParagrafDemo/ZAKON-O-DIJASPORI-I-SRBIMA-U-REGIONU-Sl.-
glasnik-RS,-br.-88-2009.htm. Accessed on 20 September 2018.
7 Large number of ethnic Serbs from the countries of former Yugoslavia emigrated abroad in the 
Balkan region during the civil conflict in the 1990s.
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This wide definition of the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘Serbian diaspora’ is confirmed by the 
definition of diaspora as not only Serbian citizens living abroad, but also “members 
of Serbian nation who live in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Albania and Hungary” (ibid.). The law also 
envisioned the establishment of a Ministry for Diaspora and an Assembly of 
Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, which would be responsible for supporting proj-
ects aiming on promotion of Serbian language and culture. It also stated that rela-
tions between the homeland and diaspora have to be strengthened through the 
promotion of economic cooperation (see also Petronijević 2014).
In 2011, the government introduced a “Strategy of Preserving and Strengthening 
the Relations of the Home State and Diaspora and Serbs in the Region”8 (Ministry 
of Religion and Diaspora 2011).9 A new Ministry of Diaspora and an Assembly of 
Diaspora and Serbs in the Region were also established following the 2009 law. 
However, this Ministry was abolished in 2012 and replaced by the Office for 
Cooperation with the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through diplomatic missions 
including embassies, consular services and honorary consulates, provides support 
for the development of the diaspora’s national and cultural identity. The Law on 
Foreign Affairs (2007)10 defines the obligations of these institutions towards Serbian 
nationals residing abroad. The Ministry also encourages the diaspora to intensify 
relations with the Serbian “motherland” (matica, in Serbian) and continually pro-
motes ties in the area of business, science, culture and sports (see also Petronijević 
2014). The Office for Cooperation with the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, as 
sub-unit of the Ministry, is in charge of administrative and professional tasks related 
to the status of Serbian citizens living abroad, but it does not offer any specific assis-
tance for Serbs abroad in situation of need (this is rather the responsibility of mis-
sions and consulates and the Department for Consular Services, see below). With an 
aim of promoting closer economic ties with diaspora, the Office has also established 
local Offices for Diaspora, which are supposed to provide information on potential 
for local diaspora investments. There is also the Centre for Diaspora within the 
Serbian Chamber of Commerce, established in 2011, which is in charge of making 
contacts with Serbian entrepreneurs living abroad.
The Assembly of Serbian Diaspora and Serbs in the Region is considered the 
highest diaspora body. Its main task is to identify problems faced by the diaspora 
8 Ministry of Religion and Diaspora (2011). Strategy of Preserving and Strengthening the Relations 
of the Home State and Diaspora and Serbs in the Region [Strategija Očuvanja i jačanja odnosa 
matčine države i dijaspore i matične države i Srba u regionu]. http://dijaspora.gov.rs/wpcontent/
uploads/2012/12/strategija_mvd2011.pdf. Accessed 23 September 2018.
9 The term “Serbs in the region” includes all ethnic Serbs who live in the Balkan region e.g. ethnic 
Serbs living in former Yugoslavia countries Slovenia and Croatia. This also includes a large num-
ber of ethnic Serbs who live in Republic of Srpska, which is one of the federal states of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Serbs living in Kosovo, Serbia’s autonomous region, which declared independence 
in 2008 that was not recognized by Serbian’s government, are considered residents of Serbia.
10 Law on Foreign Affairs (2007). [Zakon o Spoljnim Poslovima]. https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/
zakon_o_spoljnim_poslovima.html. Accessed 20 September 2018.
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and develop solutions. The assembly has 45 delegates elected by Serbian nationals 
residing abroad according to quotas for each country/group of countries for a 4-year 
term. The delegates are all Serbian nationals residing abroad and their meetings take 
place through regular sessions on Diaspora Day, or through extraordinary sessions 
upon agreement. Meetings are supposed to take place in Belgrade, but there is also 
the possibility of organizing “electronic sessions” (i.e. video conferences). The 
assembly establishes and appoints representatives to different diaspora councils: the 
Economic Council, the Status Council, and the Council for Culture, Education, 
Science and Sports. Even though this assembly is the highest diaspora body, it does 
not have a consultative function, as it is not obligatory for home country authorities 
to consult the Assembly regarding diaspora issues. This implies that the Assembly 
meetings have mainly symbolic character (Tomić 2016). However, the consultative 
function is performed by the Committee for Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, the 
committees of the National Assembly of Serbia in charge of questions pertaining to 
the Serbian diaspora and Serbs in the region.11 The mission of the Assembly is 
defined as follows: (1) it determines the problems of the diaspora and Serbs in the 
region and proposes solutions; (2) it provides guidelines for the development of the 
Strategy for Preserving and Strengthening the Relations of the Home State and dias-
pora, as well as home countries and Serbs in the region; (3) it elects Councils of 
Diaspora and Serbs in the region, supervises their work and decides on termination 
of the mandate of their members; (4) it performs other activities of importance for 
the interests of the diaspora and Serbs in the region. As the mission is rather general, 
the elected members of the Assembly do not have a specific mission to help Serbian 
citizens in the country in which they were elected, even though this help can take an 
informal form.
19.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
Serbian nationals living abroad can vote in legislative and presidential elections, 
following amendments to the Law on the Election of Representatives (2000)12 and 
to the Law on Election of the President of the Republic of Serbia (2007).13 Non- 
resident nationals have to vote in-person in the diplomatic missions or in Serbia. 
In-person voting implies that citizens vote in polling stations located in the embas-
sies. Polling stations open only in places where at least 100 voters are registered. 
11 Serbian Parliament (2018). Committee for Diaspora and Serbs in the Region [Odbor za Dijasporu 
i Srbe u Regionu]. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/narodna-skupstina-/sastav/radna-tela/odbori. 
78.895.html. Accessed 21 September 2018.
12 Law on the Election of Representatives (2000). [Zakon o Izboru Narodnih Poslanika] https://
www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_izboru_narodnih_poslanika.html. Accessed 20 September 2018.
13 Law on the Election of the President of Serbia (2007) [Zakon o Izboru Predsednika Republike]. 
https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_izboru_predsednika_republike.html. Accessed 23 
September 2018.
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Postal voting is not allowed, and voters have to cast their ballots in the same place 
in both rounds, in case there is a second election round.
The Serbian diaspora’s participation in legislative and presidential elections is 
characterized by a low turnout, which could be explained by political and proce-
dural reasons (Rigoni 2013; Prelec 2017). The policies of previous Serbian authori-
ties have been perceived as hostile towards the diaspora. In the eyes of Serbian 
authorities, the diaspora represented political opposition and the authorities, accord-
ingly, discouraged its involvement in Serbia’s political life (see also Ragazzi and 
Balalovska 2011). With respect to procedural reasons, a recent online survey on 
diaspora’s voting highlighted barriers such as the insufficient number of polling sta-
tions, the requirement to register 20 days before the elections and the obligation to 
vote in person (Prelec 2017). Other studies also point to the lack of administrative 
capacity and lack of information for potential voters (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011).
With respect to political parties’ policies toward diaspora, no party has a special 
department dealing with diaspora, but some parties are more vocal than others when 
it comes to diaspora and Serbs from the region. Among these, the extreme right- 
wing party Doors (Dveri), emphasises the importance of links with Serbian dias-
pora and stresses the importance of diaspora’s (financial) support to the party. Party 
member, Ivan Kostić, was one of the president of the Committee for Diaspora and 
Serbs in the Region. Two other right-wing parties  – the Serbian People’s Party 
(Srpska Narodna Partija) and the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna 
Stranka) – have more limited interest in the diaspora. They focus mostly on cultural 
ties and diaspora’s financial support for the home country (see below on remit-
tances). As a consequence, there has been no debate in Serbia on the question of 
social protection of Serbian nationals living abroad or on the specific issues regard-
ing extension or restriction of their welfare benefits.
In order to understand the relationship between Serbia and its nationals residing 
abroad, it is worth noting the amount of diaspora’s monetary remittances to the 
home country. In 2015, monetary remittances represented the equivalent of 9.2% of 
the Serbian gross national product (Grečić 2016). According to the National Bank 
of Serbia,14 the largest amount of remittances come from Germany (23.6%), 
Switzerland (15.1%), France (9.4%) and Austria (8.6%). In 2017, it was estimated 
that the Serbian diaspora sent over 3.6 million US dollars to Serbia.15
However, the total amount of remittances is difficult to estimate because a con-
siderable share of remittances comes through informal or private channels. As banks 
in Serbia do not show great interest in remittances, money transfer can be done only 
through foreign banks or fast money transfer institutions, such as Western Union or 
MoneyGram, which makes the process expensive. Once received, remittances are 
14 National Bank of Serbia (2018). News on assignments [Novosti - u vezi sa doznakama]. http://
www.nbs.rs/internet/latinica/scripts/showContent.html?id=9627&konverzija=yes. Accessed 21 
September 2018.
15 World Bank (2018) Migration and Remittance Data. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migra-
tionremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data. Accessed on 23 September 2018.
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used mainly to cover basic daily expenses and raise the quality of living conditions. 
They are rarely kept as savings or used for the development of the home community.16
The Serbian diaspora also engages in solidarity activity by financially supporting 
populations in need and infrastructure building in Serbia. For example, during the 
major floods in 2014, the Serbian diaspora responded to the call for help of the 
Serbian government by providing aid for the reconstruction of affected regions. 
Diaspora representatives sent money, food, clothes, shoes and medicines to affected 
areas. According to the Ministry of Finance, almost 700,000 euro was collected 
through PayPal foreign currency accounts and more than 27 million euro has been 
donated by diaspora (Rigoni 2013).
All Serbian governments since 2000 have claimed that ‘more must be done’ to 
leverage a segment of remittance flows into investments and savings. As part of its 
strategy to develop business relations with diaspora, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has two state secretaries who target Serbian entrepreneurs living abroad. On the 
local level, there are more than twenty-five local diaspora offices for economic 
development and cooperation with diaspora. These offices are part of the local 
municipal governments, often in connection with the Chamber of Commerce 
(Tomić 2016). Even though these local offices do exist, in practice, local govern-
ment bodies randomly establish cooperation with the diaspora (Petronijević 2014). 
Also, there is no national strategic plan on the use of remittances, and remittances 
have never been invested in large development projects. There are also no specific 
policies, which incentivize investment of the diaspora into local developments proj-
ects or business. A recent study by the United Nation Development Programme17 
stresses that there is a lack of specialized programme targeting diaspora investment 
and no differentiation between foreign investment and diaspora investment, which 
ignores a huge potential sector for inbound foreign investment.18
16 International Organization for Migration (2008). Migration in Serbia: A Country Profile 2008. 
International Organization for Migration, Geneva, Switzerland. http://publications.iom.int/sys-
tem/files/pdf/serbia_profile2008.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2018.
17 United Nations Development Programme (2017). Assessment of the national investment frame-
work for diasporas in the Republic of Serbia. United Nations Development Programme. http://
www.rs.undp.org/content/serbia/en/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/assessment-of-
the-national-investment-framework-for-diasporas-in.html. Accessed 20 September 2018.
18 Also, there are no policies that encourage the return of citizens residing abroad, even though 
there are estimates that return of pensioners (permanent repatriation) could generate around 500 
million euros with minimal investment (see Politika 2017). Return of pensioners from diaspora for 
the betterment of Serbia [Povratak penzionera iz rasejanja boljitak za Srbiju]. http://www.politika.
rs/sr/clanak/385517/Trece-doba/Povratak-penzionera-iz-rasejanja-boljitak-za-Srbiju. Accessed 24 
September 2018).
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19.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Serbia
The national social security system in Serbia is based on the social insurance model 
and financed mainly by insurance contributions. The entitlement for most social 
protection benefits in cash or in kind is based on employment period and/or pay-
ment of compulsory social insurance contributions. This also explains why Serbian 
nationals residing abroad have limited access to these benefits. They are able to 
access only two types of benefits – healthcare, and pension and invalidity insur-
ance – and this under a special condition. This condition implies that they can be 
compulsory insured in Serbia in case they are not insured in the country in which 
they live/work. They can also be insured in case when they are insured in the coun-
try abroad in which they live, but this insurance does not allow them to access these 
benefits outside that country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a dedicated web-
site called “Guide for the Diaspora”, which provides information on the conditions 
under which these two types of insurance can be acquired by Serbian nationals 
residing abroad. National institutions in charge of managing healthcare and pension 
and invalidity insurance- the National Health Insurance Fund and the National 
Institute for Pension and Invalidity Insurance- also provide this information on their 
websites.
Serbian missions and consulates abroad also provide help to the diaspora. The 
role of these institutions was broadly defined by the Law on Foreign Affairs (2007), 
but this law does not specifically define the obligations of the missions and consul-
ates towards Serbian nationals abroad. There is a special department of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs – the Department for Consular Services-, which is defined as 
being in charge of “protecting the interests of Serbian nationals abroad”.19 The 
department is responsible mainly for administrative services, including services 
related to repatriation and deportation of Serbian citizens from abroad, notary and 
registry tasks (e.g. for marriage and birth), protection of property interests, protec-
tion in case of arrest and condemnation, etc. Similarly, according to the Ordinance 
on Honorary Consuls (2009),20 the functions of honorary consuls include protection 
of Serbian nationals’ rights and interests in the country of residence and concrete 
measures in providing necessary help in situations of emergency, including reports 
on deaths, accidents, arrest, investigation, deportation, or judicial procedure. 
However, the mission and consular sections are not obliged to provide any type of 
in-cash or in-kind social security benefits for Serbian nationals living abroad.
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). Sector for Consular Services [Sektor za Konzularne Poslove]. 
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/o-ministarstvu/organizacione-jedinice/konzularni-
poslovi?lang=lat. Accessed 21 September 2018.
20 Ordinance on Honorary Consuls (2009). [Uredba o Počasnim Konzulima]. http://www.pravno-
informacioni-sistem.rs/SlGlasnikPortal/reg/viewAct/3e9f4315-20ba-4774-bfb2-1c608bf5d825. 
Accessed 23 September 2018.
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Serbia is a member of a number of regional organizations and initiatives,21 but 
none of these organizations provides access to social protection of Serbian nationals 
who move to others states that are also members of the same regional organizations. 
However, there are 28 bilateral social security agreements between Serbia and other 
countries, which also include the countries that represent the five largest worldwide 
destinations for Serbian nationals: Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France and 
Croatia. These bilateral agreements imply that Serbian nationals living in these 
countries and nationals of these countries living in Serbia have equal access to the 
national social protection system of their country of residence. The condition is that 
Serbians residing in these specific countries are legally entitled to specific social 
protection benefits in Serbia, in order to be entitled to these benefits in the country 
of their residence abroad. The same applies for the nationals of these countries 
residing in Serbia – they have to be entitled to these benefits in their country of 
origin in order to access them as residents in Serbia. While the range of benefits 
covered depends on country specific social security agreements, all of them cover 
healthcare and pensions benefits.
On their websites, the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, the Office for the 
Collaboration with Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, and consulates offer informa-
tion on bilateral social security agreements. However, they do not offer further ser-
vices or information related to welfare benefits in the host countries, not even in the 
five major destination countries for Serbian citizens, nor do they cooperate with 
non-governmental institutions active in the sphere of social protection.
19.3.1  Unemployment
In Serbia, unemployment benefits are financed through the social insurance scheme, 
which includes compulsory contributions, set at 1.5% of workers wages, and their 
reception is conditioned on the previous employment/insurance period. Serbian 
nations residing abroad, as they are not employed/insured against unemployment in 
Serbia, do not have access to these unemployment benefits.
As for the employment services offered to Serbian citizens who plan on moving 
abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Serbian embassies and consulates, do not 
provide any professional training, cash or in-kind benefits in situation of unemploy-
ment. They also do not repatriate unemployed nationals residing abroad. The 
National Employment Service does not offer any training programme before migra-
tion that aims specifically to prepare nationals for employment abroad. However, 
the Service provides some assistance in job search, as it occasionally lists advertise-
ments for jobs abroad. According to the Law on Employment and Insurance in the 
21 For a list of regional organizations in which Serbia is a member check here: http://www.mfa.gov.
rs/en/foreign-policy/eu/regional-initiatives
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Case of Unemployment (2009),22 employment agencies can carry out mediation in 
the employment of Serbian citizens in Serbia as well as abroad.
It is worth mentioning that the National Employment Service offers a booklet 
with information on residence permits, conditions and processes related to life and 
work in Germany for Serbian nationals.23 The National Employment Service, in 
cooperation with the German Organization for International Cooperation (GIZ) and 
the Federal Agency for Work and Mediation with Foreigners of the German Federal 
Agency for Work, also announces calls (in 2016, already the 5th call) for employ-
ment of Serbian nurses and technicians in Germany.
The National Employment Service24 also provides information on bilateral social 
security agreements between Serbia and other countries that cover unemployment 
insurance. Out of the five largest worldwide destinations of Serbian citizens  – 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France and Croatia – only the bilateral social secu-
rity agreements signed with Austria and Croatia grant Serbian nationals from these 
two countries access to unemployment benefits. In order to receive the cash benefits 
in case of unemployment, Serbians from Austria and Croatia have to be already 
entitled to these benefits in these two countries, as this creates the basis for their 
entitlement in Serbia. Also, there is a condition for the aggregation of work i.e. 
insurance periods, which implies that during the previous 12  months the person 
entitled to unemployment benefits was employed (and insured) in the country in 
which he/she claims the benefit for at least 26 weeks.
19.3.2  Health Care
In Serbia, access to healthcare benefits is based on the compulsory social insurance 
scheme, financed mainly by contributions, which are set at 10.3% of workers’ 
wages. Even though access to healthcare benefits is conditioned by contributions, 
Serbian nationals residing abroad are able to join the healthcare insurance scheme. 
Law on Health Insurance (2005)25 specifies that two categories of Serbian citizens 
employed abroad have the right to compulsory healthcare insurance. One category 
are those who do not have insurance coverage in the country in which they live. The 
second category includes those who have access to health insurance in the country 
22 Law on Employment and Insurance in Case of Unemployment (2009) [Zakon o Zapošljavanju i 
Osiguranju u Slučaju Nezaposlenosti]. https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_zaposljavanju_i_
osiguranju_za_slucaj_nezaposlenosti.html. Accessed 23 September 2018.
23 Available at: http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/digitalAssets/4/4913_brosura_-_rad_u_nemackoj.pdf
24 National Employment Services (2018). Application of Inter-state Agreements [Primena 
Međudržavnih Sporazuma]. http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/trazite-posao/dok-traziteposao/neza 
posleni/primena_me_udr_avnih_sporazuma.cid542. Accessed on 21 September 2018.
25 Law on Health Insurance (2005). [Zakon o Zdravstvenom Osiguranju]. https://www.paragraf.rs/ 
propisi/zakon_o_zdravstvenom_osiguranju.html. Accessed 23 September 2018.
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of residence, but cannot use it to cover health expenses outside the territory of that 
country.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies and consulates assist nationals with 
access to healthcare and invalidity benefits indirectly, by providing information 
through the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office for the 
Collaboration with Diaspora and Serbs in the Region at the special website “Guide 
for Diaspora”. This website provides information on rights to healthcare and inva-
lidity insurance, types of insurance, documents needed to access the healthcare 
insurance and bilateral social security agreements. The national institution in charge 
of the healthcare insurance –the National Institute for Health Insurance- also pro-
vides information on these bilateral agreements.26
Serbia has bilateral social security agreements on healthcare benefits with the 
countries that represent the five largest worldwide destinations of national citizens 
of Serbia. Similar to unemployment benefits, in order to receive healthcare benefits, 
Serbians have to be entitled in their country of residence, as this creates the basis for 
their entitlement in Serbia. On the basis of the bilateral agreement between Serbia 
and France, Serbian nationals from France have also access to professional illness 
and accident insurance.
Consulates do not offer cash benefits to nationals residing abroad to deal with 
health issues. They only offer administrative support with repatriation of remains. In 
case of serious accidents or illness, Serbian consulates can inform relatives, visit in 
hospital or recommend clinics and doctors. However, consulates do not provide any 
financial assistance even in case of emergency. Missions also do no provide finan-
cial assistance for repatriation of remains, but they offer administrative and organi-
zational assistance. Lastly, they do not offer any pre-departure information including 
training programs regarding healthcare and invalidity risk in any of the five coun-
tries that are the top destinations of Serbian nationals.
19.3.3  Pensions
In Serbia, pensions are regulated according to the social insurance scheme, pay-as- 
you-go pension model and one needs to work and contribute to the pension insur-
ance for at least 15 years to receive a pension (non-contributory pensions do not 
exist). While entitlements to pensions is contributory, Serbian nationals residing 
abroad have access to the compulsory pension and invalidity insurance under spe-
cial conditions. According to the Law on Pension and Invalidity Insurance (2003),27 
Serbian nationals employed (and insured) abroad have access to pension (and 
26 National Institute for Health Insurance (2018). International Contracts [Inostrani Ugovori]. 
http://www.rfzo.rs/index.php/osiguranalica/zz-u-ino/ino-ugovori. Accessed 21 September 2018.
27 Law on Pension and Invalidity Insurance (2003). [Zakon o Penzijskom i Invalidskom Osiguranju]. 
https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_penzijskom_i_invalidskom_osiguranju.html. Accessed 
23 September 2018.
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 invalidity) insurance if at the time they are employed abroad they do not have a pen-
sion or invalidity insurance, or if the rights of pension and disability insurance under 
the regulations of the state in which they reside cannot be used outside its territory.
Consulates assist nationals with access to pensions indirectly, by providing infor-
mation on rights to pension insurance, types of insurance, documents needed for 
access to pension insurance and bilateral social security agreements through the 
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office for the Collaboration with 
Diaspora and Serbs in the Region through “Guide for Diaspora”. The National 
Institute for Pension and Invalidity Insurance also provides information on the cal-
culation of the pensionable period spent abroad. The Institute for Social Insurance 
provides information to Serbians residing abroad. Finally, to receive a pension from 
Serbia, one has to submit a life certificate usually once per year. Consulates can 
authenticate such certificate.
The National Institute for Pension and Invalidity Insurance also provides infor-
mation on rights to pension and invalidity insurance and bilateral social security 
agreements on pension insurance between Serbia and other countries.28 Since Serbia 
has bilateral agreements on pension benefits with the five largest worldwide destina-
tions of national citizens of Serbia – Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France and 
Croatia – Serbian embassies and consulates in these countries provide information 
on access to these benefits on their websites.
19.3.4  Family Benefits
In Serbia, access to family benefits is not based on compulsory social insurance, 
since there are no special payroll taxes for this type of benefits, but some of them are 
dependent on previous employment. There are five different types of family bene-
fits. Maternity, paternity and childcare benefits depend on previous employment 
period. Parental and child benefits do not have previous employment as eligibility 
criteria, but are conditioned by citizenship and residence. Serbian nationals residing 
abroad therefore do not have access to any of these family benefits.
However, consular offices provide administrative help with some family-related 
issues. For example, Serbians residing abroad can register their child in the Serbian 
registry of births through consulates. Application for the registration has to be sub-
mitted in person and under the condition that one parent is Serbian. The documents 
that need to be submitted are the child’s birth certificate of the country abroad and 
parents’ marriage certificate.
In addition, the Ministry of Education manages the Special Programme on the 
Education and Upbringing Abroad, through which it regulates the licences and 
working conditions of Serbian language teachers who are sent abroad with the mis-
sion to teach Serbian abroad to children. The Serbian language courses target 
28 Available at: https://www.pio.rs/lat/medjunarodni-ugovori.html. Accessed 23 September 2018.
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children of Serbian nationals, but are also open to children with no Serbian origins. 
As part of this programme, the Office for the Collaboration with Diaspora and Serbs 
in the Region also offers free textbooks for learning of Serbian language, as well as 
audio files for children education (pre-school and elementary school level), that can 
be downloaded directly from the office’s website. In each one of the top five world-
wide destinations of Serbian nationals – Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France and 
Croatia – the website of consulates list Serbian associations and clubs, and provide 
information on supplementary programme on Serbian language and culture. In 
some countries, Serbian language courses are offered in regular schools, based on 
agreements with schools in destination countries. They are also organized indepen-
dently, outside of the country’s educational system, in Serbian associations and 
clubs. These language courses are usually free and if they are organized by the 
Serbian Ministry of Education, children are able to get a certificate about the com-
pleted grade.
On the basis of bilateral social security agreements, in Germany, France and 
Switzerland, Serbian nationals have access to child allowance. To receive such 
allowance, Serbian nationals residing in these countries have to be entitled to these 
benefits in Serbia. The same applies for the nationals of these countries residing in 
Serbia – they have to be entitled to these benefits in their country of origin in order 
to receive these benefits in Serbia.
19.3.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources 
(Including Homelessness)
In Serbia, the scheme for minimum guaranteed resources is entitled ‘financial social 
assistance’ and is a means-tested benefit. This benefit functions as the last resort of 
social protection, i.e. the ultimate “safety net” that aims to prevent extreme hardship 
and protect single persons and households from severe poverty. This benefit is not 
accessible to Serbian nationals abroad.
With respect to non-resident citizens, there is no policy by which consulates 
ought to provide them financial assistance in case of economic hardship or home-
lessness. Consulates do not provide in-kind benefits, such as access to material 
goods or services. More specifically, none of the institutions  – the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, its Office for the Collaboration with Diaspora and Serbs in the 
Region and/or the Committee for Diaspora and Serbs in the Region – provides any 
sort of help (administrative or financial) for Serbian residents abroad in case of 
hardship. Similarly, these Serbian diaspora institutions do not offer any help to 
Serbian nationals abroad with regard accessing benefits and services related to min-
imum income resources in the host country either. This complete absence of Serbia’s 
support to diaspora faced with economic hardship is symptomatic of the more gen-
eral perception of the Serbian diaspora as a source of financial help for the home 
country rather than the other way round.
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19.4  Conclusions
As shown in this chapter, Serbia’s system of social protection, which is based on the 
social insurance model, offers benefits that provide coverage from both labour mar-
ket related risk (unemployment, guaranteed minimum resources) and life-long risks 
(healthcare, family care, pensions). However, the access to these social protection 
benefits in Serbia for Serbian nationals residing abroad has been limited to only two 
aspects of social protection – healthcare and pension insurance – under the specific 
condition that they are not entitled to these benefits in their country of work/resi-
dence and/or that they are not able to access these benefits outside the territory of 
that country. At the same time, Serbia has signed bilateral social security agree-
ments with 28 countries, including the five countries with the largest number of 
Serbian nationals (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France and Croatia). Serbians 
residing in these countries have access to more extensive social benefits in Serbia, if 
they are entitled to these benefits in their country of residence/employment. A struc-
tural reason why access to social protection benefits in Serbia for Serbian nationals 
abroad has been restricted is the country’s social protection system, in which entitle-
ments have been mainly based on employment rather than citizenship.
At the same time, even though the Serbian diaspora plays an important role in 
providing financial support to the country of origin, both as formal and informal 
remittances, there has been no debate on the possible extension of social protection 
of Serbian nationals living abroad. The only rights relatively recently acquired by 
Serbian nationals residing abroad were the voting rights in legislative and presiden-
tial elections. More generally, the key focus of the government policies has been 
diaspora’s financial support and strengthening cultural and educational ties with 
diaspora. The financial support is used mainly to cover basic living expenses and 
rise the quality of living conditions. Therefore, it can be concluded that despite the 
structural reasons, Serbian authorities do not consider diaspora’s access to social 
protection in their home and host countries as a priority. Instead, the diaspora is 
largely perceived as a ‘supplement’ to the social-safety net for Serbian families with 
members residing abroad.
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Chapter 20
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Switzerland
Bettina Kahil-Wolff Hummer
20.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in Switzerland
The link between migration and welfare in Switzerland has great practical relevance 
given the number of persons migrating in and out of Switzerland. More than one 
third of the population has a migrant background and a bit less than one third of 
gainful activities in Switzerland are accomplished by foreigners.1 The persons con-
cerned integrate both into the Swiss job market and social security, as tax and social 
contribution payers and, potentially, as beneficiary of social benefits. The Swiss 
social security system also covers individuals living or working outside Switzerland, 
more particularly, Swiss citizens and European Union (EU)/European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) nationals. In many ways, the Swiss social security has there-
fore to respond to migration-related questions that are relevant to this research 
(Kahil-Wolff 2017).
1 Federal statistical office 2017, Statistischer Bericht zur Integration der Bevölkerung mit 
Migrationshintergrund, Neuchâtel.
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20.1.1  Main Characteristics of the Swiss Social 
Security System
In Switzerland, almost all social protection schemes are provided by the Federal 
social security system (Riemer-Kafka 2018). The Federal Constitution2 supplies the 
Federal State with the necessary legislative competences in the field of pensions 
(Article 111), illness and accident insurance (Article 117), maternity leave (Article 
116), unemployment (Article 114) and all other social risks listed in the ILO 
Convention 102. Social assistance – although it is mentioned in article 12 of the 
Constitution – is not regulated at the federal level (except for Swiss nationals resid-
ing abroad), but by the legislation of the 26 autonomous Swiss cantons. International 
law plays a major role as most migrants move between Switzerland and EU/EFTA 
Member States, hence triggering the application of EU coordination rules (EU 
Regulations n° 883/2004 and n° 987/2009) and the right to free movement of 
persons.3
The Federal social security system of Switzerland is based on 10 different 
branches which provide protection against social risks related to old-age, death, 
invalidity, illness, accidents, maternity, unemployment and family charges. Each 
branch has the shape of a compulsory public social insurance based on public law. 
The different insurance branches are financed mostly by contributions (paid by 
insured persons, workers, employers) and partly by taxes. General principles and 
procedures are regulated by the Federal Law on the General Part of Social Insurance 
(LPGA).4 The organization of all social security schemes is decentralized. It relays 
on independent public and private bodies monitored by federal authorities such as 
the Federal Office for Social Insurances (OFAS) and the Federal Office for Public 
Health (OFSP).
For each branch, the statutory law clearly defines the insured persons, the risks 
covered, and the benefits provided. Hence, insurance institutions cannot – with few 
exceptions – adopt autonomous provisions. Whereas some branches are covering 
the entire population (public pension system for old-age, survivors and invalidity/
illness insurance), others are mandatory for workers only (complementary pension 
scheme/public accident insurance/unemployment insurance). Self-employed per-
sons may ensure themselves on a voluntary basis in the public accident insurance 
(LAA) and in the complementary pension scheme (LPP, 2nd pillar). In each social 
security scheme, including the sickness insurance, persons are insured individually 
but never as family members.
2 Recueil systématique du droit fédéral, RS 101. Based on art. 14 § 6 of the Federal Act on the 
Compilations of Federal Legislation and the Federal Gazette (Publ A, RS 170.512), the Federal 
Chancellery may publish legal texts of particular importance or international interest in English; 
the present report refers to the English version whenever available.
3 European Court of Justice, European Case Law Identifier, ECLI:EU:C:2011:839, § 43
4 Loi fédérale sur la partie générale du droit des assurances sociales, LPGA, RS 830.1
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There is no National Health Service in Switzerland. Access to health care is pro-
vided through social insurances such as the ones for illness (LAMal),5 accidents 
(LAA),6 invalidity (LAI),7 or the military insurance (LAM).8 Whereas the illness 
insurance reimburses the expenses of insured persons, all other branches function 
by direct and full payment (the care providers are paid by the insurer). There is no 
mandatory sickness leave insurance. Workers and employers may conclude a public 
voluntary sickness insurance or a private one. Without such insurance, employers 
must pay the wages during a period of time that depends on the duration of employ-
ment (Geiser et al. 2019). Compulsory coverage of inability to work, however, is 
provided by other mandatory social insurance branches when related to maternity, 
accidents, work injuries, injuries in military activities or measures concerning the 
integration of disabled persons. Old-age, survivor and disability pensions are pro-
vided through a three-pillar system granted by the Federal Constitution. They rely 
on a public minimum scheme that is pay-as-you-go based and covers the whole 
population (LAVS, 1st pillar),9 a capitalized complementary pension scheme 
focused on workers earning more than CHF 21.330 per year (LPP, 2nd pillar)10 and 
on individual tax deductible savings (3rd pillar). Non-contributory old-age, survivor 
and disability benefits are paid to pension holders if the public pension does not 
cover the vital minimum (LPC).11
Swiss social security also includes family benefits (LAFam and LFA),12 mater-
nity leave benefits (LAPG)13 and unemployment benefits (LACI).14 Some benefits 
(such as health care and pensions) overlap because they partly cover identical 
groups of persons and risks. LPGA and special provisions therefore ensure the coor-
dination of those benefits to prevent unjustified multiple coverage or unintended 
lacks (Frésard-Fellay and Frésard 2018).
5 Loi fédérale sur l’assurance-maladie, LAMal, RS 832.10
6 Loi fédérale sur l’assurance-accidents, LAA, RS 832.20
7 Loi fédérale sur l’assurance-invalidité, LAI, RS 831.20
8 Loi fédérale sur l’assurance militaire, LAM, RS 833.1
9 Loi fédérale sur l’assurance-vieillesse et survivants, LAVS, RS 831.10
10 Loi fédérale sur la prévoyance professionnelle, LPP, RS 831.40
11 Loi fédérale sur les prestations complémentaires, LPC, RS 831.30
12 Loi fédérale sur les allocations familiales, LAFam, RS 836.2; Loi fédérale sur les allocations 
familiales dans l’agriculture, LFA, RS 836.1
13 Loi fédérale sur les allocations pour perte de gain, LAPG, RS 834.1
14 Loi fédérale sur l’assurance-chômage obligatoire et l’indemnité en cas d’insolvabilité, LACI, 
RS 837.0
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20.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
In Switzerland, like in most European countries, social protection regulation started 
in the late nineteenth century, under the influence of the growing industrialization 
and the risk of personal injuries caused to workmen. As one can see from the sick-
ness and accident insurance created after 1911, the Swiss social protection system 
is partly inspired by the Bismarckian system, with a series of mandatory, strongly 
decentralized public insurance schemes. Currently, Swiss social security law also 
provides a certain number of protection schemes that apply to the whole population 
(especially in order to cover the risks of sickness, old age, disability and death).
Some important social security developments occurred in parallel with demo-
graphic changes. After the second World War when Switzerland started building the 
national pension system, economic growth triggered a need of foreign labor force 
that was mostly satisfied by Italian workers. In 1951, a few years after the creation 
of the Swiss public pension system, a first social security agreement was concluded 
between Italy and Switzerland to protect Italian migrant workers. Social security 
agreements with Germany (1964), Austria (1967) and France (1975) followed in the 
attempt to address economic relations and migration related issues with those coun-
tries. Other cornerstones in the field of social protection for migrants can be found 
in the law of the land. The Swiss public pension system, including the disability 
insurance created in 1959, first included a waiting period of 10 years before insured 
foreigners were entitled to an old-age, survivor or disability pension. At that time, 
the legislator intended to favor migrants from countries that would give equal treat-
ment to Swiss citizens on their territory, via national law or bilateral agreements 
(Binswanger 1950). This discriminating rule was lowered to a 1 year waiting period 
in 1997. Since June 2001, the situation of most migrants living and/or working in 
Switzerland are subject to EU Regulations n° 883/2004 and n° 987/2009. At the 
same time, the federal legislator narrowed the access to the public pension system 
for Swiss citizens living abroad; today, Swiss citizens (as well as EU citizens) may 
adhere to the system only if living outside an EU or EFTA country and after a five- 
year prior insurance period (see Sect. 20.2.3 below).
Today, the largest group of foreigners living or working in Switzerland are EU 
and EFTA citizens. According to the Foreign Population and Asylum Statistics 
2017, published by the Federal State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) in March 
2018, around 70% of the permanent foreign resident population come from 
European countries, with Italy first (319.367 persons), Germany second (305.785 
persons) and Portugal third (268.012 persons). The main reasons for migration 
towards Switzerland are the Swiss job market (47% take up employment) and fam-
ily reunification (31% of migrants arrive to Switzerland for this reason).15 A decade 
ago, the SEM reported about the constant increase of migration in Switzerland, with 





two million persons immigrating to Switzerland since the end of World War II and 
1.5 million foreign nationals in 2007.16 In 2019, Switzerland hosted around 2 mil-
lion foreigners out of 8,4 million inhabitants (hence, 23,8% of the total population). 
The situation is different in the field of emigration. Only one-tenth of Swiss citizens 
live abroad. This percentage is mostly stagnant, with 10% in 200717 and 11% in 
2018.18 A majority of non-resident Swiss citizens live in Europe, especially in 
France, where they settle for retirement.19
20.2  Migration and Social Protection in Switzerland
With some exceptions, the Swiss social security law does not distinguish between 
nationals and foreigners. Most social security branches are based on the idea that 
individuals must be insured according to the rules of domicile and/or lex loci labo-
ris. As long as a person fulfills the conditions required by the law, he/she is insured 
no matter his/her origin or nationality. The federal law concerning the General Part 
of Social Insurance (LPGA) does not contain any rules either that make a distinction 
between nationals and foreigners. However, there are special rules in areas such as 
the exportability of public pensions, access to the voluntary public pension scheme 
for individuals living abroad or access to invalidity benefits. As explained below, 
these rules require Swiss/EU/EFTA citizenship. About 20 bilateral social security 
agreements, the Free Movement of Persons Agreement (Switzerland-EU) and the 
ETFA Agreement (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland) waive most of 
the discriminating national rules. Towards EU/EFTA Member States, Switzerland 
applies EU Regulations n° 883/2004 and n° 987/2009. However, these Regulations 
do not cover social assistance so that, even when the Free Movement of Persons 
Agreement and the EFTA Agreement are applicable, Switzerland may still refuse 
social aid to inactive persons who are not workers or self-employed.
Foreigners’ access to social benefits in Switzerland is also constrained by the 
migration rules in the federal law. As a result of a popular vote in 2014, a new provi-
sion stipulates that the administration will not issue a residence permit to foreigners 
who apply for non-contributory benefits paid to old-age, survivor or disability pen-
sion holders provided by the federal complementary scheme (LPC). The new rules 
also state that foreign job-seekers and their families do not qualify for social assis-
tance (art. 29a Federal Act on Foreign Nationals, FNA, RS 142.20). Concerning 
persons who fall into the scope of the Free Movement of Persons Agreement, FNA 
specifically stipulates that it is not applicable to these persons unless the legal act 
16 Federal Office for Migration, Migration Report 2007, p. 7. https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/
sem/publiservice/berichte/migration/migrationsbericht-2007-e.pdf
17 Federal Office for Migration, Migration Report 2007, p. 7.
18 Federal Statistical Office, Press release, Swiss abroad in 2018, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/
home. assetdetail.7826275.html
19 Federal Statistical Office, Press release, Swiss abroad in 2018.
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contains rules that are more advantageous than the FMP Agreement. The revision of 
the Immigration Law did also lead to certain modifications of social security law. 
The new provisions restrict the access to non-contributory pensions (art. 5 LPC now 
stipulates that complementary benefits are provided only to foreigners who have a 
legal residence in Switzerland) and allow the data exchange between social security 
institutions and border protection authorities. Concerning the disability insurance, 
the federal law also allows to ask the assistance of immigration authorities when 
dealing with cases of insured persons (article 59 LAI). Furthermore, there is a new 
rule requiring a six-months waiting time for migrants to qualify for unemployment 
benefits (article 14 LACI). The new rules entered into force on July 1st 2018 and 
January 1st 2019.
Most of the new regulations, however, are not applicable to those who fall into 
the scope of EU Regulations n° 883/2004 and n° 987/2009. Those migrants are 
protected by the European coordination rules (Kahil-Wolff 2015). These Regulations 
contain certain rules that derogate national law and apply to all branches of social 
security (for instance, a national rule requires residency in Switzerland as a condi-
tion to get family benefits, whereas Regulation n° 883/2004 waives such condition 
by providing exportation of benefits).
20.2.1  Unemployment
The federal unemployment insurance covers all workers, regardless of their nation-
ality. Nevertheless, the insured person has to fulfill certain requirements that could 
restrain foreigners’ access to unemployment benefits. The law requires to be with-
out a job, effectively reside in Switzerland (Rubin 2014), comply with a 12-month 
contribution period, register with the local unemployment service and be able to 
accept a job (art. 8 LACI). Although the law does not require special eligibility 
conditions for foreigners, some of the conditions mentioned before (like residence 
or prior contribution periods) are harder to fulfill by non-Swiss residents. In particu-
lar, a foreigner, although he/she is insured, may not qualify for unemployment ben-
efits if the issuance of a work permit is not granted (ATF 126 V 376) since without 
a permit, the applicant is not allowed to accept a job. This rule does not apply, 
however, to EU/EFTA nationals. Furthermore, the condition of residency applies to 
Swiss nationals and foreigners. Thus, insured persons living abroad cannot claim 
unemployment benefits under national law. Yet, nationals who move to EU/EFTA 
countries in search for work can export their unemployment benefits for a 
short period.
Under international law, frontier workers, no matter if Swiss or EU/EFTA nation-
als, have to apply for unemployment benefits in the country where they reside. 
Concerning the prior contribution period required by Swiss law, article 61 of 
Regulation n° 883/2004 demands to aggregate periods accomplished in an EU/
EFTA country. This rule applies from the first work day (Rubin 2014) and the fed-
eral administration in the field of unemployment insurance expressively states that 
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even a one-day work period is sufficient to grant aggregation.20 According to Swiss 
law, Swiss citizens and EU/EFTA nationals with a permanent residence permit who 
return to Switzerland after having worked outside the European economic area are 
partly exempt from the prior contribution requirement (art. 14 § 3 LACI).
Certain cantons have adopted local legislation concerning non-contributory 
unemployment benefits for persons who no longer qualify for benefits of the federal 
unemployment insurance. These legislations generally require residency in 
Switzerland, more particularly, in the canton concerned. In other cantons, unem-
ployed persons who are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits of the federal 
unemployment insurance fall into social assistance and the corresponding regimes 
usually contain a residence clause.
20.2.2  Health Care
There are four social insurance schemes regulating access to health care in 
Switzerland: the federal law concerning mandatory sickness insurance (LAMal), 
the federal law concerning mandatory disability insurance (LAI), the federal law 
concerning mandatory accident insurance for workers (LAA), and the federal law 
concerning mandatory military insurance (LAM). The sickness insurance provided 
by LAMal contains two strings: a compulsory care insurance and a voluntary daily 
benefits insurance to compensate a loss of income in case of health-related incapac-
ity to work. The first string is financed by individual premiums; employers do not 
contribute to this string. The health care provided must correspond to a legally 
defined list that includes nearly all medical practices necessary to treat the sick 
insured person. As the care insurance is mandatory, health insurers cannot exclude 
persons who are sick or require a waiting period, although the scheme is limited to 
persons residing or working in Switzerland. Except certain situations like emer-
gency or treatments not available in Switzerland, care provided on Swiss territory 
only entitles to reimbursement. The second string that is supposed to provide ben-
efits in cash offers a very limited protection (sickness cash benefits provided by 
LAMal often reach an average amount of not more than CHF 15.- per day) because 
the insurer is not legally obliged to cover a minimum amount. Therefore, most 
employers who want to cover their staff have to contract a private insurance that is 
not part of social security. Foreign residents can access health benefits in kind under 
the same conditions as national residents.
Like in all the other fields of social security, Switzerland applies EU Regulation 
n° 883/2004 which facilitates access to health care in cross border situations by 
prohibiting discrimination and by providing health care in the Member State of resi-
dence or short term stay (see also Eugster 2016). The competent State (for instance, 
Switzerland if the person is insured in Switzerland) has to pay for the health care 
20 seco, Administrative Ordinance on January 1st 2019, E11, p. 105.
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provided abroad. This Regulation applies to Swiss, EU and EFTA nationals. Benefits 
in cash must be paid regardless national residency clauses. Swiss national law does 
not contain any rules that grant health care especially to Swiss citizens living abroad, 
but if an individual is in need, the payment of health care provided abroad may, in 
certain cases, be based on Federal Act on Swiss Persons and Institutions Abroad, RS 
195.1). Moreover, only one of the social security agreements ratified by Switzerland 
(with Germany) provides cross-border access to health care.
The accident insurance (LAA) provides health care and several cash benefits 
whenever a worker is victim of an accident (professional and non-professional acci-
dents) or suffering from an occupational disease. Self-employed persons have 
access to the same benefits if they are insured on a voluntary basis. LAA does not 
contain any special rules differentiating between nationals and foreigners. However, 
self-employed persons who wish to adhere to the voluntary scheme must have their 
residency in Switzerland. This rule does not apply to persons falling into the scope 
of EU Regulations n° 883/2004 and n° 987/2009.
Besides the sickness insurance, the Swiss pension system also provides benefits 
that cover certain health issues. The old-age insurance (AVS) and the disability 
insurance (AI) pay benefits in kind to insured persons that need long term care 
(Kieser 2020). Health care is provided by the disability insurance to children and 
young persons under the age of 20 if they suffer from a congenital defect (article 13 
LAI). Some exceptions apart, young foreigners born outside Switzerland do not 
qualify for benefits from LAI including health care in case of a congenital defect 
(art. 6 § 2 LAI). They may however get health care from the Swiss illness insurance 
(LAMal).
20.2.3  Pensions
Three federal laws regulate access to the Swiss public pension system: LAVS, LAI 
and LPC.  The pension scheme is mandatory for persons living or working in 
Switzerland. Old-age pensions are provided after a contributory minimum period of 
1 year but the amount of the pension depends on the number of years of contribu-
tions and the income gained during those years (Valterio 2011). Under certain con-
ditions, non-contributory pensions are paid to Swiss, EU and EFTA citizens who do 
not fulfill the minimum period of 1 year, but these conditions are seldom fulfilled 
(the applicant needs to have domicile and permanent residency in Switzerland and 
must have been insured without any interruption). Furthermore, in addition to the 
contributory pension, non-contributory old-age, survivor and disability benefits are 
paid to pension holders if their pension does not cover the vital minimum. Pension 
holders must reside in Switzerland to receive non-contributory benefits. The volun-
tary access to the pension scheme for persons who are living or working abroad is 
restricted to Swiss, EU and EFTA nationals. These rules concern persons working 
for the Swiss Government or for certain International organizations and persons liv-
ing outside Switzerland or in EU/EFTA countries (LAVS). For posted workers and 
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students, the nationality does not make a difference. For instance, no matter if the 
worker is Swiss or not, he/she remains insured while working abroad for an 
employer based in Switzerland. Independently from any gainful activity, Swiss citi-
zens (as well as EU citizens) may adhere to the public pension system on a volun-
tary basis if they are living in a third country (i.e. outside Switzerland, the EU or the 
EFTA); this possibility, however, is subject to a five-year prior insurance period. 
Persons who do not remain insured while working or living abroad will have a 
shorter contribution period and will – pro rata temporis – receive a smaller pension. 
The same rules apply, mutatis mutandis, for the disability insurance.
Swiss citizens residing abroad are entitled to claim public pensions from 
Switzerland, but foreigners must have their domicile and permanent residence in 
Switzerland. For foreigners falling into the scope of a bilateral agreement or the EU 
Regulations n° 883/2004 and n° 987/2009, the residence condition is waived and 
pensions are exportable no matter in which country they choose to reside. Other 
foreigners who do not get a pension because they move out of Switzerland are able 
to get a part of their contributions back (Valterio 2011).
At the federal level, individuals who receive pensions from the public pension 
scheme (LAVS/LAI) may qualify for a complementary non-contributory pension 
(LPC). The system is implemented by the 26 cantons which may adopt rules that 
improve the benefits provided by LPC. LPC requires pension holders to reside in 
Switzerland and EU Regulation n° 883/2004 does not waive this condition. From 
July 2018 onward, additional requirements apply to foreigners, as complementary 
benefits are provided to foreigners only if they have a legal residency in Switzerland 
and 10  years of prior residence. For EU/EFTA citizens, however, the 10  years 
requirement is waived by Regulation 883/2004. The complementary pension 
schemes (second pillar: LPP and supplementary benefits) do not stipulate discrimi-
nating rules concerning foreigners. An insured person who leaves the country has 
the right to ask the pension fund for repayment of his/her assets; concerning LPP 
benefits, this rule does not apply to persons covered by EU Regulations n° 883/2004 
and n° 987/2009.
20.2.4  Family Benefits
Switzerland has introduced family benefits but does not provide parental leave. 
Family benefits have been regulated mainly by the legislation of the 26 cantons, 
although the federal legislator adopted a legal framework (LAFam) in 2006 aiming 
to harmonize this policy area. Family benefits are provided to workers and self- 
employed persons who are insured as such by the public pension scheme (AVS). 
The presence of one or more children, no matter their nationality, triggers the right 
to family benefits. The law does not stipulate any other condition concerning citi-
zenship. No prior contribution period is required to access these benefits, although 
article 7 of the Ordinance (OAFam, RS 836.21) requires residence in Switzerland as 
an eligibility condition (condition waived by EU Regulation n° 883/2004). 
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Furthermore, OAFam reserves birth allowance to mothers who have been living in 
Switzerland for at least 9 months before giving birth (this allowance is not included 
in Regulation n° 883/2004). Federal law contains no rules that allow non-resident 
Swiss citizens to receive family benefits from Switzerland. The law of the 26 can-
tons might contain rules that restrict certain types of family benefits to Swiss citi-
zens (e.g. Ticino, ATF 143 I 1).
The maternity benefits scheme (LAPG, RS 834.1- see also Geiser et al. 2019) is 
inspired by Directive 92/85/EEC concerning pregnant workers and workers who 
have recently given birth. LAPG covers female workers and self-employed working 
in Switzerland who have been insured in the public pension scheme (AVS) during 
9 months before giving birth and have worked at least 5 months during this period. 
For Swiss/EU/EFTA nationals, Regulation n° 883/2004 provides aggregation of 
periods accomplished in an EU/EFTA Member state. The LAPG scheme grants 
benefits during 14 weeks, at 80% of the average income previously earned.
20.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
As mentioned, the public pension scheme (1st pillar) is supplemented by non- 
contributory benefits granting minimum resources to pension holders (LPC). 
Besides this, Swiss law also provides social aid to persons in need. The access to 
social assistance is mainly based on the legislation of the 26 cantons, although a 
certain harmonization is ensured via cooperation between the cantons (Conférence 
Suisse des institutions d’action sociale, CSIAS). As a common denominator, social 
assistance or social aid is provided to persons living in Switzerland who cannot 
cover their basic living costs. Benefits include basic living and housing costs. In 
addition, the federal law provides benefits that allow to pay the mandatory social 
health insurance (LAMal), while also granting the right to assistance for persons in 
need, including access to indispensable health care (see also Gächter and 
Filippo 2015).
In most cantons, social assistance is restricted to persons living in the canton. EU 
Regulation n° 883/2004 is not applicable to social assistance, but the Free Movement 
of Persons Agreement mentioned above contains rules concerning non-contributory 
benefits and social aid. The Agreement grants equal treatment with respect to wel-
fare benefits for EU/EFTA nationals who qualify as workers but it allows Switzerland 
to not provide social assistance to non-active foreigners (art. 24 annex I FMPA and 
EU Directive 2004/38EC on the right of citizens to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States). Concerning persons who lose their job, the law 
excludes them from social aid (art. 61a § 3 FNA). Moreover, foreigners can lose 
their residency permit if claiming or obtaining social aid. According to FNA, the 
competent authority may revoke a permit if a foreigner or a person the foreigner 
must care for is dependent on social assistance.
Federal law also provides social aid for Swiss citizens living abroad. The Federal 
Act on Swiss Persons and Institutions Abroad (SAA, RS 195.1) concerns Swiss 
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citizens who are not domiciled in Switzerland and who are registered as such in the 
Swiss Abroad Register. The Swiss Confederation grants social assistance to non- 
resident Swiss who are in need and “unable to support themselves or with their own 
resources, with financial assistance from private sources or with assistance from the 
receiving state” (art. 24 SAA). The type and the amount of social aid depend on the 
conditions in the receiving state. The applicant may be advised to return to 
Switzerland if this is in his/her interest and the Confederation covers the travel 
costs. Once the person is back in Switzerland, the canton of residence becomes 
competent to provide social assistance if needed.
20.3  Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the Swiss social security system covers individuals who 
live and/or work in Switzerland. In general, the law does not distinguish between 
nationals and foreigners, besides certain exceptions concerning access to voluntary 
schemes, disability benefits and unemployment benefits. Social assistance is limited 
to persons residing in Switzerland. Most of the national rules, however, are subject 
to social security coordination which arises from the Free Movement of Persons 
Agreement applied to EU/EFTA nationals. In the future, the implementation of 
FMPA and Regulation n° 883/2004 might even be strengthened by an Agreement on 
institutional matters that the EU and Switzerland have drafted in December 2018.21 
This Agreement provides for a dispute settlement that allows to bring a dispute 
before the European Court of Justice and thus promises a more homogenous appli-
cation of EU law within the in Free Movement of Persons Agreement.
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Chapter 21
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 
and Social Protection for Swiss Citizens 
Abroad
Lorenzo Piccoli
21.1  Diaspora Policy Infrastructure and Key Policies
This chapter presents the policies of Swiss institutions in their dealings with Swiss 
abroad, with a specific focus on the area of social protection. The chapter is divided 
into two main sections. First, it describes the general institutional framework by 
which Swiss institutions interact with nationals abroad, as well as the main engage-
ment policies with this population. The second part of the chapter focuses on the 
policies, programmes and services offered by Swiss institutions to respond to the 
social protection needs of Swiss abroad across five specific policy areas: unemploy-
ment, health care, pensions, family benefits, and guaranteed minimum resources. 
This chapter explains how the Federal Council has gained control over this network 
of institutions starting from the 1960s. The centralization of social protection 
towards Swiss abroad was the result of a new legislation recognizing the crucial role 
of Swiss nationals abroad in shaping both internal politics and the external image of 
Switzerland. As part of this strategy, the Federal Council developed more encom-
passing social protection policies, while safeguarding pre-existent cantonal and 
charitable associations. As a result, Swiss nationals abroad can access a wide set of 
social entitlements.
Due to the lack of scientific literature on this topic, the data used for this chapter 
amount to 19 formal policy-making documents (existing legislation, expired 
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legislation, motions to the Federal Assembly, official guidelines and regulations), as 
well as a set of six interviews with policy-makers and experts.1
21.1.1  Diaspora Infrastructure
The Federal Statistical Office (FSO) estimates that there were 751,800 Swiss nation-
als living abroad at the end of 2017.2 Of these, 73.5% had dual citizenship, 62% 
were based in Europe and 54.4% were women.3 In terms of countries of destination, 
France has the largest Swiss expatriate community in Europe (193,300  in 2017), 
followed by Germany (88,600) and Italy (49,600). Outside Europe, the majority of 
Swiss citizens live in the United States (79,900), Canada (39,700), Australia 
(24,900) and Israel (19,900). In total, Swiss nationals abroad represent 11% of the 
total Swiss population. They are often referred to as the “Swiss colony”, the “com-
munity of Swiss abroad”, or the “fifth Switzerland” (Fünfte Schweiz), alluding to 
the fourfold linguistic division within Switzerland.
There is virtually no academic research on the policies towards the Swiss abroad. 
This stands in stark contrast with the relative abundance of studies targeting specific 
communities of Swiss abroad. Scholars have researched the Swiss in the Americas 
(Arlettaz 1979), Argentina (Glatz 1997), Australia (Wegmann 1989), Brazil (Dewulf 
2007), Canada (Bovay 1976), Chile (Schneiter 1983), China and North European 
countries (Camenisch and Muller 2017), Poland (Andrzejewski 2002), Russia 
(Bühler et al. 1985) or Romania (Chinezu 2002). Some scholars have even studied 
cantonal emigrants, like the Ticinese in California (Perret 1950) and the Bernese in 
the United States (Geissbuhler 1999). Yet, no systematic study has been conducted 
on the institutional structuring of the relationship between the Confederation and 
the Swiss nationals abroad.
1 The full list of interviews includes: 1) Director at the Organisation of the Swiss Abroad (14/6/2018, 
Bern); 2) Division Director at the Federal Council: Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten Konsularische Direktion, Zentrum für Bürgerservice Sozialhilfe für 
Auslandschweizer/innen (5/9/2018, Bern); 3) Division Director at the Federal Council: 
Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Konsularische Direktion, 
Delegierte für Auslandschweizerbeziehungen (14/9/2018, Bern); 4) Division Director at the 
Federal Council: Dienst Sprachen und Gesellschaft, Bundesamt für Kultur (26/9/2018, Bern); 5) 
Division Director at the Federal Council: Département fédéral de l’intérieur, Office fédéral des 
assurances sociales, Affaires internationales (3/10/2018, Bern); 6) Former Director at the 
Organisation of the Swiss Abroad (4/10/2018); Director of the Associazione Gazzetta Svizzera 
(5/10/2018, Milan).
2 Federal Statistical Office of Switzerland (2018). Statistics on the Swiss Abroad. https://www.eda.
admin.ch/eda/en/home/living-abroad/publications-statistics/statistics.html. Accessed 18 
March 2019.
3 Most dual nationals lived in Oceania (78.3%), North and South America (77.2%), and Europe 
(73.7%). In Africa and Asia, the percentage of dual nationals was around 60%.
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Historically, the Federal Council has actively worked towards guaranteeing the 
social protection of Swiss abroad. Since 1846, the main institution that is responsi-
ble for engaging with Swiss nationals abroad is the Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs (FDFA, Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten). In 
addition to protecting Switzerland’s interests abroad, the FDFA has among its main 
tasks the improvement of services for Swiss nationals living abroad and the mainte-
nance of the administrative register of the Swiss abroad E-VERA, which contains 
information on the Swiss nationals abroad.4
Within the FDFA, the Consular Directorate (CD, Konsularische Direktion) over-
sees the mobility of Swiss nationals abroad. In particular, the CD’s Delegate for 
Relations with the Swiss Abroad promotes the interests of Swiss nationals abroad 
and coordinates the working of the 170 embassies and consulates around the world, 
as well as 200 honorary consulates. Honorary consulates have, among their main 
tasks, the conduct of official relations with the authorities in the host country and 
information sharing. They can also provide advice to Swiss abroad and, in agree-
ment with the embassy or consulate or with the FDFA, they can take the appropriate 
measures for Swiss abroad who are in a situation of physical or financial risk and 
demand assistance.
The Federal Council actively supports institutions that promote relations and 
assist Swiss abroad. Among these, the Organisation of the Swiss Abroad (OSA, Die 
Auslandschweizer-Organisation) plays a particularly prominent role. This non- 
profit organisation was established during World War I, in 1916, under the umbrella 
of the New Helvetic Society (NHS, Neue Helvetische Gesellschaft), which had 
itself been created 2  years earlier to defend the unity of the young Helvetic 
Confederation. The OSA was initially operative abroad. It set up a permanent sec-
retariat in Geneva in 1919, which was then moved to Fribourg in 1923, and then in 
Bern in 1928. In 1924, the OSA started to receive financial support from the Federal 
Council. Today, its activities are enshrined in Article 9.2 and Article 38 of the 
Federal Act on Swiss Citizens and Institutions Abroad.5 It has three main tasks: 
providing services for Swiss nationals abroad, communicating with them, and rep-
resenting them in Switzerland. More specifically, the OSA provides advice on all 
types of legal, social security insurance and training matters; it publishes the bi- 
monthly magazine “Swiss Review” and promotes active cultural and educational 
programmes for young Swiss nationals abroad. The OSA also organizes the 
Congress for Swiss nationals abroad, which takes place every year in a different city 
4 The register is updated through the notifications sent to the FDFA by the municipal offices upon 
departure and return of Swiss nationals. According to information estimations of the government 
officials, in addition to the 751,800 persons who were officially registered to live abroad in 2017, 
there are about 250.000 Swiss abroad who has not registered in E-VERA.
5 The two articles read, respectively: “The Confederation shall maintain contact with institutions 
that promote relations between the Swiss Abroad and that contribute to better support and network-
ing of the Swiss Abroad, particularly the Organisation for the Swiss Abroad” and “[The 
Confederation] may grant financial support to the Organisation for the Swiss Abroad to safeguard 
the interests of the Swiss Abroad and to provide them with information”.
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of Switzerland. The directors of the OSA hold at least four official meetings with 
representatives of the CD every year and the OSA receives three million francs 
(approximately two million and sixty-five hundred euro) per year from the Swiss 
Federal Council to carry out its activities (Table 21.1).6
The Foundation for Young Swiss Abroad (FYSA, Stiftung für junge 
Auslandschweizer) is also directly connected to the Swiss Federal Council and its 
role is enshrined in Article 9.3 of the Federal Act on Swiss Citizens and Institutions 
Abroad.7 This Foundation was created under the name Swiss Aid in 1917, in order 
to allow Swiss children living in disaster-torn areas abroad to spend a couple of 
weeks relaxing with host families in a quiet setting. The first holiday camps were 
organised in the 1960s, while the Foundation took its current name in 1979.
Similar to the working of the FYSA, educationsuisse also promotes the training 
of young Swiss abroad and works closely with Swiss schools abroad and with inter-
national schools where Swiss teachers teach. This non-profit organisation was 
established in 1942 as “Help Committee for Swiss Schools Abroad” and was later 
on simply renamed as “Committee for Swiss Schools Abroad”. Since 2012, it is 
6 Banque de données des subventions fédérales, 2018
7 Loi fédérale sur les personnes et les institutions suisses à l’étranger, 26/9/2014: “[The 
Confederation] shall promote exchange between young Swiss Abroad and encourage their ties to 
Switzerland.”
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known as educationsuisse and, following the Federal Act on the Diffusion of Swiss 
Education Abroad, it is economically supported by the Federal Council, Office of 
Culture (OC, Bundesamt für Kultur).8
All Swiss abroad registered with a Swiss representation, except those living in 
Italy, receive the bi-monthly magazine Swiss Review (Schweizer Revue), which 
reports specifically on issues which interest Swiss abroad and strengthens their ties 
with the home country. Special emphasis is given to politics, so that Swiss citizens 
living abroad can exercise their electoral rights in a responsible and informed man-
ner. Because it contains governmental information and announcements, the Swiss 
Review also serves as an official publication organ. Since 1973, the Review has 
been published by the OSA in Bern, which receives public funding from the FDFA 
for the publication. Edited to 422,000 copies, it is politically neutral.
Swiss nationals living in Italy do not receive the Swiss Review. Instead, they can 
sign up for the Swiss Gazette (Gazzetta Svizzera), which was created by the then 
cultural attaché of the Swiss embassy in Milan in 1968. This magazine, published 
in Italian, aims at strengthening the links between the various Swiss colonies in Italy 
and maintaining the bonds with Switzerland. It is managed by the Swiss Gazette 
Association (Associazione Gazzetta Svizzera), which was established in 1995. The 
Association is subsidised for one third by the Swiss Federal Council and for two 
thirds by the readers. Its annual budget of around 300,000 francs is used to publish 
11 issues per year. The Swiss Gazette is read by about 30,000 people, with 22,000 
printed copies and about 7000 access online per month. Like the Swiss Review, the 
Swiss Gazette is politically neutral.
Political parties have traditionally engaged with Swiss nationals abroad. All the 
main parties that are currently part of the Federal Council (The Liberals; the Social 
Democratic Party; the Swiss People’s Party; the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party) have a branch that maintains the ties with nationals abroad. In 2004, under 
impulse of the OSA, several members of the Federal Assembly established the 
Parliamentary Group of the Swiss Abroad, which is coordinated by three 
Co-Presidents and currently consists of 75 members of both chambers. Its activity 
is dedicated to the representation of the interests of Swiss nationals abroad and 
every 3–4 months, the Group releases a newsletter with information on the most 
important reforms that may affect Swiss nationals abroad. In the current legislature 
(2019–2023), the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group of the Swiss Abroad is the big-
gest group in the Federal Assembly.
8 Loi fédérale sur la diffusion de la formation suisse à l’étranger, 21/3/2014.
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21.1.2  Key Engagement Policies
In public discourses, Swiss nationals abroad are seen as important actors in shaping 
Switzerland’s image in the world. For this reason, the institutions have traditionally 
invested in fostering cultural networks and have actively promoted the establish-
ment of minimum social standards of protection for Swiss nationals abroad (Arlettaz 
1986). The protection of Swiss abroad is enshrined in Article 40 of the Federal 
Constitution, stipulating that “the Confederation shall encourage relations among 
the Swiss abroad and their relations with Switzerland. It may support organisations 
that pursue this objective. It shall legislate on the rights and obligations of the Swiss 
abroad, in particular in relation to the exercise of political rights in the Confederation, 
the fulfilment of the obligation to perform military or alternative service, welfare 
support and social security”. This legislation was first introduced as Article 45 of the 
Constitution in 1966, following a popular initiative with 68% of approval by the 
voters. It became Article 40 following the revision of the Constitution in 1999.9
More detailed policies in this field are regulated by the Swiss Abroad Act, the 
Federal Act of 26 September 2014 on Swiss Nationals and Institutions Abroad.10 
The law includes measures aimed at supporting, informing and promoting links 
between Swiss nationals abroad, their political rights, social assistance that may be 
granted to them and support for specific institutions. The Act defines Swiss nation-
als abroad as those Swiss citizens who “are not domiciled in Switzerland and who 
are listed in the Register of the Swiss Abroad” and aims at “facilitate[ing] interna-
tional mobility for Swiss nationals” and “promot[ing] Switzerland’s presence and 
links abroad”. Swiss abroad are recognised as being of a unique importance to their 
homeland regarding knowledge, experience, access and connection.
Swiss abroad are directly involved in political affairs. Since 1992, all Swiss 
nationals abroad are eligible to vote and to stand as candidates in elections for the 
National Council and in national referendums, under condition that they register 
upon moving out of the country.11 Moreover, the law entitles Swiss nationals abroad 
to sign federal initiatives and requests for referendums at the federal level. Twelve 
cantons also provide the right of vote in cantonal matters and the right to be elected 
to the respective Council of State to Swiss nationals abroad (Arrighi and 
Piccoli 2018).12
Until 2018, the Federal Council had concluded international social security 
agreements with 44 countries. The objectives of these agreements are to ensure the 
equal treatment of citizens from the contracting States, determining the applicable 
legislation and the payment of social security benefits abroad. Switzerland is also 
9 Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 18/4/1999.
10 Loi fédérale sur les personnes et les institutions suisses à l’étranger, 26/9/2014. See also: 
Ordonnance sur les personnes et les institutions suisses à l’étranger, 15/10/2018.
11 Ordonnance sur les droits politiques des Suisses de l’’étranger, 16/10/1991.
12 The full list of cantons that provide the right to vote in cantonal elections is as follows: Basel-




part of several standard-setting conventions. In accordance with the Agreement on 
the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the European Union 
(EU),13 relations with EU Member States are governed by the provisions of 
Regulations (EC) No. 883/0414 and (EC) No. 987/09.15 Both regulations coordinate 
the various European social security systems and apply also for European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) countries.16
21.2  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Switzerland
Until recently, the social protection of Swiss abroad was left to ad hoc initiatives by 
the Federal Council, such as the aid operation to support Swiss abroad following 
World War II in 1957, as well as to charitable organisations, non-profit organisa-
tions, cantonal and municipal institutions. The Federal Council counted 57 organ-
isations providing social support to Swiss abroad in the early 1970s. It also estimated 
the federal expenditure for Swiss abroad at around 85,000 francs per year, vis-à-vis 
a cantonal expenditure of about 63,900 francs per year. At the time, it was not 
unusual that a Swiss expatriate originally from Zürich, for example, obtained social 
support from his canton while his neighbour from Grisons did not. The uneven 
social protection accorded to Swiss abroad, as well as the need to coordinate the 
interventions and the new Article 45 on the rights and obligations of the Swiss 
abroad introduced in 1966, inspired the Federal Assembly to approve the Federal 
Act of 21 March 1973 on Social Assistance and Loans to Swiss Citizens Abroad.17 
It was the first time the federal institutions took the matter of welfare assistance for 
Swiss nationals abroad in their own hands.
Today, Article 22 of the Federal Act on Swiss Citizens and Institutions Abroad 
stipulates that “the Confederation grants social assistance to the Swiss Abroad who 
are in need”. Swiss nationals abroad who find themselves in need of social 
13 Accord entre la Confédération suisse, d’une part, et la Communauté européenne et ses Etats 
membres, d’autre part, sur la libre circulation des personnes, 21/6/1999.
14 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination 
of social security systems, 29/4/2014.
15 Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems, 16(9/2009.
16 Ordonnance sur l’’introduction progressive de la libre circulation des personnes entre, d’’une 
part, la Confédération suisse et, d’’autre part, l’’Union européenne et ses Etats membres, ainsi 
qu’’entre les Etats membres de l’’Association européenne de libre-échange, 22/5/2002.
17 Loi fédérale sur l’assistance des Suisses de l’étranger, 21/3/1973. See also earlier debates in the 
Federal Assembly: Message du Conseil fédéral à l’’Assemblée fédérale concernant l’’insertion 
dans la constitution d’’un article 45 bis sur les Suisses à l’’étranger, 2/7/1965; and Message du 
Conseil fédéral à l’’Assemblée fédérale concernant un projet de loi fédérale sur l’’assistance des 
Suisses de l’’étranger, 6/9/1972.
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protection of any kind, be it matters of health, pension, unemployment, or minimum 
resources, can contact the Swiss representation responsible for their place of resi-
dence abroad. This is part of an official policy called Social security for Swiss citi-
zens abroad (Sozialhilfe für Auslandschweizerinnen und Auslandschweizer) 
(Table 21.2).
Consulates and embassies normally try to find ways to include the person in the 
social welfare of the host country, except for emergency cases like hospitalisation, 
when the representation grants the essential emergency aid and notifies the Consular 
Directorate (CD).18 Most often, however, the person fills an application which is 
first reviewed and completed by the representation responsible for her/his place of 
residence abroad and transfers it together with a report and request to the CD at the 
FDFA in Bern. The CD decides whether to accept applications following a set of 
guidelines internal to the ministry. In urgent cases, the representation grants the 
essential emergency aid and notifies the CD. The CD may authorise representations 
to grant additional social assistance on their own initiative. In addition to una tan-
tum financial help, this policy also allows for continuous funding over the years, 
provided that the individual stipulates a plan together with the CD. Every year, the 
CD submits to Parliament a budget, part of the broader budget for the FDFA. The 
18 Note that the majority of these cases actually concern Swiss temporarily abroad, e.g. tourists.
Table 21.2 Number of Swiss abroad who benefit of social assistance through the Swiss Federal 
Council (2011–2017)
Year Assistance abroad Repatriation Emergency aid for tourists
2011 323 142 90
2012 307 158 101
2013 285 143 114
2014 295 144 98
2015 262 110 158
2016 258 118 148
2017 224 88 132
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the FDFA
Table 21.3 Financial cost of 
the social assistance through 
the Swiss Federal Council, in 
Swiss francs (2011–2017)








Source: Own elaboration based on data from the FDFA
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amount of money spent by the CD has been steadily decreasing over the last 5 years, 
from 1,7 million francs in 2010 to 1,1 million at the end of 2017 (Table 21.3).
Interestingly, according to Article 25 of the Federal Act on Swiss Citizens and 
Institutions Abroad, Swiss nationals might be ineligible for social assistance if they 
have another nationality that is considered preponderant. The internal guidelines of 
the ministry explain how to determine which of the nationalities is preponderant, 
namely: (i) the circumstances which led to the applicant’s acquisition of the foreign 
nationality; (ii) the state where the applicant resided during childhood and training; 
(iii) the length of stay in the current State of residence; (iv) the applicant’s relations 
with Switzerland.19 There are some specific situations when, even though the for-
eign nationality of the applicant is preponderant, social assistance can still be 
granted on an exceptional basis.20 It may be that over time the predominant national-
ity changes. If social assistance has begun to be granted when Swiss nationality 
predominates, assistance benefits granted on a regular basis may be maintained 
even if, over time, the foreign nationality has become preponderant. If a person 
receiving social assistance acquires a foreign nationality, the payment of assistance 
benefits should be re-examined.
The persons in need may be advised to return to Switzerland if it is in their or 
their family’s interests to do so. In such cases, the Federal Council shall not or shall 
no longer pay social assistance benefits abroad. In the event of a return to Switzerland, 
the Federal Council anticipates the expenses to cover the cost of the travel. It may 
also anticipate the expenses if the person in need decides to return to Switzerland of 
her/his own accord. The FDFA runs a counselling service on returning to Switzerland, 
providing information on entry and living conditions to Swiss nationals returning to 
Switzerland from abroad.
Article 35 of the Federal Act on Swiss Persons and Institutions Abroad estab-
lishes that social assistance recipients must repay the social assistance benefits if 
they no longer require them and are able to support themselves and their families.21 
Social assistance benefits may be claimed back up to 10 years after the last payment, 
unless the receivable was stipulated contractually or by the CD. However, not all the 
recipients of social assistance are able to pay back the money they have received.
If Swiss nationals die abroad, the foreign authority will inform the local Swiss 
representation in the country concerned. If this is not done, family members may 
give the foreign death certificate to a Swiss representation, which will send the 
document to the deceased’s municipality of origin. If a person wishes to be buried 
in Switzerland, the Swiss representation will also prepare the necessary documents 
19 Checkliste mehrfache Staatsbürgerschaft: Welches Bürgerrecht dominiert? Gesetzliche 
Grundlagen, 1/1/2015.
20 These situations are the following: (i) minor children, where the predominant nationality of one 
of the parents is Swiss; (ii) severely disabled persons, where the predominant nationality of one of 
the parents is Swiss; (iii) persons at risk of imminent death, very serious illness, reversible dis-
ability; (iv) in the event of war, natural disaster or political disturbance. In borderline situations, the 
doubt must benefit the applicant.
21 Loi fédérale sur les personnes et les institutions suisses à l’étranger, 26/9/2014.
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for repatriation. The Federal Council may cover the costs of funerals for Swiss 
nationals who die abroad and who are without means, provided neither their rela-
tives nor the receiving state is willing to pay the costs.
In addition to these policies, the Federal Council supports institutions that pro-
mote relations between Swiss nationals abroad and their ties to Switzerland. Today, 
more than 750 Swiss associations and institutions overseas are affiliated to the OSA, 
including humanitarian groups, traditional Swiss clubs, sporting associations, 
choirs, charities, and family associations. These diverse associations constitute 
“micro-communities of solidarity, where Swiss identity can be easily transmitted” 
(Leu 2016: 31). In Paris for example, the Swiss Society of Charity has been operat-
ing since 1820 and currently has around 20 volunteers who go to the aid of Swiss 
nationals who are sick or lonely, help them with administrative matters and make 
hospital visits. Some of these associations are representative of specific cantons. In 
Argentina and Brazil, for instance, the association Valaisans du Monde is well 
established; in Brazil, the association Nova Friburgo represents Swiss nationals 
from the canton of Fribourg. These associations work closely to Swiss diplomatic 
missions: although they do not formally participate in the decision-making process, 
in some countries, they provide information that can help the missions deciding on 
whether requests for welfare assistance are legitimate. In a few countries, Swiss 
diplomatic missions rely on these associations to provide first hands-on support to 
Swiss nationals. While providing social help, these associations also ensure an 
enduring cultural connection between Swiss nationals abroad and the country of 
origin. The OAS, for example, supports elderly Swiss citizens with poor economic 
possibilities who wish to return to their homeland for a visit. Requests must be sub-
mitted to the Swiss embassy or consulate where the person resides. The financial 
support however excludes coverage of unpaid stay taxes (e.g. for overstayers) or 
other debts incurred in the host country which make it impossible to leave.
The following pages describe in detail the services and policies for five key 
social protection areas. They focus mostly on EU cooperation agreements because 
most Swiss nationals abroad reside in these countries.
21.2.1  Unemployment
Swiss nationals in the EU benefit from the bilateral Agreement on the Free 
Movement of Persons signed on 21 June 1999, while Swiss nationals in Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway benefit from the EFTA Convention signed in Stockholm 
on 4 January 1960. In principle, anyone who is gainfully employed abroad or is a 
family member of an individual employed abroad is not insured under the compul-
sory Swiss OASI/DI scheme. However, they may take out such insurance under 
certain conditions. Individuals who are gainfully employed in an EU/EFTA Member 
State by a Swiss employer and are paid by this employer can continue to be covered 
by the OASI/DI/APG schemes and the unemployment insurance scheme if their 
salary is paid in Switzerland, by the Swiss employer; or, alternatively, if the employer 
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agrees that the employee continues to be insured in Switzerland. Insurance cover, 
however, can only be continued if the individual concerned has been insured for five 
consecutive years in the compulsory or optional OASI/DI scheme, either directly 
prior to taking up employment abroad or – for individuals who have been posted in 
an EU/EFTA Member State while still insured in Switzerland – directly after the 
termination of their employment abroad. For continued insurance during employ-
ment in an EU country, Swiss nationals and citizens of EU Member States can use 
insurance periods in EU or EFTA countries to count towards this five-year period. 
The same applies for EFTA nationals for continued insurance during employment 
in Iceland, Liechtenstein or Norway. Continued insurance cover in Switzerland 
does not exempt a person from any social insurance obligations in his/her country 
of employment. Swiss consulates and embassies can assist Swiss abroad in their 
dealings with unemployment benefits, by helping them to navigate the legislation.
For Swiss nationals who move abroad, unemployment benefits can be paid 
abroad under certain circumstances and for a maximum of 3 months. After register-
ing with the Swiss employment services, insured persons must remain available to 
the competent employment service for 4 weeks. Once their claim for export has 
been approved, insured persons may move to the country where they want to look 
for a job, notify the competent employment services of their arrival and comply 
with that country’s control procedures.
If the person does not find employment within 3 months, he/she can return to 
Switzerland and continue to receive unemployment insurance benefits. The CD of 
the FDFA provides a special service for Swiss nationals abroad who intend to return 
to the home country. In particular, the CD helps preparing the job search in 
Switzerland, forwarding job applications to the respective cantonal employment 
offices.
21.2.2  Health Care
The Federal Law on Health Insurance holds that health insurance is solely manda-
tory for those living in Switzerland. However, agreements concluded with the EU 
and EFTA have brought about exceptions to this rule for the following categories of 
Swiss nationals abroad: cross-border workers and their family members; pensioners 
and their family members; Swiss nationals abroad drawing unemployment benefits 
in Switzerland and their family members, as well as family members of temporary 
residents in Switzerland. As a general principle, these individuals have the possibil-
ity to choose between health care in their country of residence or in Switzerland. 
Swiss pensioners abroad must continue to hold basic health insurance with a Swiss 
provider for themselves and their dependents; but this rule does not apply to pen-
sioners living in Austria, Italy, Germany, France, and Spain, as one of the conditions 
that are part of the Agreement with the EU on the Free Movement of Persons signed 
on 21 June 1999. The rule also does not apply to those individuals who are receiving 
a pension from their country of residence, even if the pension received in the 
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country of residence is lower than the Swiss pension. Finally, if the pensioner is 
domiciled in a country from which he/she does not receive a pension but receives a 
Swiss pension and a pension from another EU/EFTA state, he/she must stipulate 
insurance in the country in which he/she has held insurance for the longest period 
for retirement pension purposes.
For all other categories of Swiss nationals living in EU/EFTA Member States, 
the Agreement on the freedom of movement of persons concluded between 
Switzerland and these countries establishes coordination of the social insurance sys-
tems. Within the health insurance framework, the Agreement stipulates that the 
appropriate place for health care coverage is the country in which the person is 
working. For example, a Swiss citizen working and residing in Italy will be gov-
erned by the Italian health insurance regime.
When a Swiss national emigrates to a state outside of the EU/EFTA, it is no lon-
ger possible for her/him to remain in the compulsory basic health insurance scheme. 
Health insurance companies have the possibility to privately provide health insur-
ance plans for abroad.
The OSA offers information services in these matters, such as answering legal 
questions, indicating companies that propose international health insurance, 
explaining the consequences of emigration on the social insurance scheme, and 
providing information on the specific regulations concerning health legislation.
Consulates can assist individuals finding a doctor or setting up a visit in the hos-
pital. The policy of social security for Swiss citizens abroad also allows consulates 
to anticipate the money to cover to emergency health care, if needed.
21.2.3  Pensions
Independently of the country where they reside, all Swiss citizens are entitled to a 
Swiss old-age pension if they have paid their pension contribution for at least 1 year. 
They are also entitled to a Swiss invalidity pension if they have paid their contribu-
tion for at least 3 years. The old-age and survivors’ insurance (OASI) and the dis-
ability insurance (DI) are compulsory only for individuals living in Switzerland. 
Swiss nationals abroad have the possibility, in principle, of joining the optional 
OASI/DI scheme. This optional insurance aims to avoid a situation where, in the 
event of an accident or at retirement age, they or their survivors, may not receive a 
pension at all or only receive one on the basis of the years of pension contribution 
paid under the compulsory pension insurance system and contributions paid as 
such. In fact, failure to pay one single year of contribution to the voluntary scheme 
leads, as a general rule, to a reduction of the pension. Those who wish to join the 
voluntary OASI insurance scheme should present their request to the Swiss 
Compensation Office (SCO) in Geneva. This request must be sent within 1 year of 
leaving the compulsory insurance scheme and the cost of the insurance depends on 
the employment condition – past and present – of the individual.
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21.2.4  Family-Related Benefits
Family-related benefits are not accessible to Swiss nationals abroad (although Swiss 
family allowances can also be paid for children residing in the EU/EFTA). The 
Federal Council, however, provides some indirect support to families abroad 
through financial incentives for the education of pupils in Swiss schools and for 
short return trips to Switzerland for Swiss children who live abroad. These activities 
are coordinated by the Federal Office of Culture.
Swiss schools abroad are subsidised by the Swiss Confederation provided they 
meet the requirements of the Federal Act on the Provision of Swiss Education 
Abroad (Swiss Schools Act) of 21 March 2014.22 Currently, the Swiss Confederation 
recognises 18 Swiss schools abroad, five of which are in South America, four in 
Italy, two in Spain, and two in Asia (Table 21.4).
The Federal Office of Culture is responsible for the promotion and recognition of 
Swiss schools abroad and it works together with the association educationsuisse, 
which represents the interests of the Swiss schools with the Swiss authorities. The 
association also provides information about the range of international schools sup-
ported by the Federal Council. Swiss families abroad who do not live in the vicinity 
of a Swiss school, but who wish to provide their children with Swiss training, can 
22 Loi fédérale sur la diffusion de la formation suisse à l’’étranger, 21/3/2014. See also: Ordonnance 
sur la diffusion de la formation suisse à l’étranger, 28/11/2014; and the debates in the Federal 
Assembly: Message concernant la loi fédérale sur la transmission de la formation suisse à 
l’étranger, 7/6/2013.
Table 21.4 Annual subsidies of the Swiss Federal Council to the Swiss Schools Abroad 
(1980–2015)
School Students Swiss Students Funding in francs
Bangkok 264 43 602.952
Barcelona 656 156 1.702.447
Bergamo 176 28 371.704
Bogota 727 144 1.811.615
Curitiba & Sao Paulo 1.369 179 2.108.004
Catania 92 24 260.833
Lima 715 233 1.741.247
Madrid 560 82 1.157.986
Milan 515 151 1.542.882
Mexico City, Cuernavaca, Querétaro 1.424 141 2.338.670
Rome 504 145 1.632.025
Santiago de Chile 729 176 1.829.954
Singapore 277 153 1.119.574
Total 8.008 1.655 18.219.893
Source: Own elaboration based on information from the Federal Office of Culture. Note: The 18th 
Swiss School Abroad, the School of Beijing, is not in the list because it was recognised in 
December 2017
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apply for support from the Confederation for the following three actions: (1) recruit-
ing a Swiss teacher at a German, French, or international school abroad; (2) estab-
lishing courses on the history and geography of Switzerland and national languages; 
(3) purchasing of Swiss educational material. The promoter or applicant must in any 
case be an association of Swiss parents or a Swiss organization.
In addition to this service, the Federal Office of Culture also supports the 
Foundation for Young Swiss Abroad (FYSA, Stiftung für junge Auslandschweizer). 
This charity provides resources for Swiss children living abroad to spend some time 
in Switzerland. The charity was initially established on the initiative of a small 
group of volunteers who, in 1917, brought to Switzerland 280 Swiss children from 
war zones in Germany. Children spent a few weeks of holiday and were hosted by 
families. The cost of this initiative was met in full by the Federal Council. The fol-
lowing year, a private committee was formed under the name of “Swiss Aid”, which 
set itself the objective of continuing and building upon the aid work started. In 
October 1979, a decision was made to change the name of the Foundation from 
“Swiss Aid” to the “Foundation for Young Swiss Abroad”. Today, the Foundation 
relies on the administrative structures of the OSA, therefore relying indirectly on 
federal funding. It is composed of ten cantonal committees, which organise annual 
fundraising events. In total, the Federal Office of Culture spends about 20 million 
francs per year on Swiss schools abroad, which represents 15% of the total budget.
21.2.5  Economic Hardship
There is no policy concerning the guaranteed minimum resources for Swiss nation-
als abroad. However, consulates and embassies often provide financial support to 
Swiss nationals abroad who do not have sufficient economic resources through the 
Social security for Swiss citizens abroad overseen by the Consular Directorate (CD) 
at the FDFA in Bern. As previously noted, this policy allows for structured welfare 
funding. According to the government officials interviewed for this research, the 
majority of recipients of social assistance abroad have received funding from the 
CD for several years now.
21.3  Conclusions
Social policies for Swiss nationals abroad revolve around the institutionalisation of 
a large network that is: (i) overseen by the Federal Council, mainly the FDFA and, 
to a lesser extent, the Federal Office of Culture; (ii) coordinated by non-profit organ-
isations funded to work together with the Federal Council, mainly the OSA and, in 
some specific domains, the Foundation for Young Swiss Abroad and education-
suisse; (iii) implemented by the consulates and the embassies; (iv) complemented 
by the activities of the 750 Swiss associations, charities, and clubs around the world. 
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This constitutes a “guichet unique” for what is, in fact, a broad range of policies 
and actors.
This highly institutionalised system has developed quite recently. Until the late 
1960s, the social protection of Swiss nationals abroad was uncoordinated and 
dependent upon cantonal authorities and benevolent societies. The Federal Council 
took over starting from 1966, with the introduction of what is now Article 40 of the 
Constitution, which encourages and supports relations between Switzerland and the 
Swiss abroad. In 1973, the Council approved the Federal Act on Social Assistance 
and Loans to Swiss Citizens Abroad.23 Since 2014, the social protection of Swiss 
abroad is mandated by the Federal Act on Swiss Citizens and Institutions Abroad. 
This legislation is a consequence of the recognition, by the Federal Council, that 
Swiss nationals abroad have a crucial role on two fronts. Internally, they shape poli-
tics through their right to vote and stand as candidates in federal elections and in 
some cantonal elections. Externally, they are considered informal ambassadors of 
the country, a particularly important role also because Switzerland is not part of the 
EU and must find alternative ways to make its voice heard. As part of this strategy, 
the Federal Council developed more encompassing social protection policies, while 
safeguarding pre-existent cantonal associations. Today, Swiss nations abroad can 
access a wide set of social entitlements.
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Chapter 22
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Tunisia
Laura Gelb and Mohamed Ali Marouani
22.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in Tunisia
22.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
The first modern type1 social security scheme appeared in Tunisia in 1898 under the 
French protectorate. It was exclusively reserved for civil servants and mainly 
designed for pensions management. A family allowance scheme was created in 
1918 and a long-term sickness scheme was set up in 1951. Family allowances were 
further extended in 1944 and a pension scheme was introduced for the banking sec-
tor in 1949 (Chaabane 2002). However, the most important social security reforms 
took place after independence, during the 1960s (for healthcare and family allow-
ances) and 1970s (for old-age and disability pensions). Social security covered 
independent workers since 1982, low-income workers (maids, craftsmen, etc.), 
intellectuals and artists since 2002.
Tunisia has signed bilateral social security conventions with 14 European and 
North African countries in the attempt to protect the social rights of Tunisian 
1 What existed before could be considered as a charities, although in some cases there were some 
rules for taxes collection and allowances to the poorest.
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emigrants, mainly the transferability of benefits. A voluntary contributory system 
was created in 1989 for emigrants in other regions (Gulf, North America), which 
allows mainly to cover the families remaining in the country.2 This scheme covers 
health, pensions, invalidity and death.
Currently, the Tunisian social security system includes several categories of 
contributory benefits such as family allowances, cash benefits (sickness, mater-
nity and death), health care, old-age, disability and survival pensions, death ben-
efits and compensations for accidents at work and occupational illnesses. The 
specific procedures for accessing these benefits vary substantially across work-
ers. For example, non-wage earners in the agricultural sector are not entitled to 
benefit from family allowances. The beneficiaries are the contributors them-
selves, their spouses, children until 20 years and ascendants above 60 who are in 
the care of the contributor. To benefit from health and maternity, the contributor 
needs to prove 50 days of work during the last two quarters, or 80 days of work 
during the last four quarters.3
The state manages the social security system through two funds: the National 
Social Security Fund (CNSS) for the private sector and the National Pensions and 
Contingency Fund (CNRPS) covering civil servants. Health benefits are managed 
by the National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) created in 2004. In 2013, CNSS 
affiliates represented 75% of all affiliates in the country and they were covered by 
seven different regimes according to their professional category (Ben Othman and 
Marouani 2016). The most important regime is the RSNA (Régime des salariés non 
agricoles) for non-agricultural employees, which represented 53% of all contribu-
tors to the CNSS in 2013. Agricultural employees with low revenues contribute to 
the RSA regime (Régime des salariés agricoles), whereas those with higher reve-
nues are covered via the RSAA regime (Régime des salariés agricoles amélioré). 
Self-employed contribute to the RTNS regime (Régime des travailleurs non sala-
riés) and, since 2002, two additional regimes were introduced in the CNSS: RACI 
(Régime des artistes, créateurs et intellectuels), for artists and intellectuals and 
RTFR (Régime des travailleurs à faibles revenus) for low wage employees (Ben 
Othman and Marouani 2016).
There are two categories of CNSS affiliates: wage-earners and independent 
workers. Table  22.1 summarizes the contributions rates for each social security 
branch and the respective shares paid by employers and employees. Table  22.2 
describes the amounts of contributions for independent workers.
Old-age, health and maternity are automatically included in independent work-
ers’ contributions. They can voluntarily cover themselves against professional acci-
dents (0,4–4%). The contribution rate is 14.71% computed on the declared income, 
or on a lump-sum basis for the lowest income groups. Low-income people not cov-
ered by the social security contributory scheme can benefit from specific social 
2 http://www.social.gov.tn/index.php?id=49&L=0
3 CLEISS (2018). Le régime tunisien de sécurité sociale (salariés). http://www.cleiss.fr/. Accessed 
01 August 2018.
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assistance programs. The program for families in need (PNAFN, see below) is the 
main instrument of social assistance in Tunisia. It covers around 240,000 families 
by providing them cash transfers (110 TND per month, around 40 EUR) and a card 
for subsidized health care at public health centres.4 Involuntarily unemployed, tem-
porary workers and unemployed graduates have also a renewable one- year health 
coverage. Most casual agricultural workers, domestic employees and non-eligible 
unemployed do not have access to health coverage.
4 UNICEF (2014). Evaluation of the Education Benefit Program of PNAFN in Tunisia. 
Evaluation Report.
Table 22.1 Contributions for wage-earners
ITEM Employer (%) Employee (%) Total (%)
Old-age, disability and survival 7,76 4,74 12,5
Health, maternity 5,08 3,17 8,25
Family allowances 2,21 0,89 3,10
Professional accidents and illnesses 0,4 to 4 – 0,4 to 4
Government special fund 1,52 0,38 1,90
TOTAL 16,97 - 20,57 9,18 26,15 - 29,75
Source: http://www.cleiss.fr/docs/cotisations/tunisie.html
Table 22.2 Contributions for independent workers
Quarterly amounts of contributions







7 8775,00 1 290,803
8 11,700,00 1 721,070
9 14,625,00 2 151,338
10 17,550,00 2 581,605
Source: http://www.cleiss.fr/docs/cotisations/tunisie.html
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22.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
According to Seklani (1974), Italians constituted the bulk of the foreign popula-
tion in Tunisia at the end of the nineteenth century (80,000). They were mainly 
from Sicily and worked as fishermen, craftsmen and farmers. At the end of World 
War II, the number of foreigners reached 350,000, dominated by French citizens, 
as a result of a deliberate policy to reduce Italian influence in Tunisia. Libyans 
and Algerians were also present, but most of them left after the discovery of oil 
in Libya and Algeria’s independence. The Bizerte crisis in 1961 and the nation-
alization of agricultural land in 1964 led 70% of foreigners to leave the country 
(Seklani 1974). The 2014 census showed that immigration was relatively low in 
recent years, foreigners representing around 0.5% of the population. This num-
ber does not include Libyans visiting Tunisia for long periods, sometimes 
exceeding 6 months since the deterioration of the security situation in Libya. 1,8 
million entered Tunisia and 1,4 million left in 2014.5 Although to a lesser extent 
than Morocco and Libya, Tunisia has also become a transit country for sub-
Saharan migrants and refugees (Natter 2015).
The emigration of Tunisian nationals did not start significantly before indepen-
dence. Recruitment was organized in cooperation with European countries as 
Tunisia signed agreements with France (1963), Germany (1965), Belgium (1969), 
and the Netherlands (1971). In 1967, the Government created a directorate within 
the Ministry of Social Affairs to manage the flows of migrants to Europe (mainly to 
France and, to a much lesser extent, also to Germany). This directorate seemed 
effective in training Tunisians to the growing demand of booming Europe. The 1973 
oil crisis led to a significant reduction in emigration flows to Europe and the emer-
gence of Libya as a new significant destination, overtaking even France in the 
mid- 1970s (Natter 2015). An agreement was signed in 1971 to organize these 
migration flows, although the Libyan regime did not hesitate to resort to mass expul-
sions of Tunisians on the occasion of major diplomatic disagreements. The other 
important country for Tunisia’s emigration history is Italy, which became a signifi-
cant destination in the 1980s. Migration to Italy was mainly seasonal or temporary, 
but it became increasingly permanent after the implementation of a visa for 
Tunisians in 1990.
More than 1,2 million Tunisians (around one tenth of the population) were 
registered with Tunisian consulates in 2012.6 More than half reside in France 
(55%), 15% in Italy and 7% in Germany. The rest are based in Arab countries 
(15% between Libya, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) or in North 
America (3%). The educational level of emigrants increased significantly over the 
four last decades, reflecting an increase of the share of student migration (David 
5 World Bank (2017). Impact of the Libya crisis on the Tunisian economy. Washington D.C.: 
World Bank.
6 Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger (2012). Répartition de la Communauté tunisienne à 
l’étranger 2012.
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and Marouani 2018). More educated workers tend to settle more permanently 
(Boughzala and Kouni 2010).
The pressure of European countries on Tunisia to tighten its control of illegal 
migration led the Government to adopt a law in 2004 which sanctions heavily smug-
glers and any individual which contributes to illegal migration. Despite this law, 
bilateral negotiations with the two main host countries continued. In 2008, for 
example, France and Tunisia signed an agreement allowing more skilled migration 
to France in exchange of tighter controls and more readmissions of undocumented 
migrants in Tunisia. The agreement was only partly implemented (Natter 2015). 
Finally, the security void following the 2011 revolution led to a surge of illegal 
migration (Boubakri 2013), although this hike was temporary as border controls in 
cooperation with European partners was reintroduced quickly.
22.2  Migration and Social Protection in Tunisia
Two interlinked factors determine the regularity of the residence status of foreigners 
in Tunisia: respecting the rules for residence and having a work contract (for which 
non-nationals should get a permit). This work permit is generally granted under 
rather restrictive conditions (economic needs tests, etc.) for a maximum period of 
1 year. Students, spouses of foreign residents and citizens from Maghreb countries 
can have residence permits without an authorization to work. Refugees registered 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have softened 
residence conditions, but they are not allowed to work (Hanafi 2017).
Once the legal residence requirement is met, there is no specific element in the 
Tunisian social security law that could discriminate between national and foreign 
residents in terms of accessing social benefits. Furthermore, according to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs,7 bilateral social security agreements have been signed 
with 14 countries: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Luxembourg, Germany, 
Italy, Austria, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Spain and Portugal. 
All these conventions establish the principles of equal treatment with nationals 
of the country of employment and free transfer of benefits to the country of ori-
gin, with some exceptions such as the transfer of family allowances for children 
remaining in the home country that Austria, Switzerland and Luxembourg do not 
allow (Maddouri 2011). Moreover, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement signed 
between Tunisia and the European Union (EU) in 1995 includes a component for 
regional coordination of social security agreements. This component is based on 
five principles (Maddouri 2011). Firstly, Tunisian workers and their family mem-
bers residing with them benefit from a system characterized by the absence of 
any nationality-based discrimination. Secondly, social security covers sickness 
7 Ministère des Affaires sociales (2018). http://www.social.gov.tn. Accessed 1 August 2018.
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and maternity benefits, invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits, industrial acci-
dent and occupational disease death benefits, unemployment benefits and family 
benefits. Thirdly, the aggregation of the periods of insurance, employment or 
residence completed in the various Member States with regard to pensions and 
old-age pensions, invalidity and survivors’ benefits, family benefits, sickness and 
maternity benefits and health care for themselves and their families residing 
within the EU. Fourth, the export of family benefits within the EU. Fifthly, free 
transfer to Tunisia of pensions and old-age pensions, survival and accident at 
work or occupational disease and invalidity. 12 years after the entry into force of 
the Euro-Med Association Agreement in 1998, the European Commission pre-
sented its first proposal of implementation of this component.
There is a specific regime for Tunisian residents in countries that have not con-
cluded social security agreements with Tunisia (Gulf, North America, Eastern 
Europe, etc.). The management of this regime is entrusted to the institutions of the 
Ministry at the Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE) and the National Social Security 
Fund (CNSS). Contributors have access to the same benefits in Tunisia, but their 
health expenses in the host country are not covered. According to Maddouri (2011), 
the affiliation to this regime is very low, which led the Government to think about 
ways to increase information, simplify procedures and give more incentives to 
increase the coverage among the target population.
22.2.1  Unemployment
In Tunisia, unemployment benefits are granted to individuals with an open-ended 
contract who become involuntarily unemployed due to economic or technological 
reasons. The Tunisian unemployment scheme combines elements of unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance. They can be considered as unemployment 
insurance because the worker needs to contribute for three successive years to the 
CNSS within a given company to be eligible. However, the scheme also has some 
elements of unemployment assistance, as the upper limit of the unemployment ben-
efit is the minimum wage and its maximum duration is of 12 months, independently 
on the length of individual contributions (once it is more than 3 years). There is no 
nationality criteria specified in the unemployment scheme.
Severance payments and legal rights are also taken in charge by the CNSS for 
workers who lose their jobs for economic or technological reasons. The indemnities 
and rights related to dismissal must be judged by a Court.8 Severance payments and 
legal rights cover unpaid wages and accessories, unpaid leave with pay, severance 
indemnities and the end-of-service bonus fixed by the Labour Code. Employees 
who have lost their jobs can also benefit from the maintenance of family allowances 
8 CLEISS (2018). Le régime tunisien de sécurité sociale (salariés). http://www.cleiss.fr/. Accessed 
1 August 2018.
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and health benefits. Independent workers do not benefit from this scheme and there 
is no possibility to join the scheme voluntarily.
22.2.2  Health Care
Health-related benefits are managed by the National Health Insurance Fund 
(CNAM). Foreign workers and their families can access these benefits under the 
same conditions as Tunisian nationals. For Tunisians employed in countries not 
linked to Tunisia by a social security agreement, a voluntary insurance system was 
set up in 1989 covering health care for the worker and the family members remain-
ing in Tunisia. This voluntary contribution to the CNSS gives the same entitlements 
as the traditional scheme.
Workers who contribute to the CNSS and CNRPS and their families benefit from 
the CNAM system, which allows for reimbursements of medical costs or partial 
costs directly paid by the health fund. The beneficiary can choose between three 
systems: a) a public health care system where the patient benefits from services 
provided in public health structures and social security clinics; b) a contract doctor 
chosen by the patient and paid directly by CNAM) or; c) the reimbursement of costs 
in the two public and private sectors covered by the agreement, payment of the 
resulting costs by the social insured and subsequent reimbursement by the fund 
within the limits of the reimbursement rates relating to care benefits granted under 
the basic scheme. The third scheme is generally chosen by better-off households, as 
some doctors do not adhere to the CNAM contractual scheme for various reasons.
Insured individuals who wish to change the scheme must inform the fund at least 
3 months before the end of the calendar year. Some specific groups are also exempted 
from paying the CNSS contribution: students, trainees, maids, laborers, farmers, 
fishermen, etc. Foreign students, nationals of a country that has a bilateral social 
security agreement with Tunisia for students or those receiving a scholarship from 
the Tunisian Government also benefit from the same advantages as Tunisian 
students.
It is estimated that between 10 and 20% of the vulnerable population in Tunisia 
does not benefit from any health coverage (Jaouadi 2016). Regular migrants who 
are not covered through a work contract in Tunisia can be affiliated to private insur-
ance schemes (national or foreign) if they want to access the Tunisian health care 
system. Access to health care is also covered by some bilateral social security agree-
ments signed by Tunisia (such as the one with Libya- see Jaouadi 2016). However, 
undocumented migrants face serious difficulties in accessing health facilities in 
Tunisia. Some of them benefit from the assistance of NGOs and humanitarian orga-
nizations. Although they do not have a guaranteed access to public health facilities, 
some are treated on a case-by-case basis by managers who try to find organizations 
to cover their medical treatment (NGOs, international organizations, embas-
sies, etc.).
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Cash benefits in case of sickness are paid under certain conditions: the insured 
needs to justify 50 days worked in the two last quarters or 80 days in the preceding 
year. The compensation is paid during 180 days, ceiling which can be increased in 
case of long-term illness. Foreigners who contribute to the social security system 
have the same health entitlements as Tunisians.
22.2.3  Pensions
The Tunisian pension system is a pay-as-you-go system. A rapid demographic tran-
sition led to a structural deficit of the old-age funds since 2000 for the CNRPS and, 
since 2002, for the CNSS. According to the Tunisian National Statistical Institute 
(2009), the share of retirees is expected to increase from 10% in 2010 to 20% in 
2034, mainly due to the rapid aging of the Tunisian population. The increase in the 
dependency rate puts a heavy pressure on the financial viability of the social secu-
rity system (Ben Othman and Marouani 2016). Moreover, the Government plans to 
increase the statutory retirement age from 60 to 62 years in 2020, although this 
measure cannot guarantee the equilibrium of the funds’ budgets.
The contribution to the pension system is compulsory and linked to obtaining a 
formal work contract. When a worker is affiliated to CNSS or CNRPS, a percentage 
from his/her income is automatically levied on employers and employees for pen-
sions (total of 12.5% for pensions) and a percentage for health (8.25%). This condi-
tional access to the health system is an incentive for workers to contribute to the 
social security system given that their behavior towards health risks is not impacted 
by time preference (Ben Braham and Marouani 2019).
Foreigners can access the contributory pension from Tunisia under the same eli-
gibility criteria as Tunisian nationals. The residence criteria is compulsory at the 
time of claiming an old-age pension in Tunisia. However, this restriction does not 
apply for nationals from countries linked to Tunisia by bilateral social security 
agreements who can accumulate rights if they work in different countries and ben-
efit from an old-age pension independently of their decision to remain or not in 
Tunisia (Maddouri 2011). The pension is paid “pro rata temporis”. Each institution 
compares the amount of the national pension and that of the proratized pension and 
pays the more advantageous of the two. The debtor fund pays the pension directly, 
which is reversible to the beneficiaries. Tunisian workers residing abroad who ben-
efit from the special social protection scheme that Tunisia has implemented for 
them also have access to an old-age pension from their country of nationality.
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22.2.4  Family Benefits
Maternity benefits are currently equal to 2/3 of the average daily wage, capped at 
twice the minimum wage during the maternity leave period (4 weeks in the private 
sector and 10 weeks in the public administration).9 There are also parliamentary 
discussions for extending the maternity leave period to 14 weeks for mothers in both 
sectors and 15 days for fathers instead of two currently. The objective is to adapt the 
Tunisian law to the Convention 183 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
on the protection of maternity in accordance with the new Tunisian Constitution. A 
scheme for paternity benefits is currently being discussed. Child benefits are granted 
to all contributors to the Social Security Funds for their three first children aged 
under 16 (or under 18 for those who are apprentices and receive less than 75% of the 
minimum wage, under 21 years if they are pursuing studies, or without any age limit 
for those with a disability or handicap).
Foreign residents who contribute to the Tunisian social security system are enti-
tled to the same family-related benefits as national residents. However, Maddouri 
(2011) raises the issue of the transferability of child benefits when the children 
remain in the country of origin. Most bilateral agreements signed by Tunisia allow 
for the exportability of family allowances, except for the more recent agreements 
signed with Austria, Luxemburg and Switzerland.
22.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
Tunisia does not have a guaranteed minimum resources program, although there is 
an assistance scheme for the most vulnerable families since 2007 (Programme 
National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses, PNAFN10). Beneficiaries of PNAFN 
are also eligible for free medical assistance under the Free Medical Assistance 
Programme (AMG). This cash-transfers program targets households which have a 
lower income than the poverty line; have members with disabilities and/or chroni-
cally ill; lack a head of the family or there are no means to sustain the family. 
Household eligibility is reviewed every 2 years. Beneficiaries must visit the social 
welfare office every year and get a stamp on their free health care card. The card and 
PNAFN status can be revoked if the social worker deems that the household is no 
longer eligible.
230,000 households are currently covered by this program, thus receiving around 
150 Tunisian Dinars (50 EUR) per month.11 Although this is not specifically 
9 CLEISS (2018). Le régime tunisien de sécurité sociale (salariés). http://www.cleiss.fr/. Accessed 
1 August 2018.
10 https://socialprotection.org. Accessed 1 August 2018.
11 CRES (2017). Évaluation de la performance des programmes d’assistance sociale en Tunisie. 
Ministère des affaires sociales de Tunisie et Banque africaine de développement
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stipulated as such in the legislation, this program is de facto reserved only for 
national residents, as foreigners must generally hold a work contract in order to 
obtain their residence permit in Tunisia (except students, spouses, etc.). Tunisian 
residents abroad do not qualify for this program.
Overall, except for some special categories (students, spouses of legal foreign 
residents, Maghreb countries’ nationals), the main obstacle in terms of accessing 
social benefits for foreigners is to have a work contract which is a sine qua non 
condition to have legal residence in Tunisia. Thus, the access to social security by 
foreigners depends mainly on being affiliated with the social security fund through 
the work of the family head.
22.3  Conclusions
Tunisia has invested heavily in its social security system since the independence and 
kept reforming the legislation to improve the coverage of the system. Unemployment 
insurance is probably the main issue that has not been tackled yet, although many 
international institutions studies pointed the need of such a mechanism.12 The pen-
sion system suffers also from the rapid demographic transition and the absence of 
reforms.
The first category of beneficiaries of the Tunisian social security system are the 
contributors who access the system through their formal work status. The second 
category is composed of students and families in need. Informal workers cannot 
access the social security system, except if they are beneficiaries of the programs for 
vulnerable families. Migrants who have a work contract benefit from equal access 
to social benefits as Tunisian workers. However, the residence criteria is compul-
sory at the time of claiming an old-age pension. This restriction does not apply for 
nationals from countries linked to Tunisia by bilateral social security agreements. 
They have also the possibility to transfer their old-age pensions abroad and to ben-
efit from family allowances, including in some cases when their children stay in the 
home country. It is important to notice that Tunisia signed these agreements mainly 
with countries where it has an important emigrant population such as France, Italy, 
Libya, etc. Some agreements, such as the one with Mauritania, cover only students.
Migrants from countries not covered by a social security agreement with Tunisia 
have the possibility to use the voluntary contribution scheme. However, the cover-
age of this system is still low due probably to low incentives. Moreover, temporary 
migrants and undocumented ones are almost not covered in terms of social security, 
which increases their vulnerability. Although non-discriminatory in principle, the 
Tunisian social security excludes those who do not have formal work contracts. 
Given that the access of foreigners to work contracts is hard, it means that the access 
12 See, for instance, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/05/20/tunisia-moves-to-
modernize-its-social-protection. Accessed 1 August 2018.
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to the social security system is also hard. If we consider health more specifically, the 
access is not easy for irregular migrants, although some solutions are found through 
NGOs or international organizations. As for the assistance components (such as the 
PNAFN cash transfer program), although not formally excluding foreigners, they 
seem de facto dedicated to nationals.
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Chapter 23
Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 
and Social Protection for Tunisian Citizens 
Abroad
Stéphanie Pouessel
23.1  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
This chapter will present the general institutional framework by which Tunisian 
authorities interact with nationals abroad. In doing so, it will focus on the policies, 
programs and services offered by Tunisian authorities to respond to the social pro-
tection needs of nationals abroad across five specific policy areas (family, health-
care, pension, unemployment and guaranteed minimum resources). Consequently, 
the chapter helps to understand the conditions of access of different categories of 
individuals to the diaspora and consular policies of Tunisia and, more generally, to 
what extent the home country protects its nationals abroad.
As explained in the chapter, the country’s diaspora policies have given priority to 
cultural ties between Tunisian nationals residing abroad and their home country, 
diaspora’s financial support for the home country and voting rights following to the 
2011 democratic turn that has totally reconfigured the relations between political 
elites and citizens. At the same time, social protection for diaspora is limited to 
healthcare, pensions and family benefits, which is explained by the fact that the 
Tunisian social protection system is limited for all citizens whether they live abroad 
and or in Tunisia.
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23.1.1  The Tunisian Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
Emigration to Europe is a phenomenon that strongly shapes the Tunisian society. 
Since mid-1900s, Tunisia has experienced a large wave of emigration towards 
Europe. Today, about 10% of the Tunisian population is living abroad and 83.5% of 
them reside in the European Union (EU). France, in particular, is a major destina-
tion country as it hosts 58.5% of the total Tunisian emigrant population (followed 
by Italy, Libya and Germany). The Tunisian emigrant population in Europe varies 
depending the motivations for migration (studies, work, exile, etc.), its legal status 
(documented or not) and its patterns of acquisition of the destination country’s 
nationality (it is estimated that 219,037 Tunisian nationals are dual citizens).1
Looking at the Tunisian state’s reaction towards emigration, authorities have his-
torically dealt with emigration by trying to protect its non-resident nationals through 
agreements with European destination countries. The state aimed to promote espe-
cially Tunisian workers and students abroad, in the hope that this would trigger 
benefits back to Tunisia. At the same time, it aimed to strengthen the national, cul-
tural and identity ties of emigrants with Tunisia.
The progressive closing of pathways for legal migration towards the end of the 
twentieth century has led to increased illegal migration which has also become one 
of country’s policy priorities. To support this argument, it is to be noted that Tunisia 
was, along with Morocco, among the first countries to sign a re-admission agree-
ment with Italy in 1998. However, while Tunisia has been very active in the area of 
migration control, it has simultaneously developed policies to encourage the mobil-
ity of its citizens and trigger investments in Tunisia. Today, the profile of the dias-
pora hardly fits the image of the post-war emigrants: new generations of Tunisians 
abroad are mostly born abroad with two nationalities and they have developed cul-
tural affinities with another country. As they can no longer be considered “migrants”, 
Tunisia struggles to recognize them as full and equal citizens despite their national 
and cultural connections with other countries (Boubakri 2009).
23.1.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
Historically, Tunisia’s infrastructure for its diaspora relies mostly on its consular 
network and ministry-level institutions. Today, Tunisia counts with 62 embassies 
and 24 consulates spread all over the world. Paris, Nice, Marseille, Lyon, Milan and 
Grenoble are the fist most important consular districts.
Beyond consulates, nationals abroad have been dealt with a series of institutions 
that varied over time. At the time of the national independence (1954), the so-called 
“Tunisian workers abroad” (TTE) were considered as a critical response to the 
1 Office des Tunisiens à l’étranger (2006).
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country’s labour market issues. For this reason, in 1967, the Tunisian Government 
created the Office for Employment and Vocational Training (Office de l’Emploi et 
de la Formation Professionnelle, OTE) that organized the direct recruitment of 
unskilled Tunisian workers for industry and building sectors in European countries. 
The Tunisian Government expected that workers would migrate temporarily and 
then return, which led scholars such as Sayad (1999) to postulate that the generation 
of Maghrebi migrants in France underwent a process of double absence by which 
they were disconnected from both their home and host countries. In response to this 
phenomenon, Tunisia adopted the principle of dual citizenship in 1975 “probably[as] 
a way to recognize that Tunisians in Europe would not return” (Brand 2006).
As stated above, Tunisia has historically promoted legal migration by signing 
agreements with European countries and with countries outside Europe (Canada, 
Australia, etc.), while trying to strengthen links with Tunisian emigrants in order to 
encourage their participation in  local development in the homeland (Katterbach 
2010). The OTE was created to this end to implement these policies through various 
cultural and social assistance programs.2 To this day, it publishes scientific reports, 
analyses, and expert notes on the state of Tunisian emigration. Originally, it belonged 
to the State Secretariat for Migration and Tunisians Living Abroad of the Ministry 
of Social Issues and Solidarity. Since January 2014, the OTE is subordinated to the 
Ministry of Social Issues and Solidarity (similarly to the pre-2012 period). The OTE 
has 14 social attachés in Tunisian embassies and consulates and organizes cultural 
events, summer camps for Tunisian children living abroad and language courses to 
foster Tunisian migrants’ ties to the country.
After the fall of the Ben Ali regime in 2011, emigrants – through elites and lead-
ers of civil society associations active in the EU countries of residence – expressed 
a significant desire to participate in process of rebuilding the country. Migration 
issues became part of the important social, economic and political changes brought 
about by the revolution, which materialized in a new attitude on the part of public 
authorities regarding the Tunisian community abroad.
Following the post-revolution election in 2011, authorities therefore created the 
State Secretariat for Migration and Tunisians living Abroad (SEMTE), under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs, mostly to acknowledge the importance 
of the country’s emigrant communities.3 SEMTE works on this task in collaboration 
with various ministries, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Employment and Vocational 
Training, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. It aims to instill a sense of belonging to 
the homeland among Tunisians abroad; ensure effective assistance to Tunisians 
abroad; protect the rights of the community; improve access to social protection; 
improve the quality of administrative support for Tunisians abroad; support 
community integration; and strengthen community involvement in the current dem-
ocratic process. In 2014, however, the State Secretariat was suppressed and its 
2 Available at: http://www.social.gov.tn/index.php?id=52&L=0. Accessed 06 April 2020.
3 Available: http://www.social.gov.tn/index.php?id=12&L=0. Accessed 06 April 2020.
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responsibilities downgraded to the Office of Tunisians Abroad. It was reinstated in 
2017 under the name the State Secretariat of Migration and Tunisians Living 
Abroad. Overall, in line with the political developments of the country in recent 
years, Tunisia’s diaspora infrastructure is thus characterized by a certain level of 
volatility.
23.1.3  Key Engagement Policies
The General Direction of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for dealing with all matters concerning the consular domain, in particu-
lar, the protection of the rights and interests of Tunisian citizens living abroad, as 
defined by the bilateral agreements and according to the provisions of the 1963 
Vienna Convention for consular relations. The General Direction of Consular 
Affairs ensures the follow-up of the activities of consular missions and sections 
accredited abroad, in coordination with the Tunisian ministries and specialized 
agencies.
Tunisian embassies and consulates abroad also provide services such as consular 
registration and authentication or legalization of documents. The services offered 
also include registering births, marriages and deaths, certifying copies of identity 
documents, applications for conversion to Islam, and nationality procedures (certifi-
cate of nationality and acquisition of Tunisian nationality by the Tunisian mother 
and the foreign father for the benefit of their minor child born abroad or by the 
Tunisian mother and the foreign father for the benefit of their minor child born 
abroad to a non-Tunisian father who died or disappeared). Finally, Tunisian embas-
sies and consulates offer citizen services such as liquidation of the assets of Tunisians 
who die abroad, dealing with conjugal disputes, national service or help with the 
importation of vehicles and goods during a temporary or definitive return to Tunisia.
For instance, consulates offer a consular registration for any citizen legally resid-
ing abroad, at any Tunisian diplomatic or consular mission abroad.4 The head of the 
family (the husband) or the wife if it is impossible to register the husband (in case 
of illegal residence, for example) is invited to register in the consular register, but 
they remain registered in their country of origin. To obtain any documents (passport, 
dispensation from military service, copy of the criminal record or any authentica-
tion of documents), an identity card, fiscal stamp and photo identification are 
required.
All Tunisian embassies and consulates abroad also offer a social service that 
provides information on social security coverage, as discussed below.5
4 Temporary registration is granted to those who do not have a residence permit. Available at: 
https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/en/nc/quick-access/e-services/. Accessed 06 April 2020.
5 Available at: http://www.cgt-paris.diplomatie.gov.tn/index.php?id=165. Accessed 06 April 2020.
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To strengthen cultural ties with diaspora, the Tunisian House (Maison de la 
Tunisie) was created in 1953 to accommodate Tunisian students. Similarly, an 
Arabic language program was created for the younger generations of the diaspora in 
Europe, with a view to rooting them in their national identity. Overall, every consul-
ate abroad has to propose Arabic courses to citizens abroad, and lessons are offered 
free of charge. In France, for instance, the Tunisian House in Nice offers Arabic 
courses for Tunisian children 6–15 years on a weekly basis.
OTE has a series of activities in the cultural and educational fields that are 
designed to strengthen ties with the diaspora. For Tunisian children abroad, OTE 
organizes Arabic language summer classes in Tunisia during the summer season. 
These classes will take place in the centers and schools reserved for this program. 
For Tunisian students and adults abroad, OTE organizes, in collaboration with the 
Bourguiba Institute of Modern Languages, three sessions of Arabic language for the 
benefit of Tunisian students and adults residing abroad. Similarly to what other 
states such as Israel or Morocco offer, during school holidays, OTE organizes 
exploratory trips, allowing young Tunisians living abroad to visit their country of 
origin with the idea of confronting them with “the richness of the national heritage”. 
The OTE also organizes, on an annual basis, exploration trips for Tunisians abroad 
aged 65 and over, enabling them to visit their country of origin and strengthen ties 
with their country and to promote their culture in their country of residence. OTE 
organizes camps during the summer season for young Tunisians living abroad 
between 9 and 14 years old. These camps are intended to help preserve the ties that 
bind them to their country of origin.
Looking at economic policies, the Tunisian Investment Incentives Code is the 
main reference for both domestic and foreign investors. Its aim is to ensure freedom 
to invest and to reinforce the Tunisian economy’s openness to the outside, while 
ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of direct foreign investment in the Tunisian 
legislation. It sets the ground rules for the creation of projects and incentives for 
investment in Tunisia by both Tunisian and foreign investors, resident, non-resident, 
or in partnership. It contains a set of financial and tax benefits and covers the major-
ity of sectors.
In Tunisia, a series of tax incentives aim to encourage Tunisians abroad to invest 
in Tunisia by facilitating investment on legal, administrative and regional levels. 
Tunisians abroad enjoy tax benefits all over Tunisia. The investment of Tunisian 
emigrants is facilitated through one-stop-shops and further promoted through spe-
cial incentives such as tax and customs exemptions. For instance, all Tunisians liv-
ing abroad have the right to import their own car into Tunisia and clear it by payment 
of all duties and taxes due in Tunisian Dinars without production of import authori-
zation. This Special Regime managed by the customs allows Tunisians living abroad 
to import a passenger vehicle or commercial vehicle with a gross vehicle under 3.5 
tones (pick-up truck).6
6 Decree n° 2009–2162 of 14 July 2009.
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In addition, in regions that are classified as areas of investment, any investment 
operation (owned by foreigners or by Tunisians) receives 10 years of tax exemption 
and, in agricultural regions, incentives through the Agency for the Promotion of 
Agriculture Investment (APA). Furthermore, Tunisian entrepreneurs living abroad 
have the right to import goods related to their core business activities (industrial, 
commercial or agricultural) without paying customs duties. Lastly, to support 
migrant engagement in the economy of the home country and avoid double taxation, 
Tunisia has ratified non-double-taxation treaties with around 50 countries, includ-
ing nearly all European countries.7
As for electoral rights, Tunisians abroad have the right to vote in the presidential 
elections since 1988 but, because of the authoritarian regime, it is considered that 
residents abroad did not have actual access to political participation until 2011. 
After the fall of the former regime in 2011, the president of the High Authority for 
Achieving the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic 
Transition defended the extension of the right to vote for Tunisians abroad in parlia-
mentary elections. In response to “emigrant lobbying” (Lafleur 2013), a new elec-
toral commission, known by its acronym ISIE, was created in May 2011 to supervise 
elections abroad where six districts had been created to represent the diaspora.8 
Overall, 454 polling centers were created, including in places outside the consular 
system: schools, offices of associations, centers, municipalities, etc. Indeed, the 
Tunisian revolution introduced the participation of Tunisians abroad in elections for 
the National Assembly and representation within the National Assembly.
In the first post-revolution election held in October 2011, the Tunisian diaspora 
was able to elect its representatives in the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in 
order to enhance political participation for Tunisians abroad. 18 seats of the assem-
bly were reserved to representatives from the diaspora (eight for France; three for 
Italy; three for America; three for the Arab countries; one for Germany; three for the 
Americas and the rest of the world). The new Tunisian Constitution that passed in 
January 2014 acknowledges the role of Tunisians living abroad. Two articles of the 
Constitution clearly address this group: Article 55 that guarantees the right to vote 
and the right to be represented in the Assembly; and Article 74 that grants dual citi-
zens the right to run for the position of President of the Republic, under the condi-
tion that they pledge to give up the second nationality if elected.
Tunisians residing abroad can cast a ballot in home country elections at the 
national level. To be allowed to vote for presidential or legislative election, the basic 
7 South Africa / Senegal / Mali / Cameroon / Ethiopia / Mauritius / Burkina Faso / Jordan / Egypt / 
United Arab Emirates UAE / Pakistan / Sultanate of Oman / Qatar / Lebanon / Yemen / Syria / 
Kuwait / Sudan / Saudi Arabia / France / Germany / Austria / Norway / Italy / Denmark / Sweden 
/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and of Northern Ireland / Spain / Turkey / Romania / Czech 
Republic / Poland / Switzerland / Netherlands / Hungary / Luxembourg / Portugal / Malta / Belgium 
/ Hellenic Republic / Serbia / Canada / United States of America / South Korea / Indonesia / China 
/ Iran / Vietnam.




criteria are to be 18  years old; to have no criminal record; to be registered in a 
Tunisian consulate abroad and to initiate the registration process. Tunisians can vote 
in person at consulates, embassies and polling stations abroad, but there is no pos-
sibility to vote by proxy.9 Similarly, nationals residing abroad can stand as candi-
dates and be elected in elections held at the national level, namely for the Assembly 
of the Representatives of the People or President.
23.2  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Tunisia
Before looking at Tunisia’s engagement with citizens abroad in five core area of 
social protection, it is important to note that the Tunisian welfare state suffers from 
a series of limitations. Only 37% of Tunisia’s population of 11 million contributes 
to pension payments, only half of the population is covered by health insurance, and 
there are no unemployment benefits for people who lose their jobs. Moreover, 
although nearly a quarter of Tunisians (23%) receive benefits, less than a half (40%) 
of those who do are among Tunisia’s poorest people.
The Tunisian social security system is essentially run by the state. There are two 
funds under the state supervision which manage the statutory social security 
schemes: the National Pension and Social Contingency Fun (Caisse Nationale de 
Retraite et de Prévoyance Sociale, CNRPS) for the public sector and the National 
Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale, CNSS) for the private 
sector. The board of administration of these funds is composed on a tripartite basis 
(the state, employers, and employees).
The CNSS was founded through Law 60–30 of 14 December 1960 to extend 
social insurance coverage to the private sector. The CNSS is a public organization 
with financial autonomy, but it is overseen by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The 
main CNSS social insurance schemes cover the following occupational groups: 
private-sector employees, excluding agriculture; employees in agriculture; mem-
bers of agricultural cooperatives; self-employed, including in agriculture; Tunisians 
working abroad; students; low-income earners (including construction laborers, 
domestic workers, independent fishermen and small farmers, amongst others); 
artists.
The social protection regime for Tunisian workers abroad (known in French as 
Régime de sécurité sociale aux travailleurs tunisiens à l’étranger) is the institution 
that provides social security for Tunisians living abroad, following the Decree No. 
89-107 of 10 January 1989 that extended the social security system to Tunisian 
workers abroad, whether employed or self-employed.10
9 Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/nc/acces-rapide/nos-missions-a-letranger/. Accessed 
06 April 2020.
10 The Decree is available at: http://www.cnss.tn/documents/54202/130173/D.89-107.pdf. 
Accessed 06 April 2020.
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Additionally, the Tunisian Government has concluded 13 bilateral social security 
agreements with the following countries: France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya and 
Portugal. These agreements uphold the principles of equality of treatment and trans-
fer of rights to the country of residence.
For decades, France has welcomed the largest number of Tunisian residents 
abroad. France signed a social security agreement with Tunisia in 2003, which 
allowed Tunisian workers carrying out their professional activities in France to be 
subject to the social security schemes applicable in France. Among the key rights 
granted is the right for Tunisian women working in France who meet the conditions 
for receiving maternity insurance benefits in kind and in cash to retain this benefit 
when transferring their residence to France. Tunisian workers in France whose con-
dition immediately requires health care during a temporary stay in Tunisia during a 
leave of absence, respectively, shall receive these benefits for a period not exceeding 
3  months. The dependents of a worker who resides in Tunisia while the worker 
resides in France shall receive sickness and maternity insurance benefits in kind. 
The dependents of a Tunisian worker benefit from immediate sickness and mater-
nity insurance benefits when they reside temporarily in France.
Pensioners and early retirees who are entitled to sickness and maternity insur-
ance benefits in kind under the legislation of only one of the two signing states and 
who reside in the other state shall receive benefits in kind in the country of resi-
dence. In term of family benefits, it is possible to aggregate the periods of insurance 
completed in Tunisia for the purpose of qualifying for family benefits. The payment 
of family allowances to the children of the worker, early retiree, annuitant or pen-
sioner is maintained until the children reach the age of 18. Family allowances are 
limited to four children.
To support Tunisian citizens abroad, embassies and consulates offer a number of 
social services. They provides information on social security coverage, help in the 
treatment of marital conflict, health problems, judicial and administrative difficul-
ties in addition to counseling and information. Social attachés are key in this regard, 
as their job is to defend the interests of the Tunisian community abroad in the area 
of social protection. They are assigned to every Tunisian consulate and embassy in 
Europe, Canada and the Arab world. In addition to these services, Tunisians abroad 
can find information about social risks associated with living abroad and their wel-
fare entitlements while living abroad on the website of the National Health 
Insurance Fund.11




In Tunisia, unemployment allocation is offered under very strict conditions. Tunisian 
national residing abroad, as they are not employed/insured against unemployment 
in Tunisia, do not have access to unemployment benefits. With respect to employ-
ment services offered to Tunisian citizens who plan on moving abroad, neither the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor Tunisian embassies or consulates provide profes-
sional training, cash or in-kind benefits in situation of unemployment. They also do 
not repatriate unemployed nationals residing abroad.
Similarly, the National Employment Service does not offer any training program 
before emigration that aims specifically to prepare nationals for employment abroad. 
However, the National Employment Service’s website has a dedicated page to 
Tunisian workers abroad12, where it lists jobs announcements in different countries.
Lastly, the role of social attachés in consulates in the area of unemployment 
consists in the provision of information on how to find a job or access unemploy-
ment benefits of the destination country.
23.2.2  Health Care
In Tunisia, health insurance is managed by the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance 
Maladie (CNAM). The welfare scheme in Tunisia is compulsory for the entire pop-
ulation. It differs according to the socio-professional category. The insured’s spouse 
and minor children are entitled to social security benefits and therefore to health 
insurance. To receive benefits from social security, one must either have worked at 
least 50 days during the last two quarters or have worked at least 80 days during the 
last four quarters.
Since 1989, Tunisian workers abroad have the possibility to voluntary join their 
home country’s social security system. This social protection regime concerns: sala-
ried workers; non-wage earners; agricultural and non-agricultural workers; the 
unemployed; public officials; supplementary beneficiaries of the worker (i.e. wife, 
children and other dependents); and students who continue their studies. With this 
scheme, Tunisian workers abroad and their family members residing in Tunisia can 
receive health benefits in kind.
The applicant must submit to the National Social Security Fund a birth certificate 
extract less than 3 months old, a copy of the National Identity Card, a work certifi-
cate or other documents attesting the exercise of a professional activity abroad and 
an official request13.
To benefit from this regime, the Tunisian worker abroad is obliged to join the 
National Social Security Fund and choose an income class used as a basis for the 
12 Available at: http://www.aneti-international.tn/en. Accessed 06 April 2020.
13 Available at: http://www.cnss.tn/documents/10156/25391/P304.pdf. Accessed 06 April 2020.
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calculation of contributions and benefits in cash, to mention the affiliation number 
in all correspondence or contact the National Fund, and to pay contributions quar-
terly in the first 15 days after each quarter.
To register family members, the Tunisian worker abroad must file with one 
regional and local offices of the CNAM, a birth certificate of less than 3 month of 
the spouse and each dependent child.
Consulates assist nationals living abroad with access to healthcare indirectly, 
providing information on rights to healthcare, types of insurance, documents needed 
for access to healthcare insurance and bilateral social security agreements through 
the website of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Since Tunisia has bilateral agreements 
on healthcare benefits with the most important destinations of Tunisians abroad, 
embassies and consulates in these host countries provide information on access to 
these benefits on their websites (these agreements uphold the principles of equal 
treatment and transfer of rights to the country of residence). In embassies and con-
sulates, a social service provides information on rights to pension and invalidity 
insurance and bilateral social security agreement on pension insurance between 
Tunisia and other countries.
23.2.3  Pensions
In Tunisia, pensions are regulated according to the social insurance scheme. 
Pensions can be received at the standard retirement age of 60 years, assuming a 
minimum of 120 months of contributions have been made to the scheme. Pension 
benefits are calculated as percentages of the employee’s end-of-career salary on the 
basis of which they paid contributions for a minimum of 2 years. The minimum 
pension for public sector employees is 66.7% of the national minimum salary 
(known by its acronym as SMIG), which is an inter-trade minimum wage.
The pension system faces deficits, by conservative estimates, with the result that 
the most vulnerable members of the society, such as the self-employed, often remain 
uncovered by pension schemes.
The workers concerned by the social protection regime for Tunisian workers 
abroad benefit from the old-age pension and invalidity benefits schemes. The age of 
entitlement to old-age pension is 65 years old. However, people can apply for a 
retirement pension from the age of 60. The old-age pension rate is set at 30% of the 
average reference income.
Consulates assist nationals living abroad with access to pensions indirectly, pro-
viding information on rights to pension insurance, types of insurance, documents 
needed for access to pension insurance and bilateral social security agreements 
through the website of the Ministry of Social Affairs. For instance, in the bilateral 
agreement between Tunisia and Italy, the survivors of a pensioner or a deceased 
worker receive their pension.
Since Tunisia has bilateral agreements on pension benefits with the most impor-
tant destinations of Tunisians abroad, embassies and consulates in these countries 
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provide information on access to these benefits on their websites. In embassies and 
consulates, a social service provides information on rights to pension and invalidity 
insurance and bilateral social security agreements on pension insurance between 
Tunisia and other countries.
Lastly, an important measure targeting old-age Tunisians living abroad is the 
repatriation in case of death. The Tunisian state pays for the repatriation of deceased 
citizens. It is a consular practice and a service offered by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The procedure is carried out by the consulate, in collaboration with the fam-
ily of the deceased. The conditions for repatriation are that death must have occurred 
in the competent consular country, that a proof of Tunisian nationality must be pro-
vided and that the deceased does not have had any legal impediments in the host 
country. The documents to be provided are the death certificate and either the 
Tunisian identity document or the birth certificate. The Tunisian authorities pay all 
the repatriation and administrative costs.
23.2.4  Family-Related Benefits
In Tunisia, family benefits are paid for children younger than 16 (18 if an appren-
tice, 21 in the case of students or the insured’s children providing care for brothers 
and sisters, no age limit if disabled). Allowances are paid for up to three children.
The social protection regime for Tunisian workers abroad and bilateral social 
security agreements extend this right to Tunisian workers abroad. Family allow-
ances are granted to children who remain in Tunisia, up to a maximum of four 
children.
Beyond benefits per se, Tunisian authorities have also developed numerous cul-
tural and educational programs (with a focus on Arabic language classes) targeting 
the younger generations in Europe with a view of stimulating their national identity 
(see above).
23.2.5  Economic Hardship
There is no policy by which Tunisian consulates ought to provide financial help to 
nationals abroad in case of economic hardship or homelessness. Consulates do not 
provide in-kind benefits, such as access to material goods or services. More specifi-
cally, none of the institutions - whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its Office for 
Tunisians Abroad or social service offices in consulates and embassies - provide any 
sort of help (administrative or financial) for Tunisians abroad in case of hardship. 
Similarly, these Tunisian institutions do not offer any help to Tunisian nationals 
abroad with regard to accessing benefits and services related to minimum income 
resources in the host country either.
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23.3  Conclusions
This chapter has shown that, in line with the well-established perception of the 
Tunisian diaspora that historically perceived itself as being instrumentalised by the 
homeland, Tunisian authorities traditionally perceived citizens abroad as an instru-
ment for economic development, while aiming to foster linkages with this popula-
tion by promoting cultural ties with emigrants and their descendants.
Since 2011 and the regime change, a new priority has emerged among Tunisian 
migrants who have fought to be recognized as full members of their homeland’s 
polity. In this regard, citizens from abroad obtained the right to vote in parliamen-
tary elections from overseas, with a specific parliamentary representation that few 
sending states have given to their diaspora (Lafleur 2013).
While the government has integrated its emigrant population into the political 
process since 2011, this has not translated in significant policy changes to the ben-
efit of the diaspora in recent years. Policies still focus on first Tunisians migrant 
workers generation and their descendants and recent emigrants that have different 
characteristics than the old guest workers continue to be largely ignored by their 
homeland. For these reasons, Tunisian nationals abroad organize themselves infor-
mally as an emigrant lobby: their messages flow through Facebook pages, websites, 
associations, etc., spreading information, developing solidarity and enabling 
mobilization.
In spite of these limitations, the 2011 revolution re-awakened a deep-seated 
interest in Tunisian politics among those politically active Tunisians abroad, rein-
vigorating a long-distance sense of patriotism and untethering a process of “dias-
pora return”. Coming from Europe and beyond, these returnees settled at the core of 
the state, becoming involved in political parties and civil society or reintegrating 
into social life. Their multiple belongings, their complex relation with their country 
of “origin”, their “return” that does not entail entirely “leaving” their former coun-
try, and their ability to speak different languages, all challenge the traditional 
approach of Tunisian authorities that perceive Tunisians abroad in monocultural 
terms. For this reason, it is not unlikely that this population will affect the shape and 
content of Tunisia’s diaspora policies in the coming years.
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Chapter 24
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in Turkey
Mehmet Fatih Aysan
24.1  Overview of the National Social Security System 
and Main Migration Features in Turkey
Social security systems have undergone significant challenges through economic 
and social dynamics. Contemporary migration flows across countries bring new 
risks and opportunities for different welfare regimes. Hosting about 4.5  million 
immigrants and having 6 million citizens abroad, Turkey is among the countries 
most affected by this wave of immigration. This chapter has two objectives. First, it 
aims to present the general legal framework regulating the Turkish welfare regime, 
paying particular attention to any variances in the conditions of access to social 
benefits between Turkish citizens residing in Turkey and abroad and foreigners 
residing in Turkey. Second, it aims to discuss how these different groups of indi-
viduals access social benefits across five main social policy areas (unemployment, 
health care, family allowances, pensions, and guaranteed minimum income).
The chapter consists of three parts. The basic characteristics of the Turkish social 
security system and migration trends are discussed in this part. The second part 
analyses different groups’ access to social benefits provided by the state. It also 
scrutinizes the eligibility conditions that affect access by Turkish citizens, foreign-
ers residing in Turkey, and Turkish people residing abroad to different social bene-
fits. The third part summarizes the main findings, assesses the recent trends and 
challenges to social benefits across the five social policy areas, and offers recom-
mendations for sustainable social policies.
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24.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
Many researchers analyse Turkey as a Southern European or Mediterranean welfare 
regime because of the role of the family in welfare distribution and the country’s 
combination of Beveridgean universal national health services with Bismarckian 
income transfers (Gough 1996; Bugra and Keyder 2006; Gal 2010; Aysan 2013, 
2018). According to Aysan (2018; 103–106), there are four main characteristics of 
the Turkish welfare regime. First, similar to Southern European and Middle Eastern 
countries, families play a significant role in the management of social risks. Second, 
the state has a strategic role in welfare distribution, particularly in education, health 
care, and pensions, while the market has a relatively minor but increasing role in 
welfare distribution. Third, non-governmental organizations (particularly religious 
organizations and home-township networks) also play a moderate role in welfare 
distribution. Fourth, populism and patronage are significant political apparatuses 
that shape the Turkish welfare regime and they are linked to historical developments 
particularly related to the process of political mobilisations (Ferrera 1996).
According to a recent survey on Turkish social policies (Aysan 2018), four wel-
fare actors –the state, the family, the market, and non-governmental organisations– 
have varying roles in welfare distribution in Turkey. While 93% of the participants 
asserted that the family is the most important welfare actor in Turkey, the state 
(90%), the market (60%), and non-governmental organisations (54%) are relatively 
less significant players in welfare distribution. Hence, according to Aysan (2018; 
106), although some have argued that Turkey is a residual and weak welfare state 
(Bugra and Keyder 2006; Bugra and Adar 2008), the Turkish state has a substantial 
role in welfare distribution, particularly for health care, education, and old-age 
security.
Global economic developments and new social risks, such as changes in family 
structure, demographic ageing, and huge migration flows from the southern and 
eastern borders of Turkey, have caused substantial transformations in the Turkish 
welfare regime since the mid-2000s. While Turkey achieved rapid economic growth 
in the 2000s, it also had one of the highest levels of social security expenditure in 
Europe, which necessitated two reforms of the social security system (in 1999 and 
2006, respectively). In contrast to some welfare regimes which face social security 
challenges due to demographic factors, the Turkish social security regime faces 
additional challenges stemming from different endogenous factors such as corrup-
tion, populism, and institutional problems (Aysan 2013). In light of these chal-
lenges, by the mid-2000s, it was apparent that the Turkish social security system 
was not sustainable and required structural reform.
The Social Security and General Health Insurance (Law no. 5510) reform imple-
mented in 2006 had three main components. First, three different occupationally 
based social security institutions were merged under one single institution: the 
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Social Security Institution (SSI, Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu, SGK).1 The structural 
and economic differences among these three institutions show a fragmented struc-
ture in the social security system, one which also exists in Continental and Southern 
European welfare regimes. Despite the new social security reform, these occupa-
tional differences and benefits are still valid in terms of the social security premiums 
of employees and the pension incomes of retirees in different sectors. For instance, 
in contrast to the social security scheme for public employees, the scheme for inde-
pendent workers provides relatively low levels of benefits such as old-age, disabil-
ity, and health insurance. Second, a universal health insurance system was formed 
to provide equal health coverage for all Turkish citizens, foreign workers and their 
dependents. Third, means-tested social assistance for all citizens started to be coor-
dinated by an overarching social assistance system. This reform was particularly 
vital in the transformation of the inegalitarian Turkish social security system by 
replacing the separate social security institutions with a single overarching institu-
tion (Aysan 2013; 155).
24.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
Turkey has experienced a series of migration flows since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of its territories in Europe led 
many Turks and Muslims to migrate to Anatolia (Karpat 1985). The First World War 
and the emergence of the Turkish Republic resulted in the population exchange of 
many Muslims and Greeks (Hirschon et al. 2003). Nevertheless, the first large-scale 
migration from Turkey to Europe started after Turkey signed its first bilateral agree-
ment with Federal Germany in 1961, with others soon following with Austria 
(1964), the Netherlands (1964), Belgium (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967), 
among others. Through these agreements, Turkey was able to export its labour 
power, decrease its unemployment rates, and develop its economy through remit-
tances (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976).
The bilateral social security agreements signed in the 1960s were mostly for 
Turkish citizens working in Western Europe. Their aim was to provide social secu-
rity for Turkish guest workers in their host countries and upon their return to Turkey. 
Hence, the agreements signed with Germany, France, and the Netherlands (the three 
largest destinations of Turkish citizens) mainly address such employment-related 
social security conditions as unemployment benefits and pensions. They do not, 
however, facilitate access to guaranteed minimum income. Turkish citizens working 
1 The first institution was the Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, SSK) estab-
lished in 1946 for blue-collar employees working in public and private sectors. The second one 
was the Retirement Fund (Emekli Sandigi, ES) established in 1949 solely for white-collar public 
employees. Finally, social security coverage was extended by the Social Security Institution of 
Craftsmen, Tradesmen, and Other Self-Employed People (Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diger Bagimsiz 
Calisanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, Bag-Kur), which was established in 1971.
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abroad are obliged to adhere to the regulations of the host country. Employment 
status, citizenship, possession of a residence permit, and local regulations are 
important determinants of access to benefits in many countries. The effects of these 
migration outflows continue to be felt today. According to the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (2019), about 5.5  million of the 6  million Turkish people living 
abroad are based in Europe, while the rest are based in North America, Asia, the 
Middle East, and Australia. In total, the number of Turks living abroad represents 
about 8% of the total population of Turkey in 2018.
Turkey was one of the original signatories, with a geographical limitation, to the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Under the convention, Turkey assumes full responsibil-
ity for refugees coming from countries that are members of the Council of Europe, 
while it may offer more limited protection to people coming from other regions. 
According to OECD (2010), Bulgaria, Germany, and the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM) are countries whose nationals represent the three largest 
groups of foreigners residing in Turkey. Nevertheless, many “foreigners” coming 
from these three countries are originally Turkish or Muslim, and most of them have 
dual citizenship. Hence, they have the same social rights as national citizens and 
their access to social protection schemes is different from that of the general cate-
gory of foreigners living in Turkey.
At the beginning of the 2010s, this picture changed with the arrival of new immi-
grants from Turkey’s southern and eastern borders. According to Directorate 
General for Migration Management (2019), there were about 4.5  million immi-
grants, particularly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, living in Turkey in 2018. 
Because of the geographical limitation to the Refugee Convention, many of these 
immigrants do not have official refugee status. Nevertheless, several social protec-
tion schemes are in place for their benefit, particularly in the case of Syrians living 
in Turkey under temporary protection status. These social protection schemes 
include free health care, free drug plans, free education services, and monetary 
support.
24.2  Migration and Social Protection in Turkey
Turkey’s welfare regime is a complex one. One of the primary sources of this com-
plexity is Turkey’s rapidly changing economic and political circumstances and rela-
tions with international organizations. Another is Turkey’s complex migration 
history, which over the years has added, especially in the case of recent immigrants 
from Syria, new layers of intricacy to the Turkish social protection system (Ihlamur- 
Oner et al. 2012).
There are four main characteristics of social protection in Turkey: (i) national 
health care services based on universalistic principles for all citizens; (ii) a frag-
mented and corporatist social security system based on employees’ occupations and 
social security plans; (iii) means-tested income transfers for people in need; (iv) the 
social protection system itself has a very complex structure and it is confusing for 
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many individuals. In light of these general characteristics, the conditions under 
which Turkish citizens and foreigners have access to social benefits in Turkey can 
be summarized as follows:
• Residence and employment status are important determinants of one’s access to 
social protection in Turkey.
• Employment status generally determines the right of access to unemployment 
benefits, health care, pensions, and family benefits, while residence status is 
important for all social policy areas except pensions.
• The majority of social benefits provided for Turkish citizens are also available 
for foreigners who have legal status in Turkey through their employment status.
• Guaranteed income based on means-tested measures is mostly for residents of 
Turkey (nationals and foreigners).
• Family benefits may vary depending on one’s occupation, residence and 
nationality.
Turkey is not a part of any regional integration organization working to promote 
intra-regional social security coordination or facilitate access to social benefits for 
specific migrant groups. Nevertheless, the EU accession process requires the gov-
ernment to pay consideration to EU regulations in the design of social policies.
24.2.1  Unemployment
Turkey has had a high and steady unemployment rate since the 2001 economic cri-
sis mainly due to its welfare regime type and labour market characteristics (Aysan 
2008). Considering the present high unemployment rates, which stood at 11% for 
all age groups and 20% for the 15–24 age group in 2017 (OECD 2018), unemploy-
ment benefits provide an important social safety net for unemployed persons. Both 
Turkish employees and employers are eligible for unemployment insurance. While 
foreign employees can also benefit from this insurance, Turkish citizens living 
abroad are not eligible, since they are not working in Turkey. Hence, the main 
requirement to obtain this benefit is one’s working status in Turkey.
The Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services has a general oversight of 
employment and related fields. Under the supervision of the Ministry, the Turkish 
Employment Agency provides different services such as protecting and improving 
employment, addressing unemployment, and executing unemployment insurance 
services. Employees, employers, and the state pay an unemployment insurance pre-
mium based on employees’ monthly gross income to the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund, with contributions of 1% from the employee, 2% from the employer, and 1% 
from the state.
In order to be paid unemployment benefits, the following conditions apply: (i) 
the worker must have been fired for reasons not his/her fault, (ii) the worker must 
have worked at the place of work for 120 days and paid the unemployment insur-
ance premiums, and (iii) the worker must have paid the unemployment insurance 
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premiums for at least 600 days in the last 3 years. In addition, foreign workers must 
have lived in Turkey for at least one year to be eligible. Unemployed persons can 
benefit from unemployment insurance for up to 10 months. Turkey does not have 
any specific scheme of unemployment assistance.
24.2.2  Health Care
Basic healthcare services and drug plans are provided by the state. This system 
depends largely on a compulsory social insurance scheme financed by both employ-
ees and employers’ contributions. Spouses and dependent children of the insurant 
also enjoy health care benefits through the SSI. Persons who do not have health care 
coverage through their employment status must pay the insurance premiums them-
selves in order to benefit from the national health services provided by the state. If 
one’s monthly household income is less than one-third of the gross minimum wage, 
the premium is paid by the state. In total, 98% of the population was covered by the 
national health care system in 2017 (SSI 2017).
All foreigners residing in Turkey, regardless of their employment status, are cov-
ered by the health care system if they pay the national health security premium. 
Foreigners benefit from the same conditions as national citizens in terms of access-
ing benefits in kind in case of sickness. The health care and drug expenses of Syrians 
and some other nationalities under temporary protection status are paid by the 
Turkish state. Turkish citizens living abroad are not eligible for national health 
insurance benefits. Nevertheless, if they show an address in Turkey and pay the 
general health insurance premiums, they can also receive health insurance benefits.
The cost of medical treatment in state hospitals is paid by the health care scheme 
provided by the SSI. In state hospitals, patients pay only a very small amount of the 
cost of ambulatory treatment (0.1 Euros in 2019). Although treatment costs vary, 
patients pay an additional 10 Euros, on average, for ambulatory treatment in private 
hospitals. The rest of the treatment cost is paid by the SSI, which also helps cover 
drug expenses. Workers and their dependents pay 20% of the drug costs, while retir-
ees pay 10%. The regulations are the same for Turkish citizens and foreigners who 
have social security coverage.
Other benefits provided by the state include support for workers who are tempo-
rarily or permanently incapacitated. There is no requirement of a minimum period 
of contribution or residence for this benefit. Temporary incapacity is the inability of 
the insured to work for a short period, due to workplace accident, occupational dis-
ease, illness, or maternity. Temporary incapacity must be documented by an autho-
rized physician or health committee. Insured foreigners benefit from the same 
conditions as Turkish citizens, but non-resident nationals are not eligible for tempo-
rary incapacity benefits.
Permanent incapacity, or disability, which is determined by the health committee 
of the SSI, is defined as losing the capacity to work in one’s profession at a mini-
mum of 60% or at a degree which prevents a worker from carrying out his/her duties 
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because of a workplace accident or occupational disease. Disability insurance is a 
mandatory component of social insurance and is paid for through employee premi-
ums. All working Turkish citizens are eligible for this benefit if they pay the social 
security premiums for at least 5 years. Foreigners and national citizens living abroad 
are not eligible for this long-term insurance.
24.2.3  Pensions
Old-age security and pension systems are key elements in discussions of state wel-
fare reform (Myles and Pierson 2001; Myles 2002). Pension systems based on Pay- 
as- you-go (PAYG) schemes are under debate, particularly in ageing countries. 
According to the World Bank (1994), the financial security of seniors would be 
better served if old-age security had three components: a publicly managed manda-
tory pension system, a privately managed mandatory savings system, and a defined 
contribution voluntary savings system. Because of Turkey’s long ties and stand-by 
agreements with the World Bank and IMF, the pension reform proposals raised by 
these institutions were more than a policy recommendation for Turkish 
policymakers.
Despite Turkey’s relatively young population, the share of public old-age expen-
diture in total government expenditure is higher in Turkey (16.3%) than in Norway 
(10.3%) or Canada (9.1%) in 2010 (OECD 2018). In Turkey, the retirement age is 
58 for women and 60 for men, while life expectancy at birth is 76 for men and 80 
for women, as of 2018. Hence, the pension system and the retirement age are always 
at the centre of debates on social security reform. The pension system, which aims 
to achieve income maintenance through contributions of both employees and 
employers, experienced two major reforms in 1999 and 2006, and another revision 
in 2016. The 2006 reform increased the average pension contribution period from 
7000 to 9000 days for both sexes. Furthermore, the reform implemented a gradual 
increase in the minimum official retirement age from 58 to 65 for women and from 
60 to 65 for men. Nevertheless, the minimum retirement age will be only 65 by 
2036, and it will be gradually equalized at 65 by 2048 (Aysan 2013).
The Turkish pension system provides different options for different retirees and 
is therefore very fragmented. When citizenship is considered, the system is even 
more complicated. As of 2018, Turkey uses a multi-pillar old-age security system 
proposed by the World Bank. The first tier comprises programmes designed to pro-
vide pensioners a minimum standard of living. The second tier is an earnings-related 
component designed to provide some standard of living in retirement. The third tier 
comprises voluntary savings contributed by employers or individuals.
Social assistance for the elderly forms the first tier of the system. It is a means- 
tested pension income funded by the state for Turkish citizens over the age of 65 
who earn less than one-third of the minimum wage. Hence, it can be considered as 
a guaranteed minimum income for the poor elderly. Turkish citizens living abroad 
and foreigners are not eligible for this support.
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The second tier is contributory pension income provided by the state for those 
who have paid old-age pension premiums. Pension benefits are central instruments 
that help the state distribute social welfare. This public contributory pension is 
available not only to working citizens but also to foreigners employed in Turkey. 
There is a compulsory social security deduction from workers’ monthly income 
based on their salary, but homemakers and independently employed people can con-
tribute voluntarily to secure a pension income when they get old. Non-resident citi-
zens are also entitled to retirement benefits if they pay pension premiums in Turkey 
on a voluntary basis. Contributions made by Turkish workers to state pension pro-
grams in countries with which Turkey has a bilateral social security agreement are 
aggregated to determine their entitlement to a public contributory pension. Workers 
must pay the calculated premium cost for the period worked abroad to the 
SSI.  Another part of the second tier, a privately defined savings scheme, was 
included in the system in 2017. According to Law no. 4632, employers are obliged 
to transfer at least 3% of the basic earnings of their employees to a private pension 
plan. Employees have the right to stay in this system for as long as they wish. 
Employees who are automatically included in this system receive additional pen-
sion premium support from the state if they stay in the system. Foreign employees 
are not eligible for this new system.
The third tier is a defined contribution voluntary savings system available for 
working and non-working groups, including foreigners. There is no residence or 
citizenship requirement to buy individual pension insurance.
24.2.4  Family Benefits
While there is no parental benefit in Turkey, there are maternity and paternity ben-
efits for different occupational groups regardless of their nationality. The conditions 
of access to maternity and paternity benefits are the same for national and foreign 
residents, although birth grants are exclusively reserved for resident nationals.
One’s occupation is the main determinant for accessing these family benefits. 
Turkish citizens living abroad are not eligible to apply. In order to receive maternity 
benefits, a mother must have worked at least 90 days in the year before giving birth. 
As part of these benefits, 66.7% of an insured worker’s gross income, which is close 
to her net earnings, is paid for 8 weeks before the expected date of childbirth and 
8 weeks after the birth. Mothers can take up to 24 weeks of additional unpaid mater-
nity leave after the paid leave. For public employees, unpaid leave may be extended 
to 108 weeks (2 years). Mothers can also work part-time with a full income 2 months 
after the birth of their first child, 4 months after their second child, and 6 months 
after their third child. Fathers working in the private sector can take 5 days of pater-
nity leave, while public employees can take 10 days. There is no unpaid paternity 
leave in Turkey.
While there are some small lump-sum payments for public employees’ children 
for specific conditions, there is no systematic child benefit in Turkey. Nevertheless, 
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resident Turkish mothers receive a birth grant in the form of cash support for a new- 
born baby. Regardless of their employment status, mothers receive a lump-sum pay-
ment of 50 Euros for their first child, 60 Euros for their second child, and 100 Euros 
for their third child in 2019.
In addition, the number of children a family has affects the rate of its minimum 
living allowance (asgari gecim indirimi), which is deducted from one’s monthly 
income tax and available for Turkish citizens as well as foreign employees and their 
dependents living more than 6 months a year in Turkey. This benefit, nevertheless, 
is very small: 25 Euros for a single person and 40 Euros for a married person with 
two children in 2019. There are also indirect benefits for children and students. For 
example, conditional cash transfers for the poorest households are paid for children 
who attend school. Immigrants who have temporary protection status, particularly 
Syrians, also get this monthly conditional cash transfer, although other migrants 
such as Afghans and Uzbeks are not eligible.
24.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
The guaranteed minimum resource scheme aimed to help citizens and foreigners in 
need is organized by the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund. The Fund is over-
seen by the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Service, but its social assistance 
services are managed by governors and other local authorities. There are different 
schemes for individuals who have lower income and lack social security coverage. 
The poor including widowed women, the elderly, the disabled, foreigners who have 
temporary protection status can receive varying amounts of guaranteed minimum 
income. There is no minimum period of residence in Turkey that Turkish citizens or 
foreigners have to prove to become eligible for the benefit. However, non-resident 
citizens are not considered as eligible claimants.
Turkey’s public social assistance as a percentage of GDP was 1.5% in 2017 
(Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services 2018). The share of support pro-
vided for refugees has increased significantly since the beginning of the war in 
Syria. As of October 2018, about 1.5 million foreign beneficiaries (a quarter-million 
households), mostly Syrians, received direct support through Turkish Red Crescent 
debit cards in the context of the organization’s Social Harmonization Program 
(Turkish Red Crescent 2018).
24.3  Conclusions
The Turkish welfare regime has undergone substantial transformations through the 
impact of internal and external dynamics (Aysan 2018). While an ageing popula-
tion, increasing living standards, and high migration flows from the south and east 
have led the state to play a more active role in the welfare of both citizens and 
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immigrants, its increasing social expenditures have forced the state to develop new 
strategies for the increasing social protection needs of various groups.
The Turkish social protection system has a very complex and bureaucratic struc-
ture administered by many different institutions. Ongoing policy reforms, new regu-
lations, and populist policies make the system more complex even for social security 
experts. Employment status affects not only one’s income and pension benefits, but 
also health care and family benefits. The general characteristics of social benefits 
for Turkish citizens living in Turkey and abroad and foreign residents can be sum-
marized as: (i) residence and employment status are important determinants of 
one’s access to social protection in Turkey; (ii) employment status generally deter-
mines the right of access to unemployment benefits, health care, pensions, and fam-
ily benefits, while residence status is important for all social policy areas except 
pensions; (iii) most social benefits provided for Turkish citizens are also available 
for foreigners who have legal status in Turkey through their employment status; (iv) 
guaranteed income based on means-tested measures is mostly for national and non- 
national residents of Turkey; (v) family benefits may vary depending on one’s occu-
pation, residence, and nationality.
The Turkish system of social protection is a fragmented one, with divisions 
based on occupational differences, residence, income level, and citizenship, much 
like the welfare regimes of Continental and Southern Europe. Nevertheless, the resi-
dence and employment status are the key determinants for accessing social benefits. 
Turkey, which was traditionally a source country for Europe and a transit country 
for many neighbours, has become a destination country particularly since the early 
2010s. Regional conflicts and better economic opportunities in Turkey attract 
increasing number of legal and illegal immigrants to Turkey. Relatively generous 
social benefits for immigrants who have legal status and other migrants under tem-
porary protection status might be related with the old social protection system 
designed for Turkish citizens living in Turkey. In addition, the social protection 
benefits of increasing number of Turkish citizens living abroad and their increasing 
burden to social security system were not re-evaluated by the recent governments. 
Hence, the Turkish social protection system is not designed for these new migration 
waves. This fragmented nature as well as regional and global socio-economic risks, 
which make structural social security reforms inevitable, bring new challenges to 
the Turkish welfare regime.
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This chapter aims to describe and explain the development of the main features of 
Turkish diaspora policies, with a particular emphasis on the area of social protec-
tion. First, it presents the general institutional framework through which Turkish 
authorities interact with their nationals abroad and depicts the main engagement 
policies outside of the area of welfare. Secondly, it illustrates the policies, pro-
grammes and services offered by the Turkish authorities to address the social pro-
tection needs of Turks abroad. The chapter focuses on five main policy areas 
(unemployment, guaranteed minimum resources, health care, family benefits, and 
pensions) and discusses the role of three main actors (consulates, diaspora institu-
tions and home country ministries/agencies) in the creation and implementation of 
these policies.
Turkey’s diaspora policies have gone through different stages since the start of 
labour migration to Europe in the early 1960s. In line with the European Union 
(EU) membership bid until 2007 and the Government’s assertive neo-Ottomanist 
foreign policy that envisions the country as a global actor, Turkey has had an increas-
ingly active diaspora engagement since early 2000s (Unver 2013; Aydin 2014; 
Mencutek and Baser 2018). In this period, the Turkish state has adopted a strategy 
of proactive institutionalisation and investment in social capital upgrading in its 
emigrant politics (Aksel 2014), and has implemented a number of significant mea-
sures such as granting voting rights to the citizens abroad. One main pillar of the 
Turkish state’s approach to the nationals abroad has been to defend and protect their 
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rights before the host country authorities. The other pillar has been to consider them 
as political and economic contributors, courting both their political influence as 
‘public diplomats’ and their entrepreneurial activities (Aydin 2014; Mencutek and 
Baser 2018). In accordance with this double approach, this chapter shows that in the 
area of social protection, Turkish authorities mostly assume the role of facilitating 
migrants’ access to the welfare benefits offered in the destination countries. This is 
accompanied by a number of policies designed to strengthen their economic, cul-
tural and political ties with the homeland.
In the first section of the chapter, we examine the diaspora infrastructure through 
which the Turkish state engages with nationals abroad. Then we present the key 
engagement policies illustrating the priorities and the level of engagement of Turkey 
with its diaspora. In the second section, we focus on welfare policies facilitating the 
access to social protection of Turkish nationals residing abroad.
25.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home 
Country Engagement
25.2.1  The Turkish Diaspora and its Relations 
with the Homeland
The current composition of the Turkish emigrant population is mainly shaped by the 
labour migration starting in the early 1960s. Germany rapidly became the most 
important destination for Turkish workers, whose number increased from 7116 in 
1961 to 910,500 in 1973 (Al-Shahi and Lawless 2005, p. 12). Considerable numbers 
of Turkish workers were also recruited in other countries such as the Netherlands, 
France, Austria, Belgium, as well as Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
Starting as a temporary labour migration, the Turkish presence in these countries 
quickly turned into a permanent one. Although the recruitment of Turkish workers 
stopped in the 1970s following the sharp economic downturn in Europe, Turkish 
citizens continued to migrate in other ways such as family reunification and family 
formation. Particularly after the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey, and later due to the 
Kurdish conflict in Southeast Turkey, a political diaspora was added to the labour 
diaspora, which was followed by irregular migration in the 2000s (Sirkeci et  al. 
2012). Today, the highest numbers of Turkish citizens reside in Germany (3,081,113), 
France (649,482), the Netherlands (396,555), Austria (279,390) and Belgium 
(269,861).1 These countries are followed by the United States of America (USA- 
230,377) which mainly hosts professionals, students and clandestine migrants pro-
viding unskilled or semi-skilled labour (Akcapar 2009).
In the early years of labour migration to Europe, the overall strategy of the 
Turkish state was to facilitate remittance flows and assist the return of migrants. As 
1 Calisma ve Sosyal Guvenlik Bakanligi (Ministry of Labour and Social Security) (2018). https://
www.csgb.gov.tr/. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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it became clear in the early 1970s that Turkish migrants were settling permanently 
in Europe, Turkish authorities mainly leaned towards new measures against cultural 
assimilation, as well as policies that would encourage return such as a return pro-
gram in collaboration with United Nations Development Programme. A key devel-
opment in this era was the engagement of the Presidency of Religious Affairs with 
Turks abroad, sending imams to Europe from 1971 (Aksel 2014, p. 202).
The 1980s witnessed a further involvement of the Turkish state in emigrant poli-
cies, due to the political emigration of opposition groups in the aftermath of the 
1980 coup d’etat, and the emerging threats to the overall wellbeing of Turkish citi-
zens abroad due to rising xenophobia and strict migration policies of the receiving 
countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Kadirbeyoglu 2007; Mügge 2012; Aksel 
2014). In this context, the Turkish state mainly aimed at controlling and improving 
the conditions of the Turkish population in Europe. Among the most significant 
policy steps in this decade were the implementation of the dual citizenship law for 
the first time in 1981, sending Turkish teachers and imams to destination countries, 
the establishment of the Higher Coordination Council for Workers, and legislations 
on voting at customs in 1986 (Aksel 2014, p. 204).
In the 1990s, a new set of policies was introduced, encouraging the political and 
social participation of Turks abroad, such as the Pink Card which granted a number 
of rights to emigrants who gave up Turkish citizenship (Kadirbeyoglu 2010; Aksel 
2014). According to Aydin (2014, p. 9), “two aims or intentions lay at the heart of 
Turkish diaspora policy in this decade: the successful integration of all people from 
Turkey in the countries that received them, and support of migrants in their demands 
for cultural rights.” Yet, Mencutek and Baser (2018) note that, due to the problem-
atic security and economic conditions within Turkey, the Turkish state did not have 
the capacity to adequately address the needs of the Turks abroad. Rather, “homeland 
security had become dominant in the state’s approach to its interactions with 
migrants abroad” in this era (2018, p. 8).
The 2000s marked the beginning of a transformation process in Turkey’s domes-
tic and foreign politics, which has had significant effects on its diaspora engagement 
strategies. Under the rule of the Party for Justice and Development (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkish foreign policy adopted neo-Ottoman tones sym-
bolizing new geopolitical ambitions. The Turkish state defined new aims such as 
foreign policy activism and playing the role of a bridge and model country. Also, an 
emphasis on multiple geographical, historical and religious identities went hand in 
hand with the generation of a Muslim nationalism on the basis of a historic Turkish 
and Ottoman identity (Aydin 2014, p. 11). In this changing foreign policy context, 
new dimensions were introduced to Turkish diaspora policies. Aydin (2014, p. 13) 
underlines that the three main features that characterised this period are the explicit 
definition of Turks abroad as a “diaspora”,2 the Turkish state’s engagement with this 
2 In the legislative language, Turks abroad are generally referred to as “Turkish citizens” (e.g. the 
Law on the Establishment and Duties of the MFA No: 6004). More recently, a key institution in 
Turkish diaspora politics, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), has 
adopted the term “Turkish diaspora” in addition to “Turkish citizens”, to describe the Turkish 
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diaspora as a part of public diplomacy, and connecting this policy with a new view 
of the nation compatible with multiple Muslim identities. Mencutek and Baser 
(2018, p. 8) argue that in this period, “Turkey moved from being a managed labour 
state to a global-nation state that adopts many diaspora policies and provides emi-
grant populations with a greater number of rights.”
This period follows the state’s shifting perceptions of the Turks abroad from 
remittance machines to Euro-Turks which are unlikely to return, but maintain trans-
national ties to their homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Aksel 2014, p.  204). 
According to Mencutek and Baser (2018), in the area of culture, the main concern 
of the Turkish state is to establish strong relations with second and third generation 
emigrants abroad. As regards the economic policies, they write: “Turkey is inter-
ested in the entrepreneurial activities of Turks abroad, their contribution to building 
trade relations, furthering economic growth, and strengthening bilateral relations/
export ties.” (2018, p. 9) In the area of citizenship, more rights have been conceded 
to Turks abroad (such as the external voting rights), and the scope of rights for for-
mer citizens has been extended. Overall, in this period, the Turkish state considers 
the Turkish diaspora both as a resource to tap into in the context of transnational 
policy-making and lobbying procedures and as an important element of its imag-
ined political community, which it must protect as an ambitious actor in the interna-
tional arena (Mencutek and Baser 2018).
25.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
25.2.2.1  The Consular Network
Turkey’s consulates and honorary consulates are supervised by the General 
Directorate for Consular Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA3). Based 
on the Law on the Establishment and Duties of the MFA No 6004,4 the duties of the 
consulates include providing consular services and protection to Turkish citizens 
and legal entities with Turkish nationality, providing visa services for foreign 
nationals, performing the tasks listed in the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations of 1963 and fulfilling duties given by Turkish embassies. According to the 
same law, honorary consulates are also responsible for protecting and developing 
the interests of Turkey, ensuring consular protection for Turkish citizens and legal 
entities with Turkish nationality, conducting consular procedures if specifically 
authorized, and fulfilling other duties assigned by the embassy.
emigrants abroad. The policies of the YTB also addresses “the diasporas of related communities”, 
with which Turkey has “shared historical and cultural ties.”
3 Disisleri Bakanligi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2018). http://www.mfa.gov.tr/. Accessed 20 
February 2018.
4 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/mevzuat-2013.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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In addition to the traditional consular services, other services are offered by the 
attachés and advisors who are appointed by the Turkish ministries to work in con-
sulates or embassies. The attachés and advisors are mainly in charge of diplomatic 
tasks, while also providing information and other services to the nationals abroad on 
the host and home country services and policies. Their general duties are defined by 
their own ministries, while their specific tasks are determined based on the needs of 
the diaspora.
Attachés and advisors are appointed according to the needs of the emigrants, so 
they are not in service in every host country. The attachés/advisors of the Ministry 
of Labour, Social Services and Family are the most relevant ones in the context of 
this chapter. This Ministry was established by the first Government after the imple-
mentation of the presidential system in June 2018 and is the unification of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Family and Social 
Policies. While the services of the former Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
are more widespread and established in 23 countries, the first attaché of the former 
Ministry of Family and Social Policies was appointed in 2015 to Dusseldorf. In 
2017, plans were announced to appoint further seven advisors (in Berlin, Paris, 
Brussels, Stockholm, London, Oslo, The Hague) and 13 attachés (in Cologne, 
Munich, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf). As of March 2020, the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Services and Family has 30 advisors and 27 attachés in 29 countries.5
Turkey also offers mobile consular services. These services are not defined in the 
law and their scope depends on the consulate, although not all consulates offer 
them. An online search suggests that consulates in large countries such as Canada, 
the USA, Australia, and China tend to offer these services more often. This include 
assistance with military enlistment, citizenship application, civil registry (marriage, 
birth, ID card, etc.), address declaration, and criminal record declaration. The 
upcoming mobile service days are generally announced on the webpages of the 
consulates.
25.2.2.2  Institutions at the Sub-ministry Level
One of the main institutions at the sub-ministry level is the General Directorate for 
Consular Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose duties are defined by 
the Law on the Establishment and Duties of the MFA No 6004. The General 
Directorate is responsible for the consular relations, as well as the coordination and 
execution of the related meetings and negotiations. Consular services and issues 
regarding Turkish nationals abroad are under the responsibility of this Directorate.
The General Directorate of Foreign Affairs and Services for Workers Abroad, 
supervised by the recently established Ministry of Labour, Social Services and 
Family, is another diaspora engagement institution. Founded in 1967, it is 
5 https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/digm/contents/dis-temsilciliklerimiz/genel-bilgiler/. Accessed 
20 February 2018.
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responsible for protecting and improving the rights and interests of Turkish workers 
abroad, by offering help regarding their problems abroad or after return. It also aims 
at monitoring employment types and rates of the Turkish labour force abroad, devel-
oping related policies, coordinating social security agreements with other countries, 
and keeping contact with international institutions of labour and social security.6
One of the most significant institutional changes at the sub-ministry level was the 
introduction of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB, 
Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı) in 2010.7 The YTB worked 
under the supervision of the prime ministry until Turkey’s transition to the presiden-
tial system in June 2018. Since then, it works under the authority of the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism. The YTB constitutes the main institutional basis for the state’s 
relations with Turkish citizens, (former) nationals and kin and co-ethnic communi-
ties abroad, as well as international students of Turkish and Muslim origin in Turkey. 
Its main aim is to strengthen and maintain social, cultural and economic relations 
with Turkish citizens and other Turkish origin communities abroad. Also, it consid-
ers the international students who are YTB scholarship-holders all over the world as 
volunteer ambassadors of Turkey. The YTB fosters relations with Turks abroad 
mainly through meetings with the Turkish migrant associations and an advisory 
committee of selected migrants called the Consultative Board of Turkish Citizens 
Abroad (Yurtdışı Türkler Danışma Kurulu).
In 2018, the YTB for the first time directly addressed the issues of family and 
social services for the Turks abroad with the Family and Social Services Experts 
Training and Consultation Program and scholarships for expert training. Also in 
2018, the YTB started a scholarship program for expert training of lawyers who 
received their high school education and law degrees abroad and who are affiliated 
to the bars of the host countries. According to its website, the aim of the program is 
to train legal experts to fight Islamophobia, discrimination, and violation of rights 
against Turks abroad. Scholarship holders are expected to work with an NGO deter-
mined by the YTB to offer consultancy services to the Turks abroad, as well as do 
research and prepare reports on related topics.
The YTB also places a special emphasis on the issue of education and cultural 
mobility of Turks abroad, supporting the children and the youth through weekend 
schools, scholarships and internships for nationals and Blue Card holders who live 
abroad. For instance, the ‘Young Leaders Program’ (called the Diaspora Youth 
Academy in 2018) was designed to help create role model individuals for the 
Turkish diaspora since 2013. Moreover, the first Human Rights Education Program 
was held during the summer of 2017 with the aim of training undergraduate stu-
dents on issues such as human rights protection, public advocacy, and the function 
of Turkey’s administrative system and public institutions.
6 https://www.csgb.gov.tr/diyih/contents/genelmudurluk/gorevlerimiz/. Accessed 20 
February 2018.
7 For further details regarding YTB’s activities and aims, see: https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/corporate/
institution. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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25.2.2.3  National-Level Public Institutions
One of the earliest national-level public institutions of the diaspora infrastructure is 
the Islamic Union of the State Office of Religious Affairs (DITIB, Diyanet İşleri 
Türk İslam Birlığı) established in 1984 in Germany to coordinate the religious asso-
ciations and maintain links with emigrants (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Aksel 2014; 
Mencutek and Baser 2018). Originally founded as a religious association, DITIB 
gradually became the umbrella organisation of the mosque associations in Germany. 
Among the main aims cited on its webpage are undertaking religious activities, 
establishing interreligious dialogue with other groups, encouraging Turks to 
embrace the Turkish culture and organizing cultural and social activities. According 
to Aydin (2014, p. 17), “DITIB is subject to the management and control of the 
Turkish state Presidium for Religious Affairs (DİB) and thus represents a view of 
Islam that is compatible with the official state policies.” The primary focus of DITIB 
is to provide religious services such as hajj and umrah Islamic pilgrimage trips to 
Mecca, and funeral funds for the repatriation of the deceased to Turkey.8 It also has 
departments dedicated to the youth, women, consulting on social and family affairs, 
intercultural and interreligious dialogue, and educational and cultural topics.
In other host countries, similar institutions, usually known as Diyanet, were 
established in the form of foundations, such as the Turkish Islamic Foundation of 
Belgium (Belcika Diyanet Vakfi), the Turkish Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands 
(Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi) and DITIB France. Imams working with these founda-
tions are civil servants whose salaries are paid by the Turkish Government, which 
creates an organic link between these foundations and the Presidium for Religious 
Affairs (DIB, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) (Yanasmayan 2010, p. 146). Underlining 
the influence of the DIB over these foundations, Doomernik (1995, p. 51) notes 
“since mosque organizations usually have tight budgets and employees are very 
expensive, it immediately becomes clear how powerful this Diyanet [DIB] trump 
card is.” The scope of the services provided by these foundations varies from one 
country to another, as there is no unified program.
The World Turkish Business Council (DTIK, Dünya Türk İş Konseyi), founded 
under the semi-autonomous Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK, Dış 
Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu) in 2007, represents the main institution through which 
Turkey maintains ties with the “Turkish business community” abroad (also see 
Mencutek and Baser 2018).9 According to its website, DTIK aims “to boost the 
commercial and economic relations among the Turkish business community settled 
outside Turkey, to strengthen and disseminate the Turkish diaspora further, to create 
8 Being buried in the home country is an important issue for most Turks. According to der Spiegel, 
“Islamic undertakers estimate that 70–80% of Muslim immigrants in Germany arrange to have 
their bodies sent home mainly to Turkey.” Along with religious reasons, this tendency also has 
financial and legal reasons. For example, Muslims prefer to be buried in shrouds, but laws in most 
German states require a coffin for a burial. (http://www.spiegel.de/international/homeward-bound-
muslims-in-germany-choose-to-be-buried-abroad-a-462035.html. Accessed 20 February 2018.)
9 http://www.dtik.org.tr/KonseyYapilanmasiTanitim.html. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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one main centre for all kinds of problems that the Turkish entrepreneurs face abroad, 
and to lead the efforts to establish a stronger image for Turkey in the world.”
The Yunus Emre Foundation (YEV, Yunus Emre Vakfı) and the Yunus Emre 
Cultural Centres (YEKMs, Yunus Emre Kültür Merkezi), founded in 2007, have been 
the central institutions for the promotion of Turkish culture. Their responsibilities are 
stated as “presenting Turkish cultural heritage, promoting cultural exchange, making 
information about Turkey available and providing educational services on Turkish 
language and culture and on the country’s arts” (Aydin 2014). Although they are not 
specifically designed to meet the needs of the Turks abroad, the services they offer, 
such as Turkish language and culture courses, are arguably addressed to them as well.
25.2.2.4  Consultative Bodies
The Consultative Board of Turkish Citizens Abroad (Yurtdışı Türkler Danışma 
Kurulu) was the main consultative body through which the Turkish nationals abroad 
can express opinions about specific areas of interest. It was founded in 2010 by the 
same law that regulates the YTB and was active until the end of 2016.10 It consisted 
of maximum 70 members living in countries which host the largest number of 
Turkish citizens. Its members, with or without Turkish citizenship, were nominated 
by the presidency of the YTB and appointed by the president of the Board itself. 
Their duties include advising on problems of Turks abroad; advising on the equal 
participation of the Turks abroad to the economic and social life in their countries of 
residence; advising on the detection of the needs of the Turks abroad that should be 
met by the Turkish Republic; advising on activities to raise international conscious-
ness on xenophobia, racism and discrimination; organizing workshops, meetings, 
conferences about the issues under its responsibility; participating to similar events 
organised by other institutions. The Board met at least once a year. It took decisions 
by majority vote, but the opinions of the MFA were given priority in the decision-
making process. It was not obligatory for the Turkish authorities to consult this Board.
25.2.2.5  Diaspora Infrastructure of the Turkish Political Parties
With the new legislation that gives extraterritorial voting rights to the Turkish 
nationals abroad since 2012, the Turkish political parties have increased their organ-
isational capacities abroad. To deal with the concerns of the nationals abroad, main-
stream parties have created bodies such as the Foreign Affairs Office (AKP) and the 
Coordination Office for Organisation Abroad (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
Republican People’s Party). These parties have also opened representative units in 
the host countries.
10 The Consultative Board is at the phase of organisational restructuring at the moment of writing 
of this chapter. https://www.ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/yurtdisi-vatandaslar-danisma-kurulu-yvdk. 
Accessed 20 February 2018.
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25.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
While diaspora policies remained relatively inefficient until the 1980s, Article 62 of 
the 1982 Constitution prepared the legal framework for the emigrant affairs for the 
first time, decreeing that the state should “take all necessary measures to ensure 
family unity, the education of children, and the social security of Turkish citizens 
working abroad, to secure their ties to their homeland and to help them to return.” 
Through the 1990s, Turkey’s interest in diaspora engagement increased, but 
remained limited to advisory boards and parliamentary commissions. An intensive 
period of engagement and institutionalisation started in 2003 by a parliamentary 
investigation commission attending to the problems of the Turkish nationals abroad 
and calling for a separate directorate for emigrant affairs (Mencutek and Baser 2018).
Scholars explain the major changes in diaspora engagement policies since the 
early 2000s by the EU accession trajectory (which is now abandoned), and the tran-
sition to an active foreign policy with neo-Ottoman connotations, which puts 
emphasis on public diplomacy (Unver 2013; Aydin 2014; Mencutek and Baser 
2018). Following Erdogan et al. (2013), Mencutek and Baser (2018) write that the 
Turkish state has created a unified set of diaspora policies with the following objec-
tives: to defend emigrants’ rights, especially regarding the prevention of discrimina-
tion, racism and Islamophobia; to improve the competence and qualifications of 
emigrants; to foster emigrants’ relations with the homeland, and their role in Turkish 
politics, foreign policy and the economy; and to reflect the broadening of Turkey’s 
conceptions of citizenship, belonging and identity.
In this regard, the granting of the external voting rights in 2012, and the founda-
tion of institutions such as the YTB, the DTIK and the YEKMs, are considered 
among the main policy steps in diaspora engagement. Mencutek and Baser (2018) 
also underline the increasing quality of the consular services in the last decade, fol-
lowing the orders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop closer relations with 
the Turks abroad (Mencutek and Baser 2018). To this, one can also add the above- 
mentioned expansion of the services of the attachés and advisors working within 
the body of the consulates and embassies.
Several changes were also made regarding citizenship policies. First, in 2004, the 
‘pink card’, which was issued to the Turks abroad who gave up Turkish citizenship, 
was substituted by a ‘blue card’. In 2009, with the Turkish Citizenship Law No 
5901, the scope of the rights guaranteed by the blue card was extended.11 Accordingly, 
blue card holders can enjoy all the rights granted to Turkish citizens, except the right 
to vote, the right to work as a state officer, the right to import vehicles and house-
hold goods without taxation, as well as the military service obligations (Mencutek 
and Baser 2018).
In the economic realm, several policies have been implemented to encourage 
investment and economic engagement of the Turks abroad. With a change in the 
11 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/06/20090612-1.htm. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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Law on Value Added Tax No 6824 in 2017,12 Turkish nationals who live abroad for 
more than 6  months with work and/or residence permits and foreign non-profit 
organisations in Turkey enjoy the same rights as foreign investors residing abroad to 
buy real estate without VAT payment, as long as the payment is made to real or legal 
persons in Turkey. Moreover, until 2017, Turks abroad could benefit from cash repa-
triation (varlık barışı) based on Law No 6736, which annulled monitoring, taxing 
and charging fees in the transfer of money and other assets from abroad. This regu-
lation was repealed in June 2017 due to the Tax Information Exchange Agreement 
among the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). With a new regulation introduced by Law No 7143, a new cash repatria-
tion policy has been implemented since July 2018.13 This law guarantees exemption 
from fees and taxation for individuals who transfer their assets such as money, gold, 
securities and other capital market instruments to Turkey and declare them to 
Turkish banks.
25.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection in Turkey
In a context of intensified diaspora engagement policies, which mainly aim at 
defending the rights of the emigrants in the host countries and promoting their eco-
nomic and political contributions to Turkey, social protection policies offered by the 
Turkish state to its nationals abroad remain limited. Consulates and attachés mainly 
play a role in the dissemination of information regarding the social protection regu-
lations of Turkey and the host countries and provide assistance in related paper-
work. Until 2018, the main social services offered by the Turkish state or its diaspora 
institutions to nationals abroad were repatriation services for the deceased, health 
aid for those who benefit from health coverage in a number host countries, right to 
retirement from abroad, and child support. In 2018, the role of the YTB, which is the 
main diaspora institution, has been increased with the aforementioned programs 
and scholarships on family, social services and legal affairs. The YTB mainly aims 
at defending and protecting the Turks abroad in relation to host country authorities 
in these matters. Yet, counselling and therapy services through NGOs constitutes a 
new example of the institution’s involvement in the direct provision of social 
services.
Regarding the most relevant social protection services, such as the in-cash and 
in-kind aids by the consulates or other diaspora institutions, Turkey does not have 
any publicly announced policies. Indeed, the Consular Guide for Travellers Abroad 
prepared by the MFA clearly states that consulates and embassies do not have public 
12 https://www.verginet.net/Dokumanlar/2017/6824-Sayili-Kanun-Vergi-Indirimi.pdf. Accessed 
20 February 2018.
13 https://www.gib.gov.tr/7143-sayili-kanunun-tebligleri. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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funds for in-cash aids.14 Exceptional examples are the social aid programs orga-
nized by the Diyanet foundations in the host countries. For example, the Turkish 
Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi) collaborates with 
Dutch NGOs such as the food banks to help the poor regardless of their religious 
and ethnic background.
Repatriation aid in case of emergencies such as wars or natural disasters is listed 
as the responsibility of the consulates in the Consular Guide for Travellers Abroad. 
However, there is no detailed description of this policy, which is likely to be discre-
tionary. Repatriation of deceased bodies has been addressed by the Funeral Funds 
of DITIB in Germany and the corresponding foundations in other countries, which 
work like a solidarity fund with monthly membership fees. Overall, informing, 
assisting and defending the Turkish nationals with respect to social protection pro-
cedures of host countries is the main priority of the Turkish diaspora policies in this 
dimension.
As for the policy of information dissemination, similar to the attachés/advisors 
taking charge of dissemination of information in the host countries, the YTB offers 
an online guide called “Guide for Citizens Abroad”.15 This guide presents informa-
tion about the services of the Turkish state on a series of citizenship affairs, includ-
ing the procedures for obtaining a passport abroad, customs regulations, Blue Card 
regulations, as well as health, social security and social services policies. As its 
name suggests, the above-mentioned Consular Guide for Travellers Abroad by the 
MFA is designed for the Turkish citizens travelling to other countries, rather than 
the emigrants living abroad. Notwithstanding, it may be helpful for emigrants, as 
well, as it gives advice and describes the responsibilities of the consulates in a num-
ber of cases such as hospitalization, detention, and emergency situations.
25.3.1  Unemployment
Social protection services for the Turkish nationals abroad in the area of unemploy-
ment are limited. A general policy of consulate services such as training, cash or 
in-kind benefits or repatriation assistance for the unemployed emigrants does not 
exist. Although there are no specific descriptions or unified regulations, some con-
sulates circulate job offers and organize activities where employers can meet Turkish 
nationals. Consulates announce such opportunities in their websites and by mailing 
lists. As there is no specific registry or description of these services, the only way to 
identify them is to look through the announcement pages of each consulate. For 
example, in May 2016, Berlin consulate hosted the second German-Turkish 
Professional Training Fair, where Turkish nationals had the chance to meet German 
14 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/yurt-disina-seyahat-edeceklere-konsolosluk-rehberi.tr.mfa. Accessed 20 
February 2018.
15 https://www.ytb.gov.tr/yurtdisi-vatandas-rehberi. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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companies, German Pension Insurance Institute, Chamber of Craft and Related 
Trade Workers of Germany, and the Turkish-German Chamber of Industry and Trade.
Protecting and improving the rights and interests of Turkish workers abroad and 
helping with their problems abroad are stated among the responsibilities of the 
Directorate of Foreign Affairs and Services for Workers Abroad of the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Services and Family. The attachés/advisors of this Ministry assist 
nationals abroad in dealing with local regulations on unemployment, including get-
ting access to unemployment benefits in the host country. Assistance includes pro-
viding information and advocacy before the local authorities, as well as helping 
with the paperwork and applications to the local authorities, collaborating with the 
latter in professional training programs, etc. There are advisors/attachés in 23 coun-
tries. In Germany, their services are a bit more extended due to the large Turkish 
population. For example, the office of the attaché in Germany has a detailed website 
where one can find Turkish translations of German laws and regulations on many 
topics including unemployment benefits.
25.3.2  Health Care
In the area of health care and invalidity, consular services, such as training to pre-
vent health risks abroad, cash or in-kind benefits or repatriation assistance in case of 
illness, do not exist. In a number of countries, consulates and attachés offer assis-
tance in the preparation and submission of administrative documents for the health 
aid program for Turkish nationals who have health coverage abroad.
One of the most relevant policies in the area of health care is the above- mentioned 
health aid program for individuals (both Turkish nationals and non-nationals) who 
have health coverage in countries which have signed bilateral social security agree-
ments with Turkey.16 Accordingly, individuals paying social security contributions 
in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, France, Northern Cyprus Turkish 
Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, 
Luxemburg, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are entitled to free health care during 
their stay in Turkey, upon paying a contribution fee.17 To receive this service, they 
need to submit the necessary documents obtained from the social security institute 
in the host country to the social security institute in Turkey. The service includes 
coverage of medical visits, treatments, medicine, and hospitalisation by the Social 
Security Institute of Turkey. Among these countries, individuals who have health 
coverage in Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany receive a per-
manent YUPASS number for the health services indicated above, while the others 
are provided a “Health Aid Document”, the duration of which is ascertained by the 
16 https://www.ytb.gov.tr/soru-cevap/saglik-ve-sosyal-guvenlik. Accessed 20 February 2018.
17 Fees for outpatients depend on the institution. For medical coverage, working individuals pay 
20%, whereas the retired pay 10%.
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social security institute of the country of residence. YUPASS originally started as a 
part of the social security agreement between Germany and Turkey. Austria, 
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands were included in the YUPASS system in 2017.
In the case of Germany, services of the attachés/advisors of the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Services and Family are relatively extensive. The attaché office of 
the former Ministry of Labour and Social Security offers an elaborated webpage to 
assist nationals abroad in dealing with health regulations in host and home coun-
tries, by mainly providing Turkish translations of German laws. The attaché office 
of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies provides consultancy services on inva-
lidity benefits given by German institutions. Services include providing informa-
tion, helping with filing applications, advocacy before German institutions, and 
referring the applicants to relevant NGOs or other institutions.
25.3.3  Pensions
Starting in the 1960s, Turkey has signed bilateral social security agreements that 
facilitate the portability of pensions with 28 countries, including Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.18 As of January 2015, the scope of the agreement with 
Germany includes old-age pensions, survivor’s pensions, invalidity benefits, health 
insurance benefits, occupational diseases, work injuries, and family allowances that 
are unilaterally covered by Germany (Holzmann 2016, p. 16). According to Holzman 
(2016, p. 15), despite significant changes in the characteristics of migration and the 
situation of the labour market, the scope of these agreements tend to “reflect the 
migration situation of decades ago and the labor market goals of the 1950s 
and 1960s.”
Based on the Turkish Law on Retirement from abroad No 3201,19 the attachés of 
the Ministry of Labour, Social Services and Family are responsible for providing 
assistance and information to Turkish nationals regarding access to home country 
pensions. According to this law, which dates back to 1985, nationals working abroad 
can pay SSI premiums to Turkey for the time they work abroad. Although returning 
to Turkey is stated as a condition for receiving pensions, the website of the YTB 
mentions that the condition of return can also be interpreted as “no longer working 
abroad and not receiving any host country pensions or aids.”20 The requirements are 
to be a Turkish citizen, to file a written application and to document the time spent 
abroad. As a proof of return, the applicants need to present the entry stamps on their 
passports. The attachés receive the applications and if the evaluation is favourable, 
they issue the “Service Abroad Document” (Yurtdışı Hizmet Belgesi) to the 
18 http://www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/portal/sgk/en/detail/social_sec_agree. Accessed 20 February 2018.
19 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.3201.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2018.
20 https://www.ytb.gov.tr/soru-cevap/saglik-ve-sosyal-guvenlik. Accessed 20 February 2018.
25 Diaspora Policies, Consular Services and Social Protection for Turkish Citizens…
414
applicants. Subsequently, this document should be submitted to the SSI in Turkey 
by the applicants themselves. Moreover, the SSI in Turkey offers consultancy by 
phone for inquiries regarding retirement from abroad on issues such as how to file 
an application, and how to receive pensions.
25.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
In the area of family-related diaspora policies, the consulates and the attachés of the 
Ministry of Labour, Social Services and Family help Turkish nationals obtain birth 
certificates for children born abroad and help prepare their paperwork for child sup-
port. Based on the Population Services Law No 549021 and the Civil Law No 4721,22 
all Turkish citizens have to declare the birth of their children to the Turkish consul-
ate within 60 days. Documents issued by foreign authorities need to be sent by mail 
or handed in personally to the consulate by either of the parents. In principle, decla-
rations are made to the mission that corresponds to the place of birth of the child. If 
the parents choose to declare it in another country, which has not signed the 
International Commission on Civil Status contract on the issuing of multilingual 
birth certificates, the application is double-checked by the consulate that is respon-
sible for the place of birth of the child.
Based on Decree No 63323 dating back to 2015, the Ministry of Family and 
Social Policies24 pays a one off child benefit per child born to nationals abroad or in 
Turkey, as well as to the former Turkish citizens who are Blue Card holders. The 
amount is 300 TL (around 50 Euros) for the first child, 400 TL (around 65 Euros) 
for the second child, and 600 TL (around 100 Euros) for each of the following chil-
dren. Applications by nationals abroad are made to the consulates and embassies 
with the birth certificate of the child and a petition.
One of the most significant institutional developments in the area of family is the 
appointment of the Dusseldorf attaché of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies 
for the first time in 2015. With this step, the Ministry aims to work on detecting and 
solving the problems faced by nationals abroad, come up with suggestions on how 
citizens abroad can benefit more effectively from the host country social services, 
defend the rights of nationals abroad, follow social security regulations in host 
countries and collaborate with host country authorities.25 The Dusseldorf attaché 
addresses the problems of Turks in all parts of Germany until the opening of new 
21 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5490.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2018.
22 https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4721.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2018.
23 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/06/20110608m1-1.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2018.
24 From June 2018 on, the new Ministry of Labour, Social Services and Family
25 Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanligi Dusseldorf Ateseligi (Dusseldorf attaché of the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policies) (2018). https://dusseldorf.aile.gov.tr/. Accessed 20 February 2018.
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similar offices in Hamburg, Stuttgart, Cologne and Munich, which was declared by 
the Ministry in 2017.26
In 2018, the YTB has for the first time directly addressed the issues of family and 
social services for the Turks abroad. Together with the Family and Social Services 
Experts Training and Consultation Program, it organised a meeting of experts on the 
cultural, social, legal and demographic dimensions of the family structure of Turks 
abroad in September 2018.27 Only Turkish nationals, or Blue Card holders who 
received their graduate and/or post-graduate degrees in a number of host countries, 
are eligible for this program. Moreover, the YTB offers scholarships for expert 
training for the Turkish nationals and Blue Card holders who receive graduate and 
post-graduate degrees in the host country institutions in fields related to family 
issues and social services.28 The goal of these scholarships is to increase the variety 
of family-related support, therapy, consultancy and social services for Turks abroad 
and to contribute to the formation of human resources in this field. In return, schol-
arship holders are expected to volunteer in NGOs determined by the YTB which 
address the needs of Turkish citizens.
As mentioned earlier, the YTB also plays a role in family services as they offer 
courses and scholarships to children abroad. The YTB funds the Weekend Schools 
Program, which is organised by NGOs and other educational institutions and aims 
to provide Turkish, history, religion, culture and arts classes to Turkish children 
abroad with a duration of 32 to 40 weeks. It also supports NGOs abroad, which 
work in the promotion of bi-lingual preschool education. Another institution 
involved in the education of children is the Directorate of the Religious Affairs, 
whose advisors (mostly imams) offer religion classes.
25.3.5  Economic Hardship
The only service that the Turkish state offers to nationals abroad in the realm of 
social assistance is the help provided by the attachés of the former Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security. This assistance consists of providing information and 
advocacy regarding the procedures and regulations in the host country. As men-
tioned earlier, the attaché office in Germany offers a detailed website where one can 
find Turkish translations of German laws and regulations on many topics that also 
cover the German scheme of guaranteed minimum resources.
26 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/almanyanin-4-kentinde-aile-ataseligi-aciliyor-40392454. 
Accessed 20 February 2018.
27 https://www.ytb.gov.tr/guncel/aile-ve-sosyal-hizmetler-uzmanlari-egitim-programi. Accessed 
20 February 2018.
28 https://www.ytb.gov.tr/guncel/aile-ve-sosyal-hizmetler-alanlarinda-uzmanlik-bursu. Accessed 
20 February 2018.
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25.4  Conclusions
Turkey’s diaspora engagement policies have taken different forms since the 1960s. 
Until acknowledging emigrants’ permanent settlement in the host countries, the 
Turkish state mainly aimed at benefitting from emigration in order to boost eco-
nomic growth and cut down the unemployment rates. During the 1980s, the 
Government started to take measures to control and improve the circumstances of 
the Turkish population in Europe. In the 1990s, further institutional mechanisms 
were developed to encourage social and political engagement of the Turkish dias-
pora with the homeland. However, due to domestic security and economic concerns 
in this period, the Turkish state did not have the adequate resources to fully address 
the problems of the emigrants (Mencutek and Baser 2018).
Following the transition to a more active foreign policy in the 2000s, Turkey has 
strived to boost its soft power and to display its increasing competence as a global 
actor. The shifts in foreign policy mark the start of a new era of Turkish diaspora 
politics with significant institutional changes. In this new era, one tier of the overall 
approach of the Turkish state to nationals abroad has been to defend and protect 
their rights before the host country authorities. The other tier has been to consider 
them as political and economic contributors, courting both their political influence 
as ‘public diplomats,’ and their entrepreneurial activities (Aydin 2014; Mencutek 
and Baser 2018).
In this context, Turkey’s social protection policies mainly focus on helping the 
emigrants navigate the host country social protection procedures and strengthening 
their economic, cultural and political ties with the homeland. Many consular social 
protection services such as in-kind, in-cash and repatriation aids are not present in 
the framework of social protection policies. Attachés of the Ministry of Family and 
Social Policies and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, who work in consul-
ates, mainly concentrate on assistance with host country procedures. In other words, 
Turkish authorities consider themselves as the facilitator of migrants’ access to the 
welfare entitlements of the destination countries. In this context, the new legal 
expertise and family and social services programs of the YTB starting in 2018 signal 
a step forward in the Turkish diaspora engagement policies of social protection.
Among the five core policy areas discussed above, family-related benefits, access 
to home country pensions, and healthcare stand out as the most significant ones. 
Family-related benefits have the largest scope with elements such as child benefits, 
expansion of the related attaché offices, the YTB programs and educational services 
for children. In line with the Government’s emphasis on family values as an intrin-
sic part of conservative policies, family benefits constitute the broadest social policy 
area. Protecting the Turkish family values in the host country constitutes an impor-
tant core for the overall diaspora policy of defending the rights of emigrants, espe-
cially regarding discrimination, racism and Islamophobia. In this respect, training 
social service workers and lawyers employed by host country institutions can also 
be considered as an example of how Turkey shows its increasing capabilities to the 
other actors in the global arena.
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The 2018 presidential and legislative elections consolidated the power of the rul-
ing party AKP and its leader Erdogan. Since then, the President and Government 
have been challenged by the electoral success of the opposition in key Turkish cities 
in the 2019 local elections and the economic downturn. Despite such challenges, 
Turkey has continued with an active foreign policy approach in 2019, bringing for-
ward the issues of national security and strategic autonomy. While it has gradually 
moved away from its traditional Western allies, it has entered in new deals with 
Russia and continued to build important ties in Africa and Eurasia. Based on the 
current situation, it is likely that Turkey’s active foreign policy approach will con-
tinue in the future. In this respect, rather than any major changes or new directions 
in the diaspora engagement policies, one can expect a strengthening of the already 
existing approaches. The latest programs added to the agenda of the YTB can be 
regarded as a proof of this continuing trend.
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Chapter 26
Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, 
Emigrants and Resident Nationals 
in the UK
Alessio Bertolini and Daniel Clegg
26.1  Overview of the Welfare System and Main Migration 
Features in the United Kingdom
The UK has a complex history of social protection rights in relation to immigrants. 
Gradually moving away from its colonial heritage, the UK over time imposed limi-
tations on both immigration rights and access to its welfare system on its (former) 
British subjects, who no longer enjoy a privileged status compared to other immi-
grant groups. At the same time, the UK’s membership of the EU, and particularly its 
participation in the Single Market, created a category of migrants from EEA coun-
tries who enjoy no immigration restrictions and have almost equal access to social 
protection to British citizens residing in the UK. The large influx of migrants from 
EEA countries in recent years prompted UK Governments to try to limit their access 
to social protection, as a mounting anti-immigration climate and especially a fear of 
overburdening the welfare system with ‘benefit tourists’, has become a dominant 
political issue. This culminated in the 2016 vote for the UK to leave the EU in an 
advisory referendum, with the UK officially leaving the EU (so-called Brexit) on 31 
January 2020. After this date, the UK has entered a transition period under which 
the details of the future relation between the UK and EU are being negotiated. The 
transition period is set to end on 31 December 2020. The new legislative framework 
which will regulate access to social protection for EEA immigrants residing in the 
UK and British nationals residing in EEA countries is likely to bring conspicuous 
changes for these two categories. However, at present, it is difficult to gauge the 
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entity of these changes as access to social protection constitutes among the most 
controversial issues over which the UK and the EU aim to find an agreement.
In this chapter, we demonstrate how, at present, access to social protection by 
immigrants is hierarchically structured depending on immigration status, residency 
status and benefit type. Most favoured under UK law and policy are resident British 
citizens and all immigrants with a permanent leave to remain, who enjoy full social 
protection rights. Next are EEA immigrants with a right to reside, who have the 
same rights as British citizens in most social protection fields. Nevertheless, the 
basis of the right to reside plays an important role, as only those in employment or 
their family members enjoy full social protection rights, whilst all others face limi-
tations in many non-contributory benefits. Finally, non-EEA immigrants with a 
temporary leave are generally excluded from all non-contributory benefits, but they 
are usually entitled to contributory ones. As regards British citizens who have emi-
grated, they generally have access to contributory benefits, but face several limita-
tions as regards non-contributory ones, with easier access for those living in EEA 
countries or in countries with which the UK has a social security agreement.
26.1.1  Main Characteristics of the National Social 
Security System
The UK social protection system is rather residual in European comparative per-
spective, reflecting an emphasis as in other ‘liberal’ welfare states on market over 
non-market relations (Dukelow and Heins 2018). The financing of social security 
rests to a more limited extent than in most other European countries on specific 
payroll contributions, which account for only 35% of receipts in 2015 compared to 
a European average of over 50% and more than 60% in both France and Germany. 
The lion’s share of social protection funding in the UK comes from general govern-
ment sources, which in 2015 represented more than 50% of receipts.1
The UK social security system – the system of cash transfers – is still highly 
centralised in its governance, with most expenditure in this area administered by the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) or Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC). For reasons linked to its special status, Northern Ireland has its own cash 
transfer legislation and associated administrative bodies – though legislation has 
traditionally followed and matched that in Great Britain. Another qualification is 
that some powers over a number of social security benefits were devolved to the 
Scottish Government under the 2016 Scotland Act (Simpson et al. 2019). The main 
working-age social security benefits, family benefits and the state retirement 
pension remain, however, reserved to the Westminster Government. The provision 
of health and social care services has been rather more affected by the recent 
1 Eurostat (2019) ‘Social protection receipts by type’, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.
do?tab= table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00108&plugin=1. Accessed 10 April 2019.
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devolution of powers to the UK’s constituent nations, as since 1999 the devolved 
Governments in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh have had power over the organisa-
tion of both health provision and local government social services.
The UK social security system is characterised by four main types of cash benefit 
(Millar and Sainsbury 2018: 3–4). First are universal or demogrant benefits, paid at 
standard rates to all individuals who fall into a specific category, irrespective of their 
work/contribution record or their household income. Child benefit was until recently 
the main example, but since 2013, high-earners are no longer eligible; specific dis-
ability and carer benefits to cover exceptional costs (Disability Living Allowance; 
Personal Independence Payment; Attendance Allowance) also fall into this cate-
gory. Secondly, contributory benefits, entitlement to which is based on an individu-
al’s contribution history derived mainly from their employment biography, cover 
individuals against interruption of earnings for reasons of retirement, unemploy-
ment, sickness/disability and widowhood. Unlike in many other developed coun-
tries, contributory benefits (also called ‘national insurance’ benefits) in the UK are 
paid at a flat-rate, without any reference to an individual’s prior earnings. Means- 
tested benefits (also called ‘income based’ or ‘income related’), thirdly, are paid to 
a variety of households with low incomes based on the circumstances of the adult 
members and the number of children living in the household. Tax credits, finally, are 
an administratively specific form of means-tested benefit that have become an 
important feature of the UK social security landscape since the late 1990s. Tax cred-
its are paid to lower-income working households (Working Tax Credit) and lower- 
income working or non-working households with children (Child Tax Credit).
In-kind benefits, or services, are the other major component of the social protec-
tion system. This is a particularly significant type of social protection in the area of 
health in the UK, which has a National Health Service (NHS) to provide ambulatory 
and hospital care. With some overlap with the NHS, services in the area of social 
care and social work are provided by local governments.
At time of writing, the UK social security system is in a transitional phase that 
results from the gradual implementation of the main provisions of the 2012 Welfare 
Reform Act. The most significant of these is the introduction of a new general 
means-tested benefit called Universal Credit (UC), which will eventually replace 
existing categorical means-tested benefits for the unemployed, the disabled and lone 
parents as well as means-tested housing benefits and tax credits. UC is being intro-
duced initially only for new claimants, and only for all new claimants in certain 
parts of the country (so-called ‘full service areas’). In some other parts (so-called 
‘gateway areas’), only new claimants meeting gateway conditions – for example, 
being single and not having children, but also being a British citizen – can claim 
UC, while others can continue to claim pre-existing ‘legacy benefits’. The latest 
estimate for the date at which all current claimants of legacy benefits will be trans-
ferred on to UC is 2022.
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26.1.2  Migration History and Key Policy Developments
In line with other former colonial countries, the UK has a long history of immigra-
tion. For a great part of the second half of the twentieth century, the largest share of 
immigrants came from Commonwealth countries and Ireland (Hansen 2000). The 
British Nationality Act 1948 granted the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom 
and Colonies (CUKS) to all individuals born or naturalised in either the UK or one 
of its colonies, thus allowing individuals from the colonies who moved to the UK to 
be considered like any other British citizen in most rights (Spencer 1997).
Nevertheless, the growing immigration flows from the 1950s onwards prompted 
successive Governments to gradually tighten immigration laws and restrict the 
social rights of immigrants. In the 1960s, controls were first introduced and then 
tightened on all immigrants not born in the UK or not holding a passport issued by 
the British Government. In 1971, the ‘right of abode’ was created, granting full 
social protection rights only to those CUKSs born in the UK, born, adopted or mar-
ried to a British citizen and those who had settled in the UK for at least 5 years. In 
1981, the CUKS status was substituted by different citizenship statuses for British 
citizens and from those from Overseas or Dependent Territories, granting the ‘right 
of abode’ only to the former (Spencer 1997).
The 1990s constituted a turning point for immigration in the UK. On the one 
hand, the scrapping of the Primary Purpose rule (1997) relaxed regulations prevent-
ing spouses married to British citizens from settling in the UK (Wray 2006). 
Together with an improved economic situation, this contributed to drawing an 
increased number of migrants to the country, more than doubling net migration 
within a few years (Vargas-Silva and Fernández-Reino 2018). On the other hand, 
the deepening of the European Single Market largely abolished immigration restric-
tions on EEA nationals, allowing free movement of people in and out of the UK. To 
regulate access to the welfare system among this group of migrants within the 
parameters allowed by EU law, the ‘habitual residence’ test was introduced and 
access to non-contributory benefits for EEA immigrants was granted only to those 
who could prove to be ‘habitually resident’ in the UK (Kennedy 2011a). This test 
also applies to British citizens who have been living abroad, as access to most non- 
contributory benefits is conditional on being habitually resident in the UK, though 
British citizens living in the EEA or in non-EEA countries with which UK has 
social security agreements can still claim some non-contributory benefits.
Immigration from EEA countries remained relatively low until 2004, when the 
EU enlargement brought a high number of Eastern Europeans, especially Polish, to 
the UK.  The UK was one of the few EU countries not to introduce transitional 
immigration restrictions on citizens of the acceding member states, only introduc-
ing some limitations on social protection access through the Worker Registration 
Scheme, which allowed Eastern European (so called ‘A8’) immigrants with a con-
tract of employment to access a range of non-contributory benefits only after 
12 months of residence (McCollum 2012; Dustmann and Frattini 2014). In the same 
year, legislation was amended to grant access to non-contributory benefits only to 
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EEA immigrants with a ‘right to reside’ (Kennedy 2011b, 2015a). In 2007, follow-
ing the unexpected inflow of EEA immigrants which had doubled net migration 
since 2004, the Government introduced strict immigration rules for citizens of 
Romania and Bulgaria (so-called ‘A2’) and temporary restrictions in both work and 
social protection rights (Shutes 2016).
The Coalition Government that came to power in 2010 adopted a much tougher 
stance on immigration and access to social protection rights than its predecessor, as 
the increased flux of migrants in previous years pushed immigration to the top of the 
political agenda, together with an increasingly dominant political and media dis-
course on ‘benefit tourism’ (Carmel and Sojka 2018). With respect to non-EEA 
nationals subject to immigration control, the Welfare Reform Act 2012 introduced 
the possibility to restrict access to contributory benefits to those with a right to work 
in the UK, though at time of writing, this provision has not been followed up by 
implementing regulations (Child Poverty Action Group 2017: 67); and the 
Immigration Act 2014 introduced an ‘immigration health surcharge’ payable at the 
time of the visa application as a condition of free access to most NHS services 
(Powell and Bate 2017).
Over the same period, the Eurozone crisis helped to change patterns of EEA 
migration to the UK, as Southern Europe became an important source of immigra-
tion. Further, the end of the transitional restrictions to A2 nationals in January 2014 
rapidly brought Romania to overtake Poland as the main country of origin of new 
migrants. The end of restrictions for Bulgarians and Romanians also brought a raft 
of policy changes to address what then Prime Minister David Cameron described as 
“the magnetic pull of Britain’s benefit system” (cited in Kennedy 2015a: 19). These 
included the introduction of a more rigorous ‘habitual residence test’ and several 
restrictions in accessing non-contributory benefits.
Immigration and migrants’ access to social protection were core political issues 
during the EU membership referendum campaign, and popular opposition to immi-
gration is often argued to be a key factor in explaining the referendum results 
(Clarke et al. 2017; Blinder and Richards 2018). After the 2016 vote, the inflow of 
EEA immigrants has waned, whilst immigration from non-EEA countries has 
stayed in line with previous years (Vargas-Silva and Fernández-Reino 2018).
26.2  Migration and Social Protection in the United Kingdom
The conditions that regulate access to social security benefits can be thought of as 
pertaining to three different levels of conditionality (see Clasen and Clegg 2007): 
conditions of category, conditions of circumstance, and conditions of conduct. 
While conditions of circumstance (e.g. contribution requirements, means-tests), and 
conditions of conduct (e.g. work or training requirements for claimants), are the 
main focus of comparative social security analysis, the boundaries of the risk groups 
that social benefits and services are designed to help are themselves social con-
structs, formed by manipulation of conditions of category. While these conditions 
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are of various types (demographic for age-related benefits, diagnostic for health 
services or disability benefits, etc.), a number also relate to the legal and/or physical 
attachment of claimants to the national territory. Conditions of ‘ordinary residence’ 
or ‘habitual residence’ are part of this first level of conditionality, and for UK nation-
als apply to all means-tested benefits and tax credits as well as to child benefit 
(except where a bilateral agreement covering this benefit is in place), though not to 
contributory benefits (Child Poverty Action Group 2018: 1549–1555). Under the 
UK’s ‘habitual residence’2 rules, for example, a claimant must be able to prove that 
at the time of the claim they have a settled intention to reside in the UK (in fact, the 
common travel area)3 and, for unemployment assistance alone, that they have been 
living in the common travel area for the past 3 months.
EEA nationals coming to the UK to seek work also have to pass the habitual resi-
dence test, which has been made more rigorous due to concerns about ‘benefit tour-
ism’ by this group (Carmel and Sojka 2018). But many EEA nationals do not need 
to prove habitual residence in the UK to claim benefits, as long as they have a ‘right 
to reside’ as workers or self-employed persons (or their family members), for which 
they need to show that they are in ‘genuine and effective work’. The status of worker 
or self-employed, and with it the right to reside and claim benefits, can also be 
retained after the (self-)employment ends for up to 6 months, though longer than 
that only if a ‘genuine prospect of work’ (GPoW) can be demonstrated. In this way, 
we see domestic policy using conditions of conduct to make limitations on access to 
benefits that they can no longer pursue through conditions of category due to EU 
law (see also Shutes 2016). After Brexit, it is likely that only EEA with settled sta-
tus4 will continue to enjoy the same rights as before. Non-EEA nationals who are 
subject to immigration control are excluded by the terms of their visas from access-
ing those UK benefits that fall under the definition, in immigration law, of ‘public 
funds’. This concept covers all means-tested benefits and tax credits as well as the 
universal child benefit and disability/carer’s benefits. The rights of non-EEA 
migrants to social protection in the UK are essentially limited to contributory ben-
efits and health services. It is still uncertain whether EEA immigrants without set-
tled status will be treated as non-EEA immigrants for social protection purposes at 
the end of the transition period following Brexit.
Benefits requiring habitual or ordinary residence generally cannot be exported 
overseas, and benefits that don’t – such as contributory benefits – may also have 
2 The term ‘habitually resident’ is not defined in legislation, but there is now quite a substantial 
body of case law on what it means. Factors may include the length and continuity of residence, the 
person’s future intentions, reasons for migration or where the person’s ‘centre of interest’ lies 
(Kennedy 2015b).
3 The common travel area (CTA) is an open borders arrangement between the UK, Ireland, the Isle 
of Man and the Channel Islands. For the purposes of immigration policy and control, residence in 
any part of the CTA counts as residence in another.
4 At present, EEA immigrants who have been living in the UK for a continuous 5-year period can 
apply for settled status. Those who have immigrated to the UK before 31 December 2020 can 
apply to pre-settled status.
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presence requirements that end entitlement in all but temporary periods of absence 
from the common travel area. For some benefits, EU law on the coordination of 
social security relaxes these rules for UK nationals moving to EEA countries for as 
long as the UK remains the ‘competent state’. It is not very clear what will happen 
at the end of the transition period. Reciprocal agreements relax them for UK nation-
als moving to non-EEA countries with which the UK has signed an agreement, but 
these are few in number, highly variable in their coverage and always exclude 
means-tested benefits.
26.2.1  Unemployment
The UK unemployment benefit system currently combines an insurance benefit 
(contribution-based Jobseekers Allowance, JSA-C), which is flat-rate and paid for a 
maximum of 6 months on the basis of contribution record, and a means-tested ben-
efit (income-based Jobseekers Allowance, JSA-IB), which is paid at a rate depen-
dent on income and family composition.
To be entitled to JSA-C, a UK national must have paid national insurance contri-
butions (NICs) for 26 weeks in the two tax years preceding the claim; and contribu-
tions paid or credited must amount in both the tax years to 50 times the minimum 
weekly contribution for that year. There is no requirement of prior residence. The 
benefit has a presence requirement, though temporary periods of absence from the 
common travel area are permissible in specified situations, e.g. 7 days to attend a 
job interview. Entitlement to JSA-IB depends on a household means test and having 
been habitually resident in the common travel area in the 3 months preceding the 
claim. The presence requirements are the same for JSA-IB as those that apply 
to JSA-C.
To receive either form of JSA, it is necessary to be registered unemployed, 
immediately available for work and actively seeking work. Claimants must sign a 
‘jobseeker’s agreement stating patterns of availability, the type of employment 
being sought and steps being taken to find work. Failure to respect the terms of the 
jobseeker’s agreement may result in the suspension or reduction of benefit entitle-
ment for set periods.
EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals subject to immigration control can claim 
JSA-C on the same terms as UK nationals. Only EEA nationals can claim JSA-IB, 
which they can do either as a ‘jobseeker’ or as a ‘retained worker’ if they meet the 
standard eligibility conditions. If the claim is made as a jobseeker, there is no longer 
any entitlement to benefits which are ‘passported’ for UK nationals claiming 
JSA-IB, notably housing benefit. If the claim is made as a ‘retained worker’, hous-
ing benefit can additionally be claimed, but for those who have worked for less than 
12 months in the UK before the claim ‘retained worker’ status can be retained for a 
maximum of 6 months. If an EEA national has a right to reside only as a jobseeker, 
they can claim JSA-IB for a maximum of 19 weeks.
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Under EU social security coordination rules, JSA-C can be exported to another 
EEA country for a maximum of 3 months. Reciprocal arrangements with seven non- 
EEA states (Canada, New Zealand, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia) as well as Guernsey and the Isle of Man include JSA-C within their scope. 
JSA-IB is not exportable.
26.2.2  Health Care
Since 1948, health care in the United Kingdom has been provided through the 
National Health Service. Following devolution in 1999, health care services in the 
four countries of the UK are operated autonomously and respond to the relevant 
Government: the UK Government (NHS England), Scottish Government (NHS 
Scotland), Welsh Government (NHS Wales), Northern Ireland Executive (Health 
and Social Care in Northern Ireland).
The founding principles of the health care system are to be universal, compre-
hensive and free at the point of use, with funding coming mostly from general taxa-
tion. The system provides a wide range of health care services which are generally 
free at the point of delivery. Since 1999, different regional NHS have increasingly 
diverged in terms of policy and management, though the same basic principles can 
be said to still hold (Greer 2016).
Everyone who is ordinarily resident in the UK has access to free health care 
(with exemptions). Nationals, non-EEA immigrants with an indefinite right to 
remain and EEA immigrants have the same access to health care, though the latter 
should be formally eligible only by presenting the European Health Insurance Card. 
Nevertheless, this is not enforced in practice. Non-EEA immigrants coming for a 
stay of more than 6 months are required to pay an immigration health surcharge at 
the time of the visa application. Non-EEA immigrants coming for a stay of less than 
6 months have to pay to access health care.
Sickness benefits in cash are provided only to employees who have paid 
NICs. Access does not depend on immigration status. To qualify for sickness ben-
efits, claimants need to have been off sick for four or more days in a row and earn at 
least an average of £116 per week. There is no minimum period of employment to 
qualify. Statutory sick pay (SSP) is provided on a flat-rate basis, for up to 28 weeks. 
Receipt of SSP can continue while a claimant is living abroad if they work for a UK 
employer in the EEA, or in any other country if their employer pays UKNICs.
Invalidity benefits in the UK are in constant evolution. The former incapacity 
benefit (IB) has gradually been replaced by the Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA), which can be contribution-based (ESA-C) or income-based (ESA-IB), 
though a few claimants still receive the former incapacity benefit. At the same time, 
Universal Credit (UC) is gradually substituting ESA-IB.
In order to receive either ESA-C or ESA-IB, the claimant has to provide a medi-
cal certificate stating that they are not fit for work and pass a Work Capability 
Assessment to see whether she is actually unfit for work and whether she qualifies 
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to receive ESA long-term. The assessment is also meant to place the claimant in 
either a work-related activity group or in a support group.
In order to qualify for ESA-C, it is necessary to have paid enough NICs, which 
means having worked for at least 26 weeks in the two complete tax years before the 
claim and having paid contributions to the value of at least 50 times the lower earn-
ings threshold in both tax years. In the work-related activity group, the maximum 
duration of payment is 12 months, while it is unlimited in the support group. As 
immigration status is not a qualifying condition, nationals, EEA-migrants and non- 
EEA migrants can all access ESA-C. In order to keep receiving ESA-C, the claim-
ant can go outside the UK for a maximum of 4 weeks (or 26 weeks for medical 
treatment). ESA-C can however be exported to an EEA country for up to 1 year.
Access to ESA-IB depends on a household means-test and all claimants must 
satisfy the condition of habitual residence. As ESA-IB falls under the definition of 
‘public funds’, non-EEA migrants without an indefinite leave to remain cannot 
claim this benefit. Those who receive ESA-IB can go abroad for a maximum of 
4 weeks (or 26 weeks if it is for medical treatment).
26.2.3  Pensions
The UK pension system is organised in a three-pillar structure. The first pillar is 
constituted by the Basic State Pension (BSP), which is a contribution-based benefit 
providing flat-rate protection for wage earners. The second pillar is the State Second 
Pension (S2P) or Additional State Pension. The S2P is meant to top up the BSP with 
an earnings-related component, providing additional public pension income in 
retirement, though workers can choose to contract out of the scheme by joining an 
occupational scheme provided by their employer. Following the Pensions Act 2014, 
from April 2016 the two state components have merged into one flat-rate state pen-
sion, named New State Pension (NSP), which will substitute for both BSP and S2P 
for men born after 6 April 1951 and women born after 6 April 1953.
In order to be entitled to the BSP, the S2P or the NSP, it is necessary to be of 
pension age (65 years old) and have paid NICs. Both the BSP and the NSP are pro-
vided on a flat-rate. There are no residence or immigration status requirements to 
receive those pensions. Nationals, EEA migrants and non-EEA migrants can access 
either BSP or NSP, as long as they have paid enough contributions. There is no limi-
tation on where the person can live while receiving the benefit.
The main means-tested benefit for those of pension age is the Pension Credit 
(PC). It is meant to supplement the BSP or the NSP for those on low income and is 
calculated on the basis of a household means test. The PC has two components: the 
Guarantee Credit (GC) and the Savings Credit (SC). The GC tops up pension 
incomes below £163 per week per individual (or £248.80 per couple) in order to 
reach either threshold. SC is an extra credit for those who have saved some money 
towards their retirement. People who retired after 6 April 2016 are no longer eligi-
ble for SC.
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In order to receive PC, claimants, including nationals returning to the UK and 
EEA immigrants, have to pass the habitual residence test. As PC falls under the defi-
nition of ‘public funds’, all non-EEA immigrants without an indefinite leave to 
remain cannot access PC. In order to keep receiving the benefit, the person has to 
reside in the UK and they can leave the country only for up to 4 weeks without 
explanation, 8  weeks for deaths of a partner or child, 26  weeks if for medical 
treatment.
26.2.4  Family Benefits
The UK social security system features maternity pay, paternity pay and shared 
parental pay. The main parental benefit is statutory maternity pay (SMP). To receive 
the benefit, the mother has to be an employee and have worked for the same 
employer for at least 26 weeks continuing into the ‘qualifying week’, namely the 
15th week before the expected week of childbirth. Furthermore, she has to have 
earned at least £116 pounds per week on average. SMP is paid for up to 39 weeks. 
There are no immigration status requirements to receive SMP, meaning that all 
migrants can access it. If the mother lives abroad, she can receive SMP if she works 
for a UK employer in the EEA or if her employer continues paying UKNICs.
If a mother does not qualify to SMP, she may be eligible for Maternity Allowance 
(MA). To access MA, the mother has to be either employed or self-employed, or 
have recently stopped working, and she has to have been either employed or self- 
employed for at least 26 weeks and have earned at least £30 per week for 13 weeks 
in the 66 weeks before the expected date of child’s birth. The benefit can be paid up 
to 39 weeks. All migrants can access MA if they meet the other requirements. If the 
mother lives in the EEA or in a country with which the UK has an agreement, she 
can continue to receive MA.  To access paternity pay, the requirements are very 
similar to those of SMP. There are again no residency or immigration status require-
ments. Parents can also opt for shared parental pay (SPP). The eligibility criteria 
and the amount received are the same as for SMP.
Child benefit (CB) has traditionally been the only truly universal welfare benefit 
in the UK welfare system. Until recently, every household responsible for a child 
below 16 years old (or under 20, if they stay in approved education or training) was 
entitled to CB. Since 2013, however, the universality of the benefit has been under-
mined through the introduction of a high-income tax charge for individuals earning 
more than £50,000 per year, which reaches 100% of the CB for incomes above 
£60,000. This has made CB de facto means-tested on individual (not household) 
income. To receive CB, all nationals returning to the UK and EEA migrants need to 
pass the habitual residence test. Non-EEA migrants without an indefinite leave to 
remain cannot claim CB. A person can still receive the benefit if they leave the UK 
for a short period of time (up to 12 weeks). For a longer period, receipt of CB can 
only continue if the claimant continues to pay UK NICs (or receive a UK 
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contribution-based benefit) and resides in an EEA country or in a country with 
which the UK has an agreement.
26.2.5  Guaranteed Minimum Resources
From the abolition of Supplementary Benefit in the late 1980s until recently, the UK 
did not have a general scheme of guaranteed minimum resources but instead a 
highly complex ‘last safety net’ composed of multiple categorical means-tested 
benefits. The introduction of Universal Credit (UC) with the 2012 Welfare Reform 
Act however recreates such a general system, at least for people of working age. UC 
is being implemented progressively, and currently co-exists with the categorical 
benefits it will eventually replace. UC is a centralised benefit, administered by the 
Department for Work and Pensions.5
UC is a household entitlement, and eligibility is based on the income and assets 
of a household falling below a specified level. It is reassessed on a monthly basis 
and the benefit amount is variable depending on the income and assets of the house-
hold. Claimants of UC must sign a ‘claimant commitment’ which specifies their 
work-related requirements. The ‘default’ position is that all claimants will have full 
work-related requirements, with the need to demonstrate work search and work 
availability. Exceptions exist, for example, when people care for very young chil-
dren or have work-limiting disabilities.6 Failure to comply with work-related 
requirements or other elements of the claimant commitment can result in the claim-
ant being sanctioned.7
Claimants of UC must meet the habitual residence requirement, which since 
2004 requires prior evidence of a right to reside. EEA migrants who are in the UK 
exercising their 3 month ‘initial right of residence’ under the European Directive 
2004/38/EC are not considered to have a right to reside, and so cannot claim 
UC. Being granted a right to reside as an ‘EEA jobseeker’ only satisfies the right to 
reside requirement for JSA-IB, but it does not satisfy it for UC. This means that an 
EEA jobseeker living in an area that has yet to introduce UC may be able to claim 
benefits, whereas one living in a full service UC area will not. As UC falls within 
the definition of public funds under immigration law, it cannot be claimed by non- 
EEA citizens in the UK and subject to immigration control. UC cannot be exported 
5 Though UC is a reserved benefit, the Scotland Act 2016 gave the Scottish Government some 
limited powers to vary its administration in Scotland.
6 Under the initial regulations, EEA citizens able to claim UC were necessarily considered to be in 
the default position, irrespective of their ability to actually (seek) work. This discriminatory anom-
aly was rectified in 2015 by the Universal Credit (EEA jobseekers) amendment regulations 20015 
(SI 2015/546).
7 House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee (2018). Benefit Sanctions, 19th Report 
of Session 2017–2019, HC 955. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/
cmworpen/ 955/955.pdf. Accessed 19 Feb 2018.
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to EEA countries and is not covered by any agreements with non-EEA states. UC 
claims can continue during temporary absences from the UK of up to 1 month (or 
longer in case of death of a close relative or medical treatment) (Child Poverty 
Action Group 2018: 1623).
26.3  Conclusions
The social protection rights of migrants in the UK have greatly evolved in the past 
few decades. On the one hand, there has been a gradual restriction of these rights for 
immigrants coming from colonies or former colonies, whilst EU law has granted 
access to most social protection rights for EEA migrants. Nevertheless, a growing 
anti-immigration sentiment, which has seen immigration and immigrants’ rights to 
social protection becoming core political issues in the past decade, have prompted 
successive Governments to restrict social protection rights for both EEA and non- 
EEA immigrants, and this is currently one of the most controversial issues in the 
negotiations between the UK and the EU in the transition period after Brexit.
In this chapter, we have shown that, at present, there is a hierarchy of access to 
the UK social protection system according to the interplay of three main variables: 
immigration status, residency status and benefit type. Those with ‘the right of 
abode’, which includes all full British citizens who are habitually resident in the 
UK, enjoy the broadest access. Those with a right to reside as EEA nationals (or 
family members thereof) enjoy many of the same rights of access to benefits as UK 
citizens, though for demogrants, means-tested benefits and tax credits, the precise 
basis of an EEA national’s right to reside plays an important role. People who are 
(retained) workers or self-employed (or family members thereof) can access these 
benefits on the same grounds as UK citizens, whereas those with only an initial right 
of residence or whose right to reside is as an EEA jobseeker face more limitations. 
This situation is likely to undergo significant changes at the end of the transition 
period following Brexit but, at the time of publication, the new regulatory frame-
work is still being negotiated. For non-EEA nationals, only those granted a perma-
nent leave to remain can (normally) access the full range of social benefits and 
services. Those with time-limited leaves, and subject to immigration control, can 
claim contributory benefits if they are entitled and access health services, but are 
unable as a condition of their visa to access ‘public funds’ as defined in immigration 
law, which in practice covers all demogrants, means-tested benefits and tax credits. 
As such, contributory benefits and health services are the most accessible benefits; 
demogrants, means-tested benefits and tax credits are far less so. As regards British 
citizens living abroad, they are entitled to most contributory benefits (albeit some 
for a limited period of time), whilst they face restrictions in accessing means-tested 
benefits, demogrants and tax credits, though they can still claim child benefits and 
maternity allowance if living in a EEA country.
The distinction between types of benefits is important for access to benefits via 
reciprocal agreements too. The UK has signed 20 such agreements with non-EU 
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states, all of which cover pensions, most of which cover family and sickness bene-
fits and some of which cover unemployment benefits. In all cases, however, the 
agreements pertain to non-means tested benefits, either contributory or universal.
Concerns about the access of migrants to the UK social security system has been 
a central issue in UK political debates in recent years, and fed into the most signifi-
cant political event in contemporary British history: the holding of an in-out refer-
endum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, and subsequent popular 
vote for ‘Brexit’. Limiting access of EEA nationals to UK benefits, specifically in- 
work tax credits and social housing, and ending the possibility for EEA nationals 
resident in the UK to receive child benefits when their children lived in another 
Member State were key demands in the UK Government’s ultimately ill-fated 
attempt to renegotiate the terms of its EU membership ahead of the 2016 referen-
dum (Clegg 2016). Though the renegotiation and referendum were prompted by 
extreme tensions over EU membership within the governing Conservative Party 
(Clegg 2017), the ambition of making access to the UK benefit system more restric-
tive to migrants in fact enjoys cross-party support (Kennedy 2015c). The future of 
UK immigration policy is currently suspended on the outcome of the fraught and 
drawn-out attempts of the Government to negotiate the details of its future relation-
ship with the EU, and the outcome of negotiations is still highly uncertain.
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Diaspora Policies, Consular Services 




The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the diaspora policy infra-
structure and key social protection policies implemented by the United Kingdom 
government for its nationals living abroad. In this chapter, I will show that UK poli-
cies for its citizens abroad are characterised by limited engagement but effective 
communication leading to a disengaged state that keeps the dialogue open.
The key policy that underpins UK diaspora relations is providing information 
and support through electronic platforms in addition to some dedicated consular 
efforts to encourage economic ventures such as supporting British businesses 
abroad. The UK has been characterised by Ragazzi (2014, p. 80) as a ‘expatriate 
state’ which provides services to high-income category of “expats” employed for 
example in the transnational corporations of the sending states. Social protection 
policies on the other hand barely feature in the overall architecture of UK diaspora 
policy and are extremely limited.
Emigration policy is not effectively utilised as a form of soft power by the British 
state. The absence of state engagement stems from a lack of distinctive British iden-
tity, the heterogeneity of the British diaspora, and the profile of British emigrants 
having a typically ‘international outlook’ driven by positive pull factors with the 
assumption being that Britons living abroad do not want or need to engage with 
their homeland state. Furthermore, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
which is the key department responsible for Britons abroad, has an organisational 
culture described ‘as one of the last bastions of Westminster whiggism’, with British 
diplomacy being ‘renowned for being whiggish and reactive’ (Hall 2013, p. 236). 
As a result, some have derided the FCO as failing ‘to transform itself from a 
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lynchpin of empire into a more flexible post-colonial institution’ (Hall 2013, p. 237), 
and thus arguably diaspora policies suffer from policy inertia. Popular images of 
Britons abroad are ‘often unfair and out-dated’ but persist and ‘perhaps contribute 
to a sense in parts of government that engagement with the diaspora is only about 
helping emigrants to keep out of trouble’ (Finch et al. 2010, p. 14).
The UK is perhaps peculiar compared to other states in that immigration is highly 
politicised – arguably driving a public vote to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum 
(Dennison and Geddes 2018) – whilst at the same time the UK has almost no dias-
pora or emigrant policy to speak of and lacks any formal representative body or 
institution to represent Britons living abroad. There is no government minister or 
department with responsibility for emigrants, and no representative mechanism for 
Britons living abroad. Whilst there is little regional variation in the way of social 
protection policies for Britons residing abroad, the Scottish Government adopted a 
specific diaspora engagement plan to ‘harness the power of Scotland’s diaspora’ 
(Scottish Government 2010). Nonetheless, the UK is peculiar in its absence of a 
formal diaspora policy, despite an estimated 5.6  m Britons living abroad (Finch 
et al. 2010). Furthermore, Brexit has served to underscore the lack of formal engage-
ment between the British state and its citizens abroad, including concerns from the 
Britons living in the EU around pension transferability, and the contentious 15-year 
residency requirement which disenfranchised many Britons, highlighting what 
many decried as an unfair eligibility requirement.
The chapter begins by summarising the UK diaspora and its relation with the 
homeland. The chapter goes on to discuss the diaspora infrastructure for UK nation-
als residing abroad, key engagement policies of the UK state. The final section 
details the existing diaspora social protection policies including access to unem-
ployment benefits, health care, pensions, family-related benefits and economic 
hardship.
27.2  Diaspora Characteristics and Home Country 
Engagement Policies
27.2.1  The UK Diaspora and its Relation with the Homeland
The UK diaspora is one the largest in the world, ranked eighth highest in absolute 
numbers (World Bank 2011), with the largest stock of citizens living aboard amongst 
high-income OECD countries (Murray et al. 2012, p. 19). This being said, estimat-
ing the stock of UK-born emigrants living abroad is challenging, with figures rang-
ing from 4.5 to 5.6  million (Murray et  al. 2012, p.18; World Bank 2011; 
Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006).
English-speaking nations have consistently been the top destinations for British 
emigrants, with Australia being the persistent top choice with an estimated 
1,045,600, followed by the USA (798,000), Canada (543,900), Spain (280,500) and 
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Ireland (257,500). New Zealand, France and Germany are other important destina-
tions (Murray et al. 2012). Australia is the top destination for younger age groups 
(aged 44 and under), whereas Spain and France are top destinations for older age 
groups (Murray et al. 2012, p. 17). Much of settlement emigration has taken place 
in countries of the Old Commonwealth as a result of colonial ties associated with 
the Commonwealth project and relatedly because these are English-speaking 
nations. Australia remains the top destination of choice in part because of family 
chain migration as a result of emigration in earlier decades and ‘Empire continuing 
to exert its influence on settlement patterns long after it ceased to exist’ (Hammerton 
2017, p. 8). Thirty three per cent of all British born emigrants live in Australia or 
New Zealand (ONS 2018). In contrast the UK has a smaller proportion of citizens 
living in another EU country than any other EU state (ONS 2018). Nonetheless, as 
a result of more stringent entry requirements in Anglo sphere countries, and shifts 
to lifestyle migration, emigration to EU states has been on the rise since the 1980s 
with an estimated 784,900 British citizens living in the EU (excluding the UK and 
Ireland) in 2017 (ONS 2018).
British emigration has a long and fragmented history. In previous centuries 
Britons emigrated in large numbers to the colonies either as refugees or as forced 
economic migrants (Cohen 2008). Post-war Britain went through successive stages 
of austerity up to the early 1960s, and thus ‘the emigration of the period was itself 
a one of austerity’ (Hammerton 2017, p.  7). In the succeeding decades as UK 
became more prosperous, the patterns of migration shifted towards ‘lifestyle migra-
tion’ with Britons continuing to search for better employment but also preferred 
lifestyles such as warmer climate (Hammerton 2017, p. 7; Inter Nations 2017). In 
turn, emigration has been associated with ‘dynamic, adventurous and often rela-
tively prosperous individuals taking up exciting personal opportunities overseas’ 
(Finch et al. 2010, p. 2). In contrast to other diasporas then post-war British emigra-
tion has been underpinned by positive pull factors. British emigrants tend to be 
‘progressive global Brits’ who are self-mobilising. In turn the government’s assump-
tion is that Britons do not require or want engagement with the homeland and that 
engagement ‘is only about helping emigrants to keep out of trouble’ (Finch et al. 
2010, p. 14). This reticence goes some way to explaining the lack of UK diaspora 
engagement policy.
Considering an estimated 6.6 million UK citizens live abroad (Finch et al. 2010, 
p.  13) the British diaspora is curiously absent from both scholarly and applied 
research. Academics and policy-makers have studied UK emigration far less than 
the immigration of people into the UK. Despite the fact that the majority of British 
emigrants do so for work or to accompany someone (Murray et al. 2012, p. 9–20) – 
with the majority of British emigrants being of working age (aged 25–44 years) – 
the majority of existing research focuses on British citizens retiring abroad (e.g. 
Howard 2008; King and Patterson 1998; King et al. 2000; O’Reilly 2000; Warnes 
et al. 1999). Among British citizens emigrating between 1991 and 2010, the largest 
group was consistently those with a previous occupation that was ‘professional or 
managerial’ (Murray et  al. 2012, p.  13). Whilst there are large variations within 
countries, ‘the British diaspora tends to be more highly educated and higher skilled 
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than the general UK population’ (Finch et al. 2010, p. 38). The evidence suggests 
that UK unemployment might be closely associated with emigration levels for 
British citizens (Murray et al. 2012, p. 35).
The lack of scholarly attention to the British diaspora is partly because diaspora 
studies generally focuses on groups that suffered from imperial oppression, in con-
trast to the British or even English diaspora, which are seen ‘as progenitors of an 
empire against which outsiders were defined’ (Bueltmann et  al. 2012, p.  4). Yet 
perhaps the critical reason for the lack of research on the UK diaspora and more 
importantly the absence of a diaspora engagement policy is the UK being a multi- 
national diaspora in the first instance, made up of English, Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish, ‘and in some cases these national identifications are stronger than a 
generic British one’ (Finch et  al. 2010, p. 13). For example, Scottish and Welsh 
emigrants ‘are increasingly likely to identify with notions of Scottish or Welsh dias-
pora rather than British diaspora’ (Finch et al. 2010, p. 25) and arguably Scottish 
identity is more defined than a wider British national identity, as reflected in the 
Scottish government’s efforts to engage with its diaspora. British national identity is 
a relatively recent social construct, with a shifting debate in the last 20 or 30 years 
towards a renewed sense of Britishness to restore declining national prestige and 
pride (Finch et al. 2010, p. 75), a project perhaps never fulfilled and contentious in 
the current Brexit fuelled climate where the nation introspects about its national 
identity. At the same time, one of the most comprehensive studies on the British 
diaspora found that emigrants who had settled elsewhere long term maintained 
strong family, cultural and emotional links with the UK, few rejected the label of 
being British and many saw their Bristishness as positive in some way (Finch et al. 
2010, p. 63, 43). This implies that despite the lack of a clear national identity there 
is a homeland maintenance which the government could engage with.
27.2.2  Diaspora Infrastructure
As outlined above, the British state has a limited diaspora engagement strategy, 
namely due to assumptions that Britons do not want or need to engage with their 
homeland. The infrastructure of engagement policies is therefore focused on pro-
viding comprehensive information whilst keeping the dialogue with its citizens 
open through social media channels. Whilst there is no specific service established 
the state maintains a commitment to keep the dialogue open and have people 
informed about their (limited or absence of) rights.
The key institution for diaspora engagement policy is the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, it is rare (indeed unheard of) for British 
officials to use the term diaspora or emigrants to describe UK citizens residing 
abroad (Hampshire 2013, p. 312). Conversely, the state generally refers to British 
emigrants as British Nationals Overseas or occasionally British expatriates.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) key remit is to promote the 
UK’s interest overseas including supporting UK citizens and businesses around the 
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globe. They are the lead governmental institution by which the UK state engages 
with its national abroad. The FCO – created in 1968 when the Foreign Office and 
the Commonwealth Office merged – has three key responsibilities:
• Safeguarding the UK’s national security by countering terrorism and weapons 
proliferation, and working to reduce conflict
• Building the UK’s prosperity by increasing exports and investment, opening 
markets, ensuring access to resources, and promoting sustainable growth
• Supporting British nationals abroad around the world through modern and effi-
cient consular services.
Within the FCO, the Consular Services are the key sub-ministry (although not 
officially a sub-ministry) by which the state assists Britons living abroad. A 
Directorate within the FCO provides the Consular Services; the Directorate consists 
of a network of 620+ consular offices in embassies and consulates around the world. 
The Permanent Under-Secretary and Head of the Diplomatic Services role is to lead 
the Consular Services. There is no national-level public institution separate from 
ministries dedicated to addressing the needs of UK nationals residing abroad.
The FCO does not operate mobile consulates. In the absence of mobile consul-
ates, the FCO relies on Honorary Consuls – of which there are just over 200 globally 
in 2018 − to be present in all major locations for British tourists and residents where 
no British diplomatic or consular mission exists. According to the FCO, Honorary 
Consuls provide an invaluable emergency response to crises or urgent consular 
cases, which are then reinforced and taken on by the consular teams in posts. The 
FCO states that Honorary Consuls provide a more accessible and responsive service 
in places where it could not justify a consular presence (Foreign Affairs Committee 
2014, para 33). Honorary Consuls are volunteers (paid a stipend) who help assist 
British nationals where there is no full consular presence. Their duties may include 
crisis response, consular assistance, local authority liaison, or assisting official con-
sular visits, but do not normally include routine consular services. The time devoted 
to consular matters varies widely between posts, but Honorary Consuls are expected 
to work on average no more than 4 h a week.
The regime relating to the functions of all consulates including Honorary Consuls 
are stipulated by the Consular Relations Act 1968, which transposed Article 5 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Honorary Consuls work under 
the supervision of superintending posts and ‘their work is carefully managed and 
monitored by trained Consular staff who assess whether the task is appropriate for 
delegation to an Honorary Consul or whether a full time member of staff ought to 
be deployed’ (Foreign Affairs Committee 2014). For crisis response, the FCO estab-
lished the Global Response Centre (GRC) that handles out-of-hours calls from 
members of the public who need urgent consular assistance.
The FCO Services, which is an executive agency of the FCO, provides protection 
to physical assets but this body provides no role or dedicated services to addressing 
the needs of nationals residing abroad. The British Council (BC) is an executive 
non-departmental body of the FCO that is the UK’s international organisation for 
cultural relations and educational opportunities aiming to build lasting relationships 
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between the UK and other countries. However, the British Council is no longer the 
prerogative of the state, and it is not within their remit to address the needs of British 
nationals residing abroad.
Aside from the FCO, a further relevant state ministry involved in a minor way in 
assisting some nationals residing abroad is the UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) – 
which is a division of the Home Office – responsible for running the UK visa ser-
vice. In March 2014, the Home Office assumed full responsibility for passport 
applications, decisions and document issuance. In June 2014, there were delays in 
issuing passports. To help deal with problems issuing passports for UK citizens 
overseas, the FCO extended passports by 12 months and began to issue emergency 
travel documents to children for the first time (NAO 2015). The UKVI only assist 
nationals residing abroad in terms of partially processing some passport applica-
tions and renewals that, depending on host state, can be completed in-person at 
UKVI ‘hub and spoke’ centres1 that are located across the globe. However, in the 
majority of host states the application is processed online directly with Her Majesty’s 
Passport Office (HMPO) − which is a further division of the Home Office − in the 
UK. Some minor functions may also fall to the Visa Application Centres located 
across the globe, but these mainly concern non-British nationals applying for a 
UK visa.
Whilst there is limited regional variation in the UK’s policy towards Britons 
residing abroad, the Scottish Government adopted a diaspora engagement strategy 
in 2010 (Scottish Government 2010). The main mission of the diaspora engagement 
plan includes: Continue to build opportunities to engage with the Diaspora into 
planned Ministerial activities overseas, focusing on priority countries identified in 
the International Framework. The Scottish Government have conducted a number 
of consultations and research on the Scottish Diaspora.2 The Scottish Government 
already has a range of tools which successfully engage with an international audi-
ence and the Diaspora, including; (i) Scotland.org the official online gateway to 
Scotland; (ii) The Global Friends of Scotland and GlobalScot networks; (iii) and 
events such as Scotland Week in North America. The Scottish government’s inter-
national framework on diaspora has three key objectives:
• Creating conditions for members of the Diaspora to live, learn, visit, work and 
return to Scotland




2 Including the following papers: The Scottish Diaspora and Diaspora Strategy: Insights and 
Lessons from Ireland; Engaging the Scottish Diaspora: Rationale, Benefits and Challenges; 




• Managing Scotland’s reputation with the Diaspora, as a distinctive global iden-
tity, an independent-minded and responsible nation, confident of its place in 
the world.
In contrast to the limited state engagement strategy with Britons residing abroad, 
the three main political parties have infrastructure to engage with citizens living 
abroad. The current administration – the Conservative Party (365 seats) – run the 
ConservativesAbroad3 branch established in the late 1990s, which provides a forum 
‘for like-minded people to socialise and gives a platform for political discussion on 
matters of mutual interest’. ConservativesAbroad were instrumental in in getting 
Votes for Life on the political agenda discussed below (Collard 2018). The aims of 
ConservativesAbroad are to keep Conservatives members and supporters living 
overseas in touch with politics at home; increasing the number of registered voters 
from abroad; increasing awareness of the issues facing British Citizens living over-
seas; and lobbying to reform overseas voting laws. The Labour Party (202 seats) 
similarly run Labour International,4 which has 2400 members in over 60 countries. 
The objective of Labour International – aside from promoting the values of the UK 
Labour Party and working with sister parties in different countries – are to provide 
a focal point for the social and political needs of Labour Party members and sup-
porters living or working abroad, and developing electoral support for the Party 
among British subjects abroad. The smallest Party  – the Liberal Democrats (11 
seats) – established LibDems Abroad5 in 2010 which aims to help members and 
supporters stay in touch with the Party, ensure that the Party understands the con-
cerns of its members overseas and to encourage members and supporters to register 
to vote in UK elections.
27.2.3  Key Engagement Policies
The UK is perhaps peculiar in contrast to other states in its lack of engagement 
policy or strategy with its citizens abroad. Current engagement by the British state 
with its diaspora population is limited by international standards (Finch et al. 2010, 
p. 9), and there is no governmental policy to speak of which actively engages with 
British citizens who have emigrated abroad (Hampshire 2013, p. 312). There is no 
state level representative or consultation mechanism or any dedicated institutional 
architecture for engaging with its overseas population, nor are there specific policies 
pertaining to remittances, return, education, housing or repatriation. State engage-
ment is minimal and reactive to Britons residing overseas.
However, there are many initiatives led by the government that are of relevance 
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extensive advice on their websites and social media and is ‘a world leader in provid-
ing online and other information in supporting emigrants to be well prepared for life 
overseas’ (Finch et al. 2010, p. 11). This includes a ‘Living Abroad Checklist’, the 
Travel Aware website, retiring abroad, and tailored information for living and work-
ing (norms and rights) in every host state. Additionally, the government provide 
information on trading and investment advice for British nationals looking to emi-
grate including business factsheets, overseas Intellectual Property (IP) protection 
and guidance for setting up an overseas business.
The cornerstone of FCO policy is the (usually annually updated) booklet for 
Britons travelling overseas – Support for British Nationals Abroad: A Guide – that 
sets out the FCO customer charter and serves to outline how and when consulates 
can assist British nationals. The FCO also jointly ran an online video guide with the 
Buying Association to prepare Britons for buying property abroad.6 However, with 
the exception of the latter, most of these initiatives are orientated towards all British 
national travelling, not necessarily or specifically Britons residing abroad.
The UK state has limited diaspora integration in the way of ‘extending political 
rights’ (Gamlen 2008) Dual citizenship and external voting (by post or proxy) is 
permitted although voter registration is ‘pitifully small’ (Finch et al. 2010, p. 70). 
The Electoral Commission run a specific online page for online voters to enquire 
and register.7 Voting rights of national residing abroad has been an especially con-
tentious issue in British politics following the EU referendum in 2016. The current 
system of electoral registration for national elections (and referendums depending 
on the franchise) allows Britons residing abroad to continue to vote for 15 years in 
the constituency where they were last registered. This meant that many British citi-
zens residing abroad were ineligible to vote in the 2016 referendum despite British 
emigrants residing in the EU being highly affected by the vote, roughly estimated as 
up to two thirds of the population disenfranchised as a result of the 15-year resi-
dency rule (Benson 2019).
IPPR’s (2010) qualitative research commissioned by the FCO found that the 
overall low levels of voter registration is due to ‘the laborious processes of vote 
registration and casting postal or proxy votes’ which ‘appears to deter all but the 
most committed individuals’ (Finch et  al. 2010, p.  70). Collard (2018) similarly 
surmises that registration levels for overseas voters were low ‘largely due to bureau-
cratic obstacles’. A study conducted by the Electoral Commission (2016) high-
lighted a number of barriers to casting a ballot overseas, including confusion over 
eligibility requirements (with some 31% of respondents believing that receiving a 
UK state pension or owning property in the UK made them eligible to vote), low 
levels of understanding that an overseas voter registration has to be renewed annu-
ally, along with a lack of awareness of how to register or vote (Electoral Commission 
2016). The Association of Electoral Administrators (AEA 2017, p. 51) found that in 





mistakenly believed that they would be able to vote online or have their ballot papers 
emailed to them.
Registered overseas voters have nonetheless increased to over 285,000 largely 
due to the introduction of online registration in the 2014 and 2016 referendums and 
the 2015 and 2017 general elections (Collard 2018; Johnston 2018, p. 16). A further 
132,048 British citizens abroad registered to vote between October and November 
2019 ahead of the December 2019 General Election (Benson 2019). However, in the 
Second Reading debate on the Overseas Electors Bill 2017–2019, Cabinet Office 
Minister said ‘that the number of registered overseas voters at the June 2017 General 
Election, just over 285,000, represented about only 20 per cent of the number likely 
to be eligible’, giving a potential electorate of around 1.4 million (Johnston 2018, 
p. 15). In a research survey conducted by the Electoral Commission of UK citizens 
living overseas 58% of respondents believed that they were currently registered and 
30% of potentially eligible overseas voters responded that they had voted in the 
2015 UK General Election (Electoral Commission 2016, p. 3). Having said this, 
these figures should be treated cautiously.
Since the referendum a number of grassroot networks of UK citizens resident in 
the EU have sprung up to lobby government for secure residency status following 
Brexit. The Conservative Party pledged in their 2014 manifesto to grant ‘Votes for 
Life’ to UK citizens resident abroad, which will mean abolishing the current rule 
which disenfranchises UK citizens who have been resident abroad for more than 
15 years. In October 2016 the Conservative government published a policy state-
ment on ‘A democracy that works for everyone: British citizens overseas’, which set 
out how the 15 year rule will be removed. The Overseas Electors Bill 2017–2019 
was a private members bill that sought to end the 15-year time limit that took place 
in February 2018. The Bill ‘to make provision extending the basis on which British 
citizens outside the UK qualify to participate in parliamentary elections; and for 
connected purposes’ completed its public committee stage in November 2018 
(House of Commons 2018). However, the Bill was filibustered by Conservative MP 
Phillip Davies – a member of the European Research Group and an ardent Brexiter – 
at the report stage (Collard 2019). Thus the Bill was killed off.
Whilst there are a number of privately led networks for British nationals residing 
abroad, such as Expat Network,8 there is no specific state sponsored consultative or 
representative body or mechanism for UK nationals residing abroad. The FCO’s 
main channel of communication and responding to queries from Britons living 
abroad (aside from physical consulates and embassies) is through social media, 
where the FCO have dedicated Facebook and twitter pages for British emigrants. 
The FCO have made concerted efforts in recent years to publish up-to-date and 
bespoke travel advice for Britons and utilising social media as the key platform for 
communications. The latter has included terminating the LOCATE database – to 
register British emigrants – in 2013 when the FCO claimed that social media has 
superseded LOCATE system for registering details with an Embassy, especially in 
8 https://www.expatnetwork.com
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light of the fact that only 1% of British emigrants used the registry service (British 
Embassy Cairo 2013). Most embassies have a dedicated Facebook site for each host 
state specifically for Britons residing abroad where citizens are encouraged to 
engage with each other.
British embassies and high commissions regularly hold conferences and events 
around the world – many of which are targeted at British emigrants – where the 
FCO can provide Q&A sessions on specific issues for Britons. Consulate efforts to 
hold discussions for Britons residing in Europe have seemingly increased since the 
referendum due to the uncertainty of status for Britons living in the EU. For exam-
ple, in April 2018 the British Embassy in Paris held meetings across France to hear 
concerns around Brexit and residency status from Britons living in France locations 
(British Embassy Paris 2018). Likewise, the British Embassy in Spain held meet-
ings in 2016 at local town halls to allow Britons residing in Spain to feedback their 
concerns around Brexit (British Embassy Consulate Palma de Mallorca 2016). 
Consulates can also provide details on any local clubs or organisations for British 
expatriate communities (FCO 2018). Furthermore, embassies and consulates often 
have close contacts with British businesses – with two overseas missions sharing 
premises with business groups (Hampshire 2013, p. 314) – such as through British 
Business Forums9 (in Macedonia for example) and some embassies and/or high 
commissions specifically state that their mission is to support British businesses 
operating in host states.
27.3  Diaspora Policies and Social Protection 
in the United Kingdom
The UK government has a complete absence of policies to facilitate the access to 
social protection of national residing abroad. This absence stems from the fact that 
British emigrants tend to be high skilled, prosperous, moving for high skilled work, 
and lifestyle migration. British emigration has long been driven by positive pull fac-
tors underpinned by voluntarism then, rather than negative push factors that might 
lead to deprivation in the sending state. Combined with assumptions that Britons 
living abroad do not want or need to engage with the homeland state, there has been 
little incentive for the government to establish social protection policies.
Britons residing abroad cannot claim any UK means-tested or income-based 
benefits, and therefore there are no guaranteed minimum income benefits available 
for Britons residing abroad from the UK government. Policy is geared towards 
informing Britons of their social protection rights both from the home and host state 
via the FCO and gov.uk websites. Policy, not legal right, underpins consular affairs 
and therefore the state is under no legal obligation to provide consular assistance. 




benefits or any economic assistance in any capacity. If all other options have been 
exhausted and only in exceptional circumstances the FCO can provide an emer-
gency loan to help a Briton (tourist or emigrant) return to the UK on a discretionary 
basis10 (FCO 2018). In such cases, if the Briton is eligible they must sign a ‘under-
taking to repay’ agreement with the FCO and secure their loan by giving up their 
passport to the FCO. However, this is discretionary and rarely deployed. Whilst the 
FCO is responsible for coordinating matters with other UK government depart-
ments, there is no policy or evidence of consulates assisting Britons living abroad 
with social protection claims or welfare entitlements, although, as assistance is dis-
cretionary, this may transpire in practice. The Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) are responsible welfare, pensions and child maintenance policy.
27.3.1  Unemployment
There is no specific policy pertaining to assisting Britons residing abroad access to 
unemployment benefits and the consulate services have no outlined role in facilitat-
ing or assisting Britons in claiming any welfare entitlements. However, the UK 
government provide extensive advice on eligibility for home unemployment bene-
fits via their website, and allow Britons to find out which UK benefits they can 
retrieve and host state benefits via an online questionnaire.11
The main unemployment benefit in the UK is Jobs Seekers Allowance (JSA), of 
which there are two types: contribution based and income based. Britons residing 
abroad are not eligible to claim any income-based or means tested unemployment 
benefits, which refers to income based JSA. Due to EU legislation, Britons residing 
abroad can claim contribution-based JSA in the EEA or Switzerland states for up to 
3 months after leaving the UK, subject to other eligibility criteria, including:
• Being entitled to JSA on the day of departure
• Registering as a jobseeker at least 4 weeks before departure
• Looking for work in the UK up until the day of departure
• Emigrating abroad to look for work
• Registering at the equivalent of a Job Centre in the host state
• Following the state country’s rules on registering and looking for work.
Britons cannot usually claim contribution based JSA in non-EEA states. Some 
countries outside the EEA have social security agreements with the UK. This means 
that if a Briton has paid enough National Insurance contributions in the UK, they 
may be able to get unemployment benefits in: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Channel 
10 There are exceptional cases where the UK government – not necessarily the FCO – has repatri-
ated Britons. For example, in October 2017 the government (Department of Transport) ordered the 
country’s largest peacetime repatriation to fly 110,000 Britons back to the UK following the col-
lapse of airline Monarch.
11 https://www.gov.uk/uk-benefits-abroad
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Islands, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, New Zealand and Serbia. The UK gov-
ernment can assist with benefit claims from EU host states in a limited way by 
providing a form U1 which is a record of UK National Insurance contributions that 
may help a claim for unemployment benefit in another EU country. The government 
provide a list of countries online where Britons can potentially claim unemploy-
ment benefits in the host state. However, the website states that benefit arrange-
ments will depend on the specific host state.
The website advices that an applicant contact their local Job Centre before depar-
ture to ensure there are no forms to fill out. The government provide an international 
line for enquiries on claiming Jobs Seekers Allowance from abroad via the 
International Pension Centre, which provide separate international phone numbers 
for differing unemployment benefits including pro-rata Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) and Jobs Seekers Allowance (JSA). Further advice on claiming 
benefits in host non-EEA states are on ndirect.gov.uk.
27.3.2  Health Care
There is no specific policy to assist Britons living abroad with healthcare. Much like 
unemployment benefits the government provides extensive advice on accessing 
home and health country provision via the FCO and gov.uk websites. The National 
Health Service (NHS) is the public health services in the UK. Each of the UK’s 
health service systems operates independently, and is politically accountable to the 
relevant government: the Scottish Government, Welsh Government, Northern 
Ireland Executive and the UK government, responsible for England’s NHS. NHS 
England is an executive non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Department 
of Health and Social Care. Whilst there is usually no regional difference in UK poli-
cies towards its citizen’s abroad, access to healthcare in Scotland is a marked excep-
tion. According to NHS Scotland if a UK passport holder works anywhere outside 
the UK they can get healthcare from the NHS in Scotland if they lived in the UK 
legally for more than 10 years before moving abroad in addition to the following 
requirements: if they have come back to the UK for a visit at least once every 
2 years, their contract of employment allows them to visit the UK at least once every 
2 years, and their employer will pay for the cost of their return to the UK at the end 
of their contract.12 A further exception worth highlighting is the agreement between 
the UK and Ireland specifically. The UK and Irish authorities have an agreement 
where UK residents do not need their European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) to 
access healthcare services if they are on a temporary stay in Ireland. It is enough to 
show proof that you are ordinarily resident in the UK, such as a driving licence, 
passport or similar documentation that shows your NHS number or its equivalent.




The NHS provide information online for Britons moving abroad which details all 
relevant information regarding health and provides a country-by-country guide for 
the specific healthcare infrastructure in host states. Further advice on covering med-
ical costs when moving abroad are available on the NHS website.13 A more general 
overview of health factors abroad can be found in the FCO guide Support for British 
Nationals Abroad (FCO 2018). The FCO advises that all Britons, whether travelling 
ore moving abroad, seek out private health insurance.
The NHS is a residence-based healthcare system and therefore Britons moving 
permanently abroad are not automatically entitled to medical treatment. The UK 
NHS does not cover British nationals if they are going to be living permanently 
outside the EEA.  If a Briton has lived outside the UK for more than 3  months 
(6  months for pensioners living in EEA countries) than they may be liable for 
charges using NHS services when returning to Britain, although they are eligible for 
free medical treatment in Accident and Emergency departments of NHS hospitals. 
However, a Briton is exempt from charges if they can: produce evidence that they 
have been working abroad in a EEA country or a country with which the UK has a 
bilateral healthcare agreement for less than 5 years and have lived in the UK con-
tinuously for at least 10 years at some point, or provide evidence that they work in 
another EEA country or Switzerland and pay compulsory (not voluntary) national 
insurance in the UK.
The UK has a number of bilateral healthcare agreements with non-EEA coun-
tries. However, these agreements are based on a Briton being a lawful UK residence 
and therefore reciprocal agreements namely cover visits/tourists as opposed to 
Britons living abroad. If a Briton has lived in the UK for 10 continuous years at 
some point but are now living in an EEA member state or another state with which 
the UK has a bilateral healthcare agreement with, then under UK law they are enti-
tled to free of charge treatment (not including planned treatment).
Under the FCO customer charter, the FCO stipulates that they may help Britons 
to access medical treatment or medication if they are suffering serious medical 
problems because of serious disruptions. The FCO Customer Charter stipulates that 
the FCO can provide Britons with a list of local doctors, medical facilities and hos-
pitals in every host state. However, the FCO cannot pay for medical treatment for 
Britons living abroad and there is no policy to provide cash benefits to deal with 
health issues. The FCO have a policy of Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAM) 
which provide additional practical support to British nationals who are the victim of 
terrorist overseas; these measures may go beyond the usual help the FCO aim to 
provide and can include medical evacuation, payment of immediate medical 
expenses and repatriation. The FCO stipulate unequivocally that they do not provide 
funds for repatriation including medical repatriation outside of exceptional EAM 
measures (see above for exception for repatriation).
13 https://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/Healthcareabroad/movingabroad/Pages/Introduction.aspx
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27.3.3  Pensions
Britons retiring abroad can claim their UK state pension if they have paid enough 
UK national insurance contributions to qualify. Britons living abroad cannot access 
means-tested welfare and are therefore not eligible for pension credit. British pen-
sioners living overseas can claim their UK state pension by either contacting the 
International Pension Centre (IPC) or sending an international claim form directly 
to the IPC. The International Pension Centre provides full advice and advisors are 
on hand to issue advice on pension claims. The government provide detailed infor-
mation on how to claim UK state pension from abroad online. Furthermore, the 
Pensionary Advisory Service (TPAS) is an independent organisation grant-aided by 
the DWP that supplies free, impartial advice on UK pensions including for Britons 
residing abroad. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Custom (HMRC) – a non-ministerial 
department of the UK Government responsible for the collection of taxes, the pay-
ment of some forms of state support and the administration of other regulatory 
regimes including the national minimum wage − allows pensioners to transfer their 
UK state pension to an overseas pensions scheme if such scheme is on the recog-
nised overseas pension scheme notification list (lists for each host state pension 
scheme are available online).
Claimants may be asked to fill out a ‘life certificate’ to ensure they are eligible 
for UK state pension. Since 2013 the DWP has operated a proof of life programme 
(referred to as a Life Certificate) where state pensioners residing permanently out-
side of the UK are required to provide independent evidence in the form of a witness 
statement, confirming that the applicant is alive. The DWP sends the life certificate 
form to an applicant after they have registered with the IPC. The consulate plays no 
role in the processing of life certificates. To avoid having their pension frozen, 
claimants have 9 months to fill out and send their life certificate forms. Life certifi-
cates are not mandatory; however, in any change in circumstance (such as address 
change) claimants will need to fill and register a life certificate. There is no specific 
policy or exemptions in FCO policy for pensioners for repatriation.
The FCO advise pensioners retiring abroad to seek a State Pension Forecast from 
the DWP before emigrating. Pensioners must be within 4 months of state pension 
age to claim their pension. State pensions only increase annually if the pension 
applicant lives in the EEA, Switzerland, Gibraltar or countries that have a social 
security agreement with the UK14 (although no increases if a Briton is living in New 
Zealand or Canada).
Inflation adjustment on UK pension contributions has been a contentious issue 
amongst both British nationals and host states in terms of reciprocal social security 
agreements for a number of years. For example, in 2001 Australia terminated the 
Social Security Agreement with the UK ‘because the UK Government refuses to 
change its policy of not indexing pensions in Australia, even though it does index 
14 Barbados, Bermuda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Israel, Jamaica, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Mauritius, Montenegro, the Philippines, Serbia, Turkey and USA.
E. Consterdine
447
pensions paid in some countries with which it has Agreements’ therefore there will 
be no early access to Australia’s social security system for migrants from the UK.15 
The UK State Pension is payable overseas only uprated annually if the individual is 
resident in an EEA country or one with which the UK has a reciprocal social secu-
rity agreement requiring this. UK pensioners in other countries  – most notably 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa – have their pension frozen i.e. 
paid at the same rate as it was when they first became entitled, or the date they left 
the UK if they were already pensioners then.
The policy of not awarding increases in some countries overseas has been fol-
lowed by successive governments and continued with the introduction of the new 
State Pension in April 2016. Essentially, ‘the reason is cost and the desire to focus 
constrained resources on pensioners in the UK’ (Thurley and McInnes 2018, p. 3). 
In 2018 Pensions Minister, Guy Opperman, set out the reasons for the policy on 
uprating pensions:
There are two main reasons for not paying annual up-ratings to non-residents. First, up- 
ratings are based on levels of earnings growth and price inflation in the UK which have no 
direct relevance where the pensioner is resident overseas. Second, the cost of up-rating state 
pensions overseas in countries where we do not currently up-rate would increase immedi-
ately by over £0.5 billion per year if all pensions in payment were increased to current UK 
levels (PQ 131353, 12 March 2018 cited from Thurley and McInnes 2018, p. 3).
The All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Frozen British Pensions has lobbied 
the case for “partial uprating” – which means currently frozen pensions would be 
uprated going forward, from their current rate. It estimated the “upfront cost” of this 
at £37 million (Ibid). The arrangements to apply in EU countries in future have been 
a major subject of the negotiations on Brexit. A joint technical note on the compari-
son of EU-UK positions on citizen’s rights published on 28 September 2017 said 
both sides had committed to lifetime export of uprated pension (Thurley and 
McInnes 2018, p. 3).
27.3.4  Family-Related Benefits
Britons living abroad can get Child Benefit for children living with them within the 
EEA or Switzerland. The applicant must pay National Insurance in the UK – and 
therefore they are or were employed or self-employed – or get 1 of the following 
benefits: Contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, Incapacity Benefit, 
Contribution-based Employment and Support Allowance, State Pension, 
Bereavement Allowance (Widow’s Pension), Industrial Injuries Disablement 
Benefit. If the applicant and their partner live in different countries, then the appli-
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the child lives in will usually pay the benefit. If the benefit is more in the other 
country, that country will pay the applicant extra. Britons living abroad cannot claim 
means-tested or income-based benefits and therefore do not qualify for the Sure 
Start Maternity Grant – a one off payment of £500 for a first child.
Britons living overseas may be able to get child benefits in countries with which 
the UK has a social security agreement. Applicants are instructed to contact the 
Child Benefits Office (within HMRC) to find out if they can make a claim. The 
government provides extensive information on eligibility for child benefits for 
Britons living abroad, and the Childs Benefits Office, whilst not exclusively focused 
on Britons living overseas, provides advice on claiming child benefits including a 
dedicated phone number for overseas calls and a live webchat. As outlined, consular 
assistance is based on policy, not legal right. There is no policy to assist Britons in 
claiming UK or host family benefits, however consular assistance is discretionary 
and on a case-by-case basis depending on vulnerability.
27.3.5  Economic Hardship
There is no UK policy on ensuring that Britons residing abroad have guaranteed 
minimum resources, including in cases of homelessness. Britons residing abroad 
cannot claim any UK means-tested or income-based benefits, and therefore there 
are no guaranteed minimum income benefits available for Britons residing abroad 
from the UK government. Whilst some UK welfare entitlements can be accessed 
outside of the UK, other welfare entitlements are only applicable in host states 
where the UK has a reciprocal agreement. UK nationals can claim some contribu-
tions based state benefits (the majority are outlined above) – eligibility is varied, 
often dependent on residency, and only in countries where social security agree-
ments exist.
The FCO advice for Britons residing abroad is to contact the social security 
branch of the HMRC national insurance contributions (international services), as 
well as the DWP. Whilst consular assistance is not a legal right and there is no policy 
to assist Britons residing abroad access to guaranteed minimum resources, as con-
sular assistance is discretionary and based on vulnerability, in practice consulates 
may assist Britons in accessing information or coordinating with the DWP.  For 
example, the Spanish Embassy advices online to seek out what income-related ben-
efits are available in Spain by speaking to a social worker (trabajador social) at the 
Britons’ local town hall or to visit the nearest Instituto de Mayores y Servicios 
Sociales Office. Some embassies in host states can provide Britons in need with a 
list of legal aid organisations to help assist in their claims of economic hardship. As 
set out in the FCO customer charter, consulates will provide details of other organ-
isations in the host state that can provide specialist support where the FCO 
are unable.
The government provide information specifically for Britons residing abroad to 
claim UK welfare entitlements on their website. Aside from general guidance online 
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from the DWP, there are no other specific services offered to Britons residing abroad 
for guaranteed minimum resources.
27.4  Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown that the UK policies for its citizens abroad are charac-
terised by providing comprehensive information whilst remaining passive in its 
engagement. The British state remains disengaged with its diaspora, whilst keeping 
the dialogue open through impressive information campaigns and social media 
channels. British emigrants tend to be prosperous and migrate for lifestyle under-
pinned by voluntarism motivations and therefore there has been little incentive to 
establish social protection policies or indeed engage with its diaspora.
The UK lacks any diaspora engagement policy or social protection policies for 
its nationals residing abroad, and is therefore underpinned by a passive approach to 
its emigrants. By international standards the UK remain limited in its engagement 
strategy which is curious given that the UK has one of the largest and most widely 
dispersed overseas population of any country (Hampshire 2013 p. 303). The British 
diaspora make a large potential voting pool and is composed of high skilled, high 
income individuals who could be potential ambassadors and soft power for Britain 
across the globe (Finch et al. 2010; Hampshire 2013, p. 319). Drawing on the lim-
ited literature on the UK diaspora, scholars argue that the absence of engagement is 
due to: the lack of distinctive British national identity, the heterogeneity of the 
British diaspora meaning that forming a cohesive policy that responds to its emi-
grants is challenging, but perhaps most importantly the British diasporas’ ‘apparent 
indifference to being engaged by the government…and they do not make much use 
of such channels as to impel politicians to represent their interests’ (Hampshire 
2013, p. 319–21).
Government’s efforts to engage with its diaspora are solely through online infor-
mation campaigns and social media as part of the FCO digital first strategy (Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2014). This being said, the FCO have made headways in recent 
years in ensuring online information for Britons travelling or moving abroad is up- 
to- date, that social media is engaging and responsive, and that government websites 
detailing advice for Britons moving abroad are extensive and comprehensive. 
Consulates are responsive to the needs of British nationals if and when needed and 
the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded on consular services in 2014 that
The Consular Service has responded with a “strategic shift” to provide a more standardised 
and professional service, with greater clarity on what it can and cannot provide, and a new 
focus on the most vulnerable. This has resulted in some welcome innovations, such as 
global call centres to remove the pressure from consular officers (Foreign Affairs Committee 
2014 p. 3).
Conversely, the politics of British emigrants is relatively high on the political 
agenda, in the sense that ongoing Brexit negotiations are likely to have a significant 
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impact on Britons residing in the EU, and their entitlement and access to social 
protection in EU host states. Many Britons resident in the EU are aggrieved at the 
both the result of the referendum, and the 15-year time limit voting rule that pre-
vented many Britons from being able to vote on an issue that affects them so signifi-
cantly. With the VFL Bill killed at the report stage in 2019, the 15-year residency 
rule looks set to remain. Divisive Brexit politics means it is likely that the 15-year 
rule will continue to be contentious, and that the government through its consulate 
services will need to be more consistently engaged with Britons concerned over 
their residency status and social protection rights in the EU. Whilst pension increases 
for Britons residing in the EU has been confirmed and is unlikely to be a sticking 
point in negotiations, the outcome of agreements are bound to affect social protec-
tion rights for Britons in the EU.
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